inaugural address to his future Secretary of State, and the latter
revised it in such a vigorous and arrogant manner that the unfavorable
impression was deepened. Mr. Seward was always at hand to offer advice
and give directions upon every subject. Lincoln listened with respectful
attention, but continued to exercise his own judgment, and the spirit
of independence he showed concerning several matters which Mr. Seward
undertook to decide for him so alarmed the latter that two days before
the inauguration he wrote a polite note asking leave to withdraw his
acceptance of the office of Secretary of State. The note was received
on Saturday. Any other man but Lincoln would have been disconcerted, at
least, and would have immediately sought advice and assistance; but he
did not mention the matter to any one, nor did he make any reply until
Monday morning. Then, while waiting at Willard's Hotel for President
Buchanan to escort him to the Capitol, he dictated a brief note, saying,
"I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the withdrawal.
The public interest, I think, demands that you should, and my personal
feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direction."
He handed the note to Mr. Nicolay, saying, "I can't afford to let Seward
take the first trick."
After the return of the inaugural procession to the White House the two
men had a long and confidential talk. No one knows what they said to
each other, but Mr. Seward accepted the office and his nomination was
sent to the Senate the next morning.
Mr. Seward at once assumed that he was Prime Minister with independent
and autocratic powers. He sent agents upon secret missions, he indicated
to his visitors the policy of the administration,--and made pledges on
behalf of the President without consulting him. He opened negotiations
with the secession leaders upon his own responsibility. He issued orders
to officers of the army and navy over the heads of his associates in
charge of those departments, and gave assurances to the representatives
of foreign governments without the approval or even the knowledge of the
President. He seemed cheerfully to assume responsibility for the entire
government, and did not hesitate to permit the official representatives
of the Southern States and the public generally to presume that he and
not Lincoln was the highest and final authority. He even attempted to
deceive his wife on this subject. "I will try to save freedom and my
country," he wrote her. "I have assumed a sort of dictatorship.... It
seems to me if I am absent only eight days, this administration, the
Congress and the District would fall into consternation and despair....
I am the only hopeful, calm, and conciliatory person here...." Again he
writes, "Only the soothing words which I have spoken have saved us and
carried us along thus far. And still again the cares chiefly fall on me."
Secretary Welles wrote a book to describe the controversies between
Mr. Seward and the rest of the Cabinet, in which he shows a good deal
of resentment but a good deal of truth. Mr. Seward's moral perceptions
were obscured by the responsibilities and power that had been assumed
by him. Although he did not suspect it, he was gradually drifting into
a collision with a stronger character than his own, and but for the
magnanimity and generous nature of the President, his political career
might have been swallowed up in his vanity and arrogance.
[Illustration: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, SECRETARY OF STATE
From a photograph by Brady]
Upon April 1, after the new administration had been in control for
a little more than three weeks, under the title "Some Thoughts for
the President's Consideration," he submitted the most extraordinary
proposition that appears among the archives of the Department of State.
Assuming that he, and not Lincoln, was responsible for the conduct of
the administration and the management of the government; writing as if
he were the Prime Minister and Lincoln an impotent king; he laid down
his plan of action and the line of policy he intended to pursue. He
proposed that Lincoln should practically relinquish his Presidential
responsibilities and authority; that he should repudiate the party that
had elected him; that he should ignore the principles upon which the
Presidential campaign had been fought and surrender the moral triumph
of the victory; that he should convene Congress and declare war against
Great Britain, Russia, France, and Spain, and endeavor to negotiate
for an offensive and defensive alliance with Canada, Mexico, and Central
America against Europe. The following is the text:
"SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION, APRIL 1,
1861.
"_First._ We are at the end of a month's administration, and
yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.
"_Second._ This, however, is not culpable, and it has even
been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to
meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to
other and more grave matters.
"_Third._ But further delay to adopt and prosecute our
policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only
bring scandal on the administration, but danger upon the country.
"_Fourth._ To do this we must dismiss the applicants for
office. But how? I suggest that we make the local appointments
forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and
occasional action.
"_Fifth._ The policy at home. I am aware that my views are
singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is
built upon this idea as a ruling one,--namely, that we must
"CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON
SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION:
"In other words, from what would be regarded as a party
question, to one of patriotism or union.
"The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not
in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness
the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and
even by the Union men in the South.
"I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for
changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last
administration created the necessity.
"For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and re-enforce
all the ports in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from
foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island
of Key West under martial law.
"This will raise distinctly the question of union or
disunion. I would maintain every fort and possession in the
South.
