UTOPIA OR HELL?
Sherman’s celebrated declaration about war has certainly been borne
out by what has happened in Europe, and above all in Belgium, during
the last four months. That war is hell I will concede as heartily as
any ultrapacificist. But the only alternative to war, that is to hell,
is the adoption of some plan substantially like that which I herein
advocate and which has itself been called utopian. It is possible that
it is utopian for the time being; that is, that nations are not ready
as yet to accept it. But it is also possible that after this war has
come to an end the European contestants will be sufficiently sobered to
be willing to consider some such proposal, and that the United States
will abandon the folly of the pacificists and be willing to co-operate
in some practical effort for the only kind of peace worth having, the
peace of justice and righteousness.
The proposal is not in the least utopian, if by utopian we understand
something that is theoretically desirable but impossible. What I
propose is a working and realizable Utopia. My proposal is that the
efficient civilized nations--those that are efficient in war as well as
in peace--shall join in a world league for the peace of righteousness.
This means that they shall by solemn covenant agree as to their
respective rights which shall not be questioned; that they shall agree
that all other questions arising between them shall be submitted to a
court of arbitration; and that they shall also agree--and here comes
the vital and essential point of the whole system--to act with the
combined military strength of all of them against any recalcitrant
nation, against any nation which transgresses at the expense of any
other nation the rights which it is agreed shall not be questioned,
or which on arbitrable matters refuses to submit to the decree of the
arbitral court.
In its essence this plan means that there shall be a great
international treaty for the peace of righteousness; that this treaty
shall explicitly secure to each nation and except from the operations
of any international tribunal such matters as its territorial
integrity, honor, and vital interest, and shall guarantee it in the
possession of these rights; that this treaty shall therefore by its
own terms explicitly provide against making foolish promises which
cannot and ought not to be kept; that this treaty shall be observed
with absolute good faith--for it is worse than useless to enter into
treaties until their observance in good faith is efficiently secured.
Finally, and most important, this treaty shall put force back of
righteousness, shall provide a method of securing by the exercise of
force the observance of solemn international obligations. This is to be
accomplished by all the powers covenanting to put their whole strength
back of the fulfilment of the treaty obligations, including the decrees
of the court established under and in accordance with the treaty.
This proposal, therefore, meets the well-found objections against the
foolish and mischievous all-inclusive arbitration treaties recently
negotiated by Mr. Bryan under the direction of President Wilson. These
treaties, like the all-inclusive arbitration treaties which President
Taft started to negotiate, explicitly include as arbitrable, or as
proper subjects for action by joint commissions, questions of honor
and of vital national interest. No such provision should be made. No
such provision is made as among private individuals in any civilized
community. No man is required to “arbitrate” a slap in the face or an
insult to his wife; no man is expected to “arbitrate” with a burglar
or a highwayman. If in private life one individual takes action which
immediately jeopardizes the life or limb or even the bodily well-being
and the comfort of another, the wronged party does not have to go into
any arbitration with the wrong-doer. On the contrary, the policeman or
constable or sheriff immediately and summarily arrests the wrong-doer.
The subsequent trial is not in the nature of arbitration at all. It is
in the nature of a criminal proceeding. The wronged man is merely a
witness and not necessarily an essential witness. For example, if, in
the streets of New York, one man assaults another or steals his watch,
and a policeman is not near by, the wronged man is not only justified
in knocking down the assailant or thief, but fails in his duty if he
does not so act. If a policeman is near by, the policeman promptly
arrests the wrong-doer. The magistrate does not arbitrate the question
of property rights in the watch nor anything about the assault. He
satisfies himself as to the facts and delivers judgment against the
offender.
A covenant between the United States and any other power to arbitrate
all questions, including those involving national honor and interest,
neither could nor ought to be kept. Such a covenant will be harmless
only if no such questions ever arise. Now, all the worth of promises
made in the abstract lies in the way in which they are fulfilled in the
concrete. The Wilson-Bryan arbitration treaties are to be tested in
this manner. The theory is, of course, that these treaties are to be
made with all nations, and this is correct, because it would be a far
graver thing to refuse to make them with some nations than to refuse
to enter into them with any nation at all. The proposal is, in effect,
and disregarding verbiage, that all questions shall be arbitrated or
settled by the action of a joint commission--questions really vital to
us would, as a matter of fact, be settled adversely to us pending such
action. There are many such questions which in the concrete we would
certainly not arbitrate. I mention one, only as an example. Do Messrs.
