PREPAREDNESS AGAINST WAR
Military preparedness meets two needs. In the first place, it is a
partial insurance against war. In the next place, it is a partial
guarantee that if war comes the country will certainly escape dishonor
and will probably escape material loss.
The question of preparedness cannot be considered at all until we
get certain things clearly in our minds. Right thinking, wholesome
thinking, is essential as a preliminary to sound national action. Until
our people understand the folly of certain of the arguments advanced
against the action this nation needs, it is, of course, impossible to
expect them to take such action.
The first thing to understand is the fact that preparedness for war
does not always insure peace but that it very greatly increases the
chances of securing peace. Foolish people point out nations which, in
spite of preparedness for war, have seen war come upon them, and then
exclaim that preparedness against war is of no use. Such an argument
is precisely like saying that the existence of destructive fires in
great cities shows that there is no use in having a fire department.
A fire department, which means preparedness against fire, does not
prevent occasional destructive fires, but it does greatly diminish and
may completely minimize the chances for wholesale destruction by fire.
Nations that are prepared for war occasionally suffer from it; but if
they are unprepared for it they suffer far more often and far more
radically.
Fifty years ago China, Korea, and Japan were in substantially the
same stage of culture and civilization. Japan, whose statesmen had
vision and whose people had the fighting edge, began a course of
military preparedness, and the other two nations (one of them in
natural resources immeasurably superior to Japan) remained unprepared.
In consequence, Japan has immensely increased her power and standing
and is wholly free from all danger of military invasion. Korea on the
contrary, having first been dominated by Russia has now been conquered
by Japan. China has been partially dismembered; one half of her
territories are now subject to the dominion of foreign nations, which
have time and again waged war between themselves on these territories,
and her remaining territory is kept by her purely because these foreign
nations are jealous of one another.
In 1870 France was overthrown and suffered by far the most damaging
and disastrous defeat she had suffered since the days of Joan of
Arc--because she was not prepared. In the present war she has suffered
terribly, but she is beyond all comparison better off than she was in
1870, because she has been prepared. Poor Belgium, in spite of being
prepared, was almost destroyed, because great neutral nations--the
United States being the chief offender--have not yet reached the
standard of international morality and of willingness to fight for
righteousness which must be attained before they can guarantee small,
well-behaved, civilized nations against cruel disaster. England,
because she was prepared as far as her navy is concerned, has been able
to avoid Belgium’s fate; and, on the other hand, if she had been as
prepared with her army as France, she would probably have been able to
avert the war and, if this could not have been done, would at any rate
have been able to save both France and Belgium from invasion.
In recent years Rumania, Bulgaria, and Servia have at times suffered
terribly, and in some cases have suffered disaster, in spite of being
prepared for war; but Bosnia and Herzegovina are under alien rule at
this moment because they could no more protect themselves against
Austria than they could against Turkey. While Greece was unprepared she
was able to accomplish nothing, and she encountered disaster. As soon
as she was prepared, she benefited immensely.
Switzerland, at the time of the Napoleonic wars, was wholly unprepared
for war. In spite of her mountains, her neighbors overran her at will.
Great battles were fought on her soil, including one great battle
between the French and the Russians; but the Swiss took no part in
these battles. Their territory was practically annexed to the French
Republic, and they were domineered over first by the Emperor Napoleon
and then by his enemies. It was a bitter lesson, but the Swiss learned
it. Since then they have gradually prepared for war as no other small
state of Europe has done, and it is in consequence of this preparedness
that none of the combatants has violated Swiss territory in the present
struggle.
The briefest examination of the facts shows that unpreparedness for war
tends to lead to immeasurable disaster, and that preparedness, while
it does not certainly avert war any more than the fire department of a
city certainly averts fire, yet tends very strongly to guarantee the
nation against war and to secure success in war if it should unhappily
arise.
Another argument advanced against preparedness for war is that such
preparedness incites war. This, again, is not in accordance with
the facts. Unquestionably certain nations have at times prepared
for war with a view to foreign conquest. But the rule has been that
unpreparedness for war does not have any real effect in securing peace,
although it is always apt to make war disastrous, and that preparedness
for war generally goes hand in hand with an increased caution in going
to war.
