RUSSIA
In the middle of the nineteenth century the Russian Empire, in spite
of its vast extent and resources, played a comparatively negligible
part in international politics. To a certain extent this was the
result of the Crimean War. But still more was it due to the internal
difficulties which were so many and so serious that they kept the
empire fully occupied for a considerable period.
This condition is easily understood if we remember that at that time
of all the great European nations Russia was the least developed,
the least advanced, and the least modernized. The many reforms
instituted at that time contributed their share in changing this
condition and resulted in bringing the Russian Empire rapidly to the
forefront of European nations. With the details of the reforms we
are not concerned, but as their actual accomplishment had an
important bearing on Russia's future activities in the field of
world politics it will be well to state that they consisted chiefly
of five great measures: the emancipation of the serfs; the
institution of the zemstvos or county councils; trial by jury;
regulation of the public press; and reorganization of the army. Some
of these reforms were instituted by the government only after public
opinion had made such a course inevitable, and of the history of
this entire period it may well be said that it was written in the
very lifeblood of the Russian people. Two forces continuously
combated each other; on one side were the large masses of the
people, on the other the ruling classes. The former it is true were
not always in solid union and, indeed, more frequently left the
burden of fighting their cause to a small group of intellectuals.
Their demands in many instances were unreasonable, but the ruling
classes were just as unreasonable in their attitude, and the result
was a period of terrorism during which assassination of officials
abounded and even the life of the emperor was threatened a number of
times.
During the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria and in 1871
between France and Germany, Russia observed a friendly neutrality
toward Prussia. This attitude was the outcome of the long-standing
personal friendship between the Russian and Prussian dynasties, a
condition which at that period counted much more than in more modern
times. Although Russia kept out of any active participation in these
two struggles it used the Franco-Prussian War, when all the other
European powers were tied down by its possibilities, to declare, in
October, 1870, that it refused to be bound further by the provisions
of the treaty of Paris, made in 1856, establishing the neutrality of
the Black Sea. As a result of this a conference was called to London
the following year, 1871, which affirmed in the name of all powers
represented their determination to respect the sanctity of treaties,
but in spite of that rescinded the treaty of 1856 along the lines of
Russia's demands, and the neutrality of the Black Sea was abolished.
A few years later a separate arrangement between Russia and Turkey
made it possible for both of these powers to create and maintain
separate fleets in the Black Sea.
In 1872, as we have already heard, the three European emperors of
Russia, Austria, and Germany met at Berlin and possibly as a result
of that meeting a treaty was signed in 1873 between Germany and
Russia which, however, bearing as it did only the signatures of the
two emperors and of the heads of their respective general staffs,
had neither a real standing nor an important influence in the
affairs of either country.
[Illustration: Europe in 1648-1789, Historical Map.]
Two years later, in 1875, Russia once more acted in concert with
Austria and Germany when the Governments of these three empires
addressed a joint request to Turkey asking for the immediate
institution of reforms in the Balkan dependencies of the Turkish
Empire which were then the center of continuous upheavals and
threatened to disrupt European peace.
Before we continue the consideration of Russia's political history
it will be well to emphasize the chief characteristics of Russian
foreign policy. In western European politics Russia had no direct
interest. In the Near East, however, it was more directly interested
than any other European power with the possible exception of
Austria-Hungary; for not only were most of the European dependencies
of Turkey inhabited by Slavish people or else by races closely
related to them, but it was there also that Russia hoped to gain its
much-needed ice-free seaport. This strong interest of Russia in
Balkan affairs which will be brought out in greater detail in
another place, devoted exclusively to the Balkan question, naturally
brought it continuously in contact with Austria-Hungary. For the
latter's interest in these matters was as strong as was Russia's,
although it was, as we have seen, based on different grounds. This
condition then meant that there was nothing in the way of a strong
friendship or even a possible alliance between Germany and Russia
except Germany's friendship for and alliance with Austria-Hungary
which made it impossible for Germany to support Russia's policy in
the Balkans. As a secondary result of this obstacle to a
Russo-German alliance may be considered the gradual approachment
between France and Russia.
In one other part of the world Russia's interest was very strong and
that was in the Far East. Here it clashed with equally strong or
even stronger interests which England and Japan had and it took many
years before these three powers finally arrived at an understanding
concerning their several spheres of interest in the Far East.
