CHAPTER IX.

CO-OPERATION, &c.

#58. Arbitration.# We have now considered at some length the evils

arising from the present separation of interests between the employed

and their employers. The next thing is to discuss the various attempts

which have been made to remedy these evils, and to bring labour and

capital into harmony with each other. In the first place, many people

think that when any dispute takes place, arbitrators or judges should be

appointed to hear all that can be said on both sides of the question,

and then decide what the rate of wages is to be for some time to come.

No doubt a good deal may be said in favour of such a course, but it is

nevertheless inconsistent with the principles of free labour and free

trade. If the judges are to be real arbitrators, they must have power to

compel obedience to their decision, so that they will destroy the

liberty of the workman to work or not as he likes, and of the capitalist

to deal freely with his own capital, and sell goods at whatever price

suits the state of the market. If wages are to be arbitrarily settled in

this way, there is no reason why the same thing should not be done with

the prices of corn, iron, cotton, and other goods. But legislators have

long since discovered the absurdity of attempting to fix prices by law.

These prices depend entirely upon supply and demand, and no one is

really able to decide with certainty what will be the conditions of

supply and demand a month or two hence. Government might almost as

wisely legislate about the weather we are to have next summer as about

the state of trade, which much depends upon the weather, or upon wars

and accidents of various kinds, which no one can foresee. It is

impossible, then, to fix prices and wages beforehand by any kind of law

or compulsory decision. The matter is one of bargain, of buying and

selling, and the employer must be at liberty to buy the labour required

at the lowest price at which he can get it, and the labourers to sell

their labour at the highest price they can get, both subject of course

to the legal notice of a week or fortnight.

#59. Conciliation.# Though the compulsory fixing of wages is evidently

objectionable, much good may be done by #conciliators#, who are men

chosen to conduct a friendly discussion of the matters in dispute. The

business is arranged in various ways; sometimes three or more delegates

of the workmen meet an equal number of delegates from the masters, who

place before the meeting such information as they think proper to give,

and then endeavour to come to terms. In other cases the delegates lay

their respective views before a man of sound and impartial judgment, who

then endeavours to suggest terms to which both sides can accede. If the

two parties previously engage that they will accept the decision of this

conciliator or umpire, the arrangement differs little from arbitration,

except that there is no legal power to compel compliance with the

decision. Discredit has been thrown upon this form of conciliation by

the fact that the workmen have in several instances refused to abide by

the award of the umpire when given against them, and of course it cannot

be expected that masters will accept adverse decisions as binding under

such circumstances. Thus I am led to think that the conciliator should

not attempt to be a judge; he should be merely an impartial friend of

both sides, trying to remove misapprehension and hostile feelings,

enlightening each party as to the views and reasons and demands of the

other--acting, in short, as a go-between, and smoothing down the

business as oil eases the movement of a machine. The final settlement

must take the form of a voluntary bargain directly between the employers

and employed, which will only have compulsory effect during the week or

fortnight for which workmen usually enter into a legal agreement.

Conciliation may in this way do much good, but it cannot remove the

causes of difference--it cannot make the men feel that their interest is

one with the interest of their employers.

#60. Co-operation.# Among the measures proposed for improving the

position of workmen, the best is co-operation, if we understand by this

name #the uniting together of capital and labour#. The name co-operation

is used indeed with various meanings, and some of the arrangements

called by it have really nothing to do with what we are now considering.

#To co-operate means to work together# (Latin, _con_, together, and

_operor_, to work). About thirty-five years ago some workmen of

Rochdale, noticing the great profits made by shopkeepers in retail

trade, resolved to work together by buying their own supplies wholesale,

and distributing them amongst the members of the society which they

established. They called this #a co-operative society#, and a great

number of so-called co-operative stores have since been established.

Most of these are nothing but shops belonging to a society of

purchasers, who agree to buy at the store and divide the profits. They

have on the whole done a great deal of good by leading many men to save

money and to take an interest in the management of affairs. The stores

are also useful, because they compete with shopkeepers, and induce them

to lower their prices and to treat their customers better. We

frequently hear now of shops selling goods at #co-operative prices#.

But such co-operative societies have little or nothing to do with the

subject of capital and labour. Commonly these stores are conducted less

upon the true co-operative principle than ordinary shops. A shop is

usually managed by the owner or by a man who has a large interest in its

success, and has the best reasons for taking trouble. Co-operative

stores, on the contrary, are often managed by men who are paid by salary

or wages only, and have nothing to do with the profits and the capital

of the concern.

