[Illustration: Map--The Balkan Peninsula in 1914]
THE
NEW MAP OF EUROPE
(1911-1914)
THE STORY OF THE RECENT EUROPEAN
DIPLOMATIC CRISES AND WARS AND OF
EUROPE'S PRESENT CATASTROPHE
BY
HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, PH.D.
AUTHOR OF "THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE",
"PARIS REBORN," ETC.
NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1916
COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY
THE CENTURY CO.
_Published, November, 1914
Second Edition, March, 1915
Third Edition, August, 1915
Fourth Edition, December, 1915_
To
MY CHILDREN
CHRISTINE ESTE of Adana,
LLOYD IRVING of Constantinople,
and
EMILY ELIZABETH of Paris.
Born in the midst of the wars and changes that this book describes,
may they lead lives of peace!
There are general causes, moral or physical, which act in each State,
elevate it, maintain it, or cast it down; every accident is submitted
to these causes, and if the fortune of a battle, that is to say a
particular cause, has ruined a State, there was a general cause which
brought it about that that State had to perish by a single battle.
MONTESQUIEU.
CONTENTS
I. Germany in Alsace and Lorraine
II. The "Weltpolitik" of Germany
III. The "Bagdadbahn"
IV. Algeciras and Agadir
V. The Passing of Persia
VI. The Partitioners and their Poles
VII. Italia Irredenta
VIII. The Danube and the Dardanelles
XIX. Austria-Hungary and her South Slavs
X. Racial Rivalries in Macedonia
XI. The Young Turk _Régime_ in the Ottoman Empire
XII. Crete and European Diplomacy
XIII. The War between Italy and Turkey
XIV. The War between the Balkan States and Turkey
XV. The Rupture between the Allies
XVI. The War between the Balkan Allies
XVII. The Treaty of Bukarest
XVIII. The Albanian Fiasco
XIX. The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Servia
XX. Germany Forces War upon Russia and France
XXI. Great Britain Enters the War
Index
MAPS
I. The Balkan Peninsula according to the Treaties of San Stefano,
Berlin, Lausanne, and Bukarest
II. Partitions of Poland
III. Europe in 1911
IV. Europe in Africa in 1914
V. Belgium and the Franco-German Frontier
VI. Europe in 1914
{ix}
FOREWORD
On a July day in 1908, two American students, who had chosen to spend
the first days of their honeymoon in digging the musty pamphleteers of
the _Ligue_ out of the Bodleian Library, were walking along the High
Street in Oxford, when their attention was arrested by the cry of a
newsboy. An ha'penny invested in a London newspaper gave them the news
that Niazi bey had taken to the Macedonian highlands, and that a
revolution was threatening to overthrow the absolutist _régime_ of
Abdul Hamid. The sixteenth century was forgotten in the absorbing and
compelling interest of the twentieth.
Two weeks later the students were entering the harbour of Smyrna on a
French steamer which was bringing back to constitutional Turkey the
Young Turk exiles, including Prince Sabaheddine effendi of the Royal
Ottoman House. From that day to this, the path of the two Americans,
whose knowledge of history heretofore had been gained only in
libraries, has led them through massacres in Asia Minor and Syria, and
through mobilizations and wars in Constantinople, Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Greece, and Albania, back westward to Austria-Hungary, {x} Italy, and
France, following the trail of blood and fire from its origin in the
Eastern question to the great European conflagration.
On the forty-fourth anniversary of Sedan, when German aëroplanes were
flying over Paris, and the distant thunder of cannon near Meaux could
be heard, this book was begun in the Bibliothèque Nationale by one of
the students, while the other yielded to the more pressing call of Red
Cross work. It is hoped that there is nothing that will offend in what
is written here. At this time of tension, of racial rivalry, of mutual
recrimination, the writer does not expect that his judgments will pass
without protest and criticism. But he claims for them the lack of bias
which, under the circumstances, only an American--of this generation at
least--dare impute to himself.
The changes that are bringing about a new map of Europe have come
within the intimate personal experience of the writer.
If foot-notes are rare, it is because sources are so numerous and so
accessible. Much is what the writer saw himself, or heard from actors
in the great tragedy, when events were fresh in their memory. The books
of the colours, published by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the
countries interested, have been consulted for the negotiations of
diplomats. From day to day through these years, material has been
gathered from newspapers, especially the Paris _Temps_, the London
_Times_, the Vienna _Freie Press_, the Constantinople _Orient_, and
other journals of the Ottoman capital. {xi} The writer has used his
own correspondence to the New York _Herald_, the New York
_Independent_, and the Philadelphia _Telegraph_. For accuracy of
dates, indebtedness is acknowledged to the admirable British _Annual
Register_.
