THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY
When the transrhenane provinces of the old German Empire were added to
France in the eighteenth century, the assimilation of these territories
was a far different proposition from their refusion into the mould of a
new German Empire in 1871. In the first place, the old German Empire
was a mediæval institution which, in the evolution of modern Europe,
was decaying. Alsace and Lorraine were not taken away from a political
organism of which they were a vital part. The ties severed were purely
dynastic. In the second place, the consciousness of national life was
awakened in Alsace and Lorraine during the time that they were under
French rule, and because they shared in the great movement of the birth
of democracy following the French Revolution.
France, then, by the Treaty of Frankfort, believed that she had been
robbed of a portion of her national territory. The people of the
annexed provinces, as was clearly shown by the statement of their
representatives at Bordeaux, did not desire to enter the German
Confederation.
{22}
Germany failed to do the only thing that could possibly have made her
new territories an integral part of the new Empire, _i.e._ to place
Alsace-Lorraine upon a footing of equality with the other states of the
Confederation, and make their entry that of an autonomous sovereign
state. Consequently, neither in France nor in the _Reichsland_ was the
Treaty of Frankfort accepted as a permanent change in the map of
Europe. Germany has always been compelled, in her international
politics, to count upon the possibility of France making an attempt to
win back the lost provinces. She has sought to form alliances to
strengthen her own position in Europe, and to keep France weak.
France, the continued object of German hostility, has found herself
compelled to ally herself with Russia, with whom she has never had
anything in common, and to compound her colonial rivalries in Africa
with her hereditary enemy, Great Britain. This is the first cause of
the unrest in Europe that has culminated in a general European war.
The second cause is the _Weltpolitik_ of Germany which has brought the
German Empire into conflict with Great Britain and France outside of
Europe, and with Russia in Europe.
On the map of Europe, Russia, Great Britain, and France are, in 1914,
practically what they were in 1815. The changes, logical and in
accordance with the spirit of centralization of the nineteenth century,
have transformed middle and south-eastern Europe. The changes in
south-eastern Europe have been effected at the expense of the Ottoman
Empire, and {23} have been a gradual development throughout the
century, from the outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1822 to the
Treaty of London in 1913. In middle Europe, during the twelve years
between 1859 and 1871, the three Powers whose national unity, racially
as well as politically, was already achieved at the time of the
Congress of Vienna, were brought face to face with three new Powers,
united Germany, united Italy, and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.
The nineteenth century has been called the age of European
colonization. Europe began to follow its commerce with other
continents by the imposition of its civilization and its political
system upon weaker races. Checked by the rising republic of the United
States from encroaching upon the liberties of the peoples of North and
South America, there have been no acquisitions of territory by European
nations in the western continents since the Congress of Vienna.
European expansion directed itself towards Africa, Asia, and the
islands of the oceans. There was no Oriental nation strong enough to
promulgate a Monroe Doctrine.
In extra-European activities, Great Britain, France, and Russia were
the pioneers. That they succeeded during the nineteenth century in
placing under their flag the choicest portions of Africa and the
backward nations of Asia, was due neither to the superior enterprise
and energy, nor to the greater foresight, of the Anglo-Saxon, French,
and Russian nations. They had achieved their national unity, and they
were geographically in a position to take advantage of the great
opportunities which were opening to the world {24} for colonization
since the development of the steamship and the telegraph.
But the other three Powers of Europe came late upon the scene. It has
only been within the last quarter of a century that Germany and Italy
have been in the position to look for overseas possessions. It has
only been within the last quarter of a century that Austria, finding
her union with Hungary a durable one, has been able to think of looking
beyond her limits to play a part, as other nations had long been doing,
in the history of the outside world.
By every force of circumstances, the three new States--threatened by
their neighbours, who had looked with jealous, though powerless, eyes
upon their consolidation--were brought together into a defensive
alliance. The Powers of the Triple Alliance drifted into a union of
common general aims and ambitions, if not of particular interests,
against their three more fortunate rivals, who had been annexing the
best portions of the Asiatic and African continents while they were
struggling with internal problems.
Oceans of ink have been wasted upon polemics against the
peace-disturbing character of the Triple Alliance. Especially has
Germany and her growing _Weltpolitik_ been subject to criticism,
continuous and untiring, on the part of the British and French press.
But the question after all is a very simple one: the three newer Powers
of Europe have not been willing to be content with an application in
practical world politics of the principle that "to him that hath shall
be given." Germany and Italy, transformed under {25} modern economic
conditions into industrial states, have been looking for outside
markets, and they have wanted to enjoy those markets in regions of the
globe either actually under their flag or subjected to their political
influence. In other words, they have wanted their share in the
division of Africa and Asia into spheres under the control of European
nations.
Is a logical and legitimate ambition to play a part in the world's
politics in proportion to one's population, one's wealth, one's
industrial and maritime activity, necessarily a menace to the world's
peace? It has always been, and I suppose always will be, in the nature
of those who have, to look with alarm upon the efforts of those who
have not, to possess something. Thus capital, irrespective of epoch or
nationality or of religion, has raised the cry of alarm when it has
seen the tendency for betterment, for education, for the development of
ideals and a sense of justice on the part of labour. In just the same
way, Russia with her great path across the northern half of Asia and
her new and steadily growing empire in the Caucasus and central Asia;
France with the greater part of northern and central Africa, and an
important corner of Asia under her flag; and Great Britain with her
vast territories in every portion of the globe, raised the cry of
"Wolf, Wolf!" when the Powers of the Triple Alliance began to look with
envious eye upon the rich colonies of their neighbours, and to pick up
by clever diplomacy--and brutal force, if you wish--a few crumbs of
what was still left for themselves.
