SPECULATIVE PHYSICS.
What was Lao-tzŭ’s conception of the Cosmos? To this question we are
unfortunately unable to give a clear and satisfactory answer. It is
only occasionally, and then usually by way of illustration, that he
alludes to the material world or to the physical and mental
constitution of man. All that we can do, accordingly, is to examine
the miscellaneous passages in which he refers to these subjects, and
collect from them what information we can as to the notions which
Lao-tzŭ entertained about the origin and nature of the universe; and
we must be prepared to find under the head of speculative physics many
more matters than ought properly, according to our ideas, to be so
included.
The first point to be noticed is that, as has been already seen,
Lao-tzŭ refers all existing creatures to an eternal, all-producing,
all-sustaining unity, which he calls Nature (Tao). He does not
distinguish between mind and matter, nor would he, in my opinion, have
recognised any fundamental or generic difference between them.
Whether, however, spirit and matter were identical or diametrically
opposite, they had a common origin in Tao. But though usually he thus
refers all things to nature (Tao) as their first cause, yet he
sometimes seems to speak of the universe as coming from nothing.[1]
Nor is there any contradiction here, since Lao-tzŭ regarded
non-existence (Wu 無) as in circumstances identical with existence (Yu
有); the latter being merely the former contemplated from a different
point of view. This opinion, if not explicitly stated by himself, is
at least implied in his writings, and is explicitly stated by one of
his disciples.[2] It must be mentioned, however, that Chu-hsi (朱熹)
ascribes the very opposite doctrine to Lao-tzŭ, who, he says, regarded
existence and non-existence as _two_, whereas Chou-tzŭ (周子) regarded
them as one.[3] In the Tao-tê Ching the originator of the universe is
referred to under the names Non-Existence, Existence, Nature (Tao) and
various other designations—all which, however, represent one idea in
various manifestations. It is in all cases Nature (Tao) which is
meant, and we are now prepared to examine the part which Lao-tzŭ
assigns to this Tao in the production and regulation of the physical
world.
Tao, as spoken of by Lao-tzŭ, may be considered as a potential or as
an actual existence, and under this latter head it may be contemplated
in itself and as an operating agent in the universe. Regarded as a
potential existence it may, when compared with actual existence, be
pronounced non-existence. It is from this point of view imperceptible
to man, and can be spoken of only negatively; and so such terms as
non-existence (無), the unlimited or infinite (無極), the non-exerting
(無爲), the matterless (無物), are the expressions used with reference
to Tao thus considered.[4] Accordingly Lao-tzŭ, when speaking of it as
a potential existence, as the logical antecedent of all perceptible
existence—seems to regard it as equivalent to the primeval Nothing or
Chaos. So too the Yuan-miao-nei-pʽien (元妙内篇) says that the great
Tao which arose in non-exertion is the ancestor of all things.[5] From
this state, however, it passes into the condition of actual existence,
a transition which is expressed under the metaphor of generation.[6]
To this doctrine, that existence is generated from non-existence,
Chu-hsi objects; but his objection arises chiefly, I think, from
supposing that Lao-tzŭ regarded them as two distinct things, whereas
his doctrine on this subject is exactly like that of Chou-tzŭ, with
which Chu-hsi seems to agree.[7] We are not to suppose that Nature is
ever simply and entirely potential to the utter exclusion of
actuality, or _vice versa_: on the contrary, these two existences or
conditions are represented as alternately generating each the
other.[8] Thus the potential (or nominal non-existence) may be
supposed to be in time later than the actual, though the latter must
always be logically regarded as consequent on the former. In itself,
again, _Tao_, regarded as an actual existence is, as has been seen,
calm, void, eternal, unchanging and bare of all qualities. Regarded as
an agent operating throughout the universe, on the other hand, _Tao_
may be spoken of as great, changing, far-extending, and finally
returning (to the state of potentiality).[9] A late author gives a
curious illustration of the above notions of Lao-tzŭ, taken from the
well-known habits of the Ateuchus with reference to the propagation of
its species, but this author proceeds on the supposition that
non-existence and existence are different. We have now to combine
these two conceptions of Tao, as a potential and as an actual
