ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR
In 1904, an accord was made between Great Britain and France in regard
to colonial policy in northern Africa. Great Britain recognized the
"special" interests of France in Morocco in exchange for French
recognition of Great Britain's "special" interests in Egypt. There was
a promise to defend each other in the protection of these interests,
but no actual agreement to carry this defence beyond the exercise of
diplomatic pressure. The accord was a secret one. Its exact terms
were not known until the incident of Agadir made necessary its
publication in November, 1911.
But that there was an accord was known to all the world. Germany, who
had long been looking with alarm upon the extension of French influence
in Morocco, found in 1905 a favourable moment for protest. Russia had
suffered humiliation and defeat in her war with Japan. Neither in a
military nor a financial way was she at that moment a factor to be
reckoned with in support of France. Great Britain had not recovered
from the disasters to her military organization of the South African
campaign. Her domestic politics were in a chaotic state. The {72}
Conservative Ministry was losing ground daily in bye elections; the
Irish question was coming to the front again.
German intervention in Morocco was sudden and theatrical. On March 31,
1905, a date of far-reaching importance in history, Emperor William
entered the harbour of Tangier upon his yacht, the _Hohenzollern_.
When he disembarked, he gave the cue to German policy by saluting the
representative of the Sultan, with peculiar emphasis, as the
representative of an independent sovereign. Then, turning to the
German residents in Morocco who had gathered to meet him, he said: "I
am happy to greet in you the devoted pioneers of German industry and
commerce, who are aiding in the task of keeping always in a high
position, in a _free land_, the interests of the mother country."
The repercussion of this visit to Tangier in France and in Great
Britain was electrical. It seemed to be, and was, a direct challenge
on the part of Germany for a share in shaping the destinies of Morocco.
It was an answer to the Anglo-French accord, in which Germany had been
ignored. Great Britain was in no position to go beyond mere words in
the standing behind France. France knew this. So did Germany. After
several months of fruitless negotiations between Berlin and Paris, on
June 6th, it was made plain to France that there must be a conference
on the Moroccan question.
M. Delcassé, at that time directing with consummate skill and courage
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urged upon the Cabinet the necessity
for accepting {73} Germany's challenge. But the Cabinet, after hearing
the sorrowful confessions of the Ministers of War and Navy, and
learning that France was not ready to fight, refused to accept the
advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. M. Delcassé resigned. A
blow had been struck at French prestige.
For six months the crisis continued in an acute stage. The
chauvinistic--or shall we say, patriotic?--elements were determined to
withstand what they called the Kaiser's interference in the _domestic_
affairs of France. But France seemed isolated at that moment, and
prudence was the part of wisdom. M. Rouvier declared to the Chamber of
Deputies on December 16th: "France cannot be without a Moroccan policy,
for the form and direction which the evolution of Morocco will take in
the future will influence in a decisive manner the destinies of our
North African possessions." France agreed to a conference, but won
from Germany the concession that France's special interests and rights
in Morocco would be admitted as the basis of the work of the conference.
On January 17, 1906, a conference of European States, to which the
United States of America was admitted, met to decide the international
status of Morocco. For some time the attitude of the German delegates
was uncompromising. They maintained the Kaiser's thesis as set forth
at Algiers: the _complete_ independence of Morocco, and sovereignty of
her Sultan. But they finally yielded, and acknowledged the right of
France and Spain to organize in Morocco an international police.
The Convention was signed on April 7th. It {74} provided for: (1)
police under the sovereign authority of the Sultan, recruited from
Moorish Moslems, and distributed in the eight open ports; (2) Spanish
and French officers, placed at his disposal by their governments, to
assist the Sultan; (3) limitation of the total effective of this police
force from two thousand to two thousand five hundred, of French and
Spanish officers, commissioned sixteen to twenty, and non-commissioned
thirty to forty, appointed for five years; (4) an Inspector General, a
high officer of the Swiss army, chosen subject to the approval of the
Sultan, with residence at Tangier; (5) a State Bank of Morocco, in
which each of the signatory Powers had the right to subscribe capital;
(6) the right of foreigners to acquire property, and to build upon it,
in any part of Morocco; (7) France's exclusive right to enforce
regulations in the frontier region of Algeria and a similar right to
Spain in the frontier region of Spain; (8) the preservation of the
public services of the Empire from alienation for private interests.