Striking examples of these truths are furnished by the history of the
Spanish-American states. For nearly three quarters of a century after
these states won their independence their history was little else than
a succession of bloody revolutions and of wars among themselves as well
as with outsiders, while during the same period there was little or
nothing done in the way of effective military preparedness by one of
them. During the last twenty or thirty years, however, certain of them,
notably Argentina and Chile, have prospered and become stable. Their
stability has been partly caused by, and partly accompanied by, a great
increase in military preparedness. During this period Argentina and
Chile have known peace as they never knew it before, and as the other
Spanish-American countries have not known it either before or since,
and at the same time their military efficiency has enormously increased.
Proportionately, Argentina and Chile are in military strength beyond
all comparison more efficient than the United States; and if our navy
is permitted to deteriorate as it has been deteriorating for nearly
two years, the same statement can soon be made, although with more
qualification, of their naval strength. Preparedness for war has
made them far less liable to have war. It has made them less and not
more aggressive. It has also made them for the first time efficient
potential factors in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine as coguarantors,
on a footing of complete equality with the United States. The Monroe
Doctrine, conceived not merely as a measure of foreign policy vital to
the welfare of the United States, but even more as the proper joint
foreign policy of all American nations, is by far the most efficient
guarantee against war that can be offered the western hemisphere. By
whatever name it is called, it is absolutely indispensable in order to
keep this hemisphere mistress of its own destinies, able to prevent any
part of it from falling under the dominion of any Old World power, and
able absolutely to control in its own interest all colonization on and
immigration to our shores from either Europe or Asia.
The bloodiest and most destructive war in Spanish-American history,
that waged by Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay against Paraguay, was
waged when all the nations were entirely unprepared for war, especially
the three victorious nations. During the last two or three decades
Mexico, the Central American states, Colombia, and Venezuela have been
entirely unprepared for war, as compared with Chile and Argentina.
Yet, whereas Chile and Argentina have been at peace, the other states
mentioned have been engaged in war after war of the most bloody
and destructive character. Entire lack of preparedness for war has
gone hand in hand with war of the worst type and with all the worst
sufferings that war can bring.
The lessons taught by Spanish-America are paralleled elsewhere. When
Greece was entirely unprepared for war she nevertheless went to war
with Turkey, exactly as she did when she was prepared; the only
difference was that in the one case she suffered disaster and in the
other she did not. The war between Italy and Turkey was due wholly
to the fact that Turkey was not prepared--that she had no navy. The
fact that in 1848 Prussia was entirely unprepared, and moreover
had just been engaged in a revolution heartily approved by all the
ultrapacificists and professional humanitarians, did not prevent her
from entering on a war with Denmark. It merely prevented the war from
being successful.
Utter and complete lack of preparation on our part did not prevent our
entering into war with Great Britain in 1812 and with Mexico in 1848.
It merely exposed us to humiliation and disaster in the former war; in
the latter, Mexico was even worse off as regards preparation than we
were. As for civil war, of course military unpreparedness has not only
never prevented it but, on the contrary, seems usually to have been one
of the inciting causes.
The fact that unpreparedness does not mean peace ought to be patent
to every American who will think of what has occurred in this country
during the last seventeen years. In 1898 we were entirely unprepared
for war. No big nation, save and except our opponent, Spain, was more
utterly unprepared than we were at that time, nor more utterly unfit
for military operations. This did not, however, mean that peace was
secured for a single additional hour. Our army and navy had been
neglected for thirty-three years. This was due largely to the attitude
of the spiritual forebears of those eminent clergymen, earnest social
workers, and professionally humanitarian and peace-loving editors,
publicists, writers for syndicates, speakers for peace congresses,
pacificist college presidents, and the like who have recently come
forward to protest against any inquiry into the military condition of
this nation, on the ground that to supply our ships and forts with
sufficient ammunition and to fill up the depleted ranks of the army and
navy, and in other ways to prepare against war, will tend to interfere
with peace. In 1898 the gentlemen of this sort had had their way for
thirty-three years. Our army and navy had been grossly neglected. But
the unpreparedness due to this neglect had not the slightest effect of
any kind in preventing the war. The only effect it had was to cause
the unnecessary and useless loss of thousands of lives in the war.