The result of these alarming ambitions of the {26} Triple Alliance has
been the coming together of Russia, France, and England, hereditary
enemies in former days but now friends and allies, in the maintenance
of the colonial "trust."
The great cry of the Triple Entente is the maintenance of the European
equilibrium. For this they have reason. Europe could know no lasting
peace under Teutonic aggression. But is there not also to the account
of the Triple Entente some blame for the unrest in Europe and for the
great catastrophe which has come upon the world? For while their
policy has been the maintenance of the European equilibrium, it has
been coupled with the maintenance of an extra-European balance of power
wholly in their favour.
The sense of justice, of historical proportion, and the logic of
economic evolution make one sympathize, in abstract principle, not only
with the _Weltpolitik_ of Germany, but also with Austria-Hungary's
desire for an outlet to the sea, and with Italy's longing to have in
the Mediterranean the position which history and geography indicated
ought to be, and might again be, hers.
But sympathy in abstract principle is quite another thing from sympathy
in fact. In order to appreciate the _Weltpolitik_ of Germany, and be
able to form an intelligent opinion in regard to it--_for it is the
most vital and burning problem in the world to-day_--we must consider
it from the point of view of its _full significance in practice_ in the
history of the world.
Bismarck posed as the disinterested "honest courtier" of Europe in the
Congress of Berlin. The declaration he had made, that the whole
question {27} of the Orient "was not worth the finger bone of a
Pomeranian grenadier," was corroborated by his actions during the
sessions of the Congress. We have striking illustrations of this in
the memoirs of Karatheodory pasha, who recorded from day to day, during
the memorable sessions of the Congress, his astonishment at the
indifference which Bismarck displayed to the nationalities of the
Balkans, and to the complications which might arise in Europe from
their rivalries.
Bismarck did not see how vital was to be the Balkan question with the
future of the nation he had built. Nor did he see the intimate
relationship between the economic progress of united Germany and the
question of colonies. One searches in vain the speeches and writings
of the Iron Chancellor for any reference to the importance of the two
problems, in seeking the solution of which the fabric of his building
is threatened with destruction.
Perhaps it is easy for us, in looking backwards, to point out the lack
of foresight which was shown by Bismarck in regard to the future of
Germany. Forty-five years later, we are able to pass in review the
unforeseen developments of international politics and the amazing
economic evolution of contemporary Europe. Perhaps it is unreasonable
to expect that much attention and thought should have been given by the
maker of modern Germany to the possible sphere that Germany might be
called upon to play in the world outside of Europe.
For we must remember that the new Germany, after the Franco-Prussian
War, was wholly in an {28} experimental stage, and that the duty at
hand was the immediate consolidation of the various states into a
political and economic fabric. There was enough to demand all the
attention and all the genius of Bismarck and his co-workers in solving
these problems. Cordial relationship with Austria had to be
reëstablished. The dynasties of the south German kingdoms and of the
lesser potentates, whose names still remained legion in spite of the
_Reichsdeputationshauptschluss_ of 1803, had to be carefully handled.
There were four definite internal problems which confronted Bismarck:
the relationship of the empire to the Catholic Church; the
reconciliation of the different peoples into a harmonious whole; the
establishment of representative government without giving the strong
socialistic elements the upper hand; and the development of the
economic wealth of Germany.
There was little time to think of Germany's place in the world's
politics. In foreign affairs, it was considered that the exigencies of
the moment could be met by adopting a policy of conciliation towards
both Russia and Austria, and the winning of the friendship of Italy.
The _Kulturkampf_, the creation of the _Bundesrath_ under Prussian
hegemony, and the formation of the Triple Alliance and the events
connected with them, are important in an analysis of Germany's
international politics. Unfortunately we cannot bring them into the
scope of this book. We can mention only the various factors that have
been directly responsible for giving birth to what is called the
_Weltpolitik_.
{29}
These factors are the belief of the German people in the superiority of
their race and its world-civilizing mission; their connotation of the
word "German"; the consciousness of their military strength being
disproportionate to their political influence; the rapid increase of
the population and the development of the industrial and commercial
prosperity of the empire; and the realization of the necessity of a
strong navy, with naval bases and coaling-stations in all parts of the
world, for the adequate protection of commerce.
_The belief of the German people in the superiority of their race and
its world-civilizing mission is a sober fact_. It pervades every class
of society from the Kaiser down to the workingman. It is heralded from
the pulpit, taught in the schools, and is a scientific statement in the
work of many of Germany's leading scholars. The anthropologist
Woltmann said that "the German is the superior type of the species
_homo sapiens_, from the physical as well as the intellectual point of
view." Wirth declared that "the world owes its civilization to Germany
alone" and that "the time is near when the earth must inevitably be
conquered by the Germans." The scientific book--a serious one--in
which these statements occur was so popular that it sold five editions
in three years! Paulsen remarked that "humanity is aware of, and
admires, the German omnipresence." Hartmann taught that the European
family is divided into two races, male and female, of which the first,
of course, was exclusively German, while the second included Latins,
Celts, and Slavs. "Marriage is inevitable." Goethe expressed in
_Faust_ the opinion that the work {30} of the Germans was to make the
habitable world worth living in, while Schiller boasted, "Our language
shall reign over the whole world," and that "the German day lasts until
the end of time." Schiller also prophesied that "two empires shall
perish in east and west, I tell you, and it is only the Lutheran faith
which shall remain." Fichte, one hundred years ago, exhorted the
Germans to be "German patriots, and we shall not cease to be
cosmopolitan." Heine believed that "not only Alsace and Lorraine, but
all France shall be ours."
