first prisoners were sent to Siberia. They were prisoners of war and
natives of conquered European provinces who objected to Muscovite
rule. About 14,000 persons were sent the first year, but many died
from the hardships suffered on the road.
Besides Siberia, Russia in Asia consists of:
I. The Caucasus. It was Peter the Great who, in 1722, invaded (p. 264)
Dagestan and seized the greater part of this territory. We have seen
how the mountaineers defended their liberty under Schamyl,[11] and it
was left to his son Alexander to annex it and make it part of the
Russian Empire. Including Trans Caucasia, it covers an area of 180,843
square miles,--or about that of Colorado and Utah, and contains a
population of 8,350,000.
[Footnote 11: See p. 209]
II. The Kirghiz Steppe. This is a country of plains, unfit for
agriculture and still inhabited by nomads who live in tents and wander
with their flocks over the 755,793 square miles of territory. They are
divided into three hordes or families, one of which surrendered to
Anne Ivanovna in 1734. In 1869 the Kirghiz, together with the Cossacks
of the Don, revolted, but in the autumn of 1870, order was restored.
For administrative purposes, it is divided into:
III. Transcaspia, which, as the name indicates, includes the region
east of the Caspian Sea. It contains an area of 383,618 square miles
with a population estimated at 352,000. Like the Kirghiz Steppe, it is
unfit for agriculture, although it contains several oases. It was
formed into a province by Alexander III. in 1881.
IV. Turkestan contains 409,414 square miles with a population of
3,341,000. The valleys of the Oxus and Jaxartes are very fertile, but
the rest of the extensive province is almost a desert. The Oxus or Amu
Daria once formed the boundary of the empires of Cyrus and Alexander.
It was conquered step by step, and after many struggles with the (p. 265)
Turkomans and Kirghiz to whom it originally belonged.
V. The Khanates, so called because they once formed the territory of
the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara. This province embraces 114,320 square
miles with a population of 3,200,000. Both are recent acquisitions. It
was the war with Khiva, in 1872, which first drew the attention of
Europe to Russia's expansion in Central Asia. There had been some
doubts as to the wisdom of permitting Russia to add more territory to
her already enormous domain, but they had been allayed by a circular
note to the powers, issued by Prince Gortchakof, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, on November 21, 1864. He declared that Russia had
been brought into contact with a number of half-savage tribes who
proved a constant menace to the security of the Empire, and that the
only means of maintaining order on the frontier, was to bring them
under submission. This, he said, had been done by the United States,
and was nothing but a measure necessary for self-defense.
This reasoning was self-evident, but in 1873 the press of Great
Britain asked when and where this necessity would cease. Count
Schouvalof was sent to London and in several interviews with Lord
Granville, he stated distinctly and plainly that Russia had no
intention to annex any more territory in Central Asia. He declared[12]
solemnly with regard to Khiva that "not only was it far from the
intention of the emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive
orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that (p. 266)
the conditions imposed should be such as would not in any way lead to
the prolonged occupation of Khiva."
[Footnote 12: Parliamentary Papers, Central Asia.
1873.]
Notwithstanding this positive declaration, Khiva was annexed on the
10th of June, 1873. Four months afterwards, on the 10th of October, a
treaty was signed by the Khan of Bokhara, giving to Russia free
navigation on the Oxus, and other privileges. It has never been
formally annexed, but is to all intents and purposes Russian
territory.
XXIX--RUSSIAN METHODS. THE WAR WITH JAPAN. (p. 267)
At the time when the United States and the commercial powers of Europe
were discussing the opening of Japan, Russia resolved, if possible, to
forestall them. In 1847, the czar appointed a young general, Nicholas
Muravieff, as governor of Eastern Siberia. Shortly after entering upon
his office he sent an officer named Vagarof, who had explored the
Amoor River, back to it with four Cossacks to make an extensive
report. The party left Strelka in the spring of 1848, but was never
heard of again. Suspecting that they had been captured by the Chinese,
a demand was made for their surrender on the plea that they were
deserters, but the Chinese replied that they knew nothing of them.