I am indebted to my friends, Alexander Souter, Litt.D., Professor of
Humanity in Aberdeen University, and Mrs. Souter, for reading the
proofs of this book and seeing it through the press in England. In the
United States, the same kind office has been performed by my brother,
Henry Johns Gibbons, Esq., of Philadelphia.
As this book goes to press for the third American edition, I wish to
express my thanks to readers in Great Britain, America, France,
Germany, and Australia for suggestions and corrections, and in
particular to Baron Shaw of Dunfermline, to whom I owe the idea of the
map that has been added to face the title-page.
PARIS, July, 1915.
THE
NEW MAP OF EUROPE
{1}
The New Map of Europe
CHAPTER I
GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE
The war of 1870 added to the German Confederation Alsace and a large
portion of Lorraine, both of which the Germans had always considered
theirs historically and by the blood of the inhabitants. In annexing
Alsace and Lorraine, the thought of Bismarck and von Moltke was not
only to bring back into the German Confederation territories which had
formerly been a part of it, but also to secure the newly formed Germany
against the possibility of French invasion in the future. For this it
was necessary to have undisputed possession of the valley of the Rhine
and the crests of the Vosges.
From the academic and military point of view, the German thesis was not
indefensible. But those who imposed upon a conquered people the Treaty
of Frankfort forgot to take into account the sentiments of the
population of the annexed territory. Germany annexed land. That was
possible by the {2} right of the strongest. She tried for over forty
years to annex the population, but never succeeded. The makers of
modern Germany were not alarmed at the persistent refusal of the
Alsatians to become loyal German subjects. They knew that this would
take time. They looked forward to the dying out of the party of
protest when the next generation grew up,--a generation educated in
German schools and formed in the German mould by the discipline of
military service.
That there was still an Alsace-Lorraine "question" after forty years is
a sad commentary either on the justice of the annexation of
Alsace-Lorraine by Germany or on the ability of Germany to assimilate
that territory which she felt was historically, geographically, and
racially a part of the Teutonic Empire. In 1887, when "protesting
deputies" were returned to the _Reichstag_ in overwhelming numbers,
despite the governmental weapons of intimidation, disenfranchisement,
and North German immigration, Bismarck was face to face with the one
great failure of his career. He consoled himself with the firm belief
that all would be changed when the second generation, which knew
nothing of France and to which the war was only a memory, peopled the
unhappy provinces.
But that second generation came. Those who participated in the war of
1870, or who suffered by it, were few and far between. The hotheads
and extreme francophiles left the country long ago, and their place was
taken by immigrants who were supposed to be loyal sons of the
Vaterland. Those of {3} the younger indigenous brood, whose parents
had brought them up as irreconcilables, ran away to serve in the French
foreign legion, or went into exile, and became naturalized Frenchmen
before their time of military service arrived. And yet the unrest
continued. Strasbourg, Metz, Mulhouse, and Colmar were centres of
political agitation, which an autocratic government and Berlin police
methods were powerless to suppress.
The year 1910 marked the beginning of a new period of violent protest
against Prussian rule. Not since 1888 was there such a continuous
agitation and such a continuous persecution. The days when the
Prussian police forbade the use of the French language on tombstones
were revived, and the number of petty police persecutions recorded in
the local press was equalled only by the number of public
demonstrations on the part of the people, whose hatred of everything
Prussian once more came to a fever-heat.
Let me cite a few incidents which I have taken haphazard from the
journals of Strasbourg and Metz during the first seven months of 1910.
