THE PASSING OF PERSIA
The weakness of the Ottoman Empire and of Morocco served to bring the
colonial and commercial aspiration of Germany into conflict with other
nations of Europe. The recent fortunes of Persia, the third--and only
other--independent Mohammedan state, have also helped to make possible
the general European war.
The first decade of the twentieth century brought about in Persia, as
in Turkey, the rise of a constitutional party, which was able to force
a despotic sovereign to grant a constitution. The Young Persians had
in many respects a history similar to that of the Young Turks. They
were for the most part members of influential families, who had been
educated in Europe, or had been sent into exile. They had imbibed
deeply the spirit of the French Revolution from their reading, and had
at the same time developed a narrow and intense nationalism. But to
support their revolutionary propaganda, they had allied themselves
during the period of darkness with the Armenians and other non-Moslems.
As Salonika, a city by no means Turkish, was the _foyer_ of the young
Turk movement, so Tabriz, {85} capital of the Azerbaidjan, a city by no
means Persian, was the centre of the opposition to Persian despotism.
Young Turks, Young Persians, Young Egyptians, Young Indians, and Young
Chinese have shown to Europe and America the peril--and the pity--of
our western and Christian education, when it is given to eastern and
non-Christian students. They are born into the intellectual life with
our ideas and are inspired by our ideals, but have none of the
background, none of the inheritance of our national atmosphere and our
family training to enable them to live up to the standards we have put
before them. Their disillusionment is bitter. They resent our
attitude of superiority. They hate us, even though they feign to
admire us. Their jealousy of our institutions leads them to console
themselves by singling out and forcing themselves to see only the weak
and vulnerable points in our civilization. Educated in our
universities, they return to their countries to conspire against us.
The illiterate and simple Oriental, who has never travelled, is
frequently the model of fidelity and loyalty and affection to his
Occidental master or friend. But no educated non-Christian Oriental,
who has travelled and studied and lived on terms of equality with
Europeans or Americans in Europe or America, can ever be a sincere
friend. The common result of social contact and intellectual
companionship is that he becomes a foe,--and conceals the fact.
Familiarity has bred more than contempt.
The Young Persians would have no European {86} aid. They waited, and
suffered. Finally, after a particularly bad year from the standpoint
of financial exactions, the Moslem clergy of the North were drawn into
the Young Persia movement. A revolution, in which the Mohammedan
_mullahs_ took part, compelled the dying Shah, Muzaffereddin, to issue
a decree ordering the convocation of a _medjliss_ (committee of
notables) on August 5, 1906. This improvised Parliament, composed only
of delegates of the provinces nearest the capital, drafted a
constitution which was promulgated on New Year's Day, 1907. The
following week, Muzaffereddin died and was succeeded by his son,
Mohammed Ali Mirza, a reactionary of the worst type.
Mohammed Ali had no intention of putting the Constitution into force.
A serious revolution broke out in Tabriz a few weeks after his
accession. He was compelled to acknowledge the Constitution granted by
his father. In order to nullify its effect, however, the new Shah
called to the Grand Vizierate the exiled Ali Asgar Khan, whom he
believed to be strong enough to overrule the wishes of the Parliament.
The Constitutionalists formed a society of _fedavis_ to prevent the
return to absolutism. At their instigation, Ali Asgar Khan was
assassinated. The country fell into an anarchic state.
Constitutional Persia, as much because of the inexperience of the
Constitutionalists as of the ill-will of the Shah, was worse off than
under the despotism of Muzaffereddin. There was no money in the
treasury. The peasants would not pay their taxes. One can hardly
blame them, for not a cent of the {87} money ever went for local
improvements or local government. Throughout Persia, even in the
cities, life was unsafe. The Persians, no more than the Turks, could
call forth from the ranks of their enthusiasts a progressive and
fearless statesman of the type of Stambuloff or Venizelos. In their
Parliament they all talked at once. None was willing to listen to his
neighbour. It may have been because there was no Mirabeau. But could
a Mirabeau have overcome the fatal defects of the Mohammedan training
and character that made the Young Persians incapable of realizing the
constitutionalism of their dreams? Every man was suspicious and
jealous of his neighbour. Every man wanted to lead, and none to be
led. Every man wanted power without responsibility, prestige without
work, success without sacrifice.
It was at this moment that one of the most significant events of
contemporary times was helped to fruition by the state of affairs in
Persia. Great Britain and Russia, rivals--even enemies--in western and
central Asia, signed a convention. Their conflicting ambitions were
amicably compromised. Along with the questions of Afghanistan and
Thibet, this accord settled the rivalry that had done much to keep
Persia a hotbed of diplomatic intrigue like Macedonia ever since the
Crimean War.
In regard to Persia, the two Powers solemnly swore to respect its
integrity and its independence, and then went on to sign its death
warrant, by agreeing upon the question of "the spheres of influence."
