LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS[19]
[Footnote 19: The most important works dealing with the
military side of the Waterloo campaign are those of Mueffling,
Berton, Gourgaud, Clausewitz, Siborne, Charras, Chesney,
Hooper, Maurice, Mercer, Morris, Jomini, Ollech, Vaudoncourt,
Ropes, and Houssaye. Further, there are controversial
discussions of importance by Grouchy, Gerard, Heymes, Knoop,
Loben-Sels, and Bornstedt. The most complete bibliography is,
as usual, that of Kircheisen.]
Napoleon's Orders -- Ney's Failure to Seize Quatre Bras --
Wellington Surprised -- Napoleon's Fine Strategy -- The Meeting
at Ligny -- Bluecher's Defeat -- The Hostile Forces at Quatre Bras
-- Wellington Withdraws -- Napoleon's Over-confidence -- His
Instructions to Grouchy -- His Advance from Quatre Bras.
For four hours after his arrival at Charleroi, Napoleon, uneasy as to
the whereabouts of his detachments, stood in idleness waiting for
news. During this interval the first Prussian corps under Ziethen,
retreating from Charleroi, reached Fleurus unmolested, all except a
small body, which gathered at Gosselies, on the Brussels road, but was
easily dispersed by Reille. It seemed as if the road to Quatre Bras
was open, and when, at half-past four, Ney appeared, he was put in
command of the left, with verbal instructions, as Napoleon asserted
some years later, to seize that strategic point. Within these limits
he was to act independently. If Quatre Bras were surprised and held,
the second move could be attempted: the seizure of Sombreffe. Since
the highway between the two was the only line by which the allied
armies could quickly unite, the possibility of attacking them
separately would be assured even if the successive attacks should
follow each other so closely as to be substantially one battle. Either
Ney misunderstood, or Napoleon recorded what he intended to say, not
what he actually said. Colonel Heymes, Ney's chief of staff, declared
that the Emperor's final words were, "Go, and drive back the enemy";
the Emperor asserted that his orders to go and hold Quatre Bras were
positive.
It is also a matter of dispute whether or not Napoleon had hoped,
after seizing the bridges and crossing the Sambre, to complete his
movement by surprising both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on that same
day, the fifteenth. Had he done so, Bluecher might possibly have
withdrawn to effect a junction with Wellington for the decisive
conflict, and thus have thwarted Napoleon's strategy; but it is not
likely, for that move, as finally executed, was the work not of
Bluecher but of Gneisenau; at this stage of the campaign the Prussians
would probably have retreated toward Namur. Whatever may have been
Napoleon's intention, Ney hurried to Gosselies, stationed Reille to
hold the place, and then, despatching one division to pursue the
Prussians, and another, with Pire's cavalry, toward Quatre Bras, put
himself at the head of the cavalry of the guard to help in seizing
this latter important point. But at seven his force, to their
astonishment, was confronted by a strong body of Nassauers from
Wellington's army, who, having passed Quatre Bras, had seized Frasnes,
a village two and a half miles in advance. These made no stand, but
Ney, instead of proceeding immediately to attack Quatre Bras itself,
left his men to hold the position at Frasnes, and hurried away to
consult his superior. For this he had excellent reasons: his staff was
not yet organized, and d'Erlon's corps was not within call; he was
therefore too weak for the movement contemplated by his orders. At the
same moment Napoleon, who had been in the saddle since three in the
morning, and who had become convinced that the retreating Prussians
would not halt at Fleurus, but would rejoin their main army, turned
back to Charleroi, and, on reaching his quarters an hour later, flung
himself in utter exhaustion upon his couch. In fact, he was in
exquisite torture from the complication of urinary, hemorrhoidal, and
other troubles which his long day's ride had aggravated, and, as he
declared at St. Helena,--probably the truth,--he had lost his
assurance of final success. The day had been fairly successful, but at
what a cost of energy! No one, he least of all, could feel that there
had been any buoyancy in the movements or favoring fate in the
combinations of his armies.