The _Turnverein_ of Robertsau held a gymnastic exhibition in which two
French societies, those of Belfort and Giromagny, were invited to
participate. The police refused to allow the French societies to march
to the hall in procession, as was their custom, or to display their
flags. Their two presidents were threatened with arrest. A similar
incident was reported from Colmar. At Noisseville and Wissembourg the
fortieth annual commemoration services held by the {4} French veterans
were considered treasonable, and they were informed that they would
never again be allowed to hold services in the cemetery. At Mulhouse
the French veterans were insulted by the police and not allowed to
display their flags even in the room where they held their banquet. At
the college of Thann a young boy of twelve, who curiously enough was
the son of a notorious German immigrant, whistled the _Marseillaise_
and was locked up in a cell for this offence. The conferring of the
cross of the Legion of Honour on Abbé Faller, at Mars-la-Tour, created
such an outburst of feeling that the German ambassador at Paris was
instructed to request the French Government to refrain from decorating
Alsatians. A volunteer of Mulhouse was reprimanded and refused
advancement in the army because he used his mother-tongue in a private
conversation. On July 1st, twenty-one border communes of Lorraine were
added to those in which German had been made the official language. On
July 25th, for the first time in the history of the University of
Strasbourg, a professor was hissed out of his lecture room. He had
said that the Prussians could speak better French than the Alsatians.
The most serious demonstration which has occurred in Metz since the
annexation, took place on Sunday evening, January 8, 1910, when the
police broke up forcibly a concert given by a local society. The
newspapers of Metz claimed that this was a private gathering, to which
individual invitations had been sent, and was neither public nor
political. The police invaded the hall, and requested the audience {5}
to disband. When the presiding officer refused, he and the leader of
the orchestra were arrested. The audience, after a lively tussle, was
expelled from the hall. Immediately a demonstration was planned to be
held around the statue of General Ney. A large crowd paraded the city,
singing the _Sambre-et-Meuse_ and the _Marseillaise_. When the police
found themselves powerless to stop the procession without bloodshed,
they were compelled to call out the troops to clear the streets with
fixed bayonets.
These incidents demonstrated the fact that French ideals, French
culture, and the French language had been kept alive, and were still
the inspiration of the unceasing--and successful--protest of nearly two
million people against the Prussian domination. The effervescence was
undoubtedly as strong in Alsace-Lorraine "forty years after" as it had
been on the morrow of the annexation. But its francophile character
was not necessarily the expression of desire for reunion with France.
The inhabitants of the "lost provinces" had always been, racially and
linguistically, as much German as French. Now that the unexpected has
happened, and reunion with France seems probable, many Alsatians are
claiming that this has been the unfailing goal of their agitation. But
it is not true. It would be a lamentable distortion of fact if any
such record were to get into a serious history of the period in which
we live.
The political ideal of the Alsatians has been self-government. Their
agitation has not been for separation _from_ the German Confederation,
but {6} for a place _in_ the German Confederation. A great number of
the immigrants who were sent to "germanize" Alsace and Lorraine came to
side with the indigenous element in their political demands. If the
question of France and things French entered into the struggle, and
became the heart of it, two reasons for this can be pointed out: France
stood for the realization of the ideals of democracy to the descendants
of the Strasbourg heroes of 1793; and the endeavour to stamp out the
traces of the former nationality of the inhabitants of the provinces
was carried on in a manner so typically and so foolishly Prussian that
it kept alive the fire instead of extinguishing it. Persecution never
fails to defeat its own ends. For human nature is keen to cherish that
which is difficult or dangerous to enjoy.
To understand the Alsace-Lorraine question, from the internal German
point of view, it is necessary to explain the political status of these
provinces after the conquest, and their relationship to the Empire, in
order to show that their continued unrest and unhappiness were not due
to a ceaseless and stubborn protest against the Treaty of Frankfort.
When the German Empire was constituted, in 1872, it comprehended
twenty-five distinct sovereign kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and
free cities, and in a subordinate position, the territory ceded by
France, which was made a _Reichsland_, owned in common by the
twenty-five confederated sovereignties. The King of Prussia was made
Emperor of the Confederation, and given extensive executive powers.
Two assemblies were created to legislate {7} for matters affecting the
country as a whole. The _Bundesrath_ is an advisory executive body as
well as an upper legislative assembly. _It is composed of delegates of
the sovereigns of the confederated states_. The lower imperial house,
or _Reichstag_, is a popular assembly, whose members are returned by
general elections throughout the Empire. In their internal affairs the
confederated states are autonomous, and have their own local
Parliaments. This scheme, fraught with dangers and seemingly
unsurmountable difficulties, has survived; and, thanks to the
predominance of Prussia and the genius of two great emperors, the
seemingly heterogeneous mass has been moulded into a strong and
powerful Empire.
In such an Empire, however, there never has been any place for
Alsace-Lorraine. The conquered territory was not a national entity.