To show the German state of mind towards those whom they have not
hesitated to provoke to arms, the remarkable teaching of Hummel's book,
which is used in the German primary schools, is a convincing
illustration. Frenchmen are monkeys, and the best and strongest
elements in the French race asserted to be German by blood. The
Russians are slaves, as their name implies. Treitschke's opinion of
the British is that "among them love of money has killed all sentiment
of honour and all distinction of just and unjust. Their setting sun is
our aurora." One of the leading newspapers of Germany recently said:
"The army of the first line of which Germany will dispose from the
first day of the mobilization will be sufficient to crush France, even
if we must detach a part of it against England. If England enters the
war, it will be the end of the British Empire, for England is a
colossus with feet of clay."
The Kaiser has been the spokesman of the nation in heralding publicly
the belief in the superiority of the German people, and its world
mission. It was {31} at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding
of the Empire that the scope of the _Weltpolitik_ was announced by
Wilhelm II. He said:
"The German Empire has become a world empire (_ein Weltreich_).
Everywhere, in the most distant lands, are established thousands and
thousands of our compatriots. German science, German activity, the
defenders of the German ideal pass the ocean. By thousands of millions
we count the wealth that Germany transports across the seas. It is
your duty, gentlemen, to aid me to establish strong bonds between our
Empire of Europe and this greater German Empire (_dieses grëssere
Deutsche Reich_) ... May our German Fatherland become one day so
powerful that, as one formerly used to say, _Civis romanus sum_, one
may in the future need only to say, _Ich bin ein deutscher Burger_."
At Aix-la-Chapelle, on June 20, 1902, he revealed his ambition in one
sentence, "_It is to the empire of the world that the German genius
aspires_." Just before leaving for the visit to Tangier in 1905--the
visit which was really the beginning of one of the great issues of the
present war--he said at Bremen: "If later one must speak in history of
a universal domination by the Hohenzollern, of a universal German
empire, this domination must not be established by military
conquest.... _God has called us to civilize the world: we are the
missionaries of human progress_." This idea was developed further at
Münster, on September 1, 1907, when the Kaiser proclaimed: "The German
people will be the block of granite on which our Lord will be able to
elevate and achieve the civilization of the world!"
{32}
This attitude of mind is as common among the disciples of those
wonderful leaders who founded the international movement for the
solidarity of interests of labour, as it is among the aristocratic and
intellectual elements of the nation. The German Socialist has
proclaimed the brotherhood of man, and the common antagonism of the
wage-earners of the world against their capitalistic oppressors. But,
for all his preaching, the German Socialist is first of all a German.
He has come to believe that the mission of Socialism will be best
fulfilled through the triumph of Germanism. This belief is sincere.
It is a far cry from Karl Marx to the militant--or rather
militarist--German Socialist, bearing arms gladly upon the battlefields
of Europe to-day, because he is inspired by the thought that the
triumph of the army in which he fights will aid the cause of
Socialism.[1]
[1] While the _Landtage_ of the German states are mostly controlled by
Conservative elements, owing to restricted suffrage, the _Reichstag_ is
one of the most intelligently democratic legislative bodies in the
world. Its social legislation is surpassed by that of no other
country. During thirty years the Socialist vote in Germany has
increased one thousand per cent. It now represents one-third of the
total electorate. But the Socialists are to a man behind the war.
There is a striking analogy between the German Socialist of the present
generation and the Jacobins of 1793. The heralders of _Liberté,
Egalité et Fraternité_ fought for the spread of the principles of the
Revolution through God's chosen instruments, the armies of France, and
were carried away by their enthusiasm until they became the facile
agents for saddling Europe with the tyranny of Napoleon. Love for {33}
humanity was turned into blood-lust, and fighting for freedom into
seeking for booty and glory. Are the profound thinkers of the German
universities, and the visionaries of the workingmen's forums following
to-day the same path? Does the propagation of an ideal lead inevitably
to a blind fanaticism, where the dreamer becomes in his own imagination
a chosen instrument of God to shed blood?
There is undoubtedly an intellectual and idealistic basis to German
militarism and to German arrogance.
_Their connotation of the word_ "_German_" has led the Germans to look
upon territories outside of their political confines as historically
and racially, hence rightfully, virtually, and eventually theirs. A
geography now in its two hundred and forty-fifth edition in the public
schools (Daniel's _Leitfaden der Geographie_) states that "Germany is
the heart of Europe. Around it extend Austria, Switzerland, Belgium,
Luxemburg, and Holland, which were all formerly part of the same state,
and are peopled entirely or in the majority by Germans."
When German children have been for the past generation deliberately
taught as a matter of fact--not as an academic or debatable
question--that _Deutschland_ ought to be more than it is, we can
understand how the neutrality of their smaller neighbours seems to the
Germans a negligible consideration. No wonder the soldiers who ran up
against an implacable enemy at Liège, Namur, and Charleroi thought
there must be a mistake somewhere, and were more angered against the
opposition of those whom they regarded as their brothers of {34} blood
than they later showed themselves against the French. No wonder that
the sentiment of the whole German nation is for the retention of
Belgium, their path to the sea. It was formerly German. Its
inhabitants are German. Let it become German once more!
But to the Germans there are other and equally important elements
belonging to their nation outside of the states upon the confines of
the empire. These are the German emigrants and German colonists in all
portions of the world. In recent years there has come to the front
more than ever the theory that _German nationality cannot be lost by
foreign residence or by transference of allegiance to another State:
once a German, always a German_.
