From a photograph by Brady]

Judge Usher, Lincoln's Secretary of the Interior, says, "Chief among his

great characteristics were his gentleness and humanity, and yet he did

not hesitate promptly to approve the sentences of Kennedy and Beall.

During the entire war there are but few other evidences to be found of a

willingness on his part that any one should suffer the penalty of death.

His great effort seemed to be to find some excuse, some palliation for

offences charged. He strove at all times to relieve the citizens on both

sides of the inconveniences and hardships resulting from the war. It has

often been reported that Secretary of War Stanton arbitrarily refused to

carry out his orders. In all such cases reported it will be found that

the President had given directions to him to issue permits to persons

who had applied to go through the lines into the insurgent districts.

The President said at one time, referring to Stanton's refusal to

issue the permits and the severe remarks made by the persons who were

disobliged,--

"'I cannot always know whether a permit ought to be granted, and I want

to oblige everybody when I can, and Stanton and I have an understanding

that if I send an order to him that cannot be consistently granted, he

is to refuse it, which he sometimes does; and that led to a remark which

I made the other day to a man who complained of Stanton, that I hadn't

much influence with this administration, but expected to have more with

the next.'"

Mr. George W. Julian, a Representative in Congress, said, "I called on

the President respecting the appointments I had recommended under the

conscription law, and took occasion to refer to the failure of General

Frémont to get a command. He said he did not know where to place him,

and that it reminded him of the old man who advised his son to take a

wife, to which the young man responded, 'Whose wife shall I take?'

"At another time," said Mr. Julian, "a committee of Western men, headed

by Mr. Lovejoy, procured from the President an important order looking

to the exchange of Eastern and Western soldiers, with a view to more

effective work. Repairing to the office of the Secretary, Mr. Lovejoy

explained the scheme, as he had done before the President, but was met

by a flat refusal.

"'But we have the President's order, sir,' said Lovejoy.

"'Did Lincoln give you an order of that kind?' said Stanton.

"'He did, sir.'

"'Then he is a d--d fool,' said the irate Secretary.

"'Do you mean to say the President is a d--d fool?' asked Lovejoy in

amazement.

"'Yes, sir, if he gave you such an order as that.'

"The bewildered Congressman from Illinois betook himself at once to the

President and related the result of his conference.

"'Did Stanton say I was a d--d fool?' asked Lincoln, at the close of the

recital.

"'He did, sir, and repeated it.'

"After a moment's pause, and looking up, the President said,--

"'If Stanton said I was a d--d fool, then I must be one, for he is

nearly always right, and generally says what he means. I will step over

and see him.'"

Mr. Stanton was entirely without a sense of humor, and was the only

member of the Cabinet who could not tolerate and could never understand

Lincoln's stories and the reasons for his frequent resort to comic

anecdotes and books of humor to relieve his mind from anxiety and the

terrible strain that was always upon him. He never told a story himself,

and would not waste his time listening to stories from others. With

his unsympathetic disposition and nerveless constitution he could not

understand the need of relaxation, and his serious mind regarded with

disapproval and even contempt the simple remedies which the President

applied as relief to his anxieties and care. Charles A. Dana, who was

Mr. Stanton's assistant in the War Department, referring to this fact in

his reminiscences, says,--

"The political struggle (November, 1864) had been most intense, and the

interest taken in it, both in the White House and in the War Department,

had been almost painful. I went over to the War Department about

half-past eight in the evening and found the President and Mr. Stanton

together in the Secretary's office. General Eckert, who then had charge

of the telegraph department of the War Office, was coming in continually

with telegrams containing election returns. Mr. Stanton would read them

and the President would look at them and comment upon them. Presently

there came a lull in the returns, and Mr. Lincoln called me up to a

place by his side.

"'Dana,' said he, 'have you ever read any of the writings of Petroleum

V. Nasby?'

"'No, sir,' I said. 'I have only looked at some of them, and they seemed

to me quite funny.'

"'Well,' said he, 'let me read you a specimen,' and, pulling out a thin

yellow-covered pamphlet from his breast-pocket, he began to read aloud.

Mr. Stanton viewed this proceeding with great impatience, as I could

see, but Mr. Lincoln paid no attention to that. He would read a page or

a story, pause to con a new election telegram, and then open the book

again and go ahead with a new passage. Finally Mr. Chase came in and

presently Mr. Whitelaw Reid, and then the reading was interrupted. Mr.

Stanton went to the door and beckoned me into the next room. I shall

never forget the fire of his indignation at what seemed to him to be

mere nonsense. The idea that when the safety of the republic was thus

at issue, when the control of an empire was to be determined by a few

figures brought in by the telegraph, the leader, the man most deeply

concerned, not merely for himself but for his country, could turn aside

to read such balderdash and to laugh at such frivolous jests, was to his

mind something most repugnant and damnable. He could not understand,

apparently, that it was by the relief which these jests afforded to the

strain of mind under which Lincoln had so long been living and to the

natural gloom of a melancholy and desponding temperament--this was Mr.