Meanwhile Muravieff had ordered the exploration of the shore of the
Sea of Okhotsk and the mouth of the Amoor. These orders were promptly
executed, and in 1850 Lieutenant Orloff entered the river from the
sea. The following year Captain Nevilskoï, who had come out in the
_Baikal_, sent a boat up the river and laid the foundations of
Nikolayefsk and Mariinsk, thereby securing a foothold on the Lower
Amoor, knowing all the time that this was Chinese territory, and that
Russia was at peace with China. The survey of the Sea of Okhotsk (p. 269)
was not neglected. Port Imperial on the coast of Manchuria was
discovered and occupied, and Urup, one of the Kurile Islands, was
seized. When Commodore Perry arrived off the coast of Japan, he was
watched by Admiral Poutiatine in command of the _Pallas_, _Vostok_,
_Olivutzu_ and _Menzikoff_. Aniwa Bay was seized the same year, and
Russians landed on the west coast of what is known as Saghalien, but
was known and owned by the Japanese under the name of Karafuto.
[Illustration: Village Scene]
The Crimean War gave Muravieff a pretext to violate farther the treaty
with China. He claimed that the settlements on the Pacific, as well as
the Russian ships, were in need of supplies, and that the ocean route
was closed by the allied fleets. Was it Muravieff's duty to furnish
those supplies? In that case, any reference to the ocean route was
preposterous, because it is absurd to suppose that supplies would be
sent from Eastern Siberia to the north Pacific coast by such a route;
and if he had furnished them before by the overland route through
Siberia, why, that road was open to him. What he needed was a pretext
to secure the occupation of Japan, or at least of some of its islands,
before the other powers could know of it; and for that purpose, it was
necessary to be in possession of the lower Amoor. Perry's energetic
action thwarted him; but he could not know that. What he did know was
that China was not in a condition to oppose him, and that the other
powers need not know what he was doing.
He determined to send an expedition strong enough to insure respect,
and lost no time in preparing it. Fifty barges, a steamer, and (p. 270)
numerous rafts, a thousand Cossacks with cannon, the whole commanded
by Muravieff himself, left Shilkinsk on the 24th of May, 1854.
Following the usual custom, the expedition was accompanied by
scientific men to survey the river, prepare maps, explore the country,
and examine its resources. At ten A.M., June 8, they arrived at Aigun
where Muravieff was received by the Chinese authorities, who displayed
about the same number of armed men, but such men and such arms!
Firelocks dating from the time of Kang-hi--1689,--convinced Muravieff
that fifty Cossacks could put these braves to rout. Not caring to
arouse Chinese hostility for fear that his schemes might attract
attention, Muravieff did not resent it when the Chinese forbade him to
enter the town; he continued on his journey, and on the 27th of June
arrived at Mariinsk. After sending part of his force to Nikolayefsk,
he went on to Port Imperial where he met Admiral Poutiatine. They
discussed the situation, and Poutiatine left for Japan on the _Diana_.
Muravieff hurried back as he had come, and prepared another expedition
which he took down the river in 1855. In that year he sent three
thousand Cossacks, and five hundred colonists down the Amoor, together
with horses, cattle, provisions, and military stores. This activity
could not escape the Chinese who dispatched four officials to
Nikolayefsk to protest against the invasion of their territory. They
arrived in July, and were entertained by Muravieff with a review of
his forces; after this hint he simply dismissed them. At this time the
settlements which stood in such urgent need of supplies, were (p. 271)
Mariinsk, which consisted of two log cabins, Nikolayefsk numbered ten,
and Castries Bay had "four badly built huts."[13]
[Footnote 13: Ravenstein, Russians on the Amoor.]
In a remarkably short time we hear of the indefatigable Muravieff at
St. Petersburg urging the annexation of the Amoor. He was opposed by
the czar's ministers, but succeeded in convincing the emperor that
China could offer no resistance, and that the powers need not hear of
it until it was too late. Thus he secured large supplies of men and
money. In the beginning of 1857, he was back at his post, and on the
1st of June he dispatched Colonel Ushakof with six hundred men from
Shilkinsk, and soon after followed him with a brigade of Cossack
infantry and a regiment of cavalry, to garrison the forts which he
constructed at strategic points.
Seizing the opportunity of China's distress caused by the war with
England and France, Muravieff demanded the cession of the Amoor
Valley. The Chinese were helpless. On the 28th of May, 1858, a treaty
was signed at Aigun, giving to Russia the left bank of the Amoor down
to the Ussuri, and both banks below that confluent, besides the right
to navigate the Sungari and Ussuri rivers. Russia gave absolutely
nothing in return. Meanwhile Count Poutiatine had been sent from St.