Immediately following Russia's participation in asking reforms of
Turkey for its Balkan dependencies Pan-Slavism increased rapidly and
greatly in Russia. One of the most peculiar features of this
movement is the fact that the Russian Government suppressed with all
the power at its command and with all the severity within its
knowledge this movement as far as it affected internal affairs, but
supported it just as strongly as far as it affected the affairs of
other countries. The growth of Pan-Slavism finally resulted in
April, 1877, in Russia's declaration of war against Turkey.
In this war Russia was victorious, but only through the support
which it received from Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro. In
spite of repeated appeals on the part of Turkey to the other
European powers these did not step in until Turkey was almost
threatened with entire elimination. Then a conference of the
European powers was called at Berlin and resulted in July, 1878, in
the Treaty of Berlin which took the place of a treaty previously
arranged between Russia and Turkey in March, 1878, at San Stefano.
The Treaty of Berlin gave to Russia certain small parts of Turkey,
but successfully reduced the excessively strong influence over
Balkan affairs which Russia had attempted to gain for itself in the
Treaty of San Stefano.
In spite of the difficulties between Austria and Russia, of which we
have spoken, the two countries had arrived, previous to the outbreak
of the Russo-Turkish War, at an understanding according to which
Austria maintained a friendly neutrality toward Russia during the
war, in consideration of which Russia permitted Austria's occupation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The following years are again marked by internal difficulties
resulting in a reign of terrorism and in a period of reactionary
government which exceed almost anything in Russia's previous
history. It found its culmination in the successful assassination of
Czar Alexander II on March 13, 1881. He was succeeded by his son
Alexander III under whose rule the gulf between Russia and its
western neighbors, Germany and Austria, widened in the same
proportion as the friendship between Russia on one side and France
and England on the other increased. To a certain extent undoubtedly
this may be traced back to the new czar's personal relations with
the rulers of other nations; for the czarina was a sister of
Alexandria of Denmark, then Princess of Wales and later Queen of
England, and the daughter of that King of Denmark who in 1864 had
lost to Germany and Austria Schleswig-Holstein.
The beginning of Alexander III's reign was marked with the beginning
of a series of terrible persecutions of the Jewish inhabitants of
the Russian Empire which, though subsiding from time to time, have
continued throughout the years until the present time. With the
causes of these persecutions we are not concerned here, for they
were undoubtedly much more of an economic than of a political
nature. In one respect, however, the results had an important
bearing, at least for a time, on Russian politics. For during many
years both France and especially England found it difficult and
almost next to impossible to enter into a close alliance with a
country which apparently absolutely refused to acknowledge some of
the most fundamental principles of modern government in which they
themselves believed: religious and personal freedom.
With Alexander III came also a return to a more reactionary form of
government which in its turn brought about a revival of terrorism
and Nihilism with all its horrors and bloodshed. In spite of the
continuance of these conditions in Russian internal affairs Russia
participated actively in the general movement for expansion which
made itself felt in the latter decade of the nineteenth century. Its
interest in Near Eastern affairs became deeper and more active and
its advances in the Far East kept step. In the Near East, however,
Russia found determined opposition and the gradual development of
the independent states of Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece,
most of which were formed, at least partly, out of what was once the
Turkish Empire, made it clearer and clearer every day that Russia's
hope for gaining a maritime outlet through the conquest of
Constantinople would never be realized. Though never giving up
entirely this hope Russia's endeavors turned more and more toward
the Far East. One of the most important results of this new policy
was the beginning of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway
in May, 1891.
The same year, 1891, saw the visit of a large French fleet at
Kronstadt, the harbor of Petrograd, which was welcomed effusively.
Two years later, in 1893, a Russian fleet repaid the compliment by
visiting Toulon and found an equally hospitable reception. Even
previous to this a large amount of French capital had been invested
in Russian Government Bonds and in Russian industrial undertakings
and the friendship between the two nations increased rapidly.
However, the death of Alexander III in November, 1894, somewhat
delayed the actual conclusion of the alliance and it was not until
1896 that an extensive and far-reaching treaty was signed at the
occasion of the visit of the new Czar, Nicholas II, to Paris. The
immense significance which this Franco-Russian treaty had in respect
to its effect on all of Europe was immediately recognized. If the
treaty succeeded in lasting for any length of time, it was
reasonably clear that it would be only a question of time before it
would result in an entirely new arrangement of European affairs.