Lincoln's prevailing characteristic--that the safety and sanity of his

intelligence were maintained and preserved."

VI

A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND HIS GENERALS

When President Lincoln, confronted by the infirmities and incapacity

of General Scott and the jealousy and rivalry of the younger officers

of the army, was compelled to assume the direction of the conduct of

the war, he was entirely ignorant of military affairs, except for the

experience he had gained in his youth during the Black Hawk War, which,

however, was more of a frontier frolic than a serious campaign. His own

account of it is found in the autobiography he furnished to the press

after his nomination to the Presidency:

"Abraham joined a volunteer company, and to his own surprise was elected

captain of it. He says he has not since had any success in life which

gave him so much satisfaction. He went into the campaign, served nearly

three months, met the ordinary hardships of such an expedition, but was

in no battle."

We know from others that Lincoln was one of the first to enlist, and

that it was something besides ambition which led him to seek the

captaincy of his company. During his first year in Illinois he worked

for a time in a saw-mill run by a man named Kirkpatrick, who promised

to buy him a cant-hook with which to move heavy logs. Lincoln offered

to move the logs with his own common handspike, provided Kirkpatrick

would give him in cash the two dollars which a cant-hook would cost.

Kirkpatrick agreed to do so, but never did, and Lincoln always bore him

a grudge. When the volunteers from Sangamon County assembled on the

green to elect their officers, Lincoln discovered that Kirkpatrick was

the only candidate for captain, and remarked to his friend and neighbor,

Green,--

"Bill, I believe I can make Kirkpatrick pay me that two dollars he owes

me on the cant-hook or I'll run against him for captain."

So he and Green began immediately to "hustle" for votes, and when the

order was given for the men to assemble at the side of their favorite

candidate for captain, three-fourths of them came to Lincoln, and he led

them over the prairies and through the wilderness to the rendezvous. He

had no knowledge of military tactics and did not even know the order

to give. He used to describe his blunders with great amusement, and

one that he enjoyed particularly was a device to get his men through

a gate-way into an enclosure. They were marching across a field four

abreast, and Lincoln could not remember the proper command for changing

them into single file, "or getting the company through the gate

endwise," as he described it. "So, as we came near the gate, I shouted,

'The company is dismissed for two minutes, when it will fall in again on

the other side of the gate.'"

This ingenuity did not save him from disgrace on other occasions, and

once he was severely punished by being deprived of his sword on account

of a violation of discipline. But these punishments did not seem to

diminish the respect in which he was held by his company. They were

proud of his wit, his strength, and his learning, and throughout their

lives they remained devotedly attached to him because of his personal

qualities. One day an Indian fugitive took refuge in the camp, and the

soldier frontiersmen, with more or less experience of the treachery and

cruelty of the savage, saw no reason why they should not put him out

of the way at once, especially as they had come out to kill Indians;

but Lincoln's humanity and sense of justice revolted at the murder of a

helpless savage, and, at the risk of his life, he defied the entire camp

and saved the Indian.

At the end of their term of service his company was mustered out, and

most of the volunteers, seeing no prospect of glory or profit, started

towards home; but Captain Lincoln re-enlisted the same day as a private,

and often spoke of the satisfaction he felt when relieved of the

responsibility of command. He served through the campaign. He was the

strongest man in the army and the best wrestler, with the exception of a

man named Thompson, who once threw him on the turf.

Black Hawk was captured through the treachery of his allies. Lincoln's

battalion was mustered out at Whitewater, Wisconsin, by Lieutenant

Robert Anderson, who, twenty-nine years later, was to stand with him

as the most interesting figure upon the national stage. A story that

Lincoln was mustered into the service by Jefferson Davis has been widely

published. It was a natural mistake, however, because Davis, then a

lieutenant in the army, was stationed at a fort near Rock Island, but

during the summer of the Black Hawk War he was on leave of absence

and did not join his regiment until long after the Sangamon County

volunteers had returned to their homes. However, Lincoln was to see and

meet several interesting characters, including Colonel Zachary Taylor,

whom he afterwards supported for President, General Winfield Scott,

another Whig candidate for the Presidency and the commander of the

army at the beginning of his administration, Lieutenant Albert Sidney

Johnston, afterwards a Confederate general, and others of fame.

Lincoln never permitted any one to call him "captain," and when in

Congress in 1848 he made a political speech in which he ridiculed

the efforts of the friends of General Cass to obtain some political

advantage from that eminent gentleman's services in a similar capacity.