Petersburg to watch the allies and to profit by any blunder which they
or the Chinese might make. Poutiatine stopped in Japan, claiming that
the Koreans had given him the privilege of establishing a coaling
station at Port Hamilton, but knowing that Great Britain would
certainly investigate his claim, he did not press it. He tried to
seize the Japanese Island Tsushima in the southern entrance to the (p. 272)
Japan Sea, and midway between Japan and Korea; but a polite and firm
invitation from the British admiral to leave that island, and the
admiral's insistence to remain until after he had left it, spoiled
that little game. Poutiatine then proceeded to China where he proposed
to help put down the Tai P'ing rebellion in return for the cession of
Manchuria to Russia. This handsome offer was politely declined. Once
again Muravieff hurried to St. Petersburg; upon his advice the newly
acquired territory was officially annexed, and, by ukase of October
31, joined to the littoral of the Sea of Okhotsk and Kamtschatka under
the name of Maritime Province of Eastern Siberia, with Nikolayevsk as
capital. Muravieff remained in supreme command.
The tireless empire builder was again on the Pacific Coast in 1858. On
May 21, he founded Blagovestchensk and, after descending the river,
laid the foundation of Khabarofka, at the mouth of the Ussuri. In
October he was back at Kiakhta, arranging for the postal service
between St. Petersburg and the extreme east. On the 26th of August, he
was created Count Amoorsky, or Count of the Amoor, a promotion which
he had well earned. On the 31st of December, a remarkable ukase was
published, beginning "Now that Russia has regained possession of this
valuable region, etc." The entire territory of Eastern Siberia
contained 740,922 square miles, a territory equal to that of all the
Atlantic Coast States, together with Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia,
Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. This did not include
the Amoor Province, which was placed under the administration of (p. 273)
a governor and eighteen officials, who received a combined annual
salary of $18,873.60, of which the governor received $4680.
Muravieff was back at his post in 1859. Both he and Poutiatine tried
to induce the Japanese to give up Karafuto (Saghalien), but without
success. At this time there was again trouble between China and the
allied British and French, and when in 1860, a British-French force
marched on Peking, Russia had sent another empire builder, General
Ignatieff, to watch if he could not secure something. He did; when the
allies entered Peking, Ignatieff sought Prince Kung and told him that
the "foreign devils" would surely seize the country unless some strong
power compelled them to leave. Russia was willing to do this, because
she had always been fond of China; and all she asked was a strip of
outlying territory of no value to China. Prince Kung gladly signed
away the whole east coast of Manchuria, six hundred miles long; and
Ignatieff redeemed his promise by visiting Lord Elgin and Baron Gros,
the British and French plenipotentiaries. After paying them some
flattering compliments, he made the remark that the Peiho river would
freeze in a few days, and if they did not get out at once, they would
have to stay all winter in Peking. The two gentlemen finished their
business in a hurry, packed up, and left, but not without thanking
Ignatieff for his kindness and reporting the matter to their
government, which did not hear of the Russian's diplomacy until a year
later. This is how Russia extended her empire on the Pacific Coast.
For many years the efforts to secure the whole island of Karafuto (p. 274)
continued and Japan saw that war must follow unless a sacrifice was
made. In 1875, Japan surrendered the island, in return for the Kurile
group, but the Japanese treasured in their hearts the loss and
disgrace. It was this which caused the assault upon the present czar,
when he was traveling in Japan.
In 1894 the war between Japan and China broke out, and when China,
humbled, sued for peace, Japan demanded the cession of the Liaotung
Peninsula,--where Port Arthur is located,--besides making other
conditions. When this became known, Russia, after securing the help of
Germany and France, gave Japan the "friendly advice," which was really
a threat, not to take that peninsula. Japan, single-handed, could not
fight the three powers, and gave way; but every Japanese, high or low,
young or old, was determined to pay off Russia. They bought or built
war vessels everywhere and increased their army. Russia did not like
this, and proposed that Japan should take all the islands in the
Pacific, the Philippines, Hawaii, Borneo, etc., and leave the
continent of Asia to Russia. Japan declined, and went on building
ships. In the end of 1898, Russia announced that she had "leased" the
very Liaotung Peninsula which she had prevented Japan from taking.