Wilson and Bryan, or do they not, mean to arbitrate, if Japan should
so desire, the question whether Japanese laborers are to be allowed
to come in unlimited numbers to these shores? If they do mean this,
let them explicitly state that fact--merely as an illustration--to the
Senate committee, so that the Senate committee shall understand what
it is doing when it ratifies these treaties. If they do not mean this,
then let them promptly withdraw all the treaties so as not to expose
us to the charge of hypocrisy, of making believe to do what we have no
intention of doing, and of making promises which we have no intention
of keeping. I have mentioned one issue only; but there are scores of
other issues which I could mention which this government would under no
circumstances agree to arbitrate.
In the same way, we must explicitly recognize that all the peace
congresses and the like that have been held of recent years have done
no good whatever to the cause of world peace. All their addresses and
resolutions about arbitration and disarmament and such matters have
been on the whole slightly worse than useless. Disregarding the Hague
conventions, it is the literal fact that none of the peace congresses
that have been held for the last fifteen or twenty years--to speak
only of those of which I myself know the workings--have accomplished
the smallest particle of good. In so far as they have influenced free,
liberty-loving, and self-respecting nations not to take measures for
their own defense they have been positively mischievous. In no respect
have they achieved anything worth achieving; and the present world war
proves this beyond the possibility of serious question.
The Hague conventions stand by themselves. They have accomplished a
certain amount--although only a small amount--of actual good. This was
in so far as they furnished means by which nations which did not wish
to quarrel were able to settle international disputes not involving
their deepest interests. Questions between nations continually arise
which are not of first-class importance; which, for instance, refer to
some illegal act by or against a fishing schooner, to some difficulty
concerning contracts, to some question of the interpretation of a
minor clause in a treaty, or to the sporadic action of some hot-headed
or panic-struck official. In these cases, where neither nation wishes
to go to war, the Hague court has furnished an easy method for the
settlement of the dispute without war. This does not mark a very great
advance; but it is an advance, and was worth making.
The fact that it is the only advance that the Hague court has
accomplished makes the hysterical outbursts formerly indulged in by the
ultrapacificists concerning it seem in retrospect exceedingly foolish.
While I had never shared the hopes of these ultrapacificists, I had
hoped for more substantial good than has actually come from the Hague
conventions. This was because I accept promises as meaning something.
The ultrapacificists, whether from timidity, from weakness, or from
sheer folly, seem wholly unable to understand that the fulfilment
of a promise has anything to do with making the promise. The most
striking example that could possibly be furnished has been furnished
by Belgium. Under my direction as President, the United States signed
the Hague conventions. All the nations engaged in the present war
signed these conventions, although one or two of the nations qualified
their acceptance, or withheld their signatures to certain articles.
This, however, did not in the least relieve the signatory powers from
the duty to guarantee one another in the enjoyment of the rights
supposed to be secured by the conventions. To make this guarantee
worth anything, it was, of course, necessary actively to enforce it
against any power breaking the convention or acting against its clear
purpose. To make it really effective it should be enforced as quickly
against non-signatory as against signatory powers; for to give a power
free permission to do wrong if it did not sign would put a premium on
non-signing, so far as big, aggressive powers are concerned.
I authorized the signature of the United States to these conventions.
They forbid the violation of neutral territory, and, of course, the
subjugation of unoffending neutral nations, as Belgium has been
subjugated. They forbid such destruction as that inflicted on Louvain,
Dinant, and other towns in Belgium, the burning of their priceless
public libraries and wonderful halls and churches, and the destruction
of cathedrals such as that at Rheims. They forbid the infliction of
heavy pecuniary penalties and the taking of severe punitive measures at
the expense of civilian populations. They forbid the bombardment--of
course including the dropping of bombs from aeroplanes--of unfortified
cities and of cities whose defenses were not at the moment attacked.