Chancellor von Bülow's speech in the _Reichstag_ on April 5, 1906, was
a justification of Germany's attitude. It showed that the policy of
Wilhelmstrasse had been far from bellicose, and that Germany's demands
were altogether reasonable. The time had come, declared the
Chancellor, when German interests in the remaining independent portions
of Africa and Asia must be considered by Europe. In going to Tangier
and in forcing the conference of Algeciras, Germany had laid down the
principle that there must be equal opportunities for {75} Germans in
independent countries, and had demonstrated that she was prepared to
enforce this principle.
When one considers the remarkable growth in population, and the
industrial and maritime evolution of Germany, this attitude cannot be
wondered at, much less condemned. Germany, deprived by her late
entrance among nations of fruitful colonies, was finding it necessary
to adopt and uphold the policy of trying to prevent the pre-emption,
for the benefit of her rivals, of those portions of the world which
were still free.
Neither France nor Spain had any feeling of loyalty toward the
Convention of Algeciras. However much may have been written to prove
this loyalty, the facts of the few years following Algeciras are
convincing. After 1908, Spain provoked and led on by the tremendous
expenditures entailed upon her by the Riff campaigns began to consider
the region of Morocco in which she was installed as exclusively Spanish
territory. French writers have expended much energy and ingenuity in
proving the disinterestedness of French efforts to enforce loyally the
decisions of Algeciras. But they have explained, they have protested,
too much. There has never been a moment that France has not dreamt of
the completion of the vast colonial empire in North Africa by the
inclusion of Morocco. It has been the goal for which all her military
and civil administrations in Algeria and the Sahara have been working.
To bring about the downfall of the Sultan's authority, not only press
campaigns were undertaken, but anarchy on the Algerian frontier {76}
was allowed to go on unchecked, until military measures seemed
justifiable.
In a similar way, the German colonists of Morocco did their best to
bring about another intervention by Germany. Their methods were so
despicable and outrageous that they had frequently to be disavowed
officially. In 1910, the German Foreign Office found the claims of
Mannesmann Brothers to certain mining privileges invalid, because they
did not fulfil the requirements of the Act of Algeciras. But the
Mannesmann mining group, as well as other German enterprises in
Morocco, were secretly encouraged to make all the trouble they could
for the French, while defending the authority of the Sultan. The
Casablanca incident is only one of numerous affronts which the French
were asked to swallow.
Great Britain had her part, though not through official agents, in the
intrigues. There is much food for thought in the motives that may, not
without reason, be imputed to the publication in the _Times_ of a
series of stories of Moroccan anarchy, and of Muley Hafid's cruelties.
In the spring of 1911, it was realized everywhere in Europe that the
Sultan's authority was even less than it had been in 1905. The Berber
tribes were in arms on all sides. In March, accounts began to appear
of danger at Fez, not only to European residents, but also to the
Sultan. The reports of the French Consul, and the telegrams of
correspondents of two Paris newspapers, were most alarming. On April
2d, it was announced that the Berber tribes {77} had actually attacked
the city and were besieging it. Everything was prepared for the final
act of the drama.
A relief column of native troops under Major Bremond arrived in Fez on
April 26th. The very next day, an urgent message for relief having
been received from Colonel Mangin in Fez, Colonel Brulard started for
the capital with another column. Without waiting for further word, a
French army which had been carefully prepared for the purpose, entered
Morocco under General Moinier. On May 21st, Fez was occupied by the
French. They found that all was well there with the Europeans and with
the natives. But, fortunately for the French plans, Muley Hafid's
brother had set himself up at Mequinez as pretender to the throne. The
Sultan could now retain his sovereignty only by putting himself under
the protection of the French army. Morocco had lost her independence!