Throughout the day Bluecher had displayed a fiery zeal. Since early in
May he had had no serious consultation with Wellington, and in a
general conversation held at that time there had been merely a vague
understanding as to a union at some point south of Sombreffe. That
town was accordingly selected by him for concentration, and in general
his orders had been well executed. Why the bridges of Marchiennes and
Chatelet were not undermined and blown up by the Prussians has never
been explained. Moreover, the language of Gneisenau's orders to Buelow
being vague, the latter misinterpreted it, and his much-needed force
was not brought in, as expected. Wellington's conduct is a riddle. He
displayed little anxiety and found time for social enjoyment as well
as for the activities of military command in a supreme crisis. About
the middle of the afternoon he was informed, through the Prince of
Orange, as to his enemy's movements. With perfect calm, he commanded
that his troops should be ready in their cantonments; at five he
issued orders for the divisions to march with a view to concentration
at Nivelles, the easternmost point which he intended to occupy; at
ten, just as he was setting out for the noted ball which the Duchess
of Richmond was giving on the eve of decision, he gave definite
instructions for the concentration to begin. These were his very first
steps toward concentration, although twenty-seven years later he made
the assertion, supported only by his despatch to Bathurst of the
nineteenth, that he had ordered the Anglo-allied army to concentrate
to the left, as Bluecher had ordered the Prussians to concentrate to
the right. As a matter of fact, he was twenty-four hours behind
Bluecher in ordering his first defensive movements. This is not excused
by the fact that his movement of concentration was completed somewhat
earlier than Bluecher's. About twenty minutes after the Prince of
Orange had reached the ball-room, Wellington sent him away quietly,
and then, summoning the Duke of Richmond, who, it is doubtfully said,
was to have command of the reserve when completely formed, he asked
for a map. The two withdrew to an adjoining room. Wellington closed
the door, and said, with an oath, "Napoleon has humbugged me." He then
explained that he had ordered his army to concentrate at Quatre Bras,
adding, "But we shall not stop him there; and if so, I must fight him
here," marking Waterloo with his thumb-nail on the map as he spoke. It
was not until the next morning that he left for the front. Though
Napoleon, on the evening of the fifteenth, had neither Quatre Bras nor
Sombreffe, he held all the debatable ground; and if, next morning, he
could seize the two towns simultaneously, the first move in his great
game would be won. It seems as if he must risk everything to that end.
What passed between Napoleon and Ney from midnight until two in the
morning is unknown. There is no evidence that the Emperor expressed
serious dissatisfaction, although he may have been exasperated. He was
not exactly in a position to give vent to his feelings. Whatever was
the nature of their conversation, Ney was again at his post long
before dawn, and not a soldier moved from Charleroi until nearly noon!
It seems that Napoleon, or Ney, or both, must have been stubbornly
convinced that Wellington could not concentrate within twenty-four
hours. That Napoleon was not incapacitated by prostration is proved by
his acts: about five he sent a preliminary order to Ney; very early,
also, he took measures to complete Gerard's crossing at Chatelet; and
then, having considered at length the alternatives of pushing straight
on to Brussels or of taking the course he did, he had reached a
decision as early as seven o'clock. It seems almost certain that he
delayed chiefly to get his troops well in hand, partly to give them a
much-needed rest. They had been seventeen hours afoot the previous
day. Toward nine, believing that more of Ney's command was assembled
than was yet the case, he sent a fretful order commanding the marshal
to seize Quatre Bras, and stating that a semi-independent command,
under Grouchy, would stand at Sombreffe, while he himself would hold
Gembloux. This done, he settled into apparent lethargy. To Grouchy he
wrote that he intended to attack the enemy at Sombreffe, and "even at
Gembloux," and then to operate immediately with Ney "against the
English." His scheme was able, for if at either salient angle, Quatre
Bras or Sombreffe, his presence should be necessary, he could, at
need, quickly join either Ney or Grouchy; but his senses must have
been dulled. When informed that the enemy was at Fleurus in force, he
hesitated long before resolving to move, being crippled by the
inability of his left to move on Quatre Bras and behaving as if sure
that the soldiers before him were only a single corps of Bluecher's
army, which he could sweep away at his convenience. Meanwhile Vandamme
had advanced. The Prussians withdrew from Fleurus, and deployed at the
foot of the hillock on which the village of Ligny stands. When, about
midday, Napoleon arrived at Fleurus, he had to experience the
unpleasant surprise of finding a strong force ready to oppose him.