existence. Though void, shapeless, and immaterial, it yet contains the
potentiality of all substance and shape, and from itself it produces
the universe,[10] diffusing itself over or permeating all space. It is
said to have generated the world,[11] and is frequently spoken of as
the mother of this latter[12]—“the dark primeval mother, teeming with
dreamy beings.” All things that exist submit to Tao as their chief,
but it displays no lordship over them.[13] In the spring time it
quickens the dead world, clothes it as with a garment, and nourishes
it, yet the world knows not its foster-mother. A distinction, however,
is made—the nameless is said to be the origin of heaven and earth,
while the named is the mother of the myriad objects which inhabit the
earth. Though there is nothing done in the universe which is not done
by Nature, though all things depend on it for their existence, yet in
no case is Nature seen acting.[14] It is in its own deep self a
unit—the smallest possible quantity—yet it prevails over the wide
expanse of the universe, operating unspent but unseen.[15]
We now come to the generations of the heavens and the earth, and their
history is thus given by Lao-tzŭ.[16] Tao generated One, One generated
Two, Two generated Three, and Three generated the material world. That
is, according to the explanation given by some, Nature (Tao) generated
the Yin-chʽi (陰氣), the passive and inferior element in the
composition of things; this in its turn produced the Yang-chʽi (陽氣),
the active and superior element; which again produced Ho (和), that is,
that harmonious agreement of the passive and active elements which
brought about the production of all things.[17] Another explanation is
that Tao considered as Non-existence produced the Great Extreme
(Tʽai-chi 太極), which produced the passive and active elements; then
Harmony united these two and generated the universe.[18] Of this
section of the Tao-tê Ching Rémusat observes—“En effet, Lao-tseu
explique, d’une manière qui est entièrement conforme à la doctrine
Platonicienne, comment les deux principes, celui du ciel et celui de
la terre, ou l’air grossier et l’ether, sont liés entre eux par un
_Souffle_ qui les unit et qui produit _l’harmonie_. Il est impossible
d’exprimer plus clairemeut les idées de Timée de Locres, dont les
termes semblent la traduction du passage Chinois.”[19] The doctrines,
however, on the formation of the world put into the mouth of Timæus,
and the ideas of Lao-tzŭ on this subject, seem to me to have very
little in common. The Greek philosopher makes a personal deity the
artificer of the universe, fashioning the world out of the bright and
solid elements, fire and earth, which he unites by means of air and
water, thus forming a friendship and harmony indissoluble by any
except the author. The _harmony_ of Lao-tzŭ, on the other hand is, if
we understand him aright, only the unconflicting alternation of the
two cosmical elements, and there is no divine Demiurg in his system.
There is, however, a statement in the Timæus which resembles Lao-tzŭ’s
statement on this subject, and to which we will refer hereafter.
First in order after Tao is Tʽien (天), or the material heaven above
us. This is represented as pure and clear in consequence of having
obtained the One—that is, in consequence of having participated in the
great “over-soul” or Universal Nature.[20] Were heaven to lose its
purity and clearness it would be in danger of destruction. Of the
heavenly bodies and their revolutions, Lao-tzŭ does not make mention,
nor have we any means of ascertaining what were his ideas respecting
them. Nearly all that he says about Tʽien or heaven is metaphorical,
with apparent reference to an agent endowed with consciousness
(according to our ways of thinking). Thus he speaks of it as enduring
for a long period because it does not exist for itself; as being free
from partiality towards any of the creatures in the world; as being
next in dignity above a king and below Tao, and as taking this last
for its rule of conduct.[21]
The space between heaven and earth is represented as like a bottomless
bag or tube,[22] though this is perhaps merely a metaphorical
expression. The earth itself is at rest,[23] this being the specific
nature which it has as the result of its participation in Tao. The
heavens are always revolving over the earth, producing the varieties
of the seasons, vivifying, nourishing, and killing all things; but it
remains stationary in calm repose. Were it to lose the informing
nature which makes it so, the earth would probably be set in motion.
Its place is next in order after heaven which it takes as its model.
