There that question illustrates the character of this man Douglas exactly.

He smiles now, and says, "Did n't they carry you off?" but he said then

"he had to be carried off"; and he said it to convince the country that

he had so completely broken me down by his speech that I had to be carried

away. Now he seeks to dodge it, and asks, "Did n't they carry you off?"

Yes, they did. But, Judge Douglas, why didn't you tell the truth? I would

like to know why you did n't tell the truth about it. And then again "He

laid up seven days." He put this in print for the people of the country to

read as a serious document. I think if he had been in his sober senses he

would not have risked that barefacedness in the presence of thousands of

his own friends who knew that I made speeches within six of the seven days

at Henry, Marshall County, Augusta, Hancock County, and Macomb, McDonough

County, including all the necessary travel to meet him again at Freeport

at the end of the six days. Now I say there is no charitable way to look

at that statement, except to conclude that he is actually crazy. There is

another thing in that statement that alarmed me very greatly as he states

it, that he was going to "trot me down to Egypt." Thereby he would have

you infer that I would not come to Egypt unless he forced me--that I

could not be got here unless he, giant-like, had hauled me down here. That

statement he makes, too, in the teeth of the knowledge that I had made the

stipulation to come down here and that he himself had been very reluctant

to enter into the stipulation. More than all this: Judge Douglas, when

he made that statement, must have been crazy and wholly out of his sober

senses, or else he would have known that when he got me down here, that

promise--that windy promise--of his powers to annihilate me, would n't

amount to anything. Now, how little do I look like being carried away

trembling? Let the Judge go on; and after he is done with his half-hour, I

want you all, if I can't go home myself, to let me stay and rot here; and

if anything happens to the Judge, if I cannot carry him to the hotel and

put him to bed, let me stay here and rot. I say, then, here is something

extraordinary in this statement. I ask you if you know any other living

man who would make such a statement? I will ask my friend Casey, over

there, if he would do such a thing? Would he send that out and have his

men take it as the truth? Did the Judge talk of trotting me down to Egypt

to scare me to death? Why, I know this people better than he does. I was

raised just a little east of here. I am a part of this people. But the

Judge was raised farther north, and perhaps he has some horrid idea of

what this people might be induced to do. But really I have talked about

this matter perhaps longer than I ought, for it is no great thing; and yet

the smallest are often the most difficult things to deal with. The Judge

has set about seriously trying to make the impression that when we meet

at different places I am literally in his clutches--that I am a poor,

helpless, decrepit mouse, and that I can do nothing at all. This is one

of the ways he has taken to create that impression. I don't know any other

way to meet it except this. I don't want to quarrel with him--to call him

a liar; but when I come square up to him I don't know what else to call

him if I must tell the truth out. I want to be at peace, and reserve all

my fighting powers for necessary occasions. My time now is very nearly

out, and I give up the trifle that is left to the Judge, to let him set my

knees trembling again, if he can. set my knees trembling again, if he can.

THE PAPERS AND WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

VOLUME FOUR

CONSTITUTIONAL EDITION

By Abraham Lincoln

Edited by Arthur Brooks Lapsley

THE WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Volume Four

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES II

LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS FOURTH DEBATE, AT CHARLESTON, SEPTEMBER 18, 1858.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:--It will be very difficult for an audience so large

as this to hear distinctly what a speaker says, and consequently it is

important that as profound silence be preserved as possible.