Convincing proof of this is found in the new citizenship law,
sanctioned with practical unanimity by the _Reichstag_ and
_Bundesrath_, which went into effect on January 1, 1914. According to
Article XIII of this law, "a former German who has not taken up his
residence in Germany may on application be naturalized." This applies
also _to one who is descended from a former German, or who has been
adopted as the child of such_! According to Article XIV, any former
German who holds a position in the German Empire in any part of the
world, in the service of a German religious society or of a German
school, is looked upon as a German citizen "by assumption." Any
foreigner holding such a position may be naturalized without having a
legal residence in Germany. The most interesting provision of all is
in Article XXV, section 2 of which says: "Citizenship is not lost by
{35} one who before acquiring foreign citizenship has secured on
application the written consent of the competent authorities of his
home state to retain his citizenship."
Germany allows anyone of German blood to become a German citizen, even
if he has never seen Germany and has no intention of taking up his
residence there; and Germans, who have emigrated to other countries,
secure the amazing opportunity to acquire foreign citizenship without
losing their German citizenship.
The result of this law, since the war broke out, has been to place a
natural and justifiable suspicion upon all Germans living in the
countries of the enemies of Germany. It is impossible to overestimate
the peril from the secret ill-will and espionage of Germans residing in
the countries that are at war with Germany. There are undoubtedly many
thousands of cases where Germans have been honest and sincere in their
change of allegiance, but how are the nations where they have become
naturalized to be sure of this? A legal means has been given to these
naturalized Germans to retain, _without the knowledge of the nation
where their oath of allegiance has been received in good faith_,
citizenship in Germany.
German emigration and colonization societies, and many seemingly purely
religious organizations for "the propagation of the faith in foreign
lands," have been untiring in their efforts to preserve in the minds of
Germans who have left the Fatherland the principle, "once a German
always a German." The Catholic as well as the Lutheran Church has lent
{36} itself to this effort. Wherever there are Germans, one finds the
German church, the German school, the _Zeitung_, the _Bierhalle_, and
the _Turnverein_. The Deutschtum is sacred to the Germans. One cannot
but have the deepest respect for the pride of Germans in their
ancestry, in their language, in their church, and in the preservation
of traditional customs. There is no better blood in the world than
German blood, and one who has it in his veins may well be proud of it:
for it is an inheritance which is distinctly to a man's intellectual
and physical advantage. But, in recent years, the effort has been made
to confuse _Deutschtum_ with _Deutschland_. Here lies a great danger.
We may admire and reverence all that has come to us from Germany. But
the world cannot look on impassively at a propaganda which is leading
to _Deutschland über alles!_
When we take the megalomania of the Germans, their ambition to fulfil
their world mission, their belief in their peculiar fitness to fulfil
that mission, and their idea of the German character of the
neighbouring states, and contrast the dream with the reality, we see
how they must feel, _especially as they are conscious of the fact that
they dispose of a military strength disproportionate to their position
in mondial politics_. Great Britain, with one-third less population,
"the colossus with the feet of clay," owns a good fourth of the whole
world; France, the nation of "monkeys," which was easily crushed in
1870, holds sway over untold millions of acres and natives in Africa
and Asia; while Russia, the nation of "slaves," has a half of Europe
and Asia.
{37}
The most civilized people in the world, with a world mission to fulfil,
is dispossessed by its rivals of inferior races _and of inferior
military strength_! The thinking German is by the very nature of
things a militarist.
But even if the _logic_ of the _Weltpolitik_, under the force of
circumstances, did not push the German of every class and category to
the belief that Germany must solve her great problems of the present
day by force of arms, especially since her military strength is so much
greater than that of her rivals, the nature of the German would make
him lean towards force as the decisive argument in the question of
extending his influence. For from the beginning of history the
_German_ has been a _war man_. He has asserted himself by force. He
has proved less amenable to the refining and softening influences of
Christianity and civilization than any other European race. He has
worshipped force, and relied wholly upon force to dominate those with
whom he has come into contact. The leopard cannot change his spots.
So it is as natural for the German of the twentieth century to use the
sword as an argument as it was for the German of the tenth century, or,
indeed, of the first century. We cannot too strongly insist upon this
fatal tendency of the German to subordinate natural, moral, legal, and
technical rights to the supremacy of brute force. There is no
conception of what is called "moral suasion" in the German mind.
Although some of the greatest thinkers of the world have been and are
to-day Germans, yet the German nation has never come to the realization
that the pen {38} may be mightier than the sword. Give the German a
pen, and he will hold the world in admiration of his intellect. Give
him a piano or a violin, and he will hold the world in adoration of his
soul. But give him a sword, and he will hold the world in abhorrence
of his force. For there never was an _übermensch_ who was not a devil.
Else he would be God.
But the _Weltpolitik_ has had other and more tangible and substantial
causes than the three we have been considering. It is not wholly the
result of the German idea that Germany can impose her will upon the
world and has the right to do so. The power of Germany comes from the
fact that her people have been workers as well as dreamers. _The rapid
increase of the population and development of the industrial and
commercial prosperity of the empire_ have given the Germans a wholly
justifiable economic foundation for their _Weltpolitik_.
United Germany, after the successful war of 1870, began the greatest
era of industrial growth and prosperity that has ever been known in the
history of the world. Not even the United States, with all its annual
immigration and opening up of new fields and territories, has been able
to show an industrial growth comparable to that of Germany during the
past forty years. In this old central Europe cities have grown almost
over night. Railways have been laid down, one after the other, until
the whole empire is a network of steel. Mines and factories have
sprung into being as miraculously as if it had been by the rubbing of
Aladdin's lamp. The population has increased more than half in forty
years.
{39}
It was as her population and her productive power increased far more
quickly and far beyond that of her neighbours, that Germany began to
look out into the extra-European world for markets. She had reached
the point when her productivity, in manufacturing lines, had exceeded
her power of consumption. Where find markets for the goods? German
merchants, and not Prussian militarists, began to spread abroad in
Germany the idea that there was a world equilibrium, as important to
the future of the nations of Europe as was the European equilibrium.