#Real co-operation consists in making all those who work share in the

profits.# At present a workman sells his labour for the best price he

can get, and has nothing further to do with the results. If he does his

work well, his master gets the benefit, and if he works badly his master

is injured. It is true that he must not be very lazy or negligent for

fear of being discharged; but if he takes care to be moderately careful

and active, it is all that he need do for his own interests. No doubt it

would be a good thing to reward the more active workmen with higher

wages, and a wise employer endeavours to do this when he can, and to put

the best workmen into the best places. But the trades-unions usually

prevent it as far as they can, by insisting that men doing the same kind

of work in the same place shall be paid alike. Moreover, as we have

seen, many men are under the mistaken belief that if they work hard they

decrease the demand for employment, and tend to take away the bread from

their fellow-men. Thus it is not uncommon for workmen to study #how not

to do the work too quickly#, instead of striving to make the most goods

in the least time with the least trouble. Workmen do not see that what

they produce forms in the long run their wages, so that if all workmen

could be incited to activity and carefulness, wages would rise in all

trades.

#61. Industrial Partnerships.# The best way of reconciling labour and

capital would be to give every workman a share in the profits of his

factory when trade is so prosperous as to allow of it. Charles Babbage

proposed, in the year 1832, that a part of the wages of every person

employed should depend on the profits of the employers. In recent years

this has been tried in several large works, especially in Messrs.

Briggs' collieries, and in Messrs. Fox, Head & Co.'s iron-works. The

arrangement generally made with the men was that the capitalists should

first take enough of the profits to pay 10 per cent. interest on the

capital, together with fair salaries for the managers as wages of

superintendence, a sum to meet bad debts, the repairs and depreciation

of the machinery, and all other ordinary causes of loss. Such profit as

remained was then divided into two equal parts, one of which went to the

employers, while the other was divided among the workpeople in

proportion to the amounts of wages which they had received during the

year. Many workmen under such a scheme found themselves at Christmas in

possession of five or ten pounds, in addition to the ordinary wages of

the trade received weekly during the year.

This kind of co-operation has been called #industrial partnership#, and,

if it could be widely carried into effect, there would arise many

advantages. The workmen, feeling that their Christmas bonuses depended

upon the success of the works, would not favour idleness, and would have

some inducement for preventing needless waste whether of time or

materials. By degrees they would learn that #the best trades-union is a

union with their employers#. Strikes and lockouts would be for the most

part a thing of the past, because, if wages were too low, the

balance-sheet would prove the fact at the end of the year, and half the

surplus would go to the workmen. To be free from the danger of strikes

would be a very great advantage to the employers, and any portion of

profits which they might seem to give up would be more than repaid by

the increased care and activity of the workmen. The employers would

continue to manage the business entirely according to their own

judgment, and they need not make their affairs or accounts known to the

men. All that is requisite is that skilful accountants should examine

the books at the end of the year, and certify the amount of profits due

to the men. If this plan were thoroughly carried out, the men would feel

that they were really working for themselves as much as for their

masters, and the troubles which at present exist would be nearly

unknown.

There are great difficulties in the way of this kind of co-operation:

most capitalists do not like it, because they needlessly fear to make

known their profits to their men, and they do not understand the

advantages which would arise from a better state of things. The workmen

also do not like the arrangement, because the trades-unions oppose

co-operation, fearing that it will overthrow their own power. Where the

scheme has been tried, it has usually succeeded well, until the men,

urged by their trades-unions, refused to go on with it. Thus are people,

through prejudice and want of knowledge, made blind to the best

interests of themselves and the country.

It is to be feared, then, that industrial partnerships will not make

much progress just at present, so great is the dislike to them felt both

by trades-unions and by prejudiced employers. Nevertheless, the

arrangement is in accordance with the principles of political economy,

and it will probably be widely adopted by some future generation.

Already, indeed, many banks, mercantile firms, and public companies

practically recognise the value of the principle, by giving bonuses or

presents to their clerks at the end of a profitable year. A French

railway company adopted this practice forty years ago, and as business

falls more and more into the hands of companies whose profits are

matters of general knowledge, there seems to be no reason whatever why

the principle of industrial partnership should not be adopted. Somewhat

the same principle is said to be carried into effect in the very

extensive and successful newspaper business of Messrs. W. H. Smith &

Son.

#62. Joint-Stock Co-operation.# Another mode of co-operation consists in

working men saving up their wages until they have got small capitals, so

that they can unite together and own the factories, machines, and

materials with which they work. They then become their own capitalists

and employers, and secure all the profit to themselves. Co-operative

societies of this kind are simply Joint-Stock Companies, the shares of

which are held by the men employed. Of course the shareholders must

choose directors from among themselves, and they must also have managers

to arrange the business. The managers and directors ought to be well

paid for what they do, and have a considerable share of the profits, in

order to make them interested in the success of the works, and therefore

active and careful. Incompetent or negligent management will soon ruin

the best business.