In spite of all sophisms, this convention marked the {88} passing of
Persia as an independent state. Persia is worse off than Morocco and
Egypt. For one master is better than two!
Here enters Germany. For many years German merchants had looked upon
Persia as they looked upon Morocco and Turkey. Here were the
legitimate fields for commercial expansion. Probably there were also
dreams of political advantages to be gained later. In their dealings
with the three Moslem countries that were still "unprotected" when they
inaugurated their _Weltpolitik_, the Germans had been attentive
students of British policy in the days of her first entry into India
and to Egypt. There were many Germans who honestly believed that their
activities in these independent Moslem countries would only give them
"their place under the sun," and a legitimate field for the overflow of
their population and national energy, but that it would also be a
distinct advantage to the peace of the world. Great Britain and Russia
and France had already divided up between them the larger part of Asia
and Africa. In the process, Great Britain had _recently_ come almost
to blows with both her rivals. If Germany stepped in between them,
would this not prevent a future conflict? But the rivals "divided up."
Germany was left out in the cold. It is not a very far cry from
Teheran and Koweit and Fez to Liège and Brussels and Antwerp. Belgium
is paying the bill.
The Anglo-Russian convention of August 31, 1907, was the first of three
doors slammed in Germany's face. The Anglo-French convention of April
{89} 8, 1904, had been an attempt to do this. But by Emperor William's
visit to Tangiers in 1905, Germany got in her foot before the door was
closed! In Persia there was no way that she could intervene directly
to demand that Great Britain and Russia bring their accord before an
international congress.
Germany began to work in Persia through two agencies. She incited
Turkey to cross the frontier of the Azerbaidjan, and to make the
perfectly reasonable request that the third limitrophe state should be
taken into the _pourparlers_ which were deciding the future of Persia.
Then she sent her agents among the Nationalists, and showed them how
terrible a blow this convention was to their new constitutionalism.
Just at the moment when they had entered upon a constitutional life,
Great Britain and Russia had conspired against their independence, went
the German thesis.
If only there had been a sincerity for the Constitution in the heart of
the Shah, and an ability to establish a really constitutional _régime_
in the leaders of Young Persia, the Anglo-Russian accord might have
proved of no value. But--unfortunately for Persia and for Germany--the
Shah, worked upon skilfully by Russian emissaries and by members of his
_entourage_, who were paid by Russian gold, attempted a _coup d'état_
against the Parliament in December, 1907. He failed to carry it
through. With a smile on his lips and rage in his heart, he once more
went through the farce of swearing to be a good constitutional ruler.
But in June, 1908, he succeeded {90} in dispersing the Parliament by
bombarding the palace in which it sat.
It would be wearisome to go into the story of the revolts and anarchy
in all parts of Persia in 1908 and 1909. After a year of fighting and
Oriental promises, of solemn oaths and the breaking of them, the
constitutionalists finally drove Mohammed Ali from Teheran in July,
1909. The Shah saved his life by taking refuge in the Russian
legation. A few days later, he took the road to exile. He has since
reappeared in Persia twice to stir up trouble in the north. On both
occasions, it was when the Russians were finding it hard to justify
their continued occupation of the northern provinces.
Mohammed Ali was succeeded by his son Ali Mirza, a boy of eleven years,
who was still too young to be anything more than a mere plaything in
the hands of successive regents.
The civil strife in Persia gave Great Britain and Russia the excuse for
entering the country. In accord with Great Britain, Russia sent an
expedition to occupy Tabriz on April 29, 1909. Later, Russian troops
occupied Ardebil, Recht, Kazvin, and other cities in the Russian sphere
of influence. Owing to the anarchy in the south during 1910, Great
Britain prepared to send troops "to protect the safety of the roads for
merchants." This was not actually done, for conditions of travel
slightly ameliorated. But Persia has rested since under the menace of
a British occupation.
Every effort made to bring order out of chaos in Persia has failed.
Serious attempts at financial {91} reform were undertaken by an
American mission, under the direction of a former American official in
the Philippine Islands.
The new American Treasurer-General would not admit that the
Anglo-Russian accord of 1907 was operative in Persia. One day in the
summer of 1911, I was walking along the Galata Quay in Constantinople.
I heard my name called from the deck of a vessel just about to leave
for Batum. Perched on top of two boxes containing typewriters, was a
young American from Boston, who was going out to help reform the
finances of Persia. I had talked to him the day before concerning the
extreme delicacy and difficulty of the task of the mission whose
secretary he was. But his refusal to admit the political limitations
of Oriental peoples made it impossible for him to see that
constitutional Persia was any different, or should be treated any
differently, from constitutional Massachusetts.