It is impartial, spontaneous, unostentatious, and exists long because
it does not exist for itself. Neither in heaven nor on earth can
anything violent endure for a lengthened period. The whirlwind and
heavy rains may come, but they do not last even for a day.[24]
Next to heaven and earth are the “myriad things” that is, the animate
and inanimate objects which surround us; and here again it must be
borne in mind that Lao-tzŭ’s allusions to these matters are only
incidental and by way of illustration generally. As has been seen, all
things spring from and participate in Nature, which is, as it were,
their mother. This Nature (Tao) is, as we have seen, imperceptible in
itself, and when considered merely as a potentiality; but it bodies
itself forth and takes a local habitation and a name in all the
objects which exist in the universe, and thus it becomes palpable to
human observation—not in its essence but only in its workings. Now
this manifestation of Nature constitutes for each object or class of
objects in the world its Tê (德)—that is, what it has received or
obtained from Tao, according to some commentators. Tê is usually
translated by _virtue_, but this word very inadequately represents the
meaning of the word in this connection. Sometimes it seems to be
almost synonymous with Tao, and has functions assigned to it which at
other times are represented as pertaining to this latter. If, however,
we regard Tao as the great or universal Nature, we may consider Tê as
the particular Nature with which creatures are endowed out of the
former. It is also the conscious excellence which man and all other
creatures obtain when spontaneity is lost. Thus Lao-tzŭ regards all
things as equally with man under the care of Nature, which produces
and nourishes all alike. Heaven and earth, he says, have no
partialities—they regard the “myriad things” as the straw-made dogs
which were formed for the sacrifices and prayers for rain, and cast
aside when the rites were finished.[25] In another passage of the
Tao-tê Ching it is said that Tao generates all things, Tê nourishes
all things, Matter (Wu 物) bodies them forth, and Order (勢) gives them
perfection.[26]
Lao-tzŭ, in accordance with popular Chinese ideas, speaks of five
colours, five sounds, and five tastes;[27] and he attributes to these
a baneful influence on man, whom he teaches to overcome and nullify
them as much as possible. All things in the world, moreover, are
arranged in a system of dualism.[28] Motion is always followed by
rest, and this again by motion. Long and short, high and low, mutually
succeed each other, and are merely relative terms. Solidity gives the
object, and hollowness gives its utility, as in the case of wooden or
earthen vessels. When a thing is to be weakened it must first have
been strengthened; to that from which there is to be taken there must
first have been given. This dualism will be seen to extend into other
regions besides the physical world, and it is needless to refer to it
at greater length at present.
Further, Lao-tzŭ seems to have regarded all existing things as having
a set time during which to endure. Nature engenders them, nourishes
them and finally receives them back into its bosom. They flourish
until they attain to the state of completeness, which is soon lost,
and then decay and final dissolution ensue.[29] The tree grows from
the tiny sapling to its full maturity, then decays and returns to dark
Mother Nature. The process as conceived and sketched by the ancient
sage is beautifully described in the words of Tennyson—
“Lo! in the middle of the wood,
The folded leaf is woo’d from out the bud
With winds upon the branch, and there
Grows green and broad and takes no care,
Sun-steep’d at noon, and in the moon
Nightly dew-fed; and turning yellow
Falls, and floats adown the air.
Lo! sweeten’d with the summer light
The full-juiced apple, waxing over-mellow,
Drops in a silent autumn night.
All its allotted length of days,
The flower ripens in its place,
Ripens and fades, and falls, and hath no toil,
Fast-rooted in the fruitful soil.”[30]
Lao-tzŭ’s mode of contemplating natural phenomena is, indeed,
altogether much more like that of the poetical metaphysician than that
of the physicist. He does not look upon a stream, for example, as
composed of certain chemical elements in certain proportions, as
running at a calculable rapid rate, carrying with it an alarming
amount of mud, and having in each microscopic drop exactly so many
thousands of animalculæ. He thinks of it rather as at first a tiny
stream up among the hills, scooping out the hard earth, and slowly
wearing away impeding stones, in order to make a channel for its
waters; as flowing thence down into the vale where it gives itself up
to enrich the fields; then as passing on thence to join the brimming
river, and finally submit itself to the great sea.[31] He regards
everything from an ethical point of view, and finds a lesson
everywhere. He does not regard the study of nature as consisting in
the investigation of colour, sound, heat, and such things—the less one
has to do with these the better. The study should be carried on in
one’s own room without any adventitious aids. The student must
overcome his affections and passions before he can attain to a
knowledge of the great mysteries of Nature, but having once attained
the serene heights of desireless existence he can know all things.[32]
This is no doubt a bad way of studying nature, and one which would
never conduct to the material benefit of humanity. Yet it also has its
uses. It helps to make us “mingle with the universe,” have a lower
appreciation of ourselves, and sympathise affectionately with all
that surrounds us. We have abundance of room in the world for the two
classes of philosophers—those who experiment on Nature with a view to
the material progress of mankind, and those who regard her with the
dutiful love of a son for a mother.