It had no sovereign, and could not enter into the confederacy on an
equal footing with the other twenty-five states. The Germans did not
dare, at the time, to give the new member a sovereign, nor could they
conjointly undertake its assimilation. Prussia, not willing to risk
the strengthening of a south German state by the addition of a million
and a half to its population, took upon herself what was the logical
task of Baden or Wurtemberg or Bavaria.
So Alsace-Lorraine was an anomaly under the scheme of the organization
of the German Empire. During forty years the _Reichsland_ was without
representation in the _Bundesrath_, and had thus had no real voice in
the management of imperial affairs. By excluding the "reconquered
brethren" from {8} representation in the _Bundesrath_, Germany failed
to win the loyalty of her new subjects. Where petty states with a
tithe of her population and wealth have helped in shaping the destinies
of the nation, the _Reichsland_ had to feel the humiliation of
"taxation without representation." It was useless to point out to the
Alsatians that they had their vote in the _Reichstag_. For the
_Bundesrath_ is the power in Germany.
Nor did Alsace-Lorraine have real autonomy in internal affairs. The
executive power was vested in a _Statthalter_, appointed by the
Emperor, and supported by a foreign bureaucracy and a foreign police
force. Before the Constitution of 1911, there was a local Parliament,
called the _Landesausschuss_, which amounted to nothing, as the
imperial Parliament had the privilege of initiating and enacting for
the _Reichsland_ any law it saw fit. Then, too, the delegates to the
_Landesausschuss_ were chosen by such a complicated form of suffrage
that they represented the _Statthalter_ rather than the people. And
the _Statthalter_ represented the Emperor!
In the first decade after the annexation, Prussian brutality and an
unseemly haste to impose military service upon the conquered people led
to an emigration of all who could afford to go, or who, even at the
expense of material interest, were too high-spirited to allow their
children to grow up as Germans. This emigration was welcomed and made
easy, just as Austria-Hungary encouraged the emigration of Moslems from
Bosnia and Herzegovina. For it enabled Bismarck to introduce a strong
Prussian {9} and Westphalian element into the _Reichsland_ by settling
immigrants on the vacant properties. But most of these immigrants,
instead of prussianizing Alsace, have become Alsatians themselves.
Some of the most insistent opponents of the Government, some of the
most intractable among the agitators, have been those early immigrants
or their children. This is quite natural, when we consider that they
have cast their lot definitely with the country, and are just as much
interested in its welfare as the indigenous element.
The revival of the agitation against Prussian Government in 1910 was a
movement for autonomy on internal affairs, and for representation in
the _Bundesrath_. The Alsatians wanted to be on a footing of
constitutional equality with the other German States. One marvels at
the Prussian mentality which could not see--either with the Poles or
with the Alsatians--that fair play and justice would have solved the
problems and put an end to the agitation which has been, during these
past few years especially, a menace on the east and west to the
existence of the Empire.
Something had to be done in the _Reichsland_. The anomalous position
of almost two million German subjects, fighting for their political
rights, and forming a compact mass upon the borders of France, was a
question which compelled the interest of German statesmen, not only on
account of its international aspect, but also because of the growing
German public sentiment for social and political justice. The
_Reichstag_ was full of champions of the {10} claims of the
Alsatians,--champions who were not personally interested either in
Alsace-Lorraine or in the influence of the agitation in the
_Reichsland_ upon France, but who looked upon the Alsace-Lorraine
question as a wrong to twentieth-century civilization.
On March 14, 1910, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg announced to the
_Reichstag_ that the Government was preparing a constitution for
Alsace-Lorraine which would give the autonomy so long and so vigorously
demanded. But he had in his mind, not a real solution of the question,
but some sort of a compromise, which would satisfy the confederated
states, and mollify the agitators of the _Reichsland, but at the same
time preserve the Prussian domination in Alsace-Lorraine_. In June,
Herr Delbrück, Secretary of State for the Interior, was sent to
Strasbourg to confer with the local authorities and representatives of
the people concerning the projected constitution. It was during this
visit that the Alsatians were disillusioned. A dinner, now famous or
notorious, whichever you like, was given by the _Statthalter_, to which
representative (!) members of the _Landesausschuss_ were invited. At
this dinner the real leaders of the country, such as Wetterlé, Preiss,
Blumenthal, Weber, Bucher, and Theodor,--the very men who had made the
demand for autonomy so insistent that the Government could no longer
refuse to entertain it--were conspicuous by their absence. Those
bidden to confer with Herr Delbrück in no way represented, but were on
the other hand hostile to, the wishes of the people.