Eighty-seven thousand men, all Bluecher's army, except Buelow's corps
and a portion of Ziethen's which had been dispersed by the right wing
and cavalry of the French near Gilly, were drawn up in battle array to
oppose him. This was a loss to the foe of possibly two thousand men, a
serious weakening at a fateful moment. But the Emperor was not yet
ready to meet them, much as he had desired just such a contingency. He
was not aware of the full strength of his enemy, but he was not sure
of annihilating even those he believed to be in presence, for he had
left ten thousand men at Charleroi, under Lobau, as a reserve, and the
troops most available for strengthening his line were moving toward
Quatre Bras.
By the independent action of their own generals a substantial force of
several thousand Dutch-Belgians, virtually the whole of Perponcher's
division, was concentrated at Quatre Bras early that same morning. To
be sure, Wellington had simultaneously determined on the same step,
but it was taken long before his orders arrived. Indeed, he seems to
have reached Quatre Bras before his orderly. Scarcely halting, he
rapidly surveyed the situation and, leaving the troops in command of
the Prince of Orange, rode away to visit Bluecher. The two commanders
met at about one o'clock in the windmill of Bry. They parted in the
firm conviction that the mass of the French army was at Ligny, and
with the verbal understanding that Wellington, if not himself
attacked, would come to Bluecher's support. On leaving, the English
commander sharply criticized the tactical disposition of his ally's
army; but Bluecher, with the fixed idea that, in any case, the duke was
coming to his aid, determined to stand as he was. With similar
obstinacy, Napoleon, still certain that what he had before him,
although a great force, was only a screen for the retreat of the main
army of the allies, now despatched an order (the second) for Ney to
combine Reille, d'Erlon, and Kellermann in order to destroy whatever
force was in opposition at Quatre Bras. This was at two. The French
attack was opened at half-past two by Gerard and Vandamme; the
resistance was such as to leave no doubt of the real Prussian
strength. This being clear, Napoleon immediately wrote two despatches
of the same tenor--one he sent to Ney by an aide, and one to d'Erlon
by a subofficer of the guard.[20] The former (the third for the same
destination) urged Ney to come for the sake of France; the other
summoned d'Erlon from Ney's command to the Emperor's own immediate
assistance: "You will save France, and cover yourself with glory,"
were its closing words. This last order, the original of which has but
lately been revealed, came nigh to ruining the whole day's work.
Before Wellington could return to Quatre Bras, Ney's force was engaged
with the Prince of Orange, and before three o'clock a fierce conflict
was raging at that place. D'Erlon appears to have been in a frightful
quandary as to his duty. He marched away toward St. Amand and in his
dilemma detached his best division, that of Durutte, toward Bry.
Neither superior nor subordinate did anything to the purpose. Ney was
without the support of an entire corps and did not therefore literally
obey his orders. Napoleon was unassisted by the wandering force and
even confused by their unexpected appearance at a critical moment.
They were mistaken at Ligny for enemies; d'Erlon's vacillation had so
detained them.
[Footnote 20: For the text of the order to d'Erlon and a full
discussion of the whole subject, see Houssaye, 1815, p. 201.]
Bluecher, who was determined to fight, come what would, had held in as
long as his impatient temper permitted; but when no reinforcement from
Wellington appeared, he first fumed, and then about six gave his fatal
orders to prepare for the offensive. The nature of the ground was such
as necessarily to weaken his center by the initial movements. Napoleon
marked this at once, and summoned his guard in order to break through.
For a moment the Emperor hesitated; a mysterious force had appeared on
the left; perhaps they were foes. But when once assured that they were
d'Erlon's men, he waited not an instant longer; at eight the crash
came, and the Prussian line was shattered. Retreat was turned into a
momentary rout so quickly that Bluecher could not even exchange his
wounded horse for another, and in the first mad rush he was so stunned
and overwhelmed that his staff gave him up for lost. The few moments
before he was found were the most precious for the allies of the whole
campaign, since Gneisenau directed the flight northward on the line to
Wavre, a route parallel with that on which Wellington, whatever his
success, must now necessarily withdraw. This move, which abandoned
the line to Namur, is Gneisenau's title to fame.[21] The lines were
quickly formed to carry it out, and the rest of the retrograde march
went on with great steadiness. Napoleon did not wait until d'Erlon
arrived and thereupon order an immediate, annihilating pursuit, but
came to the conclusion that the Prussians were sufficiently
disorganized, and would seek to reorganize on the old line to the
eastward. They were thus, he thought, completely and finally cut off
from Wellington. It was not until early next morning that he
despatched Pajol, with his single cavalry corps, to follow the foe,
for he was confirmed in his fatal conjecture by the false report of
five thousand Prussians having been seen on the Namur road, and
exerting themselves to hold it. The Prussians seen were merely a horde
of stragglers. The truth was not known until next day.