In the teachings of Lao-tzŭ in Speculative Physics, as sketched above,
the student of philosophy will find many ideas resembling others with
which he is already more familiar. To those of the sages of Ancient
Greece it is perhaps unnecessary for me to do more than refer. With
them as living also in the comparative childhood of the world Lao-tzŭ
might naturally be supposed to have considerable affinity. In the
Timæus of Plato there is a passage which does not accord with the rest
of that work, nor with the spirit of the other Platonic dialogues, and
which bears considerable resemblance to the doctrine of Lao-tzŭ about
the primordial all-producing Nature (Tao). The hero of the dialogue,
if such an expression may be used, Timæus himself, suddenly leaves the
train of imaginative discourse which he had been for some time
pursuing about the visible universe and the mode in which the divine
artificer constructed it, and he introduces a new conception, that of
the primeval mother, formless, immortal, and indestructible.[33]
Reference has already been made to the resemblance between Lao-tzŭ’s
teachings and those of Anaximander, and Hegel says of the latter’s
notion, that the _ἄπειρον_ is the principle from which endless worlds
or gods originate and into which they vanish, that it sounds quite
Oriental.[34] But not only are Lao-tzŭ’s speculations on physics like
those of other ancients, they resemble also those of many modern
philosophers, and his theory about the study of Nature may well be
compared with that of Schelling. The Tao itself, or the primordial
existence, appears under various names in the history of Philosophy.
It is the Tʽai-chi (太極) or Great Extreme—the Tʽai-yi (太一) or Great
Unit—the _Anima Mundi_—the Absolute—the Vital Force—Gravity—Caloric—when
considered as universally active and productive.
“There is but one vast universal dynamic, one mover, one might,
Variously operant under the various conditions it finds;
And we call that by turns electricity, friction, caloric, and light,
Which is none of these things, and yet all of them. Ask of the waves
and the winds,
Ask of the stars of the firmament, ask of the flowers of the field;
They will answer you all of them, naming it each by a different name.
For the meaning of Nature is neither wholly conceal’d nor reveal’d;
But her mind is seen to be single in her acts that are nowhere the
same.”[35]
Further, Lao-tzŭ represents pure or abstract existence as identical
with non-existence, and in our own century Hegel has said that Being
and Non-being are the same.[36] Again, Lao-tzŭ speaks of the ultimate
existence as that out of which all other existences have proceeded,
and he regards it as becoming active and producing from having been
inactive and quiescent. So many modern philosophers have maintained
that God made all things out of himself; and in the opinion of some
the Deity became personal from being impersonal, and the Infinite
manifested itself as finite in the created universe.[37] But the great
point on which Lao-tzŭ differs from the large majority of modern
thinkers with regard to the First Cause is that he never introduces or
supposes the element of personality; consequently will and design are
excluded from his conception of the primordial existence.[38] Here, I
think, he is logically more correct than the modern philosopher
referred to above, although his notions may be much farther from the
actual truth than theirs. Again, when Lao-tzŭ speaks of Nature (Tao)
as the source whence all things spring—as that which informs and
cherishes all the world—and as that into which all living creatures,
high and low, finally return—he says what many others have expressed
in terms often very similar. I select only two or three instances by
way of illustration. The Pythagorean doctrine is thus put by Virgil—
—“deum (i.e. animum) ire per omnes
Terrasque tractusque maris cælumque profundum.
Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas;
Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri
Omnia.”[39]
Strikingly similar to Lao-tzŭ’s words are those of the Preacher—“For
that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing
befalleth them; as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have
all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast; for
all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all
turn to dust again.”[40] In later times Coleridge has said—“Life is
the one universal soul, which by virtue of the enlivening Breath, and
the informing word, all organised bodies have in common, each after
its kind. This, therefore, all animals possess, and man as an
animal.”[41] More closely resembling Lao-tzŭ’s statements on this
subject, however, are the words of Dr. Büchner—“D’un autre côté
n’oublions pas non plus, que nous ne sommes qu’une partie
imperceptible, quoique nécessaire, du grand tout qui constitue le
monde et que nous devons tôt ou tard perdu notu personalité pour
rentrer dans la masse commune. La Matière dans son ensemble est la
mère d’ou tout provient et ou tout retourne.”[42]
As we proceed we will find other doctrines of our author resembling
those of writers and thinkers far removed from him in time and space.