The next five or six years were characterized by Russia's determined
advances in the Far East, a strengthening of the Franco-Russian
friendship and serious internal difficulties. The first of these
brought Russia more and more in conflict with England and Japan of
which we shall hear more immediately. The second resulted in a
growth of the estrangement between Russia and Germany. The third for
a time threatened the very existence of the Russian monarchy and it
seemed almost impossible that anything else than revolution and
anarchy could be the final outcome. These were averted only at the
last moment by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.
In April, 1902, a treaty had been signed between China and Russia.
According to it Russia agreed to observe the integrity of China and
to evacuate Manchuria which it had begun to occupy as early as 1897.
The evacuation was to be stretched over a year and a half and in the
beginning Russia lived up to the terms of the treaty. At the end of
the first six months, however, further evacuation stopped and when
China demanded explanations Russia repudiated the arrangement and
refused to proceed with the evacuation unless additional
concessions were made by China. Throughout 1903 negotiations took
place between Japan and Russia concerning this matter which,
however, were not very rich in results. On January 13, 1904, the
Japanese Government, therefore, sent what amounted practically to an
ultimatum in regard to Manchuria and Corea. This step was followed
immediately by warlike preparations on the part of both nations.
Three weeks later on February 6, 1904, diplomatic relations between
the two countries were broken off and the Russo-Japanese War was on.
The Japanese showed themselves superior to their European
adversaries in every respect, and, after inflicting severe defeats
on land and sea, peace was concluded on September 5, 1905, at
Portsmouth, U. S. A. The Japanese were very moderate in their terms,
waiving their demand for an indemnity, returning to Russia all
interned warships and not insisting on any restriction to Russian
power in the Far East.
In the meanwhile affairs at home had progressed rapidly toward
revolution. The defeat of the Russian army and fleet, the discovery
of immense peculations in connection with their equipment and an
increase of economic pressure, all combined to hasten the outbreak
which had been preparing for years. Strikes, riots, assassination of
officials and general bloodshed were the common order of the day. At
the very beginning of these outbreaks a manifest of the czar
promised some reforms. However, he made it clear that in a general
way the Government was resolved to retain its autocratic form. In a
way this manifest is a true picture of the cool attitude which the
Government took throughout these troublous times. Whenever the
Government was forced by especially violent outbreaks to fear the
worst, it would announce the introduction of some slight reforms.
This usually had the desired result of calming down, at least
temporarily, the excited masses, which condition would be followed
almost immediately either by a withdrawal of the reforms instituted
or by some reactionary laws offsetting their influence. In a general
way the revolution, however, improved somewhat internal conditions
in Russia. It led to the establishment of a representative form of
government by the creation of the Duma, although the limits within
which the people were allowed to participate in governmental affairs
were and are even now very narrow. In fact it was not an unusual
procedure for the Government to imprison members of the Duma and to
accuse them of treason whenever they promulgated or supported
measures of which the Government did not approve, and throughout the
following years up to the present time the struggle between a
frankly reactionary government and the people demanding more liberty
continued.
One of the centers of disturbances was Finland. This former province
of Sweden had been ceded to Russia by the Scandinavian Kingdom as
long ago as 1743, after having been practically conquered in 1714.
At that time certain rights of independency and autonomy were
granted to Finland. Throughout the next century and a half Russia
lived up to these promises in a fashion. But in 1899 the Finnish
Diet was deprived of its exclusive right of legislating for the
former grand duchy, and Russia started on a policy of Russification;
although the conqueror did not differ to any noticeable extent from
other nations who found themselves in similar positions--Prussia and
Austria in Poland, Germany in Alsace-Lorraine, England in some of
its colonies--Russia had to contend with greater opposition,
perhaps, than any of them. For the Finns were a people to whom
liberty was as dear as life or even dearer and no particle of it
would they give up except if an overwhelming power forced them to do
so. One Russian governor general after another became the victim of
assassination. This fact is of particular interest to us only
because it resulted in a deep-seated hatred of Russia and all things
Russian on the part of all Swedes, indeed, of all Scandinavians who,
though Finland had been separated from them for three or four
generations, still considered this unhappy country to be part and
parcel of Scandinavia. To a great extent this explains the
Scandinavian attitude toward Russia of which we shall hear more
presently.