While I was at the hotel to-day, an elderly gentleman called upon me to

know whether I was really in favor of producing a perfect equality between

the negroes and white people. While I had not proposed to myself on this

occasion to say much on that subject, yet as the question was asked me I

thought I would occupy perhaps five minutes in saying something in regard

to it. I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of

bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white

and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of making

voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor

to intermarry with white people; and I will say, in addition to this, that

there is a physical difference between the white and black races which

I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of

social and political equality. And in as much as they cannot so live,

while they do remain together there must be the position of superior

and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the

superior position assigned to the white race. I say upon this occasion

I do not perceive that because the white man is to have the superior

position the negro should be denied everything. I do not understand that

because I do not want a negro woman for a slave I must necessarily want

her for a wife. My understanding is that I can just let her alone. I am

now in my fiftieth year, and I certainly never have had a black woman for

either a slave or a wife. So it seems to me quite possible for us to get

along without making either slaves or wives of negroes. I will add to this

that I have never seen, to my knowledge, a man, woman, or child who was

in favor of producing a perfect equality, social and political, between

negroes and white men. I recollect of but one distinguished instance

that I ever heard of so frequently as to be entirely satisfied of its

correctness, and that is the case of Judge Douglas's old friend Colonel

Richard M. Johnson. I will also add to the remarks I have made (for I am

not going to enter at large upon this subject), that I have never had the

least apprehension that I or my friends would marry negroes if there was

no law to keep them from it; but as Judge Douglas and his friends seem

to be in great apprehension that they might, if there were no law to keep

them from it, I give him the most solemn pledge that I will to the very

last stand by the law of this State which forbids the marrying of white

people with negroes. I will add one further word, which is this: that I do

not understand that there is any place where an alteration of the social

and political relations of the negro and the white man can be made, except

in the State Legislature,--not in the Congress of the United States; and

as I do not really apprehend the approach of any such thing myself, and

as Judge Douglas seems to be in constant horror that some such danger is

rapidly approaching, I propose as the best means to prevent it that the

Judge be kept at home, and placed in the State Legislature to fight the

measure. I do not propose dwelling longer at this time on this subject.

When Judge Trumbull, our other Senator in Congress, returned to Illinois

in the month of August, he made a speech at Chicago, in which he made what

may be called a charge against Judge Douglas, which I understand proved to

be very offensive to him. The Judge was at that time out upon one of his

speaking tours through the country, and when the news of it reached him,

as I am informed, he denounced Judge Trumbull in rather harsh terms for

having said what he did in regard to that matter. I was traveling at that

time, and speaking at the same places with Judge Douglas on subsequent

days, and when I heard of what Judge Trumbull had said of Douglas, and

what Douglas had said back again, I felt that I was in a position where

I could not remain entirely silent in regard to the matter. Consequently,

upon two or three occasions I alluded to it, and alluded to it in no other

wise than to say that in regard to the charge brought by Trumbull against

Douglas, I personally knew nothing, and sought to say nothing about it;

that I did personally know Judge Trumbull; that I believed him to be a

man of veracity; that I believed him to be a man of capacity sufficient to

know very well whether an assertion he was making, as a conclusion drawn

from a set of facts, was true or false; and as a conclusion of my own from

that, I stated it as my belief if Trumbull should ever be called upon,

he would prove everything he had said. I said this upon two or three

occasions. Upon a subsequent occasion, Judge Trumbull spoke again before

an audience at Alton, and upon that occasion not only repeated his charge

against Douglas, but arrayed the evidence he relied upon to substantiate

it. This speech was published at length; and subsequently at Jacksonville

Judge Douglas alluded to the matter. In the course of his speech, and near

the close of it, he stated in regard to myself what I will now read:

"Judge Douglas proceeded to remark that he should not hereafter occupy his

time in refuting such charges made by Trumbull, but that, Lincoln having

indorsed the character of Trumbull for veracity, he should hold him

(Lincoln) responsible for the slanders."

I have done simply what I have told you, to subject me to this invitation

to notice the charge. I now wish to say that it had not originally been my

purpose to discuss that matter at all But in-as-much as it seems to be the

wish of Judge Douglas to hold me responsible for it, then for once in

my life I will play General Jackson, and to the just extent I take the

responsibility.

I wish to say at the beginning that I will hand to the reporters that

portion of Judge Trumbull's Alton speech which was devoted to this matter,

and also that portion of Judge Douglas's speech made at Jacksonville in

answer to it. I shall thereby furnish the readers of this debate with the

complete discussion between Trumbull and Douglas. I cannot now read them,

for the reason that it would take half of my first hour to do so. I can

only make some comments upon them. Trumbull's charge is in the following

words:

"Now, the charge is, that there was a plot entered into to have a

constitution formed for Kansas, and put in force, without giving the

people an opportunity to vote upon it, and that Mr. Douglas was in the

plot."

I will state, without quoting further, for all will have an opportunity of

reading it hereafter, that Judge Trumbull brings forward what he regards

as sufficient evidence to substantiate this charge.