He said,--

"If General Cass went in advance of me picking whortleberries, I guess

I surpassed him in charges on the wild onions. If he saw any live,

fighting Indians, it was more than I did, but I had a good many bloody

struggles with the mosquitoes; and although I never fainted from loss

of blood, I can truly say I was often very hungry. If ever I should

conclude to doff whatever our Democratic friends may suppose there is

of black-cockade Federalism about me, and thereupon they shall take me

up as their candidate for the Presidency, I protest that they shall not

make fun of me, as they have of General Cass, by attempting to write me

into a military hero."

When compelled to supervise the enlisting and equipment of a great army

and plan campaigns that were to determine the destiny and the happiness

and prosperity of the people, he was entirely without preparation or

technical knowledge of the science of war, and could only rely upon his

common sense and apply to military affairs the experience he had gained

in politics. His talent developed rapidly, however, until he became

recognized as the ablest strategist of the war, not excepting Grant or

Sherman. His correspondence with his generals, his memoranda concerning

the movements of troops, his instructions to the Secretary of War, the

plans he suggested, and the comments and criticisms he made upon those

of others indicate the possession of a military genius which in actual

service would have given him a high reputation. In times of crisis his

generals found him calm and resourceful; in great emergencies he was

prompt, cool, and clear-sighted; and under the shock of defeat he was

brave, strong, and hopeful.

Soon after his inauguration he began to realize the magnitude of

the struggle and the responsibilities which rested upon him. He was

convinced that the government was in the right, but determined that

there should be no mistake on this point; therefore he gave the South

every liberty and indulgence that could possibly be granted. He

determined that the "overt act" should be committed by the South, that

there should be no excuse to accuse the government of "invasion" or an

attempt at "subjugation," and for that reason he delayed the attempt

to reinforce and provision Fort Sumter. When the public understood the

moral issues involved he gave the order, because he knew that he would

be supported by a united North. In his inaugural address he said, "In

your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the

momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. You

can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors." And that

solemn pledge he endeavored to fulfil even at the risk of Northern

criticism and the loss of the military posts at Charleston and other

points in the South.

It was a disheartening and almost impossible situation for the new

administration. President Lincoln and General Scott were left almost

entirely dependent upon strangers and men of no experience who had

been appointed for political reasons rather than for capacity or

knowledge. Nearly all the trained officers of the army resigned as

fast as their native States seceded; officers of Northern birth and

sympathies had been sent to distant posts so that they could not

interfere with the treasonable designs of Secretary Floyd during the

Buchanan administration. Confusion, corruption, and complications were

unavoidable, and caused the President unutterable anxiety and distress.

Ignorance and zeal often provoked more trouble than could be corrected,

and jealousy, rivalry, and partisanship made matters worse.

The political problems alone would have been as great a load as mortal

man might have been expected to carry, but his perplexities were

increased, his time occupied, and his patience sorely tested by such

an undignified and unpatriotic clamor for offices as has never been

exceeded in the history of our government. The Democratic party had

been in power for many years. Every position in the gift of President

Buchanan had been filled with a Democrat, many of them Southern

sympathizers, and now hordes of hungry Republicans besieged the White

House demanding appointments. The situation was described by the

President in a single ejaculation. A Senator who noticed an expression

of anxiety and dejection upon his face, inquired,--

"Has anything gone wrong, Mr. President? Have you heard bad news from

Fort Sumter?"

"No," answered the President, solemnly. "It's the post-office at

Jonesville, Missouri."

The area of the country was vast; the seat of war stretched from the

Atlantic to the Missouri River, with a strip of States undecided

in their purpose which must be carefully handled to prevent them

from joining the Confederacy. With inexperienced and incompetent

commanders, a divided Cabinet, public clamor dinning in his ears, and

his mind harassed by other cares and perplexities, it was difficult to

develop a military policy and plan a campaign for the suppression of

the rebellion. Even if the situation had been divested of political

significance, it would have taxed the genius of a Napoleon. The coast

line to be protected was more than three thousand six hundred miles

long, the frontier line was nearly eight thousand miles, and the

field of operation covered an area larger than the whole of Europe.

Furthermore, it was a political war, and everything must be planned

with a view to political consequences. It was not a struggle between

rival powers, nor for conquest, but for the preservation of the Union,

and from the beginning President Lincoln appreciated that the common

interests and the general welfare required that the integrity of the

country be preserved with as little loss and as little punishment as

possible to either side. Whatever damage was done must be repaired at

the end by a reunited country; whatever was destroyed was a common loss.

The war was a family affair, in which the sufferings and sorrows and

material losses must be equally shared. With all these considerations

in his mind, he undertook to guide the government in such a way as to

prevent the dissolution of the Union and at the same time accomplish

the overthrow of the slave power and the removal of that curse from the

American people.

General Scott, like General Sherman, had accurately measured the

requirements of the situation. Their experience and military instincts

taught them that it was to be a long and a tedious struggle, and they

urged deliberation and preparation as absolutely necessary to success.

