THE EVE OF WATERLOO[23]
[Footnote 23: References for this and the following two
chapters: Houssaye: 1815, Waterloo; Ussher: Napoleon's last
voyage; Ropes: Waterloo; Bustelli: L'Enigma di Ligny e di
Waterloo; York: Napoleon als Feldherr; Gardner: Quatre Bras,
Ligny, Waterloo; Gourgaud: La Campagne de 1815; Siborne:
History of the War in France and Belgium, 1815; Cotton, A
Voice from Waterloo; Loben-Sels: Precis de la campagne 1815
dans les Pays-Bas.]
Wellington's Choice of Position -- State of the Two Armies -- The
Orders of Napoleon to Grouchy -- Grouchy's Interpretation of Them
-- Napoleon Surprised by the Prussian Movements -- His Inactivity
-- The Battle-field -- Wellington's Position -- Napoleon's Battle
Array -- His Personal Health -- His Plan.
On the night of June seventeenth Wellington's army reached the heights
at Mont St. Jean, on the northern edge of what was destined to be the
most talked of battle-field in modern times. His retreat, masked by a
strong body of cavalry, with some horse-artillery and a single
infantry division, had been slow and regular, being retarded somewhat
by the heavy rain. Ney had held his position at Frasnes, well aware
that what was before him was far more than a rear-guard--in fact,
owing to the arrival of strong reinforcements during the night, it was
the larger portion of the Anglo-Belgian army. But the instant the
French marshal was informed of his enemy's retrograde movements he
threw forward a strong force of cavalry to cooeperate with Napoleon.
When reunited, the French army numbered seventy-one thousand five
hundred men, with two hundred and forty guns, excluding of course, the
whole of Gerard's corps, which had been left at Ligny to cooeperate
with Grouchy. That Wellington was far on his way to the defensive
position chosen by himself was probably in accord with Napoleon's
calculations; his only fear was lest his foe should have withdrawn
behind the forest of Soignes, where free communication with Bluecher
and the junction of the two allied armies would be assured, as would
not be the case at Mont St. Jean.
This anxiety was set at rest by a cavalry reconnaissance, and at dusk
the French van bivouacked at Belle Alliance, separated by a broad,
shallow vale from their foe. The rest of the army followed with great
difficulty, some by the road; some through plowed or swampy fields,
wading the swollen tributaries of the Dyle, and floundering through
the meadows on their banks. The army of Wellington had seized, in
passing, what provisions and forage they found, and they had
camp-fires to comfort them in the steady rain. The French had scanty
or no rations, and lay throughout the night in the grain-fields,
without fire or shelter. All told, Wellington had sixty-eight thousand
men; ten miles on his right, at Hal, lay eighteen thousand more; ten
miles on his left, twelve from his headquarters at Waterloo, was
Bluecher. Wellington, who had informed the Prussian commander that
unless support reached him he would fall back to Brussels, at two
o'clock in the morning had assurance of Bluecher's cooeperation. There
is an unsupported statement of Napoleon's that he twice sent to
Grouchy on the night of the seventeenth, by two separate officers, a
definite order to detach seven thousand men from his camp at Wavre
(where the Emperor affected to believe that Grouchy was), and make
connection by St. Lambert with the right of the main army. This would
entirely cut off Bluecher from Wellington. The motive of this statement
is transparent--with the allies separated, they were outmanoeuvered;
with the possibility of their union, and an understanding between them
to that effect, he was himself outmanoeuvered.
Grouchy denied having received this order; neither of the officers
intrusted with it ever revealed himself; the original of it has never
been found; and in subsequent orders issued next day there is no
mention of, or reference to, any such message. Either the declaration,
twice made at St. Helena, was due to forgetfulness, being an account
of intentions not carried out, or else it was put forward to explain
the result of the campaign as due to his lieutenant's inefficiency.
Grouchy must have had an uneasy conscience, since for thirty years he
suppressed the text of the Bertrand order, which was not on the
order-book because it had not been dictated to Soult; and when, after
falsely claiming for the duration of an entire generation that he had
acted under verbal instructions, he did publish it, he gave, at the
same time, a mutilated version of his own report from Gembloux, sent
on the night of the seventeenth, changing his original language so as
to show that he had never looked upon the separation of the allies as
his chief task, but that what was uppermost in his mind was an attack
on the Prussians.
It was two in the morning of the eighteenth when the letter of
Grouchy, written about four hours earlier, arrived at Napoleon's
headquarters. Both the Emperor and Soult knew by that time that the
whole of Bluecher's army was moving to Wavre; yet they did not give
this information, nor any minute directions, to the returning
messenger. Grouchy, therefore, was left to act on his own discretion,
his superior doubtless believing that the inferior would by that time
himself be fully informed, and would hasten to throw himself, like an
impenetrable wall, between the Prussians and the Anglo-Belgian army.
