CHAPTER X.

TENURE OF LAND.

64. We have sufficiently considered the difficulties which exist

regarding #Labour# and #Capital#, two of the requisites of production,

and we will now turn to another part of political economy, and inquire

into the way in which #Land#, the third requisite, is supplied.

In different countries land is held in very different ways. It is a

matter of custom, and in the course of time customs slowly change. The

way in which farms are owned and managed in England at the present time

is no indication of the way land is held in France, or Norway, or

Russia, or even the United States; nor is it the same as the way in

which farms were owned in England some centuries ago. What is fitting to

one place and state of society will not necessarily be fitting in other

circumstances. We have to consider the various ways in which the

requisites of production, land, labour, and capital, are brought

together; sometimes they are all furnished by the same person; sometimes

by separate persons.

In the condition of #slavery#, for instance, as it existed in the

Southern States of North America, the owner of an estate owned the land,

labour, and capital, all at once. Strictly speaking a slave is not a

labourer, because he cannot sell his labour at his own price, and work

or not as he likes. He is more in the position of the horse which drags

the plough, a mere beast of burden. Just as a farmer owns his horses,

and cows, and pigs, as part of his capital, so a slave-owner treats his

slaves as part of his capital. Slave-labour being given unwillingly, and

without hope of reward, is usually badly given, and is wasteful; but

there is hardly any need to consider whether slavery is good or bad in

an economical point of view, because it is altogether condemned from a

moral point of view. We may show the way the requisites of production

are furnished in slavery by the following diagram--

#Slave-Owner.#

|

/---------------------------------------------\

#Land.# #Labour.# #Capital.#

In a very large part of the world, again, the government takes the place

of land-owners, and collects the rent by means of tax-gatherers. The

farming is done by poor peasants, who find the capital, so far as there

is any, and also do the work. Thus, we have the arrangement--

#Government.# #Peasant.#

| |

/------\ /---------------------------\

#Land.# #Capital.# #Labour.#

This system is called #Ryot Tenure#, and it exists at the present day in

Turkey, Egypt, Persia, and many eastern countries; also in a somewhat

altered form in British India. After slavery, it is the worst of all

systems, because the Government can fix the rent at what it likes, and

it is difficult to distinguish between rent and taxes. When their crops

fail the ryot peasants are unable to pay the tax-gatherers, and they get

into debt and become quite helpless.

65. #Peasant Proprietorship.# One of the best modes of holding land,

when it can exist, is that known as peasant proprietorship, because the

owner of the land is the peasant himself, who labours with his own arms,

and finds the capital also. In this system, as in slavery, all the

requisites of production are in the same hands; thus--

#Peasant.#

|

/------------------------------------------------\

#Land.# #Labour.# #Capital.#

But in every other respect this system is the opposite of slavery. Its

advantages are evident; the labourer being the owner of the farm and of

all upon it, is an independent man, who has every inducement to work

hard, and to increase his savings. Every little improvement which he can

make in his farm is so much added to his wealth, and that of his family

after him. There is what is called the #magic of property#. The feeling

that he is working entirely for his own and his family's benefit #almost

magically increases his inclination to work#. In newly-settled

countries, such as the Western Territories of the United States, and

Canada, or the colonies of Australia, and the Cape, this mode of holding

land seems to be suitable, because the land is there very cheap, and

crops can be raised with little capital. In such countries there is no

need of expensive manures, elaborate machinery, and the cost of draining

and improving land.

The objection to peasant proprietorship is, that he who does the labour

of a farm with his own hands, must usually be a poor and unskilful

person. If he were rich he would probably prefer to buy up the labour of

other men, and become a capitalist farmer; if he were a really skilful

farmer, it would be a pity to waste his skill upon a small farm, when,

with more division of labour, he might profitably direct and manage a

large one. Being poor, his capital will be mostly absorbed in building

his cottage and barns, and in paying the small price of his land; he

will have little left to make improvements, or to buy good labour-saving

implements, and good stock, such as well-bred horses, cows, and pigs.

Thus, unless his land be new and very fertile, he will not get a large

return for his labour. Owing to the magic of property, he may work very

hard, and during long hours, but he will not work in an economical way,

and therefore will remain poor in spite of his severe exertions. The

peasant proprietors who still exist in Switzerland, Belgium, Norway,

Sweden, and some other parts of Europe, work almost day and night during

the summer, and they are very careful and saving; yet they seldom grow

rich, or get more than a bare living out of the soil.

