CHAPTER III

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CHESS STRATEGY

In bringing the teachings of this book under the collective

heading “Chess Strategy,” it was not in any way my intention to

draw anything like an exact parallel between the manœuvres on

the chess-board and military operations in actual warfare. In

trying to seek such analogies there is great danger of being led

astray, and little likelihood of gaining knowledge that might be

of use in practical play. Plain common-sense will give us all we

need, without our being influenced by those tactical and

strategical considerations that have been found useful in war.

The following definition may not be out of place: Strategy sets

down the whole of the problems which must be solved in war, in

order to attain the ultimate result aimed at; tactics solve such

problems in various ways, and according to the conditions

prevailing in the particular case. Sound strategy, when setting

the task, must never lose sight of tactical practicability, and

only a thorough knowledge of tactical resources makes correct

strategy possible.

Now we shall not under any circumstances, as unfortunately even

great chess masters have done, seek in outward similarities

justification for transferring to chess the teachings of the

strategy and tactics of war. It sounds pretty enough to say:

Chess is a game of war--the various pieces represent the various

kinds of forces: the pawns represent the infantry, the Knights

take the place of cavalry, the Rooks do the work of heavy

artillery, sweeping broad lines; the different ways in which the

pieces move find a parallel in the topography of the theatre of

war, in that the various battle-fields are more or less easy of

access. But it is quite unjustifiable to assign to the Knights

the functions of scouts, and to say that Rooks should stay in the

background, as heavy artillery, and so on. Such pronouncements

would not have the slightest practical value. What we take from

the science of warfare is merely the definition. In each game the

strategy of chess should set us the tasks which must be

accomplished (in order to mate the opponent’s King), and tactics

point the way in which it is possible to solve such problems.

Correct chess strategy will only set such tasks as are tactically

possible, and, if we wish to expound the principles of chess

strategy, we cannot exclude chess tactics from the field of our

observations. If here and there the results of our deliberations

bear some analogy to actual warfare, we may certainly give way to

a kind of aesthetic satisfaction in that our own occupation has

some parallel in real life, but we must never fashion our

principles in accordance with such fortuitous circumstances.

Having surveyed the problems we have to solve, we can now plunge

into our subject.

In the first chapter, when considering special cases in

elementary combinations, we have already noticed the important

part played in each skirmish by the balance between the attacking

and defending units. Speaking quite generally, common-sense will

tell us that, in all operations on the chess-board, the main

consideration for the defence will be to maintain that balance,

and that there is only justification for an attack when it is

possible to concentrate more forces on the strategic point than

can be mustered by the defence. However, one very important point

must not be neglected, though I did not touch upon it when

discussing elementary combinations for fear of complicating

matters for beginners: the balance between the contending forces

is by no means established by their numerical equality. A

paramount factor is the mobility of such forces, and as soon as

it is no longer one of the elementary cases of capture and

recapture described previously, this factor must be taken into

account in order to decide, on a general survey, whether there is

a sufficient defence to an impending attack, or whether one’s own

intended attack is likely to prevail. That mobility is the first

and foremost consideration should be self-evident, since the

relative value of the pieces can only make itself felt by their

greater or lesser mobility.

Except in certain positions, which are brought about by some

particular array of the pieces, the intrinsic value of a Rook is

greater than that of a Bishop, because it can command all the

squares on the board, whilst a Bishop is tied to its own colour;

Knight and Bishop are considered equivalent, because the Knight’s

advantage in being able to act on all the squares of either

colour is balanced by the fact that the Bishop can sweep long

diagonals. Two Bishops are, generally speaking, of greater value

than two Knights, because together they also act on all the

squares, and their command of long diagonals is a clear

advantage. The whole of this valuation, however, comes to nought

when the pieces are hindered in their mobility by the peculiarity

of any particular position.

We will consider one instance from end-game play, and one from

the openings.

In Diagram 13, White derives no advantage from being

---------------------------------------

8 | | | | | | | | |

|---------------------------------------|

7 | | | | | | | #K | |

|---------------------------------------|

6 | | #P | | | | #P | | |

|---------------------------------------|

5 | #P | | #P | | #P | ^P | #P | |

|---------------------------------------|

4 | ^P | | ^P | #Kt| ^P | | | |

|---------------------------------------|

3 | | ^P | | ^R | | | ^P | ^K |

|---------------------------------------|

2 | | | | | | | | |

|---------------------------------------|

1 | | | | | | | | |

---------------------------------------

A B C D E F G H

Diag. 13

the exchange to the good, for the Rook has no file which could be

used to break into the Black camp.

In Diagram 14, the numerical equality of forces will not save

Black, because bad development reduces the mobility of his pieces

to such an extent that he has no resources with which he can

parry the impending attack.

---------------------------------------

8 | | | #K | #R | | #B | | #R |

|---------------------------------------|

7 | | #B | | | #Q | #P | #P | #P |

|---------------------------------------|

6 | #P | #P | | #P | | | #Kt| |

|---------------------------------------|

5 | | | #P | ^P | #P | | | |

|---------------------------------------|

4 | | | ^P | | ^P | | | |

|---------------------------------------|

3 | | ^P | ^Kt| | ^B | ^Kt| ^P | |

|---------------------------------------|

2 | ^P | | | ^Q | | ^P | ^K | ^P |

|---------------------------------------|

1 | ^R | | | | ^R | | | |

---------------------------------------

A B C D E F G H

Diag. 14

White will assail the Black King’s position on the Queen side,

and Black is unable to concentrate his forces quickly enough for

the defence of the jeopardised entrenchments. Let us therefore

bear in mind that the mobility of the pieces is the deciding

factor of their efficiency, and that mobility is the highest

criterion by which to judge the merits (or demerits) of their

operations.

We will now consider this principle in its application to the

three stages of play, namely, the opening, the middle-game, and

the ending.

Chess Strategy · 第 3 / 7 章