CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL VIEW OF LAO-TZŬ’s TEACHINGS.

Before proceeding to examine in detail the doctrines of the _Tao-tê

Ching_, I shall briefly indicate their general nature; and by way of

preface to my own remarks, I now present to the reader the statements

of two critics of different countries, and of rather widely separated

dates. One of these, _Chu-hsi_ 朱熹, a Chinese philosopher who lived in

the 12th century, says:—“Lao-tzŭ’s scheme of philosophy consists in

modesty, self-emptiness, the saving of one’s powers, and the refusal

in all circumstances to agitate the bodily humours and spirits.

Lao-tzŭ’s learning consists, generally speaking, in being void of

desires, quiet, and free from exertion—in being self-empty, retiring,

and self-controlling (lit., self-keeping) in actual life. Accordingly,

what his words are ever inculcating is to have in outward deportment a

gentle tenderness and modesty, and to be at the core void of all

selfishness, and unhurtful to all things in the world.”[1] The other

critic, a French philosopher still living, says:—“La conception de

_Lao-tseu_ est un Rationalisme panthéistique absolu dans lequel le

monde sensible est consideré comme la cause de toutes les

imperfections et de toutes les misères, et la personalité humaine

comme un mode inférieur et passager du grand Être, de la grande _Uité_

qui est l’origine et la fin de tous les Êtres. Elle a, comme nous

l’avons déjà dit ailleurs une grande analogie avec le système de

l’_Identitè absolue_ de Schelling. Il y a cette difference, cependant,

que la conception du premier n’est en quelque sorte qu’à l’état

rudimentaire, comme la civilization de son époque, tandis que le

système du dernier embrasse tous les progrès que la pensée

philosophique a fait pendant plus de deux mille ans d’incessants et

souvent d’infructueus labeurs.”[2] I am unable to coincide perfectly

with the opinions of the above critics, especially with those of the

latter; and I shall probably refer to them again. There is at least

one respect in which the writings of Lao-tzŭ resemble those of

Schelling—that is, in being frequently quite unintelligible to all

ordinary mortals.

Pauthier, however, seems to have observed what the Chinese critic

apparently failed to notice—namely, that all Lao-tzŭ’s teachings are

the elucidation and development of his idea of the relations between

something which he names _Tao_ and the Universe. In taking a general

view of Lao-tzŭ’s philosophy, this is the first observation I have to

make:—It is a system which refers all things to _Tao_, as the ultimate

ideal unity of the universe. The sum of the _Tao-tê Ching_ may be said

to be that Tao originated all things, is the everlasting model of rule

for all things, and that into it all things are finally absorbed. It

behoves us then, at the outset, to endeavour to ascertain what that is

which Lao-tzŭ designates by this name, and to find some sort of an

equivalent for it in our own language, if possible.

Now the character Tao 道 is used in several very different senses in

the _Tao-tê Ching_. (1) It is used in the sense of the _way or means_

of doing a thing.[3] (2) In some passages it means to speak of or

describe.[4] (3) It is used in the sense of the course—literal and

metaphorical—characteristic of and pursued by Heaven, Earth, the

perfect man, &c.[5] This usage of the word is common to Lao-tzŭ with

the Confucianists and all other Chinese writers. In some places also

it seems to be used in the sense of good principles—truth—as in

Confucianist writings. (_See Ch._ 46.). (4) There is the

transcendental use of the word, perhaps originated by Lao-tzŭ,[6] but

at least chiefly transmitted through him. It is with _Tao_ used in

this last sense alone that we have to deal at present, and I shall

accordingly now give a sketch of Lao-tzŭ’s own account of the _Tao_

which has given a name to his philosophy.

_Tao_, then, is something which existed before heaven and earth were,

before Deity was, and which is, indeed, eternal.[7] It has not any

name really,[8] and it never had a name; but Lao-tzŭ feels himself

obliged to devise an epithet for it, and he adopts the word _Tao_.