Too frequently the peasant proprietor, if he is not very provident, runs

short of money after one or two bad seasons. He will then be tempted to

borrow money, to sell his timber, and other produce before it is ready

for the market, and thus run in debt. When his farm has increased in

value and would bring some rent, he will very likely mortgage it, that

is, give it by a legal deed as security for his debts. The mortgagee or

lender of the money then becomes part-owner of the land and capital, so

that the arrangement tends to take this form--

#Money-Lender.# #Peasant.#

| |

/----------------\ /-----------------\

#Land.# #Capital.# #Capital.# #Labour.#

66. #Tenure of Land in England.#. As agriculture becomes more a science,

farming will require greater skill, and larger capital, and the English

mode of land tenure will probably spread. In this system there is the

greatest division of labour, and different ranks of people have shares

in the business, somewhat as follows:--

#Proprietor.# #Farmer.# #Labourer.#

| | |

/-----------\ /-------------\ /----\

#Land. Capital.# #Capital. Labour.# #Labour.#

The land is usually owned by some rich man, who likes to have large

estates, but does not wish to have the trouble of farming. In respect of

the land only he is a #proprietor of a natural agent#, and the rent he

receives is true rent; but there will usually be buildings, roads,

fences, drains, and other improvements, of which he is also owner; in

respect of these he is a capitalist, and the return he receives is

interest. The farmer is a man of knowledge and skill, with considerable

capital; he hires the land and its improvements from the proprietor, and

stocks it with cattle, carts, improved implements of all kinds, and then

employs day-labourers to do the manual work, labouring himself in

superintendence, in keeping accounts, buying and selling, &c. The

labourer, generally speaking, is nothing but a labourer; he lives in a

cottage hired probably from the farmer or proprietor, and he has little

motive for working harder than he is made to do, because the advantage

goes to his employer.

In this arrangement there are great advantages, and also great

disadvantages. The farmer, being an intelligent man, acquainted with

agricultural science, and furnished with plenty of capital, can adopt

all the latest inventions, and raise the largest possible produce from

the land and labour. It is also advantageous that the farmer does not

own the land and fixed capital, because this leaves all his own capital

free to provide more expensive implements and manures, and finer kinds

of cattle. It is also a good thing that farms will, on this system, be

large, so that there will be considerable division of labour, almost as

in a factory; thus there will arise some of the advantages which were

described as belonging to the Division of Labour (Sections 25-29).

The disadvantages of the English mode of farming are also great,

especially as regards the labourers, the most numerous class. They have

none of the independence of peasant proprietors, and, when dismissed, or

too old to work, have probably to go to the workhouse. Their wages have

hitherto been very low, and saving was not possible. But this state of

things is partly due to the bad Poor Laws which used to exist in

England, and to the excessive numbers of poor, ignorant labourers. After

a time, when the poor laws are improved, when labourers become more

educated, and are employed, like factory hands, to work machines, there

is no reason why they should not get good wages, and become independent,

like artisans.

In the English system, a great deal depends upon the nature of the

agreement between the land-owner and the capitalist farmer. Many large

land-owners in England refuse to let their land for long periods They

like to have farmers who are #tenants at will#, and can be turned off

their farms at a year's notice, and deprived of the value of all the

improvements they have made, if they offend the great land-owner. It is

easy to understand this; the land-owners wish to be lords, and to rule

affairs in their own neighbourhood, as if they were little kings. This

sort of thing is called #territorial influence#, and men who have become

rich by making iron or cotton goods, often buy estates at a high price,

in order to enjoy the pleasure of feeling like lords. The rural parts of

England, Scotland, and Ireland are still, in fact, under #the feudal

system#.

In a Primer like this we have to look at the matter as regards political

economy only, and in this respect the arrangement described is bad.

Tenants at will have no inducement to improve their farms, because this

would tempt the land-owner to turn them out, or to raise the rent. It is

generally understood, indeed, that a land-owner will not use his power,

so that many farmers act as if they were sure of holding their farms; if

turned out after all, they are practically robbed of their capital; and,

in any case, they cannot possibly feel the independence which every man

ought to enjoy. We must always remember that the laws should be made not

for the benefit of any one class, but for the benefit of the whole

country. The laws concerning landlord and tenant have, however, been

made by landlords, and are more fitted to promote their enjoyment than

to improve agriculture.

There are two modes of remedying the unfortunate state of land tenure in

this country, namely:--

(1) By a system of long leases.