Among the more prominent men of Russia who fell under assassins'
assaults were Von Plehve, Minister of the Interior, and Grand Duke
Sergius, an uncle of the czar, both typical reactionaries and men
whose death may well be claimed a gain for Russia rather than a
loss. In this period also belongs the killing of hundreds of
workingmen of Petrograd who, led by a Russian priest, Father Capon,
attempted to march to the Winter Palace of their "Little Father,"
the Czar, in order to present to him in person their petition for
relief from their many oppressions. Similar scenes were repeated in
Warsaw, in Lodz and in other Russian industrial centers during 1905.
Step by step the revolution of the people seemed to gain in spite of
all efforts of the Government. It even spread to the army and navy
and at Odessa the crew of a large battleship mutinied, seized the
boat and bombarded the city, killing more than a thousand of its
inhabitants. Strikes broke out in different parts of the country.
Troops murdered their officers and went over to the cause of the
people. Nevertheless the Government finally triumphed, partly by
diplomatically granting--temporarily only, of course--some of the
demands of the masses, but chiefly by force and unrelenting
severity. The latter policy brought about the fall of one of the
most able statesmen that Russia had ever produced, Count Witte, who
was then Prime Minister and to whose diplomacy and ability Russia
owed primarily its easy bargain with Japan after the latter
country's victory.
The next year, 1906, however, brought some relief to the sorely
oppressed people. The peasants were enabled to acquire the land
which heretofore they had tilled almost like slaves for the benefit
of the great landowners belonging to the aristocratic and patrician
classes. All were made equal before the law, oppressive taxes and
restrictions concerning the choice of residence on the part of
peasants were removed and certain electoral reforms were
promulgated. The latter, however, were of short duration, for in
1907, when things had quieted down a bit they were either recalled
or nullified by technical interpretations which thoroughly defeated
their original purposes.
During this entire period the persecution of Jews was kept up. In
spite of this, however, Russia took prompt steps to stop similar
persecutions of Armenians on the part of Turks, one of the few
undertakings of the Russian Government of that time which deserves
the approval of mankind.
In August of the same year, 1907, Russia also arrived at an
understanding with England concerning the respective spheres of
influence of these two countries in Asia, an important step toward
the completion of the "Triple Entente" of Russia, England, and
France.
The year 1908 was noticeable only for the enaction of further
reactionary measures. The next year, 1909, saw Russia's
participation in the successful effort of the European powers to
adjust pacifically the various questions that had arisen from
Bulgaria's proclamation as a kingdom and Austria-Hungary's
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the same year, 1909, the
Russian advance for the possession of Persia began--without
opposition on the part of England by that time--and an understanding
was reached between the czar's and the Chinese Government concerning
the Manchurian railroad. This made it possible for Russia in the
following year, 1910, to reject the suggestion of the United States
Government to internationalize this railroad, in which attitude
Russia had the support of Japan, England and France.
During the Franco-German difficulties about Morocco in 1911 Russia
put itself squarely on the side of France and its announcement to
that effect, made officially to the German Government, was a decided
step forward toward French intimacy and German enmity. Having helped
out France in this manner, Russia promptly pushed its own cause in
Persia. With England and France indifferent to this unfortunate
country's fate, with Germany not sufficiently interested to risk a
break with any or all of the members of the "Triple Entente," and
with the United States much in the same position as Germany, Russia
had its own way and Persia had to submit to Russia's demands and to
its gradual enslavement under Russian rule.
In 1912 and 1913--before, during and after the two Balkan
Wars--Russia acted in concert with the other European powers and
refrained from active participation although its sympathies were
clearly enough with Serbia. So promising was the outlook then for a
lasting understanding between the nations of Europe that Russia and
Austria found it possible--as we have already heard--to agree, in
March, 1913, on a demobilization of their armies along their
respective borders.
A little more than a year, however, sufficed to bring about a change
in this friendly attitude of the two empires, a change fateful alike
to both and to all the world. For one day after Austria-Hungary's
declaration of war against Serbia on July 28, 1914, Russia began her
mobilization--a necessary measure with Austria at war for increased
power in the Balkans. By July 31, 1914, Russia's general
mobilization had taken place.