We cannot go into the involved story of the fight {11} in the
_Reichstag_ over the new Constitution. The Delbrück project was
approved by the _Bundesrath_ on December 16, 1910, and debated in the
following spring session of the _Reichstag_. Despite the warnings of
the deputies from the _Reichsland_, and the brilliant opposition of the
Socialists, the Constitution given to Alsace-Lorraine, on May 31st, was
a pure farce. In no sense was it what the people of the _Reichsland_
had wanted, although representation in the _Bundesrath_ was seemingly
given to them. The new Constitution preserved the united sovereignty
of the confederated states, and its delegation to the Emperor, who
still had the power to appoint and recall at will the _Statthalter_,
and to initiate legislation in local matters. A _Landtag_ took the
place of the _Landesausschuss_. The Upper Chamber of the _Landtag_
consists of thirty-six members, representing the religious confessions,
the University and other bodies, the supreme court of Colmar, and the
municipalities and chambers of commerce of Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Metz,
and Colmar, to the number of eighteen; _and the other eighteen chosen
by the Emperor_. The Lower Chamber has sixty members, elected by
direct universal suffrage, with secret ballot. Electors over
thirty-five possess two votes, and over forty-five three votes.
By forcing this Constitution upon Alsace-Lorraine, the interests of
Prussia and of the House of Hohenzollern were considered to the
detriment of the interests of the German Empire. A glorious
opportunity for reconciliation and assimilation was lost. The Emperor
would not listen to the admission of {12} Alsace-Lorraine to the
_Bundesrath_ in the only logical way, by the creation of a new dynasty
or a republican form of government, so that the Alsatian votes would
represent a _sovereign_ state. Prussia in her dealings with
Alsace-Lorraine, has always been afraid, on the one hand, of the
addition of _Bundesrath_ votes to the seventeen of Bavaria, Saxony,
Baden, and Wurtemberg, and on the other hand, of the repercussion upon
her internal suffrage and other problems with the Socialists.
Since 1911, the eyes of many Alsatians have been directed once more
towards France as the only--if forlorn--hope of justice and peace.
What words could be found strong enough to condemn the suicidal folly
of the German statesmen who allowed the disappointment over the
Constitution to be followed by a series of incidents which have been
like rubbing salt into a raw wound?
The first _Landtag_, in conformity to the Constitution of 1911, was
elected in October. It brought into life a new political party, called
"The National Union," led by Blumenthal, Wetterlé, and Preiss, who
united for the purpose of demanding what the Constitution had not given
them--the autonomy of Alsace and Lorraine. This party was badly beaten
in this first election. But its defeat was not really a defeat for the
principles of autonomy, as the German press stated at the time. The
membership of the new _Landtag_ was composed, in majority, of men who
had been supporters of the demand for autonomy, but who had not joined
the new party for reasons of local politics. Herr Delbrück had given
{13} universal suffrage (a privilege the Prussian electorate had never
been able to gain in spite of its reiterated demands) to the
_Reichsland_ in the hope that the Socialists would prevent the
Nationalists from controlling the Alsatian _Landtag_. Many Socialists,
however, during the elections at Colmar and elsewhere, did not hesitate
to cry in French, "_Vive la France! A bas la Prusse!_"
The Prussian expectations were bitterly deceived. The Landtag promptly
showed that it was merely the Landesausschuss under another name. The
nationalist struggle was revived; the same old questions came up again.
The Government's appropriation "for purposes of state" was reduced
one-third, and it was provided that the _Landtag_ receive communication
of the purposes for which the money was spent. The _Statthalter's_
expenses were cut in half, and a bill, which had always been approved
in previous years, providing for the payment of the expense of the
Emperor's hunting trips in the _Reichsland_, failed to pass.
In the spring of 1912, the Prussians showed their disapproval of the
actions of the new _Landtag_ by withdrawing the orders for locomotives
for the Prussian railways from the old Alsatian factory of Grafenstaden
near Strasbourg. This was done absolutely without any provocation, and
aroused a violent denunciation, not only among the purely German
employés of the factory and in the newspapers, but also in the
_Landtag_, which adopted an order of the day condemning most severely
the attitude of the Imperial Government towards {14} Alsace-Lorraine,
of which this boycott measure was a petty and mean illustration.