(2) By tenant right.

#67. Leasehold Tenure.# A lease is a formal agreement to let land or

houses to a tenant for a certain number of years at a fixed rent, and

with various conditions, which are carefully stated, to prevent

misunderstanding. When land is taken by a farmer under a lease for

thirty years or more, it becomes almost like his own property, because,

in the earlier part of his term, he can make great improvements with the

aid of his capital, and yet be sure of getting the value back before the

lease comes to an end. In the eastern parts of England and Scotland,

where the farms are largest and best managed, these long leases are the

usual mode of letting land. It is certainly one of the best arrangements

for promoting good farming, and it has few disadvantages, except that

the farmer will not make improvements towards the end of his lease.

#68. Tenant Right.# Another good arrangement is tenant right, which

consists in #giving the tenant a right to claim the value of any

unexhausted improvements#, which he may have made in his farm, if he be

turned out of it. A farmer can prove without difficulty how much he has

spent in building barns, stables, piggeries, &c., in draining the lands,

making roads and fences, or in putting lime and costly manures into the

soil. Those who are experienced in farming can form a good judgment how

long each improvement will continue profitable, so as to calculate how

much the tenant loses if he be turned away. Thus a good estimate may be

formed as to the sum which the tenant should receive as compensation,

and the landlord, if he chooses to dismiss the tenant, should be obliged

to pay this compensation. He will get it back by charging a higher rent

to the next tenant.

Tenant right, though unknown in most parts of England, is not at all a

new system; it has existed for a long time in the north of Ireland,

where it is called the #Ulster tenant right#. A new tenant there pays

the old tenant a considerable sum of money for the privilege of getting

a good farm with various improvements, and the land-owner is practically

prevented from turning out a good tenant at his mere will. In Yorkshire

also it has been the custom to compensate an outgoing tenant, and there

is no good reason why the custom should not be made into a legal right,

and extended over the whole country. Mr. Gladstone's Irish Land Act has

already established a somewhat similar system throughout Ireland. If the

land is to be used for its proper purposes, and not merely for the

amusement and pride of a few landlords, #every owner of land who lets it

should be obliged either to give a long lease, say of thirty or fifty

years, or else to pay the compensation fixed by a jury# after taking

evidence from those skilled in valuing farms. It should be made illegal

to let land on any other terms.

#69. The Cause of Rent.# It is very important to understand exactly how

rent arises, for without knowing this it is impossible to see why a

landlord should be allowed to come and take away a considerable part of

what is produced, without taking any other trouble in the matter. But

the fact is that we cannot do away with rents: they must go to some one

or other, and the only real question which can arise is whether there

shall be many landlords receiving small rents or few landlords with

great rent-rolls.

Rent arises from the fact that different pieces of land are not equally

fertile, that is, they do not yield the same quantities of produce for

the same quantities of labour. This may arise from the soil being

different, or from one piece of land getting more sun and moisture than

another. If the earth had a perfectly smooth surface the same

everywhere, and if it were all tilled and cultivated in exactly the same

way, there would be no such thing as rent. But the earth's surface, as

we know, has hills and valleys: there are flats of rich soil in one

place, and wastes of dry sand and stones in other places. Now, where the

soil is good and favourably situated for growing corn, or other produce,

the owner of such land must get more, in return for his labour, than if

he possessed a bad piece of land. Even then, if everybody owned the farm

which he cultivates, those who owned the better pieces would get rent,

because they would get more produce. Thus, after allowing the same

wages to all, there would remain something in addition to the lucky

owners of the better land. If, instead of working on this good land

themselves, they let it to other workmen, they will be able to get a

rent depending on the richness and the other advantages of the land.

Now there can be little difficulty in seeing how the amount of rent of

land is governed. That land will pay no rent at all which only gives

produce enough to pay the wages of the labourers who work upon it,

together with the interest of any capital which they require. The rent

of better land will then consist of the surplus of its produce over that

of the poorest cultivated land, after allowance has been made for the

greater or less amount of labour and capital expended on it. Or we may

look at the matter in this way: The price of corn is decided by the cost

of producing it on land which just pays the expenses of cultivation,

because when more corn is needed, it is from such land we must procure

it, the better land having been long since occupied. But corn of the

same quality sells at the same price whatever be its cost of production;

hence the rent of more fertile land will be the excess of the price of

its produce over that of land which only just pays the cultivator and

leaves no rent.

Political economy · 第 10 / 16 章