It will be perceived Judge Trumbull shows that Senator Bigler, upon the

floor of the Senate, had declared there had been a conference among the

senators, in which conference it was determined to have an enabling act

passed for the people of Kansas to form a constitution under, and in

this conference it was agreed among them that it was best not to have a

provision for submitting the constitution to a vote of the people after

it should be formed. He then brings forward to show, and showing, as he

deemed, that Judge Douglas reported the bill back to the Senate with that

clause stricken out. He then shows that there was a new clause inserted

into the bill, which would in its nature prevent a reference of the

constitution back for a vote of the people,--if, indeed, upon a mere

silence in the law, it could be assumed that they had the right to vote

upon it. These are the general statements that he has made.

I propose to examine the points in Judge Douglas's speech in which he

attempts to answer that speech of Judge Trumbull's. When you come to

examine Judge Douglas's speech, you will find that the first point he

makes is:

"Suppose it were true that there was such a change in the bill, and that

I struck it out,--is that a proof of a plot to force a constitution upon

them against their will?"

His striking out such a provision, if there was such a one in the bill,

he argues, does not establish the proof that it was stricken out for the

purpose of robbing the people of that right. I would say, in the first

place, that that would be a most manifest reason for it. It is true, as

Judge Douglas states, that many Territorial bills have passed without

having such a provision in them. I believe it is true, though I am not

certain, that in some instances constitutions framed under such bills

have been submitted to a vote of the people with the law silent upon the

subject; but it does not appear that they once had their enabling acts

framed with an express provision for submitting the constitution to be

framed to a vote of the people, then that they were stricken out when

Congress did not mean to alter the effect of the law. That there have been

bills which never had the provision in, I do not question; but when was

that provision taken out of one that it was in? More especially does the

evidence tend to prove the proposition that Trumbull advanced, when

we remember that the provision was stricken out of the bill almost

simultaneously with the time that Bigler says there was a conference among

certain senators, and in which it was agreed that a bill should be passed

leaving that out. Judge Douglas, in answering Trumbull, omits to attend to

the testimony of Bigler, that there was a meeting in which it was agreed

they should so frame the bill that there should be no submission of the

constitution to a vote of the people. The Judge does not notice this part

of it. If you take this as one piece of evidence, and then ascertain that

simultaneously Judge Douglas struck out a provision that did require it to

be submitted, and put the two together, I think it will make a pretty fair

show of proof that Judge Douglas did, as Trumbull says, enter into a plot

to put in force a constitution for Kansas, without giving the people any

opportunity of voting upon it.

But I must hurry on. The next proposition that Judge Douglas puts is this:

"But upon examination it turns out that the Toombs bill never did contain

a clause requiring the constitution to be submitted."

This is a mere question of fact, and can be determined by evidence. I only

want to ask this question: Why did not Judge Douglas say that these words

were not stricken out of the Toomb's bill, or this bill from which it is

alleged the provision was stricken out,--a bill which goes by the name of

Toomb's, because he originally brought it forward? I ask why, if the Judge

wanted to make a direct issue with Trumbull, did he not take the exact

proposition Trumbull made in his speech, and say it was not stricken out?

Trumbull has given the exact words that he says were in the Toomb's bill,

and he alleges that when the bill came back, they were stricken out. Judge

Douglas does not say that the words which Trumbull says were stricken

out were not so stricken out, but he says there was no provision in the

Toomb's bill to submit the constitution to a vote of the people. We see at

once that he is merely making an issue upon the meaning of the words.

He has not undertaken to say that Trumbull tells a lie about these words

being stricken out, but he is really, when pushed up to it, only taking an

issue upon the meaning of the words. Now, then, if there be any issue upon

the meaning of the words, or if there be upon the question of fact as to

whether these words were stricken out, I have before me what I suppose to

be a genuine copy of the Toomb's bill, in which it can be shown that the

words Trumbull says were in it were, in fact, originally there. If there

be any dispute upon the fact, I have got the documents here to show

they were there. If there be any controversy upon the sense of the

words,--whether these words which were stricken out really constituted a

provision for submitting the matter to a vote of the people,--as that is a

matter of argument, I think I may as well use Trumbull's own argument. He

says that the proposition is in these words:

"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered to

the said Convention of the people of Kansas when formed, for their free

acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and ratified

by the people at the election for the adoption of the constitution, shall

be obligatory upon the United States and the said State of Kansas."

Now, Trumbull alleges that these last words were stricken out of the bill

when it came back, and he says this was a provision for submitting the

constitution to a vote of the people; and his argument is this:

"Would it have been possible to ratify the land propositions at the

election for the adoption of the constitution, unless such an election was

to be held?"