Japan understood, as the whole world did, that this "lease" meant
possession. The Japanese statesmen did not protest, because there was
but one protest that Russia would heed,--an appeal to arms. That was
Japan's method when, in 1899, Alexander Pavloff, the Russian minister
in Korea, secured from that government a concession in the port of
Masampo, opening into the entrance to the Japan Sea. Japan's (p. 275)
demand was: Let Masampo go, or it means war. And Russia evacuated
Masampo, while Pavloff was told that he might take a furlough. Then
came 1900, the Boxer troubles and the international march upon Peking.
Japanese officers took note of the Russian troops, leaving the
Russians to do the same with their soldiers. Japan never ceased her
preparations. In the latter part of 1901, Marquis Ito Hirobumi visited
the United States and crossed over to England, where he proposed an
offensive-defensive alliance. British statesmen hesitated, when Ito
told them in plain terms that if no such treaty was concluded, he was
authorized to go on to Russia, and make the best terms he could for
his country.
Meanwhile Pavloff had returned to Seoul, the capital of Korea, and by
means best known to Russian diplomats, was trying to gain a foothold
on the Peninsula. Under the pretext of a timber concession, the
Russians constructed a fort on the Korean side of the Yalu
river,--where it was afterwards discovered by newspaper
correspondents. Russia had secured control of Manchuria with its
362,310 square miles and 11,250,000 population, and none of the powers
dared protest. Japan was ready. Could she allow the "peaceful"
absorption of Korea, as that of Manchuria had been accomplished? Safe
in the offensive-defensive alliance with Great Britain, Japan
approached Russia in a dignified manner, to be put off with vague
replies. After six months of patience, Japan broke off diplomatic
intercourse, and, as this is considered equal to a declaration of war,
she struck and hit hard.
[Illustration: St. Petersburg] (p. 276)
XXX--RUSSIA LOSES HER PRESTIGE. (p. 277)
When, in February, 1904, the world was startled by the Japanese guns
in the harbor of Chemulpo (Korea), one of Russia's well-known
diplomats, speaking in defense of his country, said: "Ours has been a
peaceful absorption." Another statesman, pleading for sympathy,
remarked pathetically: "We were unprepared for war." The two advocates
of Russia's cause spoke the truth, but they did not proclaim the whole
truth.
Ever since Muravieff Amoorsky began the peaceful absorption of
Manchuria by seizing the coastline of that province, Russia has
extended her dominions using no other weapon than her prestige, that
is, the dread inspired by her name, power, and resources. Repeated
protests from Great Britain remained unheeded, because the czar's
government was convinced that they would not be emphasized by a resort
to arms. The semi-civilized tribes of Central Asia were unable, of
course, to oppose the Russian advance; and China was justly afraid of
defying the great northern power. Thus the peaceful absorption
continued with such ease that the Russian tchinovnik ended in
believing in their country's prestige. Herein lies the principal cause
of the astounding history of the war with Japan.
Although Russia repeatedly agreed to evacuate Manchuria, her (p. 278)
actions in the construction of railways and other roads, the opening
of mines, the enormous capital expended in creating a commercial
emporium in Dalny, and her jealousy in excluding foreigners from that
territory,--all this was ample evidence that nothing short of
compulsion would cause her to withdraw. Besides, Alexander Pavloff,
the Russian Minister in Korea, was anxious to emulate Count Cassini,
his former chief at Peking. He was constantly plotting to secure a
foothold in the Peninsula. In 1903, it was announced that a Russian
company had obtained a timber concession on the Yalu River. A few
months afterwards, some American newspaper correspondents with the
Japanese army discovered the ruins of a Russian fort on that river,
securely screened from indiscreet eyes, but in a fine position to
control the passage. That was the timber concession.