This word, however, is not to be taken in any of its ordinary

significations,[9] but is used in a peculiar sense, to denote that

which would otherwise be nameless. This _Tao_ cannot be apprehended by

any of the bodily senses.[10] It is profound, mysterious, and

extremely subtle.[11] Represented as existing eternally, it is in its

nature calm, void, solitary, and unchanging;[12] but represented as in

operation, it revolves through the universe of being, acting

everywhere, but acting “mysteriously, spontaneously, and without

effort.”[13] It contains matter, and an inherent power of production;

and though itself formless, it yet comprehends all possible forms.[14]

It is the ultimate cause of the universe, and it is the model or rule

for all creatures, but chiefly for man.[15] It represents also that

ideal state of perfection in which all things acted harmoniously and

spontaneously, and when good and evil were unknown; and the return to

which constitutes the _summum bonum_ of existence.[16] Lao-tzŭ speaks

of the _Tao_ under various metaphors—it is the spirit of the void[17]

(lit., spirit of the valley)—a hollow utensil[18]—a river or

ocean[19]—a parent[20]—a ruler.[21] We will have more to say of this

_Tao_ shortly; but the above will perhaps suffice for the present to

give an idea of what meaning Lao-tzŭ attached to the word, or rather,

it should be said, the meanings; for he does not seem to have had in

his mind a very clear conception of what _Tao_ actually was.