[Footnote 21: Long regarded as a more or less haphazard
decision, it has been established at last that the officers
of the Prussian general staff were able by the light of a
horn lantern so to exhibit their maps, explain their study of
the ground, and develop the necessary strategy as to
determine with considerable accuracy where they were and what
the scientific move should be. When this was duly set forth
in the history of the general staff, the exultation of the
Emperor William II was expressed in his public speeches, and
the Germans of the empire were convinced that by this
decision the result of the Waterloo campaign was determined.]
Almost simultaneously with the battle of Ligny was fought that of
Quatre Bras. At eleven Ney received orders outlining a general plan
for the day; about half an hour later came the specific command to
unite the forces of d'Erlon, Reille, and Kellermann, and carry Quatre
Bras; at five arrived in hot haste the messenger with the third order.
At two o'clock there were not quite seven thousand Anglo-Belgians in
Quatre Bras, but, successive bodies arriving in swift succession, by
half-past six o'clock there were over thirty thousand. At two Ney had
seventeen thousand men, and though he sought to recall d'Erlon, yet,
owing to the withdrawal of Durutte, and to d'Erlon's indecision, he
had at half-past six not more than twenty thousand. Not one of
d'Erlon's men had reached him: Girard's division of Reille's corps was
with Vandamme before St. Amand. Gerard's corps had been kept at
Ligny. Had he advanced on the position the previous evening, or had he
attacked between eleven and two on the sixteenth, the event of the
campaign might have been different from what it was. But if he really
believed, as Heymes afterward asseverated was the case, that his
orders were merely to push and hold the enemy, then his conduct
throughout was gallant and correct.[22] The weight of evidence favors
the claim of Napoleon that the marshal was perverse in his refusal to
take Quatre Bras according to verbal orders. Whatever the truth, the
behavior of Ney's men was admirable when they did advance, but they
were forced back to Frasnes before superior numbers.
[Footnote 22: Ropes: The Campaign of Waterloo, p. 191.]
Next morning Wellington was conversing with Colonel Bowles when a
staff officer drew up, his horse flecked with foam, and whispered the
news of Ligny. Without a change of countenance, the commander said to
his companion: "Old Bluecher has had a ---- good licking, and gone back
to Wavre, eighteen miles. As he has gone back, we must go, too. I
suppose in England they will say we have been licked. I can't help it;
as they have gone back, we must go, too." Accordingly, he issued his
orders, and his army began to march at ten. On the whole, therefore,
the events of June sixteenth seemed favorable to Napoleon, since,
fighting at two points with inferior numbers, he had been victorious
at one, and had thereby secured the other also. We, of course, know
that by Gneisenau's move this apparent success was rendered nugatory.
It is useless to surmise what would have happened had Buelow been with
Bluecher, and d'Erlon and Lobau with Napoleon, or if either of these
possibilities had happened without the other; as it was, Napoleon's
strategy gained both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe.
The Prussians had lost twenty thousand men, missing, wounded, and
dead, and it required vigorous treatment to restore Bluecher. But all
night the army marched, and in the morning Buelow, having found his
direction, was near Beauderet and Sauvinieres, within easy reach at
Gembloux. The retreat continued throughout the seventeenth. It was a
move of the greatest daring, since the line was over a broken country
almost destitute of roads, and, the old base of supplies having been
abandoned, the men had to starve until Gneisenau could secure another
by way of Louvain. The army bore its hardships well; there was no
straggling or demoralization, and the splendor of success makes doubly
brilliant the move which confounded Napoleon's plans. Never dreaming
at first that his foe had withdrawn elsewhere than along his natural
line of supply toward Liege, the Emperor considered the separation of
the two allies as complete, and after carefully deliberating
throughout the long interval he allowed for collecting his troops and
giving them a thorough rest, he determined to wheel, join Ney, and
attack Wellington, wherever found. It was serious and inexplicable
slackness which he showed in not taking effective measures to
determine immediately where his defeated enemy was. Being,
nevertheless, well aware of the Prussian resources and character, he
made up his mind to detail Grouchy, with thirty-three thousand men,
for the purpose of scouring the country toward Liege at least as far
as Namur. Then, to provide for what he considered a possible
contingency,--namely, that which had actually occurred,--this adjunct
army was to turn north, and hasten to Gembloux, in order to assure
absolutely the isolation of Wellington; in any and every case the
general was to keep his communications with Napoleon open.