A great number of co-operative companies of this kind have been formed

in the last twenty years in England, France, America, and elsewhere; but

most of them have failed from want of good direction. The working-men

shareholders do not generally understand what a great deal of skill and

judgment is required in the conduct of a business; they are accustomed

to see work going on as if it went of its own accord, but they do not

see the constant anxiety and the careful calculation which is requisite

to make the work profitable. Hence they usually fail to secure good

managers, and they do not sufficiently trust those whom they appoint.

Moreover, many of the so-called co-operative companies are not really

co-operative; they frequently employ men who are neither shareholders

nor receivers of a share of profits, and they pay their managers by a

small fixed salary. #Such co-operative societies are badly-managed

joint-stock companies, and cannot be expected to succeed well.#

Another difficulty with such companies is, that they rarely have enough

capital, and, when bad trade comes, they are unable to bear the losses

which will sometimes occur for several years in succession. They can

borrow money by the mortgage of the buildings and machinery belonging to

the company, and this is usually done; but no banker will give credit to

such companies without the security of fixed property. Thus they

frequently fail when bad trade comes, and those who buy up their

property cheaply reap advantage. It is to be hoped that at a future time

all working-men will become capitalists on a small scale, and when

education and experience have been acquired, co-operative factories of

working-men may succeed. At present it would be better to leave the

management of business in the hands of capitalists, who are not only

experienced and clever men, but have the best reason to be careful and

active, because their fortunes depend upon success.

#63. Providence.# It is most deeply to be regretted that the

working-people of England will not, for the most part, see the necessity

of saving a portion of their wages in order to have something to live

upon when trade is bad, or when ill-health and misfortune come upon

them. Too many working-men's families spend all that is earned while

trade is brisk, and when employment fails they are as badly off as ever.

#There are several distinct reasons why every man or woman should save

up some property when possible#:--

(1) It forms a provision in case of ill-health, accident, want of

employment, or other misfortune; it is also wanted for support in old

age, or for the helpless widow and orphans of a workman who dies

early.

(2) It yields interest, and adds to a workman's income.

(3) It enables a man to go into trade, to buy good tools, and to

enjoy good credit in case he sees an opportunity of setting up

business on his own account.

No man and no woman, who is in the prime of life and earning fair wages,

should spend the whole. Even an unmarried person will generally reach a

time of life when, through ill health, old age, or other unavoidable

causes, it is no longer possible to get a living. By that time enough

ought to have been saved to avoid the need of charity or the degradation

of the poor-house. When there is a wife and young family, the need of

saving is evidently greater still. Every great storm, colliery

explosion, or other great accident leaves a number of helpless children

to be brought up by a struggling widow, or to go on the parish. No doubt

people may meet with disasters so unexpected and so great that they

cannot be blamed for not providing against them. A man who is blinded,

or crippled, or otherwise disabled in early life, is a proper object of

charity, but there would be plenty of benevolent institutions to provide

for such exceptional cases, if those who are more fortunate would

provide properly for themselves.

It is often said that working men really cannot save out of the small

wages they receive; the expenses of living are too great. We cannot deny

that there are labourers, especially agricultural labourers in the South

of England, whose wages will not do more than barely provide necessary

food and clothing for their families. The weekly earnings of a family in

some parts are not more than 12 or 15 shillings on the average of the

year, and sometimes even less. Such people can hardly be expected to

save. But this is not the case with the artisans and labourers in the

manufacturing districts. They seldom earn less than a pound a week, and

often two pounds. The boys and girls, and sometimes the mother of the

family, also earn wages, so that when trade is brisk a family in

Manchester or Leicester, or other manufacturing town, will get

altogether L150 a year, or more. Some kinds of workmen, especially

coal-hewers, and iron-puddlers, earn twice that amount in good years,

and are in fact better paid than schoolmasters, ministers of religion,

and upper clerks. It is idle to say that the better-paid working men

cannot save, and though we cannot make any strict rule, it is probable

that #all who earn more than a pound (five dollars, or 25 francs) a

week, might save something#.

It is easy to prove this assertion by the fact that when a strike

occurs, men voluntarily live on a half, or a third of their ordinary

wages. Sometimes they will live for three or four months on 12 or 15

shillings a week, which is paid for their support by their trades-union,

or by other unions, which subscribe money to assist them. It is quite

common for workmen to pay #levies#, that is, almost compulsory

subscriptions of a shilling or more a week, to be spent by other workmen

who are #playing#, as it is called, during a long strike. Nobody wishes

working people to live on the half of their wages, but #if, for the

purpose of carrying on struggles against their employers, they can spare

these levies, it is evident that they could spare them for the purpose

of saving#. Then, again, we know that the money spent on drink is

enormous in amount; in this country it is about L140,000,000 a year, or

about four pounds a year for every man, woman, and child. To say the

least, half of this might be saved, with the greatest advantage to the

health and morals of the savers, and thus the working classes would be

able to lay by an annual sum not much less than the revenue of the

nation.

Political economy · 第 9 / 16 章