"FOR FOREIGN NATIONS.
"I would demand explanations from Spain and France,
categorically, at once.
"I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia,
and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to
rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this
continent against European intervention.
"And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from
Spain and France,
"Would convene Congress and declare war against them.
"But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic
prosecution of it.
"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue
and direct it incessantly.
"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the
while active in it, or
"Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted,
debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.
"It is not my especial province; but I neither seek to evade
nor assume responsibility."
It is impossible for any one to conceive the feelings of the President
when he read this boastful and insolent document. But his self-control
was so perfect, his anxiety to preserve harmony among those who were
trying to save the Union was so great, and his patience so limitless
that he returned the memorandum to Mr. Seward with the following firm
and conclusive but courteous rebuke, and the subject was never alluded
to again by either of them:
"EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1861.
"HON. W. H. SEWARD.
"MY DEAR SIR: Since parting with you, I have been
considering your paper dated this day, and entitled 'Some
Thoughts for the President's Consideration.' The first
proposition in it is, '_First._ We are at the end of a month's
administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or
foreign.'
"At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said,
'The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and
possess the property and places belonging to the government,
and to collect the duties and imposts.' This had your distinct
approval at the time; and taken in connection with the order I
immediately gave General Scott, directing him to employ every
means in his power to strengthen and hold the forts, comprises
the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single
exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.
"Again, I do not perceive how the reinforcement of Fort
Sumter would be done on a slavery or party issue, while that of
Fort Pickens would be on a more national and patriotic one.
"The news received yesterday in regard to San Domingo
certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign
policy; but up to that time we have been preparing circulars and
instructions to ministers and the like, all in perfect harmony,
without even a suggestion that we had no foreign policy.
"Upon your closing proposition--that 'whatever policy we
adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.
"'For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue
and direct it incessantly.
"'Either the President must do it himself, and be all the
while active in it, or
"'Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted,
debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.'--I remark
that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line
of policy is adopted, I apprehend that there is no danger of
its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a
subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its
progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice
of all the Cabinet.
"Your obedient servant,
"A. LINCOLN."
The President never revealed this amazing incident to anybody but Mr.
Nicolay, and it was never suspected by any member of his Cabinet until
the correspondence was published by Nicolay and Hay in the _Century
Magazine_, nearly thirty years after. Mr. Seward recognized his master
at last and wrote his wife, "Executive force and vigor are rare
qualities. The President is the best of us."
From that time there were no serious differences between the President
and his Secretary of State, although they frequently differed upon
matters of policy as well as details of administration. Mr. Seward was
loyal, devoted, and always respectful to his chief.
The same cannot be said of Secretary Chase. He also had been a rival
of Lincoln for the Presidential nomination in 1860, and had gone into
the Cabinet feeling that his supporters from Ohio had made Lincoln's
nomination possible and that he was entitled to special consideration
for that reason. He supported Lincoln cordially through the campaign,
and among the first telegrams of congratulation received by the
President-elect was one from him which read, "I congratulate you and
thank God. The great object of my wishes and labors for nineteen years
is accomplished in the overthrow of the slave power. The space is
now clear for the establishment of the policy of freedom on safe and
firm grounds. The lead is yours. The responsibility is great. May God
strengthen you for your great duties."
After January 1 following the election, Mr. Chase was invited to
Springfield, and upon his arrival the President-elect waived all
ceremony and called upon him at his hotel. "I have done with you,"
said he, "what I would not have ventured to do with any other man in
the country,--sent for you to ask you whether you will accept the
appointment of Secretary of the Treasury without, however, being exactly
prepared to offer it to you." Concerning this conversation Mr. Chase
wrote to a friend as follows:
"He said he had felt bound to offer the position of Secretary of State
to Mr. Seward as the generally recognized leader of the Republican
party, intending, if he declined it, to offer it to me. He did not wish
that Mr. Seward should decline it, and was glad that he had accepted,
and now desired to have me take the place of Secretary of the Treasury."
Mr. Chase told the President-elect that he was not prepared to give
a definite answer because he wanted to ask the advice of friends and
be governed by the course of events. He valued the trust and its
opportunities, but was reluctant to leave the Senate. No further
communication took place between the two on the subject; but, assuming
that Mr. Chase had accepted, Lincoln sent his name to the Senate on
March 5 with those of other members of his Cabinet.