From the sequel of the story, it would seem that Mr. Shuster had the
same attitude of mind as his secretary. He refused to appoint fiscal
agents in the Russian "sphere" on any other ground than personal
fitness and ability. Russia protested. Mr. Shuster persisted. A
march on Teheran to expel the Americans was threatened. Persia yielded
and gave up the American mission--and her independence.
When Germany saw that the Russian troops had entered northern Persia
with the consent of Great Britain, and had come to stay, there was
nothing for her to do but to treat with Russia.
In November, 1910, when the Czar was visiting {92} the Kaiser, Russian
and German ministers exchanged views concerning the ground upon which
Germany would agree to the _fait accompli_ of Russia's exclusive
political interests in Northern Persia, and the Russian military
occupation. Satisfactory bases were found for an agreement between
Russia and Germany concerning their respective interests in Persia and
Asiatic Turkey. The Accord of Potsdam, as it is called, was made in
the form of a note presented by the Russian Government to Germany, and
accepted by her. Russia declared that she would in no way oppose the
realization of the project of the Bagdad railway up to the Persian
Gulf, and that she would construct to the border of Persia a railway to
join a spur of the Bagdad railway from Sadije to Khanikin. In return
for this, Germany was to promise not to construct railway lines outside
of the Bagdad railway zone, to declare that she had no political
interest in Persia, and to recognize that "Russia has special interests
in Northern Persia from the political, strategic, and economic points
of view." The German Government was to abandon any intention of
securing a concession for a trans-Persian railway. On the other hand,
Russia promised to maintain in Northern Persia the "open door," so that
German commercial interests should not be injured.
The accord between Russia and Germany was badly received everywhere.
France feared that Germany was trying to weaken the Franco-Russian
alliance. Great Britain did not look with favour upon a recognition by
Russia of German interests in Asiatic Turkey. The Sublime Porte felt
that {93} Russia and Germany had shown a disregard for the elementary
principles of courtesy in discussing and deciding questions that were
of tremendous importance to the future of Turkey without inviting the
Sublime Porte to take part in the negotiations. Turkey in the Potsdam
accord was ignored as completely as Morocco had been in the Algeciras
Convention and Persia in the Russo-British accord.
The Potsdam stipulations brought prominently before Europe the possible
significance of Germany's free hand in Anatolian and Mesopotamian
railway constructions. It also aroused interest in the possibility of
an all-rail route from Calais to Calcutta, in which all the Great
Powers except Italy would participate.
The trans-Persian and all other railway schemes in Persia came to
nothing. Between 1872 and 1890 twelve district railway projects had
received concessions from the Persian Government. One of these, the
Reuter group, actually started the construction of a line from the
Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. A French project for a railway from
Trebizond to Tabriz had gained powerful financial support. All these
schemes were frustrated by Russian diplomacy. In 1890, Russia secured
from the Persian Government the exclusive right for twenty-one years to
construct railways in Northern Persia. Needless to say, no lines were
built. Russia had all she could do with her trans-Siberian and
trans-Caucasian schemes. But she deliberately acted the dog in the
manger. By preventing private groups from building railways in Persia
which she would not {94} build herself, Russia has retarded the
economic progress, and is largely responsible for the financial,
military, and administrative weakness, of contemporary Persia. By the
accords of 1907 with Great Britain and 1911 with Germany, Russia
secured their connivance in still longer continuing this shameful
stagnation. To this day no railroad has been built in the Shah's
dominions.
Just a month before the outbreak of the European war, the boy Shah of
Persia was solemnly crowned at Teheran. It was an imposing and
pathetic ceremony. The Russians and British saw to it that full honour
should be given to the sovereign of Persia. The pathos of the event
was in the fact that the Russian and British legations at Teheran paid
the expenses of the coronation. The Shah received his crown from the
hands of his despoilers. A similar farce was enacted a little while
before in Morocco. Turkey alone of Moslem nations remains.
The last effort of Persia to shake off the Russian octopus was made on
October 8, 1914, when Russia was requested once more to withdraw her
troops from the Azerbaijan. The Russian Minister at Teheran, without
going through the form of referring the request to Petrograd, answered
that the interests of Russia and other foreign countries could be
safeguarded only by the continued occupation. To this response his
British colleague gave hearty assent.
The importance of the passing of Persia is two-fold. It shows how in
one more direction Germany found herself shut out from a possible field
of expansion. Through the weakness of Persia, Great Britain {95} and
Russia, after fifty years of bitter struggle, were able to come to a
satisfactory compromise. It was in Persia that their animosity was
buried, and that co-operation of British democracy and Russian
autocracy in a war against Germany was first envisaged. The failure of
the Persian constitutional Government was a tremendous blow to Germany.
It strengthened the bases of the Triple Entente. For the events of
1908 and 1909 put the accord to severe test, and proved that it was
built upon a solid foundation. The agony of one people is often the
joy of another. Has Persia suffered vicariously that France may be
saved?
{96}