Germany made no objection to the French expeditionary corps in April.
She certainly did not expect the quick succession of events in May
which brought her face to face with the _fait accompli_ of a strong
French army in Fez. As soon as it was realized at Berlin that the
fiction of Moroccan independence had been so skilfully terminated,
France was asked "what compensation she would give to Germany in return
for a free hand in Morocco." The _pourparlers_ dragged on through
several weeks in June. France refused to acknowledge any ground for
compensation to Germany. She maintained that the recent action in
Morocco had been at the request {78} of the Sultan, and that it was a
matter entirely between him and France.
Germany saw that a bold stroke was necessary. On July 1st, the gunboat
_Panther_ went to Agadir, a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. To
Great Britain and to France, the dispatch of the _Panther_ was
represented as due to the necessity of protecting German interests,
seeing that there was anarchy in that part of Morocco. But the German
newspapers, even those which were supposed to have official relations
with Wilhelmstrasse, spoke as if a demand for the cession of Mogador or
some other portion of Morocco was contemplated. The Chancellor
explained to the Reichstag that the sending of the _Panther_ was "to
show the world that Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed to one
side."
But in the negotiations through the German Ambassador in Paris, it was
clear that Germany was playing a game of political blackmail. The
German Foreign Office shifted its claims from Morocco to concessions in
Central Africa. On July 15th, Germany asked for the whole of the
French Congo from the sea to the River Sanga, and a renunciation in her
favour of France's contingent claims to the succession of the Belgian
Congo. The reason given to this demand was, that if Morocco were to
pass under a French protectorate, it was only just that compensation
should be given to Germany elsewhere. France, for the moment,
hesitated. She definitely refused to entertain the idea of
compensation as soon as she had received the assurance of the {79} aid
of Great Britain in supporting her against the German claims.
On July 1st, the German Ambassador had notified Sir Edward Grey of the
dispatch of the _Panther_ to Agadir "in response to the demand for
protection from German firms there," and explained that Germany
considered the question of Morocco reopened by the French occupation of
Fez, and thought that it would be possible to make an agreement with
Spain and France for the partition of Morocco. On July 4th, Sir Edward
Grey, after a consultation with the Cabinet, answered that Great
Britain could recognize no change in Morocco without consulting France,
to whom she was bound by treaty. The Ambassador then explained that
his Government would not consider the reopening of the question in a
European conference, that it was a matter directly between Germany and
France, and that his overture to Sir Edward Grey had been merely in the
nature of a friendly explanation.
Germany believed that the constitutional crisis in Great Britain was so
serious that the hands of the Liberal Cabinet would be tied, and that
they would not be so foolhardy as to back up France at the moment when
they themselves were being so bitterly assailed by the most influential
elements of the British electorate on the question of limiting the veto
power of the House of Lords. It was in this belief that Germany on
July 15th asked for territorial cessions from France in Central Africa.
Wilhelmstrasse thought the moment well chosen, and that there was every
hope of success.
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But the German mentality has never seemed to appreciate the frequent
lesson of history, that the British people are able to distinguish
clearly between matters of internal and external policy. Bitterly
assailed as a traitor to his country because he advocates certain
changes of laws, a British Cabinet Minister can still be conscious of
the fact that his bitterest opponents will rally around him when he
takes a stand on a matter of foreign policy. This knowledge of
admirable national solidarity enabled Mr. Lloyd George on July 21st,
the very day on which the King gave his consent to the creation of new
peers to bring the House of Lords to reason, at a Mansion House
banquet, to warn Germany against the danger of pressing her demands
upon France. The effect, both in London and Paris, was to unify and
strengthen resistance. It seemed as if the _Panther's_ visit to Agadir
had put Germany in the unenviable position of having made a threat
which she could not enforce.