They forbid such actions as have been committed against various cities,
Belgian, French, and English, not for military reason but for the
purpose of terrorizing the civilian population by killing and wounding
men, women, and children who were non-combatants. All of these offenses
have been committed by Germany. I took the action I did in directing
these conventions to be signed on the theory and with the belief that
the United States intended to live up to its obligations, and that our
people understood that living up to solemn obligations, like any other
serious performance of duty, means willingness to make effort and to
incur risk. If I had for one moment supposed that signing these Hague
conventions meant literally nothing whatever beyond the expression
of a pious wish which any power was at liberty to disregard with
impunity, in accordance with the dictation of self-interest, I would
certainly not have permitted the United States to be a party to such
a mischievous farce. President Wilson and Secretary Bryan, however,
take the view that when the United States assumes obligations in order
to secure small and unoffending neutral nations or non-combatants
generally against hideous wrong, its action is not predicated on any
intention to make the guarantee effective. They take the view that
when we are asked to redeem in the concrete, promises we made in the
abstract, our duty is to disregard our obligations and to preserve
ignoble peace for ourselves by regarding with cold-blooded and timid
indifference the most frightful ravages of war committed at the expense
of a peaceful and unoffending country. This is the cult of cowardice.
That Messrs. Wilson and Bryan profess it and put it in action would
be of small consequence if only they themselves were concerned. The
importance of their action is that it commits the United States.
Elaborate technical arguments have been made to justify this timid and
selfish abandonment of duty, this timid and selfish failure to work for
the world peace of righteousness, by President Wilson and Secretary
Bryan. No sincere believer in disinterested and self-sacrificing work
for peace can justify it; and work for peace will never be worth much
unless accompanied by courage, effort, and self-sacrifice. Yet those
very apostles of pacificism who, when they can do so with safety,
scream loudest for peace, have made themselves objects of contemptuous
derision by keeping silence in this crisis, or even by praising Mr.
Wilson and Mr. Bryan for having thus abandoned the cause of peace. They
are supported by the men who insist that all that we are concerned
with is escaping even the smallest risk that might follow upon the
performance of duty to any one except ourselves. This last is not a
very exalted plea. It is, however, defensible. But if, as a nation,
we intend to act in accordance with it, we must never promise to do
anything for any one else.
The technical arguments as to the Hague conventions not requiring us to
act will at once be brushed aside by any man who honestly and in good
faith faces the situation. Either the Hague conventions meant something
or else they meant nothing. If, in the event of their violation, none
of the signatory powers were even to protest, then of course they meant
nothing; and it was an act of unspeakable silliness to enter into them.
If, on the other hand, they meant anything whatsoever, it was the duty
of the United States, as the most powerful, or at least the richest and
most populous, neutral nation, to take action for upholding them when
their violation brought such appalling disaster to Belgium. There is no
escape from this alternative.
The first essential to working out successfully any scheme whatever for
world peace is to understand that nothing can be accomplished unless
the powers entering into the agreement act in precisely the reverse
way from that in which President Wilson and Secretary Bryan have acted
as regards the Hague conventions and the all-inclusive arbitration
treaties during the past six months. The prime fact to consider in
securing any peace agreement worth entering into, or that will have
any except a mischievous effect, is that the nations entering into the
agreement shall make no promises that ought not to be made, that they
shall in good faith live up to the promises that are made, and that
they shall put their whole strength unitedly back of these promises
against any nation which refuses to carry out the agreement, or which,
if it has not made the agreement, nevertheless violates the principles
which the agreement enforces. In other words, international agreements
intended to produce peace must proceed much along the lines of the
Hague conventions; but a power signing them, as the United States
signed the Hague conventions, must do so with the intention in good
faith to see that they are carried out, and to use force to accomplish
this, if necessary.
To violate these conventions, to violate neutrality treaties, as
Germany has done in the case of Belgium, is a dreadful wrong. It
represents the gravest kind of international wrong-doing. But it is
really not quite so contemptible, it does not show such short-sighted
and timid inefficiency, _and, above all, such selfish indifference to
the cause of permanent and righteous peace_ as has been shown by us of
the United States (thanks to President Wilson and Secretary Bryan) in
refusing to fulfil our solemn obligations by taking whatever action
was necessary in order to clear our skirts from the guilt of tame
acquiescence in a wrong which we had solemnly undertaken to oppose.