It was eight in the morning of the seventeenth when Napoleon issued
from his quarters at Fleurus. Flahaut was waiting for the reply to an
inquiry which he had just brought from Ney concerning the details of
Ligny. The Emperor at once dictated a despatch, the most famous in the
controversial literature of Waterloo, in which his own achievements
were told and Ney was blamed for the disconnected action of his
subordinates the previous day; in particular the marshal was
instructed to take position at Quatre Bras, "as you were ordered," and
d'Erlon was criticized for his failure to move on St. Amand. The
wording of the hastily scribbled order to the latter he had probably
forgotten; it was: "Portez-vous ... a la hauteur de Ligny, et fondez
sur St. Amand--ou vice versa; c'est ce que je ne sais bien." ("Betake
yourself ... to the heights of Ligny, pounce on St. Amand--or the
reverse; I am not quite sure which.") Further, the Emperor now
declared that, had Ney kept d'Erlon and Reille together, not an
Englishman would have escaped, and that, had d'Erlon obeyed his
orders, the Prussian army would have been destroyed. In case it were
still impossible to seize Quatre Bras with the force at hand, Napoleon
would himself move thither. Then, entering a carriage, he drove to
Ligny; Lobau was ordered at once to Marbais, on the road to Quatre
Bras. After haranguing the troops and prisoners, Napoleon was
informed, about noon, that Wellington was still in position. At once a
second order was sent, commanding Ney to attack; the Emperor, it ran,
was already under way to Marbais. This was not quite true, for while
he was giving detailed instructions to Grouchy before parting, that
general had seemed uneasy, and had finally pleaded that it would be
impossible further to disorganize the Prussians, since they had so
long a start. These scruples were peremptorily put down, and the chief
parted amicably from his subordinate, but with a sense of uneasiness,
lest he had left nice and difficult work in unwilling hands. Scouts
soon overtook him, and expressed doubt as to the Prussians having gone
to Namur. In case they had not, Grouchy must act cautiously.
Accordingly, positive instructions were then dictated to Bertrand, and
sent to Grouchy, whose movements were now doubly important. The latter
general was to reconnoiter toward Namur, but march direct to Gembloux;
his chief task was to discover whether Bluecher was seeking to join
Wellington or not. For the rest, he was free to act on his own
discretion.
Napoleon then entered his carriage, and drove to Quatre Bras. Mounting
his horse, he led the pursuit of the English rear. Indignant that Ney
had lost the opportunity to overwhelm at least a portion of
Wellington's force, he exclaimed to d'Erlon, "They have ruined
France!" But he said nothing to Ney himself. So active and energetic
was the Emperor that he actually exposed himself to the artillery fire
with which the English gunners sought to retard the pursuit. It was
not an easy matter for Grouchy to carry out his instructions; at two
o'clock began a steady downpour, which lasted well into the next
morning; the roads to Gembloux were lanes, and the rain turned them
into sticky mud. Not until that night was Grouchy's command assembled
at Gembloux; it was ten o'clock before the leader gained an inkling of
where the Prussians were, and then, though uncertain as to their exact
movements, he immediately despatched a letter, received by Napoleon at
two in the morning. The marshal explained that he would pursue as far
as Wavre, so as to cut off Bluecher from Brussels, and to separate him
from Wellington. Some hours later, about seven in the morning, when
finally convinced that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, Grouchy
set his columns in motion in a straight line toward that place by
Sart-a-Walhain, choosing, with very poor judgment, to advance by the
right bank of the Dyle, and thus jeopardizing the precious connections
he had been repeatedly and urgently instructed to keep open.