The indignation was at its height when Emperor Wilhelm arrived in
Strasbourg on May 13th. Instead of acting in a tactful manner and
promising to set right this wrong done to the industrial life of
Strasbourg, the Emperor addressed the following words to the Mayor:
"Listen. Up to here you have known only the good side of me; it is
possible that you will learn the other side of me. Things cannot
continue as they are: if this situation lasts, we shall suppress your
Constitution and annex you to Prussia."
This typically Prussian speech, which in a few lines reveals the
hopelessly unsuccessful tactics of the German Government towards the
peoples whom it has tried to assimilate the world over, only served to
increase the indignation of the inhabitants of the _Reichsland_; in
fact, the repercussion throughout all Germany was very serious.
The arbitrary threat of the Emperor was badly received in the other
federated states, whose newspapers pointed out that he had exceeded his
authority. It gave the Socialists an opportunity to attack Emperor
Wilhelm on the floor of the _Reichstag_. Four days after this threat
was made, an orator of the Socialist party declared
"We salute the imperial words as the confession, full of weight and
coming from a competent source, that annexation to Prussia is the
heaviest punishment that one can threaten to impose upon a {15} people
for its resistance against Germany. It is a punishment like hard
labour in the penitentiary with loss of civil rights."
This speech caused the Chancellor to leave the room with all the
Ministry. On May 22d, the attack upon Emperor Wilhelm for his words at
Strasbourg was renewed by another deputy, who declared that if such a
thing had happened in England, "the English would shut up such a King
at Balmoral or find for him some peaceful castle, such as that of
Stemberg or the Villa Allatini at Salonika."
The answer of the _Landtag_ to Emperor Wilhelm's threat was the passing
of two unanimous votes: one demanding that hereafter the Constitution
could not be modified except by the law of the country and not by the
law of the Empire, and the other demanding for Alsace-Lorraine a
national flag.
One could easily fill many pages with illustrations of senseless
persecutions, most of them of the pettiest character, but some more
serious in nature, which Alsace and Lorraine have had to endure since
the granting of the Constitution. Newspapers, illustrated journals,
clubs and organizations of all kinds have been annoyed constantly by
police interference. Their editors, artists, and managers have been
brought frequently into court. Zislin and Hansi, celebrated
caricaturists, have found themselves provoked to bolder and bolder
defiances by successive condemnations, and have endured imprisonment as
well as fines. Hansi was sentenced to a year's imprisonment by the
High Court of Leipsic only a month {16} before the present war broke
out, and chose exile rather than a Prussian fortress.
The greatest effort during the past few years has been made in the
schools to influence the minds of the growing generation against the
"_souvenir de France_" and to impress upon the Alsatians what good
fortune had come to them to be born German citizens.
Among the boys, the influence of this teaching has been such that over
twenty-two thousand fled from home during the period of 1900-1913 to
enlist in the Foreign Legion of the French Army. The campaign of the
German newspapers in Alsace-Lorraine, and, in fact, throughout Germany,
was redoubled in 1911. Parents were warned of the horrible treatment
accorded to the poor boys who were misguided enough to throw away their
citizenship, and go to be killed in Africa under the French flag. The
result of this campaign was that the Foreign Legion received a larger
number of Alsatians in 1912 than had enlisted during a single year
since 1871!
Among the girls, the German educational system flattered itself that it
could completely change the sentiments of a child, especially in the
boarding-schools. Last year the Empress of Germany visited a girls'
school near Metz, which is one of the best German schools in the
_Reichsland_. As she was leaving, she told the children that she
wanted to give them something. What did they want? The answer was not
sweets or cake, but that they might be taught a little French!
{17}
Since 1910, the German war budget has carried successively larger items
for the strengthening of forts and the building of barracks in Metz,
Colmar, Mulhouse, Strasbourg, Neuf-Brisach, Bischwiller, Wissembourg,
Mohrange, Sarrebourg, Sarreguemines, Saarbruck, Thionville, Molsheim,
and Saverne. The former French provinces have been flooded with
garrisons, and have been treated just as they were treated forty years
ago. The insufferable spirit of militarism, and the arrogance of the
Prussian officers in Alsatian towns, have served to turn against the
Empire many thousands whom another policy might have won. For it must
be remembered that by no means all the inhabitants of the _Reichsland_
have been by birth and by home training French sympathizers. Instead
of crushing out the "_souvenir de France_," the Prussian civil and
military officials have caused it to be born in many a soul which was
by nature German.