But the ways of diplomacy are tortuous. Throughout August and
September, Germany blustered and threatened. In September, several
events happened which seemed to embarrass Russia and tie her hands, as
in the first Moroccan imbroglio of 1905. For Premier Stolypin was
assassinated at Kiev on September 14th; the United States denounced its
commercial treaty with Russia on account of the question of Jewish
passports; and the Shuster affair in Persia occupied the serious
attention of Russian diplomacy. Had it not been for the splendidly
loyal and scrupulous attitude of the {81} British Foreign Office
towards Russia in the Persian question, Germany might have been tempted
to force the issue with France.
German demands grew more moderate, but were not abandoned. For members
of the House of Commons, of the extreme Radical wing in the Liberal
party, began to put the British Government in an uncomfortable
position. Militarism, entangling alliances with a continental Power,
the necessity for agreement with Germany,--these were the subjects
which found their way from the floor of the House of Commons to the
public press. A portion of the Liberal party which had to be reckoned
with believed that Germany ought not to have been left out of the
Anglo-French agreement. So serious was the dissatisfaction, that the
Government deemed it necessary to make an explanation to the House.
Sir Edward Grey explained and defended the action of the Cabinet in
supporting the resistance of France to Germany's claims. The whole
history of the negotiation was revealed. The Anglo-French agreement of
1904 was published for the first time, and it was seen that this
agreement did not commit Great Britain to backing France by force of
arms.
Uncertainty of British support had the influence of bringing France to
consent to treat with Germany on the Moroccan question. Two agreements
were signed. By the first, Germany recognized the French protectorate
in Morocco, subject to the adhesion of the signers of the Convention of
Algeciras, and waived her right to take part in the negotiations
concerning Moroccan spheres of influence {82} between Spain and France.
On her side, France agreed to maintain the open door in Morocco, and to
refrain from any measures which would hinder the legitimate extension
of German commercial and mining interests. By the second agreement,
France ceded to Germany, in return for German cessions, certain
territories in southern and eastern Kamerun.
There was a stormy Parliamentary and newspaper discussion, both in
France and Germany, over these two treaties. No one was satisfied.
The treaties were finally ratified, but under protest.
In France, the Ministry was subject to severe criticism. There was
also some feeling of bitterness--perhaps a reaction from the
satisfaction over Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech--in the
uncertainty of Great Britain's support, as revealed by the November
discussions in the House of Commons. This uncertainty remained, as far
as French public opinion went, until Great Britain actually declared
war upon Germany in August, 1914.
In Germany, the _Reichstag_ debates revealed the belief that the Agadir
expedition had, on final analysis, resulted in a _fiasco_. An
astonishing amount of enmity against Great Britain was displayed. It
was when Herr Heydebrand made a bitter speech against Great Britain,
and denounced the pacific attitude of the German Government, in the
Reichstag session of November 10th, that the Crown Prince made public
his position in German foreign policy by applauding loudly.
The aftermath of Agadir, as far as it affected Morocco, resulted in the
establishment of the French {83} Protectorate, on March 30, 1912. The
Sultan signed away his independence by the Treaty of Fez. Foreign
legations at Fez ceased to exist, although diplomatic officials were
retained at Tangier. France voted the maintenance of forty thousand
troops in Morocco "for the purposes of pacification." The last
complications disappeared when, on November 27th, a Franco-Spanish
Treaty was signed at Madrid, in which the Spanish zones in Morocco were
defined, and both states promised not to erect fortifications or
strategic works on the Moroccan coast.
But the aftermath of Agadir in France and Germany has been an increase
in naval and military armaments, and the creation of a spirit of
tension which needed only the three years of war in the Ottoman Empire
to bring about the inevitable clash between Teuton and Gaul. Taken in
connection with the recent events in Alsace and Lorraine, and the
voting of the law increasing military service in France to three years,
the logical sequence of events is clear.
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