But, when General Sherman's opinion was made public, he was called a

lunatic, and General Scott's practical plan of military operations

was defeated by public ridicule. General Sherman demanded two hundred

thousand men before attempting a campaign in the Mississippi Valley.

General Scott called for only one hundred thousand men, but said they

would be required for three years, and advised that they be distributed

among ten or fifteen healthy camps for four months until they could be

organized, drilled, and acclimated; then, after the navy had blockaded

the harbors of the Southern coast, he proposed to move his army down

both banks of the Mississippi River, establishing strong posts at

frequent intervals to protect that stream until New Orleans was captured

and occupied; he then proposed to move his army gradually eastward from

the Mississippi and southward from the Potomac, slowly closing in upon

the Confederacy until its military power was paralyzed. Notwithstanding

the sorrows and anxieties of the North, the people howled with derision

at this thorough, practical plan of the old veteran. The comic papers

took it up and published cartoons representing a monster serpent with

General Scott's head, coiled around the cotton States, and they called

it "Scott's Anaconda." In the same breath they demanded a battle. "On to

Richmond," they cried, and President Lincoln yielded to the clamor. The

battle of Bull Run was fought, with its disastrous consequences. The

lesson was valuable, as it taught the President that public opinion was

not a safe guide to follow in military operations.

It must be remembered that in the midst of the most appalling situation

in American history Lincoln stood practically alone because of a divided

Cabinet and the age and infirmities of General Scott, then seventy-five

years old, quite feeble in body and irritable of temper. The President

had great respect for him and confidence in his patriotism and military

judgment. He had supported Scott for President in 1852, had been in

correspondence with him before the inauguration, and had encouraged him

in his futile efforts to check the treasonable transactions of Secretary

Floyd and other conspirators; but he soon discovered that the venerable

warrior was in no condition to perform labor or assume responsibility.

Yet he was reluctant to do anything to wound his pride or reflect upon

his present ability. This increased the embarrassment and difficulties

of the situation. General Scott recognized and appreciated Lincoln's

consideration, but refused to resign or retire until finally driven from

his post by McClellan.

At the White House, shortly after the battle of Bull Run, the old

veteran, after listening to criticisms directed at the President for

permitting the Union army to suffer defeat, broke out in his wrath,--

"Sir, I am the greatest coward in America. I will prove it. I fought

this battle, sir, against my judgment; I think the President of the

United States ought to remove me to-day for doing it. As God is my

judge, after my superiors had determined to fight it, I did all in my

power to make the army efficient. I deserve removal because I did not

stand up when my army was not in a condition for fighting and resist to

the last."

"Your conversation seems to imply that I forced you to fight this

battle," suggested the President.

"I have never served a President who has been kinder to me than you

have been," replied the general, avoiding the question.

The battle of Bull Run was fought to gratify the politicians. It was

the only time the President yielded to public clamor, and he always

regretted it. It was a political movement. When he assembled a council

of war five days previous, the commanders declared that they had force

enough to overcome the enemy; but General Scott was positive that such

a victory could not be decisive, and advised a postponement of active

hostilities for a few months until the army could be placed in a better

condition. The Cabinet and the military committees of Congress feared

that public sentiment in the North would not consent to the delay, and

that the Confederate leaders would make such good use of it that the

results of an offensive movement would be more doubtful then than now,

hence an order for the advance was given. The President did not rebuke

General Scott for his indignant outbreak, because he felt that his words

were true.

The President suffered great anxiety during that eventful Sunday, but

exhibited his usual self-control, and attended church with Mrs. Lincoln.

After his noon dinner he walked over to the head-quarters of the army,

where he found General Scott taking a nap, and woke him up to ask his

opinion. The old gentleman was not only hopeful but confident, for one

of his aides had arrived with a report that General McDowell was driving

everything before him. The President's mind was relieved and about four

o'clock he went out to drive. At six o'clock Secretary Seward staggered

over the threshold of the White House and nervously asked for the

President. When told that he was driving, he whispered to the private

secretary,--

"Tell no one, but the battle is lost; McDowell is in full retreat, and

calls on General Scott to save the capital."

When the President drove up to the portico a few minutes later he

listened in silence to the message, but his head hung low as he crossed

the White House grounds to head-quarters. There the disaster was

confirmed, and he conferred long and anxiously with General Scott and

Secretary Cameron as to the next duty. Towards midnight he returned to

the White House and heard the accounts of members of Congress and others

who had gone out to witness the battle. His long frame lay listlessly

upon a couch, but his mind was active, his calmness and resolution had

not been disturbed, and before he slept that night he had planned the

reorganization of the army, and from that time undertook the direction

of military as well as civil and diplomatic affairs; consulting freely

with Senators and Representatives and officers of the army as he did

with his constitutional advisers, but relying upon his own judgment more

and more.

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