The illustrations given and referred to above will suffice to show
that, in speculations about Nature and the great mystery of existence,
we are little, if anything, superior to “the ancients.” The course
of speculative philosophy seems to be circular—the same truths and
errors appearing again and again, so that as Coleridge has said, “For
many, very many centuries it has been difficult to advance a new
truth, or even a new error, in the philosophy of the intellect or
morals,”[43] or, he might have added, of theoretical physics. Is it
true, after all, that the spirit of the long-deceased philosopher
returns from the Elysian fields, forgetting by its Lethean draught all
the truths and realities of the eternal, ever-the-same world, to
inform again a human body? We know that Malebranche’s character was
like that of Plato. Schelling, even in external appearance, resembled
Socrates; Hegel is called the modern Proclus; and the soul of Lao-tzŭ
may have transmigrated into Emerson. This last has been chained to “a
weight of nerves,” and located in circumstances altogether unlike
those of its former earthly existence, a fact which would account for
many points of unlikeness. The informing spirit, however, has known no
change in “its own deep self:”
“Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;
The soul that rises with us, our life’s star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar;
Not in entire forgetfulness
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.”
[1] See Ch. 40.
[2] See Preface to Tao-tê-ching-chie 道德經解.
[3] See note in the Tʽai-chi-tʽu-shuo (太極圖說). Hsing-li-ta-chʽuan.
Vol. I.
[4] See Ch. 28, 46.
[5] Yuan-chien, &c., p. 318.
[6] Ch. 40. Compare with this Aristotle’s statement, “Nature spoken
of as generation is the path to Nature.” See Essay V. in Grant’s
Aristotle’s Ethics, vol. 1.
[7] See his 全書, Ch. 85.
[8] Ch. 2.
[9] Ch. 25, see Pauthier, Chine Moderne, p. 359.
[10] See Chs. 21, 25, compare Emerson Miscellanies, p. 32.
[11] Ch. 51.
[12] Chs. 6, 52.
[13] Ch. 34.
[14] See Chs. 37, 41, 43.
[15] See Chs. 32, 39.
[16] Ch. 42.
[17] See Wu-chʽêng’s note to the passage.
[18] See the note on this passage in the Tao-tê-ching-chie; compare
also the peculiar interpretation given by Ta-chün.
[19] Mémoire, &c., p. 36.
[20] See Chs. 16, 39.
[21] See Chs. 7, 5, 16, 25.
[22] See Ch. 5; Julien, however, translates the passage, “L’être qui
est entre le ciel et la terre resemble à un souffict de forge,”
&c.
[23] Ch. 39.
[24] Ch. 23.
[25] Ch. 5.
[26] Ch. 51; but see the different interpretation given by Julien.
[27] Ch. 12.
[28] See Chs. 2, 11, 29, 36. Compare Emerson’s Essay on
Compensation—_Essays_, vol. i.
[29] See Chs. 16, 55.
[30] _The Lotos Eaters_.
[31] See Chs. 8, 78.
[32] See Chs. 1, 47.
[33] Timæus, ch. xviii. (Ed. Stallbaum). See also Grote’s Plato,
Vol. iii., p. 266–7. Timæus, however, introduces reason and other
ideas not consonant with Lao-tzŭ’s teachings.
[34] Geschichte, &c., vol. i, p. 204.
[35] Robert Lytton’s—“The Man of Science.”
[36] See Lewesʼ History of Philosophy, vol. ii., p. 533 (New Edition).
[37] On this subject information will be found in E. Laisset’s
Précurseurs et Disciples de Descartes, p. 210, &c.; Hamilton’s
Discussions; Lewisʼ History of Philosophy, vol. ii.
[38] Fichte (the elder), however, is at one with Lao-tzŭ on this
point.
[39] Georgica. Bk. iv., vs. 221–6. The rest of the passage does not
apply. Compare also Cicero’s criticism on the Pythagorean
doctrine, in the De Nat. Deorum, ch. 1, §11.
[40] Eccles., Ch. iii., vs. 19 and 20.
[41] Aids to Reflection, p. 4.
[42] Force et Matière, p. 93 (French translation).
[43] Biographia Lita., ch. 5; compare also the remarkable words of
Hegel. Geschichte, &c., Vol. i., p. 143.