Germany, looking out over the world, saw that the prosperity of Great
Britain was due to her trade, and that the security and volume of this
trade were due to her colonies.
Who does not remember the remarkable stamp issued by the Dominion of
Canada to celebrate the Jubilee of Queen Victoria? On the mercatorial
projection of the world, the British possessions were given in red.
One could not find any corner of the globe where there were not ports
to which British ships in transit could go, and friendly markets for
British commerce. The Germans began to compare their industries with
those of Great Britain. Their population was larger than that of the
great colonial power, and was increasing more rapidly. Their
industries were growing apace. For their excess population, emigration
to a foreign country meant annual loss of energetic and capable
compatriots. Commerce had to meet unfair competition in every part of
the world. Outside of the Baltic and North Seas, there was no place
that a {40} German ship could touch over which the German flag waved.
It was not militarism or chauvinism or megalomania, but the natural
desire of a people who found themselves becoming prosperous to put
secure and solid foundations under that prosperity, that made the
Germans seek for colonies and launch forth upon the _Weltpolitik_.
The first instance of the awakening on the part of the German people to
a sense that there was something which interested them outside of
Europe, was the annexation by Great Britain in 1874 of the Fiji
Islands, with which German traders had just begun, at great risk and
painstaking efforts, to build up a business. This was the time when
the Government was engaged in its struggles with the Church and
socialism, and when the working of the _Reichstag_ and the _Bundesrath_
was still in an experimental stage. Nothing could be done. _But there
began to be a feeling among Germans that in the future Germany ought to
be consulted concerning the further extension of the sovereignty of a
European nation over any part of the world then unoccupied or still
independent_. But Germany was not in a position either to translate
this sentiment into a vigorous foreign policy, or to begin to seize her
share of the world by taking the portions which Great Britain and
Russia and France had still left vacant.
German trade, still in its infancy, received cruel setbacks by the
British occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and of Egypt in 1883, the French
occupation of Tunis in 1881, and the Russian and British dealings {41}
with central Asia and Afghanistan. The sentiment of the educated and
moneyed classes in Germany began to impose upon the Government the
necessity of entering the colonial field. The action in Egypt and in
Tunis brought about the beginning of German colonization. Bismarck had
just finished successfully his critical struggle with the socialists.
The decks were cleared for action. In 1882, a Bremen trader, Herr
Lüdritz, by treaties with the native chiefs, gained the Bay of
Angra-Pequena on the west coast of Africa. For two years no attention
was paid to this treaty, which was a purely private commercial affair.
In 1884, shortly after the occupation of Egypt, a dispute arose between
the British authorities at Cape Town and Herr Lüdritz. Bismarck saw
that he must act, or the old story of extension of British sovereignty
would be repeated. He telegraphed to the German Consul at Cape Town
that the Imperial Government had annexed the coast and _hinterland_
from the Orange River to Cape Frio.
Other annexations in Africa and the Pacific followed in the years
1884-1886. In Africa, the German flag was hoisted over the east coast
of the continent, north of Cape Delgado and the river Rovuma, and in
Kamerun and Togo on the Gulf of Guinea. In the Pacific, Kaiser
Wilhelm's Land was formed of a portion of New Guinea, with some
adjacent islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomon Islands,
and the Marshall Islands were gathered in. Since those early years of
feverish activity, there have been no new acquisitions in Africa, other
than the portion of French Congo ceded {42} in 1912 as "compensation"
for the French protectorate of Morocco. In the Pacific, in 1899, after
the American conquest of the Philippines, the Caroline, Pelew, and
Marianne groups and two of the Samoan Islands were added.
In China, Germany believed that she had the right to expect to gain a
position equal to that of Great Britain at Hongkong and Shanghai, of
France at Tonkin, and Russia in Manchuria. She believed that it was
just as necessary for her to have a fortified port to serve as a naval
base for her fleet as it was for the other Powers, and that by a
possession of territory which could be called her own she would be best
able to get her share of the commerce of the Far East. From 1895 to
1897, Germany examined carefully all the possible places which would
serve best for the establishment of a naval and commercial base. At
the beginning of 1897, after naval and commercial missions had made
their reports, a technical mission was sent out whose membership
included the famous Franzius, the creator of Kiel. This mission
reported in favour of Kiau-Chau on the peninsula of Shantung in north
China.
When negotiations were opened with the Chinese, the answer of the
Chinese Government was to send soldiers to guard the bay! The Kaiser,
in a visit to the Czar at Peterhof in the summer of 1897, secured
Russian "benevolent neutrality." The murder of two missionaries in the
interior of the province, on November 1st of the same year, gave
Germany her chance. Three German war vessels landed troops on the
peninsula, and seized Kiau-Chau and Tsing-Tau. {43} After five months
of tortuous negotiations, a treaty was concluded between Germany and
China on March 6, 1899. Kiau-Chau with adjacent territory was leased
to Germany for ninety-nine years. To German capital and German
commerce were given the right of preference for every industrial
enterprise on the peninsula, the concession for the immediate
construction of a railway, and the exclusive right to mining along the
line of the railway. Thus the greater part of the province of Shantung
passed under the economic influence of Germany.
The entry of Japan into the war of 1914 is due to her desire to remedy
a great injustice which has been done to Japanese commerce in the
province of Shantung by the German occupation, to her fear of this
naval base opposite her coast (just as she feared Port Arthur), and
probably to the intention of occupying the Marianne Islands, the
Marshall Islands, and the Eastern and Western Carolines, in order that
the Japanese navy may have important bases in a possible future
conflict with the United States.
When Germany leased Kiau-Chau, she declared solemnly that the port of
Tsing-Tau would be an open port, _ein frei Hafen für allen Nationen_.