From the beginning of the administration Mr. Chase advocated a radical
policy; was very urgent in advocating the relief of Fort Sumter and
pushing the war, while Seward hung back. Mr. Chase's policy was
presented in a memorandum, with similar ones from other members of the
Cabinet, at the request of the President, in March, and reads as follows:
"If war is to be the consequence of an attempt to provision Fort
Sumter, war will just as certainly result from the attempt to maintain
possession of Fort Pickens.
"I am clearly in favor of maintaining Fort Pickens and just as clearly
in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter. If that attempt should be resisted
by military force, Fort Sumter should, in my judgment, be reinforced.
"If war is to be the result, I perceive no reason why it may not be
best begun by military resistance to the efforts of the administration
to sustain troops of the Union, stationed under the authority of the
government, in a fort of the Union, in the ordinary course of service."
[Illustration: GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN AT THE HEAD-QUARTERS OF
GENERAL MORRELL'S BRIGADE, MINOR'S HILL, VIRGINIA
From a photograph by M. B. Brady]
In the beginning Mr. Chase was a very strong supporter of General
McClellan and frequently called the attention of the latter to his
obligations to him. "The country was indebted to me," he wrote
McClellan, "in some considerable degree for the change of your
commission from Ohio into a commission of major-general of the army
of the Union;" and he wrote a friend the good news, "McClellan is
Commander-in-Chief! let us thank God and take courage!" but this was
his habit. He invariably worshipped the rising sun, and was usually
one of the first to turn his back upon old friends when they met
with misfortunes. He usually cultivated the closest relations with
those generals who had grievances against the administration. His
correspondence and his diary, as published by his chosen biographer, are
full of caustic and unkind criticisms of his chief. He received many
letters containing violent abuse of the President and his colleagues
in the government, and neither defended them nor rebuked the writers.
He records in his diary a conversation with an officer who, meeting
him, the Secretary of the Treasury, for the first time, was rude enough
to utter a gross insult directed at the President. In his comments
Mr. Chase seems to approve the remarks, and describes the President's
assailant as "well read and extremely intelligent." But Mr. Chase
never defended his colleagues when they were attacked. In reply to a
violent criticism from an enemy of the administration, he wrote, "I am
not responsible for the management of the war and have no voice in it,
except that I am not forbidden to make suggestions, and do so now and
then when I can't help it."
He soon lost his confidence in and admiration for McClellan, however,
and in his criticisms concerning his dilatory tactics was the most
bitter of all the Cabinet. He once drew up a paper, which he induced
several of his colleagues to sign, demanding McClellan's removal. He
continually offered advice and suggestions, and when they were not
accepted he usually took the trouble to record his resentment in his
diary or to express it in vigorous terms in a letter to some friend.
Chase was in favor of the unconditional emancipation of the slaves, and
when the President laid before the Cabinet the Emancipation Proclamation
he writes in his diary, "I said that I should give to such a measure my
cordial support, but I should prefer that no expression on the subject
of compensation should be made, and I thought that the measure of
emancipation could be better and more quickly accomplished by allowing
generals to organize and arm the slaves and by directing the commanders
of departments to proclaim emancipation within their districts as soon
as practicable. But I regarded this as so much better than inaction on
the subject that I could give it my entire support."
The President was not unaware of the disposition of Mr. Seward to
criticise himself and the members of his Cabinet, but placed so high
a value upon his ability and his importance to the government that he
treated him with the same patience that he did Mr. Stanton and others
who were critical and petulant concerning his deliberation and other
peculiarities. The extent to which this forbearance was exercised may
be illustrated by a note addressed to the President by his Secretary of
the Treasury, April 25, 1861, in which the latter was guilty of such
bad taste and impertinence that Lincoln would have been justified in
asking his instant resignation. Mr. Chase held the President practically
responsible for the demoralized condition of affairs in the country and
for all that had happened before his inauguration as well as since,
and said, "Let me beg of you to remember that the disunionists have
anticipated us in everything, and that as yet we have accomplished
nothing but the destruction of our own property. Let me beg of you to
remember also that it has been a darling object with the disunionists to
secure the passage of a secession ordinance by Maryland.... Save us from
this new humiliation. You alone can give the word."
Mr. Chase was in consultation with the President daily, he had been
consulted about every situation and movement, he was quite as familiar
with what had been done and what was intended as the President himself,
and the reasons which prompted him to address his chief in such a manner
can only be conjectured. It is believed that he was prompted to do so
by one of the many hostile critics of the administration, and wrote the
letter without realizing its tone and impertinence. But Lincoln received
it with his usual complacency, made no complaint to any one about it,
and calmly filed it away among his other correspondence.