By the defenders of Napoleon Grouchy is severely criticized for not
having marched early in the morning of the eighteenth to Moustier,
where, if energetic, he could have carried over his army to the left
bank of the river by eleven o'clock, thus placing his force within the
sphere of Napoleon's operations. Perhaps he would have been able to
prevent the union of the opposing armies, or, if not that, to
strengthen Napoleon in his struggle. It is proved by Marbot's memoirs
that this is what Napoleon expected. On the other hand, excellent
critics present other very important considerations: the line to
Moustier was over a country so rough and miry that after a torrential
rain the artillery would have been seriously delayed, and Prussian
scouts might well have brought down a strong Prussian column in time
to oppose the crossing there or elsewhere. Grouchy, moreover, could
not know that Wellington would offer battle in front of the forest of
Soignes--a resolution which, in the opinion of Napoleon and many
lesser experts, was a serious blunder. He appears to have been
positive that the two armies were aiming to combine for the defense of
Brussels; finally, when from Walhain the sound of the firing at
Waterloo was distinctly heard, and Gerard fiercely urged an immediate
march toward the field of battle, Grouchy was acting strictly within
the limits of the Bertrand order, and according to what he then held
to be explicit instructions, when he pressed on to concentrate at
Wavre, and thus, if Napoleon had already defeated Wellington, to
prevent any union between Wellington and the Prussian army. It is
almost certain that Grouchy would in no way have changed the event by
marching direct to Mont St. Jean, for the cross-roads were soaked, his
troops were already exhausted, and the distance was approximately
fourteen and a half miles as the crow flies: the previous day he had
been able to make somewhat less than half that distance in nine hours.
Napoleon himself did not apparently expect the Prussians to rally as
they did. He spent the hours from dawn, when the rain ceased, in
careful reconnoitering. The mud was so thick in places that he
required help to draw his feet out of his own tracks. At breakfast,
according to a contemporary anecdote, he expressed himself as having
never been more favored by fortune; and when reminded that Bluecher
might effect a union with the English, he replied that the Prussians
would need three days to form again. This opinion is in accord with
his exaggerated but reiterated estimates of the disaster produced in
Bluecher's ranks after Ligny, and taken in connection with the
difficulty of moving artillery, which is not a sufficient explanation
in itself, affords the only conceivable reason for his delay in
attacking on the eighteenth. It also explains his remissness in
leaving Grouchy to exercise full discretion as to his movements. At
eight the plan of battle was sketched; at nine the orders for the day
were despatched throughout the lines; about ten the weary but
self-confident Emperor threw himself down and slept for an hour; at
eleven he mounted, and rode by the Brussels highway to the farm of
Belle Alliance. It was probably during the Emperor's nap that Soult
forwarded to Grouchy a despatch, marked ten in the morning,
instructing that general to manoeuver toward the main army by way of
Wavre. Although, according to Marbot, Napoleon expected Grouchy in the
afternoon by way of Moustier, at one o'clock a second despatch, of
which the Emperor certainly had cognizance, was forwarded to Grouchy,
expressing approval of his intention to move on Wavre by
Sart-a-Walhain, but instructing him "always to manoeuver in our
direction." The postscript of this second order enjoins haste, since
it was thought Buelow was already on the heights of St. Lambert.
The one central idea of Napoleon and Soult was clearly to leave a wide
discretion for Grouchy, provided always that he kept his
communications with the main army open, and that his general direction
was one which would insure easy connection, in order either to cut off
or check the Prussians. But, however this may be, the hours of
Napoleon's inactivity were precious to his enemies; by twelve Buelow
was at St. Lambert, and at the same hour two other Prussian corps were
leaving Wavre. These movements were apparently tardy, but Gneisenau,
feeling that Wellington had been a poor reliance at Ligny, and very
much doubting whether he really intended to stand at Waterloo, was
unwilling that Bluecher should despatch his troops until it was certain
that the Prussian army would not again be left in the lurch. Should
the Anglo-Dutch retreat to Brussels, the Prussians must either retreat
by Louvain, or be again defeated. Anxiety was not dispelled until the
roar of cannon was heard between eleven and twelve. Then the Prussians
first exerted themselves to the utmost; it was about four when they
were within striking distance, ready to take Napoleon's army on its
flank. When Grouchy reached Wavre, at the same hour, he found there
but one of Bluecher's corps, the rear under Thielemann.
[Illustration: Campaign of 1815.
June 15th to 19th.]