The most notorious instance of military arrogance occurred in the
autumn of 1913 in Saverne. Lieutenant von Forstner, who was passing in
review cases of discipline, had before him a soldier who had stabbed an
Alsatian, and had been sentenced to two months' imprisonment. "Two
months on account of an Alsatian blackguard!" he cried. "I would have
given you ten marks for your trouble." The story spread, and the town,
tired of the attitude of its garrison, began in turn to show its
contempt for the Kaiser's soldiers. Windows in von Forstner's house
were broken. Every time officers or soldiers appeared on the streets
they were hooted. Saverne {18} was put under martial law. Threats
were made to fire upon the citizens. One day Lieutenant von Forstner
struck a lame shoemaker across the forehead with his sword. The affair
had gone so far that public sentiment in Germany demanded some action.
Instead of adequately punishing von Forstner and other officers, who
had so maddened the civil population against them, the German military
authorities gave the guilty officers nominal sentences, and withdrew
the garrison.
All these events had a tremendous repercussion in France. It is
impossible to exaggerate the ill-feeling aroused on both sides of the
Rhine, in Germany, in Alsace-Lorraine, and in France by the
persecutions in the _Reichsland_. Only one who knows intimately the
French can appreciate their feeling--or share it--over the Zislin and
Hansi trials, the Saverne affair, the suppression of the _Souvenir
Français_, the _Lorraine Sportive_ and other organizations, and the
campaign against the Foreign Legion. It has given the French soldiers
in the present war something to fight for which is as sacred to them as
the defence of French soil. The power of this sentiment is indicated
by the invasion of Alsace, the battle of Altkirk, and the occupation of
Mulhouse at the beginning of August. The French could not be held back
from this wild dash. Strategy was powerless in the face of the
sentiment of a _national_ army.
The Alsatian leaders themselves have seen the peril to the peace of
Europe of the German attitude towards their country. They did not want
France drawn into a war for their liberation. They were {19} alarmed
over the possibility of this, and desired it to be understood that
their agitation had nothing international in it. The attitude of all
the anti-Prussian parties may be summed up in the words of Herr Wolff,
leader of the Government Liberal party, who declared that "all the
inhabitants of the _Reichsland_ had as their political ambition was
only the elevation of Alsace-Lorraine to the rank of an independent and
federated state, like the other twenty-five component parts of the
German Empire." Their sincerity and their desire to preserve peace is
proved by the motion presented by the leaders of four of the political
groups in the _Reichsland_, which was voted on May 6, 1912, without
discussion, by the _Landtag_:
"The Chamber invites the _Statthalter_ to instruct the representatives
of Alsace-Lorraine in the _Bundesrath_ to use all the force they
possess against the idea of a war between Germany and France, and to
influence the _Bundesrath_ to examine the ways which might possibly
lead to a _rapprochement_ between France and Germany, which
_rapprochement_ will furnish the means of putting an end to the race of
armaments."
The mismanagement of the _Reichsland_ has done more than prevent the
harmonious union of the former French provinces with Germany. It has
had an effect, the influence of which cannot be exaggerated, upon
nourishing the hopes of revenge of France, and the resentment against
the amputation of 1870. On neither side of the Vosges has the wound
healed. The same folly which has kept alive a Polish question in
eastern Prussia for one hundred {20} and twenty-five years, has not
failed to make impossible the prussianizing of Alsace and Lorraine.
The Prussian has never understood how to win the confidence of others.
There has been no Rome in his political vision. As for conceptions of
toleration, of kindness, and of love, they are non-existent in Prussian
officialdom. Nietzsche revealed the character of the Prussian in his
development of the idea of the _übermensch_. The ideal of perfect
manhood is the imposition of one will on another will by force. Mercy
and pity, according to Nietzsche, were signs of weakness, the symbols
of the slave.
Under the circumstances, then, we are compelled after forty-five years
to revise our estimate of Bismarck's sagacity. His genius was limited
by the narrow horizon of his own age. He did not see that the future
Germany needed other things that France could give far more than she
needed Alsace and Lorraine. In posterity, Bismarck would have had a
greater place had he, in the last minutes of the transactions at
Versailles, given back Alsace and Lorraine to France, waived the war
indemnity, and asked in return Algeria or other French colonies.
But would it have been different under Germany in the French colonies?
A Herrero, employed in the Johannesburg mines, wrote his brother in
German South-West Africa: "The country of the English is truly a good
country. Even if your superior is present, he doesn't strike you, and
if he strikes you and goes thus beyond legal limits, he is punished
like anyone else."
{21}