The next thing we have to do is to endeavour to find a word which will

translate _Tao_ in this, its transcendental use—a matter of no easy

accomplishment. Pauthier, as has been seen, renders it by “_Grande

voie_ du monde,” by “Raison suprême universelle:” he also sometimes

speaks of it simply as “Raison”[22] or “Logos.” Rémusat[23] also

renders it by “Logos” or “Raison;” and it is by the term “Raison” or

“Logos” that English writers translate the character _Tao_ when it

refers to the peculiar doctrines of Lao-tzŭ and his real or pretended

followers. Julien, however, dissents from this interpretation, and

rightly I think. After giving an account of _Tao_ as taught by the

Taoists themselves, he says “Il parait donc impossible de le (i.e.,

_Tao_) prendre pour la _raison primordiale_, pour _l’intelligence

sublime_ qui a créé et qui régit le monde.”[24] It is with great

hesitation and reluctance, however, that I find myself unable to adopt

Julien’s own translation—“Voie,” or Way. I quite agree with him as to

the reason for not adopting the term Reason—namely, that _Tao_ as

represented by Lao-tzŭ is devoid of thought, judgment, and

intelligence (as to action, Lao-tzŭ is apparently not quite consistent

with himself.) Thus it is quite impossible to make it identical with

the _Logos_ of Plato, and almost absurd to identify it with the divine

_Logos_ of the Neoplatonists of Alexandria. But I do not think that

the word _way_ is the best we can use to translate _Tao_, and this for

several reasons. A way implies a way-maker apart from and antecedent

to it, but _Tao_ was before all other existences. Again, when Lao-tzŭ

speaks of it as indeterminate, as profound, and finally as producing,

nourishing, and absorbing the universe, these terms can scarcely be

applied to a way, however metaphorically used. Julien says:—“Le sens

de _Voie_, que je donne au mot _Tao_ 道, résulte clairement des

passages suivants de _Lao-tseu_: ‘Si j’étais doué de quelque prudence,

je marcherais dans le grand _Tao_’ (dans la grande _Voie_).—Le grand

_Tao_ est tres-uni (la grande _Voie_ est tres-unie), mais le peuple

aime les sentiers (ch. LIII).” “Le _Tao_ peut être regardé comme la

mere de l’univers. Je ne connais pas son nom; pour le qualifier, je

l’appelle le _Tao_ ou la _Voie_ (ch. XXV).”[25] Now in the former of the

two cases here cited the expression _ta tao_ 大道 means, I think, the

great course of duty which all men ought to pursue, but especially

those who are in authority—the way of the magistrate or ruler; an

interpretation which seems to be supported by the rest of the chapter,

though some of the commentators seem to be of the same opinion with

Julien.[26] It is to be observed that this scholar translates the

words “_ta tao_” by “la grande Voie,” but in the same chapter renders

the words “_fei tao tsai_” 非道哉 simply by “ce n’est point pratiquer le

_Tao_.” The chapter from which the latter of the above two passages is

cited by Julien also seems to require another word than _way_ to

translate _Tao_, and the same remark applies to the occurrence of the

word in several other places throughout the _Tao-tê Ching_.[27] We may

say of the _Tao_, as “Voie” or Way, that it revolves everywhere; but

we can scarcely speak of it as being parent of the Universe—the first

and highest existence. _Way_ or _road_ is, no doubt, one of the

earliest meanings of the character _Tao_, and that which underlies

many of its other uses. Nor is it very difficult to trace its progress

from the perfectly concrete _course_ or _channel_, and the abstract

_line_ or _guide_, to the ideal _path_ or _course_ which universal

nature eternally and unchangingly pursues. What Lao-tzŭ does, as it

seems to me, is to identify Nature and her ideal course; and as he

could find no more general word whereby to express this ultimate ideal

unity, he uses the word _Tao_ to designate it, just as a mathematician

uses _x_ to express an unknown quantity.

In order to appreciate Lao-tzŭ’s system properly, we must substitute

for _Tao_ a word corresponding as closely as possible to it in width

of meaning and vagueness of association. It bears a somewhat close

analogy to the _Apeiron_ of the old Ionic philosopher Anaximander; but

the Indeterminate or the Indefinite is rather an awkward word to be

frequently using, and we do not know enough of Anaximander’s system to

warrant us in substituting the _Apeiron_ for _Tao_. In modern times,

again, the _Substance_ in Spinoza’s philosophy, and the _Absolute_ in

Schelling’s, resemble it in many points; but neither could serve as a

proper translation. I have accordingly determined to express _Tao_ by

our word _Nature_, using it in its widest and most abstract

sense—“great creating Nature.” But I do not wish to be understood as

implying that this word corresponds exactly to _Tao_—far from it. I

use it simply as in my opinion the nearest approach we can get.[28]

So, then, we may say of Lao-tzŭ’s system that it refers all matter and

spirit in the universe to one original Nature, from which they both

originated, by which they are maintained, and into which they are to

be finally absorbed. This is the first general observation I have to

make on his philosophy.

Again, Lao-tzŭ’s philosophy is eminently an ethical or rather a

politico-ethical system. All his teachings aim at making man a better

individual, and a better member of society. Whatever the subject be on

which he discourses, there is generally a moral allusion or a moral

lesson taught in allegory; and the high value which he assigns to

moral excellence above all showy accomplishments deserves our greatest

commendation, even though we dissent from his disparaging view of

intellectual acquirements. He appeals more to the heart than to the

mind—more to the Hebraistic side of our nature than to the Hellenistic

(to use Mr. Matthew Arnold’s language); and the _Tao-tê ching_ is more

a book of skeleton sermons than a book of “reasoned truth.” The

intellect, indeed, is not only depressed; but is even sometimes spoken

of unfavourably, as opposed to the beneficial operation of Nature

(_Tao_) on men’s hearts.

Further, the system of Lao-tzŭ is one purely speculative, and _a

priori_ (in the Kantian sense). There is in it no gathering of

facts—no questioning of nature—no rising from particular facts or

truths of greater and greater generality. There is, in short, little

or nothing of the spirit of the inductive philosophy of modern times

to be found in the _Tao-tê ching_. It “nobly takes the _a priori_

road,” beginning with the universal cause, and coming down to

particular facts; frames hypotheses about nature and morals, and tries

to make existing circumstances conform to them. This is the character,

however, which it has in common with nearly all early systems of

philosophy, and even with some of very modern times. An utterly wrong

method we believe it to be; but we can easily forgive it in Lao-tzŭ,

when we take into consideration the circumstances amid which he lived,

and the nature and amount of the materials at his hand.