This is Trumbull's argument. Now, Judge Douglas does not meet the charge

at all, but he stands up and says there was no such proposition in that

bill for submitting the constitution to be framed to a vote of the people.

Trumbull admits that the language is not a direct provision for submitting

it, but it is a provision necessarily implied from another provision. He

asks you how it is possible to ratify the land proposition at the election

for the adoption of the constitution, if there was no election to be held

for the adoption of the constitution. And he goes on to show that it is

not any less a law because the provision is put in that indirect shape

than it would be if it were put directly. But I presume I have said enough

to draw attention to this point, and I pass it by also.

Another one of the points that Judge Douglas makes upon Trumbull, and at

very great length, is, that Trumbull, while the bill was pending, said in

a speech in the Senate that he supposed the constitution to be made would

have to be submitted to the people. He asks, if Trumbull thought so then,

what ground is there for anybody thinking otherwise now? Fellow-citizens,

this much may be said in reply: That bill had been in the hands of a

party to which Trumbull did not belong. It had been in the hands of the

committee at the head of which Judge Douglas stood. Trumbull perhaps had a

printed copy of the original Toomb's bill. I have not the evidence on

that point except a sort of inference I draw from the general course

of business there. What alterations, or what provisions in the way of

altering, were going on in committee, Trumbull had no means of knowing,

until the altered bill was reported back. Soon afterwards, when it was

reported back, there was a discussion over it, and perhaps Trumbull in

reading it hastily in the altered form did not perceive all the bearings

of the alterations. He was hastily borne into the debate, and it does not

follow that because there was something in it Trumbull did not perceive,

that something did not exist. More than this, is it true that what

Trumbull did can have any effect on what Douglas did? Suppose Trumbull had

been in the plot with these other men, would that let Douglas out of it?

Would it exonerate Douglas that Trumbull did n't then perceive he was in

the plot? He also asks the question: Why did n't Trumbull propose to

amend the bill, if he thought it needed any amendment? Why, I believe that

everything Judge Trumbull had proposed, particularly in connection with

this question of Kansas and Nebraska, since he had been on the floor of

the Senate, had been promptly voted down by Judge Douglas and his friends.

He had no promise that an amendment offered by him to anything on this

subject would receive the slightest consideration. Judge Trumbull did

bring to the notice of the Senate at that time the fact that there was no

provision for submitting the constitution about to be made for the people

of Kansas to a vote of the people. I believe I may venture to say that

Judge Douglas made some reply to this speech of Judge Trumbull's, but he

never noticed that part of it at all. And so the thing passed by. I think,

then, the fact that Judge Trumbull offered no amendment does not throw

much blame upon him; and if it did, it does not reach the question of fact

as to what Judge Douglas was doing. I repeat, that if Trumbull had himself

been in the plot, it would not at all relieve the others who were in it

from blame. If I should be indicted for murder, and upon the trial it

should be discovered that I had been implicated in that murder, but that

the prosecuting witness was guilty too, that would not at all touch

the question of my crime. It would be no relief to my neck that they

discovered this other man who charged the crime upon me to be guilty too.

Another one of the points Judge Douglas makes upon Judge Trumbull is, that

when he spoke in Chicago he made his charge to rest upon the fact that the

bill had the provision in it for submitting the constitution to a vote

of the people when it went into his Judge Douglas's hands, that it was

missing when he reported it to the Senate, and that in a public speech he

had subsequently said the alterations in the bill were made while it was

in committee, and that they were made in consultation between him (Judge

Douglas) and Toomb's. And Judge Douglas goes on to comment upon the fact

of Trumbull's adducing in his Alton speech the proposition that the bill

not only came back with that proposition stricken out, but with another

clause and another provision in it, saying that "until the

complete execution of this Act there shall be no election in said

Territory,"--which, Trumbull argued, was not only taking the provision

for submitting to a vote of the people out of the bill, but was adding an

affirmative one, in that it prevented the people from exercising the right

under a bill that was merely silent on the question. Now, in regard

to what he says, that Trumbull shifts the issue, that he shifts his

ground,--and I believe he uses the term that, "it being proven false, he

has changed ground," I call upon all of you, when you come to examine that

portion of Trumbull's speech (for it will make a part of mine), to examine

whether Trumbull has shifted his ground or not. I say he did not shift his

ground, but that he brought forward his original charge and the evidence

to sustain it yet more fully, but precisely as he originally made it.