But Japanese trade competition soon caused her to go back on her word.
She conceived a clever scheme in 1906, by which the Chinese customs
duties were allowed to be collected within the Protectorate in return
for an annual sum of twenty per cent. upon the entire customs receipts
of the Tsing-Tau district. In this way, she is more than recompensed
for the generosity displayed in allowing German goods to {44} be
subject to the Chinese customs. She reimburses herself at the expense
of the Japanese! Berlin could not have been astonished at the
ultimatum of August 15th from Tokio.
There has always been much opposition in Germany to the colonization
policy of the Government, the dissatisfaction over the poor success of
the attempts at African colonization led Chancellor Caprivi to state
that the worst blow an enemy could give him was to force upon him more
territories in Africa! The Germans never got on well with the negroes.
Their colonists, for the most part too poor to finance properly
agricultural schemes, lived by trading. Like all whites, they cheated
the natives and bullied them into giving up their lands. In South-West
Africa, a formidable uprising of the Herreros resulted in the massacre
of all the Germans except the missionaries and the colonists who had
established themselves there before the German occupation. The
suppression of this rebellion took more than a year, and cost Germany
an appalling sum in money and many lives. But it cost the natives
more. Two thirds of the nation of the Herreros were massacred: while
only six or seven thousand were in arms, the German official report
stated that forty thousand were killed. The Germans confiscated all
the lands of the natives.
In 1906, after twenty-one years of German rule, there were in
South-West Africa sixteen thousand prisoners of war out of a total
native population of thirty-one thousand. All the natives lived in
concentration camps, and were forced to work for the {45} Government.
In commenting upon the Herrero campaign, Pastor Frenssen, one of the
most brilliant writers of modern Germany, put in the mouth of the hero
of his colonial novel the following words: "God has given us the
victory because we were the most noble race, and the most filled with
initiative. That is not saying much, when we compare ourselves with
this race of negroes; but we must act in such a way as to become better
and more active than all the other people of the world. It is to the
most noble, to the most firm that the world belongs. Such is the
justice of God."
German opposition has been bitter also against the occupation of
Kiau-Chau. For traders have claimed that the _political_ presence of
Germany on the Shantung peninsula and the dealings of the German
diplomats with the Pekin court had so prejudiced the Chinese against
everything German that it was harder to do business with them than
before the leasehold was granted. They actually advocated the
withdrawal of the protectorate for the good of German commerce!
But German pride was at stake in Africa after the Herrero rebellion.
And in China, Kiau-Chau was too valuable a naval base to give up. In
1907, a ministry of colonies was added to the Imperial Cabinet. Since
then the colonial realm has been considered an integral part of the
Empire.
At every point of this colonial development, Germany found herself
confronted with open opposition and secret intrigue. The principal
strategic value of south-west Africa was taken away by the {46} British
possession of Walfisch Bay, and of east Africa by the protectorate
consented to by the Sultan of Zanzibar to the British Crown. Togoland
and Kamerun are hemmed in by French and British possession of the
_hinterland_. The Pacific islands are mostly "left-overs," or of minor
importance. In spite of the unpromising character of these colonies,
the commerce of Germany with them increased from 1908 to 1912 five
hundred per cent., and the commerce with China through Kiau-Chau from
1902 to 1912 nearly a thousand per cent.
And yet, in comparison to her energies and her willingness--let us
leave till later the question of ability and fitness--Germany has had
little opportunity to exercise a colonial administration on a large
scale. She must seek to extend her political influence over new
territories. Where and how? That has been the question. Most
promising of all appeared the succession to the Portuguese colonies,
for the sharing of which Great Britain declared her willingness to meet
Germany halfway. An accord was made in 1898, against the eventuality
of Portugal selling her colonies. But since the Republic was
proclaimed in Portugal, there has been little hope that her new
Government would consider itself strong enough to part with the
heritage of several centuries.
For the increase of her colonial empire, Germany has felt little hope.
So she has tried to secure commercial privileges in various parts of
the world, through which political control might eventually come. We
have already spoken of her effort in {47} China. Separate chapters
treat of her efforts in the three Moslem countries, Morocco, Persia,
and Turkey, and show how in each case she has found herself checkmated
by the intrigues and accords of the three rich colonial Powers.
Long before the political union of the German States in Europe was
accomplished, there were German aspirations in regard to the New World,
when Pan-Germanists dreamed of forming states in North and South
America.
These enthusiasts did not see that the Civil War had so brought
together the various elements of the United States, the most prominent
and most loyal of which was the German element, that any hope of a
separatist movement in the United States was chimerical. As late as
1885, however, the third edition of Roscher's _Kolonien,
Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung_ stated that "it would be a great step
forward, if the German immigrants to North America would be willing to
concentrate themselves in one of the states, and transform it into a
German state." For different reasons Wisconsin would appear to be most
particularly indicated.
As early as 1849, the Germans commenced to organize emigration to
Brazil through a private society of Hamburg (_Hamburger
Kolonisationverein_), which bought from the Prince de Joinville,
brother-in-law of Dom Pedro, vast territories in the state of Santa
Catharina. There the German colonization in Brazil began. It soon
extended to the neighbouring states of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul.
There are now about three hundred and fifty thousand {48} Germans,
forming two per cent. of the population. In no district are they more
than fifteen per cent. However, in Rio Grande, there is a territory of
two hundred kilometres in which the German language is almost wholly
spoken; and a chain of German colonies binds Sao Leopoldo to Santa Cruz.
Among the Pan-Germanists, the three states of southern Brazil have been
regarded as a zone particularly reserved for German expansion. The
colonial congress of 1902 at Berlin expressed a formal desire that
hereafter German emigration be directed towards the south of Brazil.