It has been a matter of very real regret to me to have to speak in the
way I have felt obliged to speak as to German wrong-doing in Belgium,
because so many of my friends, not only Germans, but Americans of
German birth and even Americans of German descent, have felt aggrieved
at my position. As regards my friends, the Americans of German birth
or descent, I can only say that they are in honor bound to regard all
international matters solely from the standpoint of the interest of the
United States, and of the demands of a lofty international morality.
I recognize no divided allegiance in American citizenship. As regards
Germany, my stand is for the real interest of the mass of the German
people. If the German people as a whole would only look at it rightly,
they would see that my position is predicated upon the assumption that
we ought to act as unhesitatingly in favor of Germany if Germany were
wronged as in favor of Belgium when Belgium is wronged.
There are in Germany a certain number of Germans who adopt
the Treitschke and Bernhardi view of Germany’s destiny and of
international morality generally. These men are fundamentally exactly
as hostile to America as to all other foreign powers. They look down
with contempt upon Americans as well as upon all other foreigners.
They regard it as their right to subdue these inferior beings. They
acknowledge toward them no duty, in the sense that duty is understood
between equals. I call the attention of my fellow Americans of German
origin who wish this country to act toward Belgium, not in accordance
with American traditions, interests, and ideals, but in accordance
with the pro-German sympathies of certain citizens of German descent,
to the statement of Treitschke that “to civilization at large the
[Americanizing] of the German-Americans means a heavy loss. Among
Germans there can no longer be any question that the civilization of
mankind suffers every time a German is transformed into a Yankee.”
I do not for one moment believe that the men who follow Treitschke
in his hatred of and contempt for all non-Germans, and Bernhardi in
his contempt for international morality, are a majority of the German
people or even a very large minority. I think that the great majority
of the Germans, who have approved Germany’s action toward Belgium, have
been influenced by the feeling that it was a vital necessity in order
to save Germany from destruction and subjugation by France and Russia,
perhaps assisted by England. Fear of national destruction will prompt
men to do almost anything, and the proper remedy for outsiders to work
for is the removal of the fear. If Germany were absolutely freed from
danger of aggression on her eastern and western frontiers, I believe
that German public sentiment would refuse to sanction such acts as
those against Belgium. The only effective way to free it from this
fear is to have outside nations like the United States in good faith
undertake the obligation to defend Germany’s honor and territorial
integrity, if attacked, exactly as they would defend the honor and
territorial integrity of Belgium, or of France, Russia, Japan, or
England, or any other well-behaved, civilized power, if attacked.
This can only be achieved by some such world league of peace as that
which I advocate. Most important of all, it can only be achieved by
the willingness and ability of great, free powers to put might back
of right, to make their protest against wrong-doing effective by, if
necessary, punishing the wrong-doer. It is this fact which makes the
clamor of the pacificists for “peace, peace,” without any regard to
righteousness, so abhorrent to all right-thinking people. There are
multitudes of professional pacificists in the United States, and of
well-meaning but ill-informed persons who sympathize with them from
ignorance. There are not a few astute persons, bankers of foreign
birth, and others, who wish to take sinister advantage of the folly
of these persons, in the interest of Germany. All of these men clamor
for immediate peace. They wish the United States to take action for
immediate peace or for a truce, under conditions designed to leave
Belgium with her wrongs unredressed and in the possession of Germany.
They strive to bring about a peace which would contain within itself
the elements of frightful future disaster, by making no effective
provision to prevent the repetition of such wrong-doing as has been
inflicted upon Belgium. All of the men advocating such action,
including the professional pacificists, the big business men largely
of foreign birth, and the well-meaning but feeble-minded creatures
among their allies, and including especially all those who from sheer
timidity or weakness shrink from duty, occupy a thoroughly base and
improper position. The peace advocates of this stamp stand on an exact
par with men who, if there was an epidemic of lawlessness in New York,
should come together to demand the immediate cessation of all activity
by the police, and should propose to substitute for it a request that
the highwaymen, white slavers, black-handers, and burglars cease
their activities for the moment on condition of retaining undisturbed
possession of the ill-gotten spoils they had already acquired. The
only effective friend of peace in a big city is the man who makes the
police force thoroughly efficient, who tries to remove the causes of
crime, but who unhesitatingly insists upon the punishment of criminals.