Then, in addition thereto, he brought in a new piece of evidence. He

shifted no ground. He brought no new piece of evidence inconsistent with

his former testimony; but he brought a new piece, tending, as he thought,

and as I think, to prove his proposition. To illustrate: A man brings

an accusation against another, and on trial the man making the charge

introduces A and B to prove the accusation. At a second trial he

introduces the same witnesses, who tell the same story as before, and a

third witness, who tells the same thing, and in addition gives further

testimony corroborative of the charge. So with Trumbull. There was no

shifting of ground, nor inconsistency of testimony between the new piece

of evidence and what he originally introduced.

But Judge Douglas says that he himself moved to strike out that last

provision of the bill, and that on his motion it was stricken out and a

substitute inserted. That I presume is the truth. I presume it is true

that that last proposition was stricken out by Judge Douglas. Trumbull

has not said it was not; Trumbull has himself said that it was so stricken

out. He says: "I am now speaking of the bill as Judge Douglas reported

it back. It was amended somewhat in the Senate before it passed, but I am

speaking of it as he brought it back." Now, when Judge Douglas parades the

fact that the provision was stricken out of the bill when it came back, he

asserts nothing contrary to what Trumbull alleges. Trumbull has only said

that he originally put it in, not that he did not strike it out. Trumbull

says it was not in the bill when it went to the committee. When it came

back it was in, and Judge Douglas said the alterations were made by him in

consultation with Toomb's. Trumbull alleges, therefore, as his conclusion,

that Judge Douglas put it in. Then, if Douglas wants to contradict

Trumbull and call him a liar, let him say he did not put it in, and not

that he did n't take it out again. It is said that a bear is sometimes

hard enough pushed to drop a cub; and so I presume it was in this case.

I presume the truth is that Douglas put it in, and afterward took it out.

That, I take it, is the truth about it. Judge Trumbull says one thing,

Douglas says another thing, and the two don't contradict one another at

all. The question is, what did he put it in for? In the first place, what

did he take the other provision out of the bill for,--the provision which

Trumbull argued was necessary for submitting the constitution to a vote of

the people? What did he take that out for; and, having taken it out, what

did he put this in for? I say that in the run of things it is not unlikely

forces conspire to render it vastly expedient for Judge Douglas to take

that latter clause out again. The question that Trumbull has made is

that Judge Douglas put it in; and he don't meet Trumbull at all unless he

denies that.

In the clause of Judge Douglas's speech upon this subject he uses this

language toward Judge Trumbull. He says:

"He forges his evidence from beginning to end; and by falsifying the

record, he endeavors to bolster up his false charge."

Well, that is a pretty serious statement--Trumbull forges his evidence

from beginning to end. Now, upon my own authority I say that it is not

true. What is a forgery? Consider the evidence that Trumbull has brought

forward. When you come to read the speech, as you will be able to, examine

whether the evidence is a forgery from beginning to end. He had the bill

or document in his hand like that [holding up a paper]. He says that is a

copy of the Toomb's bill,--the amendment offered by Toomb's. He says that

is a copy of the bill as it was introduced and went into Judge Douglas's

hands. Now, does Judge Douglas say that is a forgery? That is one thing

Trumbull brought forward. Judge Douglas says he forged it from beginning

to end! That is the "beginning," we will say. Does Douglas say that is a

forgery? Let him say it to-day, and we will have a subsequent examination

upon this subject. Trumbull then holds up another document like this, and

says that is an exact copy of the bill as it came back in the amended form

out of Judge Douglas's hands. Does Judge Douglas say that is a forgery?

Does he say it in his general sweeping charge? Does he say so now? If he

does not, then take this Toomb's bill and the bill in the amended form,

and it only needs to compare them to see that the provision is in the one

and not in the other; it leaves the inference inevitable that it was taken

out.

But, while I am dealing with this question, let us see what Trumbull's

other evidence is. One other piece of evidence I will read. Trumbull says

there are in this original Toomb's bill these words:

"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered to

the said Convention of the people of Kansas, when formed, for their free

acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and ratified

by the people at the election for the adoption of the constitution, shall

be obligatory upon the United States and the said State of Kansas."

Now, if it is said that this is a forgery, we will open the paper here and

see whether it is or not. Again, Trumbull says, as he goes along, that Mr.

Bigler made the following statement in his place in the Senate, December

9, 1857:

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