Russia's policy, therefore, was a serious menace to Japan. But Japan
did not purpose to draw ridicule by unavailing protests. Feverishly
the preparations for more emphatic action were continued; in the
latter part of 1903, Japan was ready. Safe from a possible European
intervention by her treaty with Great Britain, Japan reminded Russia
of her promise to evacuate Manchuria on October 7, and requested an
explanation for not keeping the pledge. Russia, with a blind faith in
her prestige, replied that the affair did not concern Japan but China,
whereupon Japan made a proposition concerning Manchuria and Korea which
would be acceptable. With studied contempt replies from the czar were
held back beyond the time permitted by international courtesy. (p. 279)
Moreover their tenor was not only unsatisfactory, but was also
calculated to exasperate the proud Japanese. When the final
preparations were made, Japan instructed her minister to St.
Petersburg, to demand his passports,--an act equivalent to a
declaration of war.
The tchinovnik doubted their senses. Russia maintained that a
severance of diplomatic relations did not necessarily imply an appeal
to the sword, when the news flashed over the wires that the Russian
war vessels Varyag and Koreyetz had been blown up at Chemulpo to
escape being captured. The world was still marveling at Japan's
audacity when it was informed that three other Russian war vessels had
been disabled owing to a night torpedo attack under Admiral Togo.
Why was the Russian fleet, numerically superior to that of Japan,
divided? The answer is found in that fatal word: prestige. Pavloff in
Korea had requested the presence of the two doomed ships, to keep the
Japanese in awe. Admiral Stark lay under the guns of impregnable Port
Arthur, trusting to the prestige, when the illusion vanished. There
was still the Vladivostok squadron; it made an effort to induce Togo
to leave Port Arthur by making a raid upon the north coast of Japan,
but in vain. Beyond sinking a few unarmed merchantmen, nothing of
importance was accomplished.
The czar's choice to restore Russia's naval prestige, fell upon
Admiral Makaroff. At about the same time, General Kuropatkin, the
former Minister of War, was charged with punishing Japan for her
insolence. His departure for the Far East was theatrical. After many
genuflexions before sacred eikons, he promised to restore Russia's (p. 280)
prestige by dictating terms of peace in Tokyo.
Makaroff was less enthusiastic, and perhaps more in earnest. It is
asserted that he restored discipline in a sadly demoralized fleet. He
was enticed out of Port Arthur's shelter by a small fleet of the
enemy's cruisers sent out as a decoy. When he discovered Togo's
ironclads he returned to port, but his flagship struck a mine at the
entrance to Port Arthur and sunk. The Admiral, as well as his guest,
the noted battle painter Verestchagin, perished.
With Togo blockading Port Arthur and Admiral Kaminura guarding
Vladivostok, the Japanese secured the freedom of the sea, and began to
pour troops into Korea. This was greeted with acclamation by the
tchinovnik who, after their naval misfortunes, claimed that the
situation would soon be reversed by the army. Some Japanese soldiers
were landed openly at Chemulpo, but the bulk went ashore in a
well-concealed harbor south of the Yalu River. General Kuroki was in
command.
Meanwhile Kuropatkin was in Manchuria busy organizing the army when
not obstructed by Viceroy Alexieff. Such troops as he found were
capable of rendering good service in hunting down Chinese brigands,
but, as the sequel proved, the army had also been nurtured upon that
most indigestible material, prestige. To the wonder of Europe,--and to
a less degree of America,--Kuroki crossed the Yalu and sent the czar's
dreaded soldiers flying before him. (May 1, 1904.)
Once more, and for the last time, did the Russian fleet at Port (p. 281)
Arthur attempt a sortie. It failed, and its fate was sealed.
While the wreckage of Russia's once proud fleet lay concealed in Port
Arthur's inner basin, the Japanese, after scouring the waters to clear
them from mines, landed troops on the Liaotung Peninsula, claimed by
Japan after the war with China, but despoiled of it by Russia's
peaceful absorption. In 1894, Port Arthur was taken in a day from the
Chinese: the Russians defended the impregnable fortress for six
months. "Our prestige demands that the enemy shall not capture Port
Arthur," cried the tchinovnik, and Kuropatkin was ordered to General
Stoessel's rescue. The attempt failed, and General Nogi could pursue
the siege without being disturbed. (June 14-15, 1904.)
A stolid, ignorant, and densely superstitious people was at war with a
rejuvenated nation keenly alive to the power of education. That is the
secret. Man for man, Russia would have won. But the resourcefulness of
the little brown man more than offset the Russian's physical
superiority. As the year 1905 dawned, the fall of Port Arthur was made
known to the world.