The last characteristic of Lao-tzŭ’s teachings to which I shall allude

at present is that they are all imbued with a genial and sympathetic

spirit, regarding man not merely as an individual, and not merely as a

member of human society, but also a citizen of the universe, if I may

use the expression. Modesty, gentleness, forbearance, and self-denial

are his constant watchwords. He ever inculcates on man, especially in

his highest development, a sympathy not only with his fellow men, but

also with all the creatures of the earth, and even with inanimate

nature. This doctrine results, no doubt, from the leading idea that

all owe their origin to the one all-producing, all-nourishing nature;

and it is a doctrine of which Lao-tzŭ seems to have been very fond. He

frequently alludes to it as the duty and advantage of man to be

humble, gentle, and never striving; and he utterly abhors the idea of

violence, and the ostentation of superiority. He goes to excess,

however, I think, in his notions about a peaceful, non-interfering

mode of life; and carries his doctrine of the imitation of Nature

(_Tao_) to unwarranted lengths.

Having thus described generally the nature of the teachings of the

_Tao-tê ching_, I shall now proceed to examine them more in detail. In

doing so it will be convenient to consider them under the three

leading divisions of Speculative Physics, Politics and Ethics. I must,

however, beg pardon of the pale shade of their author for doing so, as

I am certain that he would not sanction this division; and at the same

time I must forewarn the reader that he is not to think that subjects

in his opinion appertaining to these three departments are kept

rigorously distinct. Lao-tzŭ, like Plato and some other philosophers,

makes Physics and Politics subordinate parts of Ethics—the grand, all

embracing study. So when reading in the _Tao-tê ching_ about matters

which we regard as belonging peculiarly to one or other of these

divisions, we must endeavour to regard them from Lao-tzŭ’s point of

view—viz., as part of one universal, all containing nature. If we

leave out the important word which I enclose in brackets, and

substitute some such word as _yet_ or _still_, we find in the writings

of a great English poet of the 18th century sentiments very similar to

those of the Chinese sage who lived more than two thousand years

before him:—

“All are but parts of one stupendous whole,

Whose body nature is, and [God] the soul;

That, changed through all, and yet in all the same;

Great in the earth, as in the ethereal frame;

Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,

Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,

Lives through all life, extends through all extent,

Spreads undivided, operates unspent:

Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part,

As full, as perfect, in a hair as heart:

As full, as perfect, in vile man that mourns,

As the rapt seraph that adores and burns:

To _it_ no high, no low, no great, no small;

_It_ fills, _it_ bounds, connects, and equals all.”

[1] Collected Writings, ch. 58.

[2] Chine Moderne, p. 351.

[3] Ch. 59.

[4] Ch. 1. This passage is, however, also rendered according to the

metaphor of a road. See Wu-chʽêng’s note.

[5] Chs. 47, 49, 73, 77.

[6] See Ch. 25.

[7] Chs. 25, 26.

[8] Ch. 41.

[9] Ch. 1. The word chʽang (常), however, may mean lasting, eternal.

[10] Chs. 14, 35.

[11] Ch. 1, &c.

[12] Ch. 25.

[13] Chs. 25, 37.

[14] Chs. 14, 21.

[15] Chs. 1, 51.

[16] See chs. 18, 38.

[17 Ch. 6. The character 谷 is, however, also rendered otherwise in

this page. See Yi-yuan’s edition and that in the 十子全書.

[18] Ch. 4.

[19] Ch. 32.

[20] Chs. 24, 52.

[21] Ch. 51. The _Tao_ is also, however, said not to rule over the

world. See ch. 34.

[22] Chine Moderne, p. 351.

[23] Melanges Posthumes, p. 167, and in the Melanges Asiatiques. See

also Julien’s Introduction, p. xii.

[24] Introduction, p. xiii.

[25] Introduction, p. xiii.

[26] See Wu-chʽêng’s note to the passage.

[27] _E.G._, chs. 16, 14, &c.

[28] There are several passages in the _Tao-tê ching_ where Nature

could not be used to translate _Tao_; but this may in some cases arise

from the fact that Lao-tzŭ’s conception of Nature was very different

from ours.

Lao-tzu, A Study in Chinese Philosophy · 第 4 / 9 章