From Belle Alliance Napoleon returned, and took his station on the
height of Rossomme. In front was a vale something less than a mile in
width. The highway stretched before him in a straight line until it
skirted the large farmstead of La Haye Sainte on the opposite side;
then, ascending by a slant to the first crest, it passed the hamlet
of Mont St. Jean, only to ascend still higher to the top of the ridge
before falling again into a second depression. At Mont St. Jean was
Wellington's center. The road from Nivelles to Brussels crosses the
valley about a quarter of a mile westward, and on it, midway between
the two slopes, lay another farm-house, with its barns, that of
Hougomont. More than half a mile eastward, in the direction from which
the Prussians were expected, lay scattered the farm buildings of
Papelotte, La Haye, Smohain, and Frischermont. The valley was covered
with rich crops. Unobstructed by ditches or hedges, it was cut
longitudinally about the middle by a cruciform ridge, with spurs
reaching toward Belle Alliance on one side, and past Hougomont on the
other; the road passed by a cut through the longitudinal arm.
Hougomont was almost a fortress, having strong brick walls and a moat;
it stood in a large orchard, which was surrounded by a thick hedge.
The house at La Haye Sainte was brick also, and formed one side of a
quadrangle, inclosed further by two brick barns and a strong wall of
the same material; though not as large or solid as Hougomont, it was a
strong advance redoubt for Mont St. Jean.
The right and center of Wellington were thus well protected, the left
was admirably screened by the places already enumerated. His army was
deployed in three lines, the front plainly visible to the French, the
second partly concealed by the crest of the hill, and the third
entirely so. His headquarters were two miles north, at Waterloo; his
lines of retreat, though broken by the forest of Soignes, were open
either toward Wavre or toward the sea. The latter line was well
protected by the troops at Hal. Uneasy about the character of his
Dutch-Belgian troops, the duke had carefully disposed them among the
reliable English and Germans, in order to preclude the possibility of
a panic.
In the foreground of Napoleon's position was the French army, also
deployed in three lines. The front, extending from the mansion of
Frischermont to the Nivelles road, consisted of two infantry corps,
one on each side of Belle Alliance, and of two corps of cavalry, one
on the extreme right wing, one on the left; of this line Ney had
command. The second was shorter, its wings being cavalry, and its
center in two divisions, of cavalry and infantry respectively. The
third, or reserve, was the guard. Each of the lines had its due
proportion of artillery, stationed in all three along the road. This
disposition gave the French array, as seen from beyond, a fan-like
appearance, the sticks, or columns, converging toward the rear. The
array was brilliant; every man and horse was in sight; the number was
superior by about four thousand to that of the enemy; the ground was,
by eleven, almost dry enough to secure the fullest advantage from
superiority in artillery; deserters from the foe came in from time to
time. Surely the moral effect of such a scene upon the somewhat motley
throng across the valley must be very powerful. Yet the road to
Charleroi was the single available line of retreat, and it passed
through a deep cut; the soldiers were tired and not really first-rate,
fifty per cent. of the line being recruits, and nearly a quarter of
the guard untrained men; the tried officers had all been promoted, and
those who replaced them needed such careful watching that deep
formations had been adopted, and these must not merely diminish the
volume of fire, but present vulnerable targets; the cavalry had been
hastily gathered, and was far from being as efficient as the British
veterans of the German legion.
For some moments after reaching his position Napoleon stood impassive.
He was clad in his familiar costume of cocked hat and gray surtout.
Throughout his lines he had been received with enthusiasm, and his
presence was clearly magnetic, as of old. The direction of affairs in
this momentous crisis was his, and he dreamed of two implacable
enemies routed, of appeasing the two who were less directly
interested, of glory won, of empire regained. Reason must have told
him how empty was such a vision; for, since the armistice of
Poischwitz, Austria and Russia had been quite as bitter, and more
tortuous, than the other powers. His expression mirrored pain, both
physical and intellectual; his over-confidence and consequent delay
were signs of degenerate power; his exertions for three days past had
been beyond any human strength, especially when the faculties of body
and mind had previously been harassed for more than two months, as his
had been.
It was the first day of the week, but there was a calm more profound
than that of the Sabbath; the sky was dull, the misty air was heavy
with summer heat; but there was the expectant silence of a great host,
the deep determination of two grim and obstinate armies. Wellington,
with his western lines protected, would be safe when the Prussian army
should appear where he knew its van already was, and he must manoeuver
eastward to keep in touch. Napoleon must crush the British center and
left, and roll up the line to its right, in order to separate the
parts of his dual foe. To this end he had determined to make a feint
against Hougomont; should Wellington throw in his reserves at that
point on his right, one strong push might create confusion among the
rest, and hurl the whole force westward, away from Brussels. It was a
simple plan, great in its simplicity, as had been every strategic
conception of Napoleon from the opening of the campaign. But its
execution was like that of every other movement attempted since the
first great march of concentration--tardy, slack, and feeble.
Personal bravery was abundant among the French, but the orderly
cooeperation of regiment, division, and corps in all the arms, the
courage of self-restraint, and the self-sacrifice of individuals in
organized movement, with the invigorating ubiquity of a master
mind--these were lacking from the first.