Pacificists who believe that all use of force in international matters
can be abolished will do well to remember that the only efficient
police forces are those whose members are scrupulously careful not to
commit acts of violence when it is possible to avoid them, but who
are willing and able, when the occasion arises, to subdue the worst
kind of wrong-doers by means of the only argument that wrong-doers
respect, namely, successful force. What is thus true in private life is
similarly true in international affairs.
No man can venture to state the exact details that should be followed
in securing such a world league for the peace of righteousness. But,
not to leave the matter nebulous, I submit the following plan. It would
prove entirely workable, if nations entered into it with good faith,
and if they treated their obligations under it in the spirit in which
the United States treated its obligations as regarded the independence
of Cuba, giving good government to the Philippines, and building
the Panama Canal; the same spirit in which England acted when the
neutrality of Belgium was violated.
All the civilized powers which are able and willing to furnish and to
use force, when force is required to back up righteousness--and only
the civilized powers who possess virile manliness of character and the
willingness to accept risk and labor when necessary to the performance
of duty are entitled to be considered in this matter--should join to
create an international tribunal and to provide rules in accordance
with which that tribunal should act. These rules would have to accept
the _status quo_ at some given period; for the endeavor to redress all
historical wrongs would throw us back into chaos. They would lay down
the rule that the territorial integrity of each nation was inviolate;
that it was to be guaranteed absolutely its sovereign rights in certain
particulars, including, for instance, the right to decide the terms
on which immigrants should be admitted to its borders for purposes
of residence, citizenship, or business; in short, all its rights in
matters affecting its honor and vital interest. Each nation should be
guaranteed against having any of these specified rights infringed upon.
They would not be made arbitrable, any more than an individual’s right
to life and limb is made arbitrable; they would be mutually guaranteed.
All other matters that could arise between these nations should be
settled by the international court. The judges should act not as
national representatives, but purely as judges, and in any given case
it would probably be well to choose them by lot, excluding, of course,
the representatives of the powers whose interests were concerned. Then,
and most important, the nations should severally guarantee to use their
entire military force, if necessary, against any nation which defied
the decrees of the tribunal or which violated any of the rights which
in the rules it was expressly stipulated should be reserved to the
several nations, the rights to their territorial integrity and the
like. Under such conditions--to make matters concrete--Belgium would be
safe from any attack such as that made by Germany, and Germany would be
relieved from the haunting fear its people now have lest the Russians
and the French, backed by other nations, smash the empire and its
people.
In addition to the contracting powers, a certain number of outside
nations should be named as entitled to the benefits of the court.
These nations should be chosen from those which are as civilized and
well-behaved as the great contracting nations, but which, for some
reason or other, are unwilling or unable to guarantee to help execute
the decrees of the court by force. They would have no right to take
part in the nomination of judges, for no people are entitled to do
anything toward establishing a court unless they are able and willing
to face the risk, labor, and self-sacrifice necessary in order to
put police power behind the court. But they would be treated with
exact justice; and in the event of any one of the great contracting
powers having trouble with one of them, they would be entitled to go
into court, have a decision rendered, and see the decision supported,
precisely as in the case of a dispute between any two of the great
contracting powers themselves.
No power should be admitted into the first circle, that of the
contracting powers, unless it is civilized, well-behaved, and able
to do its part in enforcing the decrees of the court. China, for
instance, could not be admitted, nor could Turkey, although for
different reasons, whereas such nations as Germany, France, England,
Italy, Russia, the United States, Japan, Brazil, the Argentine, Chile,
Uruguay, Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium
would all be entitled to go in. If China continues to behave as well
as it has during the last few years it might soon go into the second
line of powers which would be entitled to the benefits of the court,
although not entitled to send judges to it. Mexico would, of course,
not be entitled to admission at present into either circle. At present
every European power with the exception of Turkey would be so entitled;
but sixty years ago the kingdom of Naples, for instance, would not
have been entitled to come in, and there are various South American
communities which at the present time would not be entitled to come
in; and, of course, this would at present be true of most independent
Asiatic states and of all independent African states. The council
should have power to exclude any nation which completely fell from
civilization, as Mexico, partly with the able assistance of President
Wilson’s administration, has fallen during the past few years. There
are various South and Central American states which have never been
entitled to the consideration as civilized, orderly, self-respecting
powers which would entitle them to be treated on terms of equality in
the fashion indicated. As regards these disorderly and weak outsiders,
it might well be that after a while some method would be devised to
deal with them by common agreement of the civilized powers; but until
this was devised and put into execution they would have to be left as
at present.