Like Mr. Seward, he went into the Cabinet with the opinion that the
President was incapable and inexperienced, and that it was his duty to
support and assist him in the management of the government; but, unlike
Mr. Seward, he was never able to rid himself of a sense of his own
superiority. He had an honest conviction that he was more competent and
would make a much better President himself, and that if his advice were
accepted and his suggestions carried out, the war would be brought to a
close much sooner than otherwise. He lacked confidence in his colleagues
also and never lost an opportunity to express it. He considered himself
their superior in zeal, ability, and devotion to the general welfare.
He imagined that every disaster which occurred in the field was due to
the refusal of the President and the Secretary of War to carry out the
plans he suggested, and that every victory could be directly attributed
to his wise counsel. This was not known at the time. Had it been, the
people of the country would have been less charitable towards Mr. Chase.
His egotism, jealousy, contempt, and hostility towards Lincoln and
his fellow-members of the Cabinet were not fully disclosed until the
publication of his biography, which contained extracts from his diary
and copies of his voluminous correspondence.
The President would not allow the conduct or the disposition of
his Secretary of the Treasury to make the slightest difference
in his treatment of that official or to affect the policy of his
administration, for in his management of the finances, without previous
experience or preparation, Mr. Chase had shown genius equal to that
of Alexander Hamilton, unswerving integrity, and untiring industry.
So highly did Lincoln esteem his public services in this respect that
he would have forgiven him anything; and Mr. Chase not only had his
constant support, but he was less interfered with in the administration
of his department than any other member of the Cabinet.
Mr. Chase began a serious and systematic canvass for the Presidential
nomination as early as the fall of 1863, and although he continued
to delude himself and assure his friends that he was indifferent to
advancement and anxious only for the public good, he found plenty of
leisure in the midst of his arduous duties and immense responsibilities
to write hundreds of letters to friends in different parts of the Union
pointing out the mistakes of the President and leaving the irresistible
conclusion that he was the only man capable of saving the country. Many
of these letters are published in his biography, and it is inexplicable
that he preserved the documentary evidence of his treachery, and even
more remarkable that his family thus exposed him to public censure and
contempt.
Although Lincoln had the full confidence of the loyal people of the
North, many disappointed politicians and other citizens in different
parts of the country were dissatisfied with his management of affairs.
The critics naturally gravitated together and sought to organize a
movement to prevent his renomination. They found it difficult to contend
against the popularity of the President, and looked among the discordant
elements for a standard-bearer. Neither in Congress nor in the army
was there any one who was willing to undertake the hopeless task until
some of the leaders consulted Mr. Chase and, to their surprise, found
him so indiscreet and disloyal as to encourage their opposition to the
administration of which he was a member, and so foolish as to believe
that he was strong enough to lead them to victory.
Mr. Chase fell willingly into the trap, although he continued to protest
his loyalty and attachment to Lincoln. His only excuse was that the
President's intellect and capacity for government were inferior to his
own, and in its great emergency his beloved country needed the strongest
man. He wrote his son-in-law, Governor Sprague, of Rhode Island, "If
I were controlled by merely personal sentiments I would prefer the
re-election of Mr. Lincoln to that of any other man, but I think a man
of different qualities from those the President has will be needed for
the next four years."
President Lincoln was fully informed concerning every movement Mr. Chase
made, for the latter was surrounded by false friends who were willing
to destroy him. However, he rebuked the tale-bearers and discouraged all
conversation concerning the ambition of his Secretary of the Treasury,
and when the criticisms uttered by Mr. Chase of himself and the members
of his Cabinet were brought to his attention, he declined to listen to
them.
"I have determined," he said, "to shut my eyes so far as possible to
everything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a good Secretary and I shall
keep him where he is. If he becomes President, all right. I hope
we may never have a worse man. I am entirely indifferent as to his
success or failure in these schemes as long as he does his duty at the
head of the Treasury Department." He appointed Chase's partisans and
wire-pullers to office as fast as the latter proposed them, although
he knew perfectly well what he was doing. He was more amused than
otherwise at the protestations of his own friends; but all the time he
was conscious that he had every reason for magnanimity. With his usual
political perspicuity, he was perfectly confident of his own nomination
and re-election, and recognized that Chase was daily making mistakes
that were fatal to his own political prospects. He endeavored to conceal
his knowledge, and avoided explanations from his Secretary of the
Treasury until the publication of a secret circular in the Washington
newspapers signed by Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas, compelled Mr. Chase to
allude to the subject. It was a spiteful, unjust, and untruthful attack
upon the President, and proposed the nomination of Mr. Chase as his
successor, appealing to patriotic citizens to organize in his support
and correspond with the chairman of his committee.