An amendment to include Argentina was rejected. The decree of Prussia,
forbidding emigration to Brazil, was revoked in 1896 in so far as it
was a question of the three states of Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio
Grande do Sul.
It has not been very many years since diplomatic incidents arose
between Brazil and Germany over fancied German violation of Brazilian
territory by the arrest of sailors on shore. But Germany has not
entertained serious hope of getting a foothold in South America.
Brazil has increased greatly in strength, and there is to-day in South
America a tacit alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to
support the American Monroe Doctrine. Germany found, when she was
trying to buy a West India island from Denmark, that she had to reckon
not only with Washington, but also with Buenos Ayres, Rio, and Santiago.
Finding herself so thoroughly hemmed in on all sides, in the New World
and in the Old World, by alliances and accords directed against her
overseas {49} political expansion, modern Germany has repeated the
history of the Jews. Deprived of some senses, one develops
extraordinarily others. Deprived of civil and social rights for
centuries, the Jews developed the business sense until to-day their
wealth and influence in the business world are far beyond the
proportionate numbers of their race. Deprived of the opportunity to
administer and develop vast overseas territories, the Germans have
turned to intensive military development at home and extensive
commercial development abroad, until to-day they are the foremost
military Power in Europe, and are threatening British commercial
supremacy in every part of the globe.
The German counterpart of the British and French and Russian elements
that are directing the destinies of vast colonies and protectorates is
investing its energy in business. During the past generation, the
German campaign for the markets of the world has been carried on by the
brightest and best minds in Germany. There have been three phases to
this campaign: manufacturing the goods, selling the goods, and carrying
the goods. German manufactures have increased so greatly in volume and
scope since the accession of the present Emperor that there is hardly a
line of merchandise which is not offered in the markets of the world by
German firms.
Articles "made in Germany" may not be as well made as those of other
countries. But their price is more attractive, and they have driven
other goods from many fields. One sees this right in Europe in the
markets of Germany's competitors and enemies. {50} Since the present
war began, French and British patriots are hard put to it sometimes
when they find that article after article which they have been
accustomed to buy is German. In my home in Paris, the elevator is
German, electrical fixtures are German, the range in my kitchen is
German, the best lamps for lighting are German. I have discovered
these things in the past month through endeavouring to have them
repaired. Interest led me to investigate other articles in daily use.
My cutlery is German, my silverware is German, the chairs in my
dining-room are German, the mirror in my bathroom is German, some of my
food products are German, and practically all the patented drugs and
some of the toilet preparations are German.
All these things have been purchased in the Paris markets, without the
slightest leaning towards, or preference for, articles coming from the
Fatherland. I was not aware of the fact that I was buying German
things. They sold themselves,--the old combination of appearance,
convenience, and price, which will sell anything.
That I am unconsciously using German manufactured articles is largely
due to the genius of the salesman. It is a great mistake to believe
that salesmanship is primarily the art of selling the goods of the
house you represent. That has been the British idea. It is today
exploded. Is it because the same type as the Britisher who is devoting
his brains and energy to solving the problems of inferior people in
different parts of the world is among the Germans devoting his energies
to German commerce in those {51} same places, that the Germans have
found the fine art of salesmanship to be quite a different thing? It
is studying the desires of the people to whom you intend to sell,
finding out what they want to buy, and persuading your house at home to
make and export those articles. From the Parisian and the Londoner,
and the New Yorker down to the naked savage, the Germans know what is
wanted, and they supply it. If the British university man is enjoying
a position of authority and of fascinating perplexity in some colony,
and feels that he has a share in shaping the destinies of the world,
the German university man is not without his revenge. Deprived of one
sense, has he not developed another--and a more practical one?
The young German, brought up in an overpopulated country, unable to
enter a civil service which will keep him under his own flag--and
remember how intensely patriotic he is, this young German, just as
patriotic as the young Frenchman or the young Britisher,--must leave
home. He is not of the class from which come the voluntary emigrants.
His ties are all in Germany: his love--and his move--all for Germany.
So he becomes a German resident abroad, in close connection with the
Fatherland, and always working for the interests of the Fatherland. He
goes to England or to France, where he studies carefully and
methodically, as if he were to write a thesis on it (and he often
does), the business methods of and the business opportunities among the
people where he is dwelling. He is giving his life to put _Deutschland
über alles_ in business right in the {52} heart of the rival nation,
_and he is succeeding_. During October, 1914, when they tried to
arrest in the larger cities of England the German and Austrian subjects
they had to stop--there was not room in the jails for all of them! And
in many places business was paralyzed.
In carrying the products of steadily increasing volume to steadily
growing markets, Germany has been sensible enough to make those markets
pay for the cost of transport. Up to the very selling price, all the
money goes to Germany. The process is simple: from German factories,
by German ships, through German salesmen, to German firms, in every
part of the world--beginning with London and Paris.
Germany's merchant marine has kept pace with the development of her
industry. Essen may be the expression of one side of modern Germany,
which is said to have caused the European war. But one is more logical
in believing that Hamburg and Bremen and the Kiel Canal have done more
to bring on this war than the products of Krupp. During the last
twenty-five years the tonnage of Germany's merchant marine has
increased two hundred and fifty per cent., a quarter of which _has been
in the last five years, from 1908-1913_. There are six times as many
steamships flying the German flag as when Wilhelm II mounted the
throne. In merchant ships, Germany stands today second only to Great
Britain. The larger portion of her merchant marine is directed by
great corporations. The struggle against Great Britain and France for
the freight carrying of outside nations has been most bitter--and most
successful. _Before {53} the present war, there was no part of the
world in which the German flag was not carried by ships less than ten
years old_.