Of course, grave difficulties would be encountered in devising such
a plan and in administering it afterward, and no human being can
guarantee that it would absolutely succeed. But I believe that it could
be made to work and that it would mark a very great improvement over
what obtains now. At this moment there is hell in Belgium and hell
in Mexico; and the ultrapacificists in this country have their full
share of the responsibility for this hell. They are not primary factors
in producing it. They lack the virile power to be primary factors in
producing anything, good or evil, that needs daring and endurance.
But they are secondary factors; for the man who tamely acquiesces in
wrong-doing is a secondary factor in producing that wrong-doing. Most
certainly the proposed plan would be dependent upon reasonable good
faith for its successful working, but this is only to say what is also
true of every human institution. Under the proposed plan there would be
a strong likelihood of bettering world conditions. If it is a Utopia,
it is a Utopia of a very practical kind.
Such a plan is as yet in the realm of mere speculation. At present
the essential thing for each self-respecting, liberty-loving nation
to do is to put itself in position to defend its own rights. Recently
President Wilson, in his message to Congress, has announced that we
are in no danger and will not be in any danger; and ex-President Taft
has stated that the awakening of interest in our defenses indicates
“mild hysteria.” Such utterances show fatuous indifference to the
teachings of history. They represent precisely the attitude which a
century ago led to the burning of Washington by a small expeditionary
hostile force, and to such paralyzing disaster in war as almost to
bring about the break-up of the Union. In his message President Wilson
justifies a refusal to build up our navy by asking--as if we were
discussing a question of pure metaphysics--“When will the experts tell
us just what kind of ships we should construct--and when will they
be right for ten years together? Who shall tell us now what sort of
navy to build?” and actually adds, after posing and leaving unanswered
these questions: “I turn away from the subject. It is not new. There
is no need to discuss it.” Lovers of Dickens who turn to the second
paragraph of chapter XI of “Our Mutual Friend” will find this attitude
of President Wilson toward preparedness interestingly paralleled by
the attitude Mr. Podsnap took in “getting rid of disagreeables” by
the use of the phrases, “I don’t want to know about them! I refuse
to discuss them! I don’t admit them!” thus “clearing the world of
its most difficult problems by sweeping them behind him. For they
affronted him.” If during the last ten years England’s attitude toward
preparedness for war and the upbuilding of her navy had been determined
by statesmanship such as is set forth in these utterances of President
Wilson, the island would now be trampled into bloody mire, as Belgium
has been trampled. If Germany had followed such advice--or rather no
advice-during the last ten years, she would now have been wholly unable
so much as to assert her rights anywhere.
Let us immediately make our navy thoroughly efficient; and this can
only be done by reversing the policy that President Wilson has followed
for twenty-two months. Recently Secretary Daniels has said, as quoted
by the press, that he intends to provide for the safety of both the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts by dividing our war fleet between the
two oceans. Such division of the fleet, having in view the disaster
which exactly similar action brought on Russia ten years ago, would be
literally a crime against the nation. Neither our foreign affairs nor
our naval affairs can be satisfactorily managed when the President is
willing to put in their respective departments gentlemen like Messrs.
Bryan and Daniels. President Wilson would not have ventured to make
either of these men head of the Treasury Department, because he would
thereby have offended the concrete interests of American business men.
But as Secretary of State and Secretary of the Navy the harm they do
is to the country as a whole. No concrete interest is immediately
affected; and, as it is only our own common welfare in the future, only
the welfare of our children, only the honor and interest of the United
States through the generations that are concerned, it is deemed safe to
disregard this welfare and to take chances with our national honor and
interest.