With the exception of Kiau-Chau, the colonies of Germany have never
been of much practical value, except as possible coaling and wireless
stations for the German fleet. But here also the opposition of her
rivals has minimized their value. Walfisch Bay and Zanzibar have, as
we have already said, lessened the strategical value of the two large
colonies on either side of the African continent. In the division of
the Portuguese colonies agreed to by Great Britain, it was "the
mistress of the seas" who was to have the strategic places--not part of
them, but all of them, the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira, and the Azores.
As Germany's commerce and shipping have so rapidly developed, the
seeking for opportunities to extend her political sovereignty outside
of Europe has not been so much an outlook for industrial enterprise as
the imperative necessity of finding naval bases and coaling stations in
different parts of the world for the adequate protection of commerce.
The development of the German navy has been the logical complement of
the development of the German merchant marine. Germany's astonishing
naval program has kept pace with the astonishing growth of the great
Hamburg and Bremen lines. Germany has had exactly the same argument
for the increase of her navy as has had Great Britain. Justification
for the money expended on the British navy is that Great Britain needs
the navy to protect her commerce, upon which the life of the nation is
dependent, {54} and to guarantee her food-supplies. The industrial
evolution of Germany has brought about for her practically the same
economic conditions as in Great Britain. In addition to the dependence
of her prosperity upon the power of her navy to protect her commerce,
Germany has felt that she must keep the sea open for the sake of
guaranteeing uninterrupted food-supplies for her industrial population.
It must not be forgotten that Germany is flanked on east and west by
hereditary enemies, and has come to look to the sea as the direction
from which her food supplies would come in case of war.
This last factor of the _Weltpolitik_, the creation of a strong navy,
must not be looked upon either as a provocation to Great Britain or as
a menace to the equilibrium of the world. If it has brought Germany
inevitably into conflict with Great Britain, it is because the navy is
the safeguard of commerce. The _Weltpolitik_ is essentially a
_Handelspolitik_. The present tremendous conflict between Great
Britain and Germany is the result of commercial rivalry. It is more a
question of the pocket-book than of the sacredness of treaties, if we
are looking for the cause rather than the occasion of the war. It has
come in spite of honest efforts to bring Great Britain and Germany
together.
Lord Haldane, in February, 1912, made a trip to Berlin to bring about a
general understanding between the two nations. But while there was
much discussion of the question of the Bagdad Railway, Persian and
Chinese affairs, Walfisch Bay, and the division of Africa, nothing came
of it. On March {55} 18th, Mr. Churchill said to the House of Commons:
"If Germany adds two ships in the next six years, we shall have to add
four; if Germany adds three, we shall have to add six. Whatever
reduction is made in the German naval program will probably be followed
here by a corresponding naval reduction. The Germans will not get
ahead of us, no matter what increase they make; they will not lose, no
matter what decrease they make." This was as far as Great Britain
could go.
In the spring of 1912, the British fleet was concentrated in the North
Sea, and an accord was made with France for common defensive action in
the North Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, during M.
Poincaré's trip to Petrograd, an accord was signed between France and
Russia for common naval action in time of war.
The Pan-Germanic movement in recent years has not been a tool of the
Government, but rather a party, including other parties, banded
together more than once to oppose the German Government in an
honourable attempt to preserve peace with the neighbours in the west.
It is a tremendous mistake--and a mistake which has been continuously
made in the French, British, and American press since the beginning of
the war--to consider the _Weltpolitik_ as an expression of the
sentiments of the German Emperor and his officials. Since it was
forced upon Bismarck against his will, Pan-Germanism has been a power
against which the Emperor William II has had to strive frequently
throughout his reign. For it has never hesitated to {56} force him
into paths and into positions which were perilous to the theory of
monarchical authority. The Kaiser has resented the pressure of public
opinion in directing the affairs of the Empire. Pan-Germanism has been
a striking example of democracy, endeavouring to have a say in
governmental policies. The Naval and Army Leagues, the German Colonial
Society, and the Pan-Germanic Society are private groups, irresponsible
from the standpoint of the Government. They have declared the
governmental programs for an increase in armaments insufficient, and
have bitterly denounced and attacked them from the point of view
exactly opposite to that of the Socialists. The Pan-Germanic Society
refused to recognize the treaty concluded between Germany and France
after the Agadir incident. Said Herr Klaas at the Hanover Conference
on April 15, 1912: "We persist in considering Morocco as the country
which will become in the future, let us hope the near future, the
colony for German emigration." The same intractable spirit was shown in
Dr. Pohl's address at the Erfurt Congress in September, 1912.
We hear much about the Kaiser and the military party precipitating war.
A review of the German newspapers during the past few years will
convince any fair-minded reader that German public opinion, standing
constantly behind the Pan-Germanists, has frequently made the German
Foreign Office act with a much higher hand in international questions
than it would have acted if left to itself, and that German public
opinion, from highest classes to lowest, is for this war to the bitter
finish. _It is the war of the {57} people, intelligently and
deliberately willed by them_. The statement that a revolution in
Germany, led by the democracy to dethrone the Kaiser or to get him out
of the clutches of the military party, would put an end to the war, is
foolish and pernicious. For it leads us to false hopes. It would be
much nearer the truth to say that if the Kaiser had not consented to
this war, he would have endangered his throne.
The principle of the _Weltpolitik_, imposed upon European diplomacy by
the German nation in the assembling of the Conference of Algeciras, was
that no State should be allowed to disturb the existing political and
territorial _status quo_ of any country still free, in any part of the
world, without the consent of the other Powers. This _Weltpolitik_
would have the natural effect, according to Karl Lamprecht, in his _Zur
Jüngsten Deutschen Vergangenheit_, of endangering a universal and
pitiless competition among the seven Great Powers in which the weakest
would eventually be eliminated.
{58}