Hundreds of young men perished in the Philippine trenches because,
while the soldiers of Aguinaldo had modern rifles with smokeless
powder, our troops had only the old black-powder Springfield. Hundreds
more, nay thousands, died or had their health impaired for life in
fever camps here in our own country and in the Philippines and Cuba,
and suffered on transports, because we were entirely unprepared for
war, and therefore no one knew how to take care of our men. The lives
of these brave young volunteers were the price that this country paid
for the past action of men like the clergymen, college presidents,
editors, and humanitarians in question--none of whom, by the way,
risked their own lives. They were also the price that this country paid
for having had in previous cabinets just such incompetents as in time
of peace Presidents so often, for political reasons, put into American
cabinets--just such incompetents as President Wilson has put into the
Departments of State and of the Navy.
Now and then the ultrapacificists point out the fact that war is bad
because the best men go to the front and the worst stay at home. There
is a certain truth in this. I do not believe that we ought to permit
pacificists to stay at home and escape all risk, while their braver and
more patriotic fellow countrymen fight for the national well-being.
It is for this reason that I wish that we would provide for universal
military training for our young men, and in the event of serious war
make all men do their part instead of letting the whole burden fall
upon the gallant souls who volunteer. But as there is small likelihood
of any such course being followed in the immediate future, I at least
hope that we will so prepare ourselves in time of peace as to make our
navy and army thoroughly efficient; and also to enable us in time of
war to handle our volunteers in such shape that the loss among them
shall be due to the enemy’s bullets instead of, as is now the case,
predominantly to preventable sickness which we do not prevent. I call
the attention of the ultrapacificists to the fact that in the last
half century all the losses among our men caused by “militarism,” as
they call it, that is, by the arms of an enemy in consequence of our
going to war, have been far less than the loss caused among these same
soldiers by applied pacificism, that is, by our government having
yielded to the wishes of the pacificists and declined in advance to
make any preparations for war. The professional peace people have
benefited the foes and ill-wishers of their country; but it is probably
the literal fact to say that in the actual deed, by the obstacles they
have thrown in the way of making adequate preparation in advance, they
have caused more loss of life among American soldiers, fighting for
the honor of the American flag, during the fifty years since the close
of the Civil War than has been caused by the foes whom we have fought
during that period.[2]
[2] Some of the leading pacificists are men who have made great
fortunes in industry. Of course industry inevitably takes
toll of life. Far more lives have been lost in this country
by men engaged in bridge building, tunnel digging, mining,
steel manufacturing, the erection of sky-scrapers, the
operations of the fishing fleet, and the like, than in all
our battles in all our foreign wars put together. Such loss
of life no more justifies us in opposing righteous wars
than in opposing necessary industry. There was certainly
far greater loss of life, and probably greater needless
and preventable and uncompensated loss of life, in the
industries out of which Mr. Carnegie made his gigantic
fortune than has occurred among our troops in war during
the time covered by Mr. Carnegie’s activities on behalf of
peace.
But the most striking instance of the utter failure of unpreparedness
to stop war has been shown by President Wilson himself. President
Wilson has made himself the great official champion of unpreparedness
in military and naval matters. His words and his actions about foreign
war have their nearest parallel in the words and the actions of
President Buchanan about civil war; and in each case there has been
the same use of verbal adroitness to cover mental hesitancy. By his
words and his actions President Wilson has done everything possible
to prevent this nation from making its army and navy effective and to
increase the inefficiency which he already found existing. We were
unprepared when he took office, and every month since we have grown
still less prepared. Yet this fact did not prevent President Wilson,
the great apostle of unpreparedness, the great apostle of pacificism
and anti-militarism, from going to war with Mexico last spring. It
merely prevented him, or, to speak more accurately, the same mental
peculiarities which made him the apostle of unpreparedness also
prevented him, from making the war efficient. His conduct rendered the
United States an object of international derision because of the way in
which its affairs were managed. President Wilson made no declaration
of war. He did not in any way satisfy the requirements of common
international law before acting. He invaded a neighboring state, with
which he himself insisted we were entirely at peace, and occupied the
most considerable seaport of the country after military operations
which resulted in the loss of the lives of perhaps twenty of our men
and five or ten times that number of Mexicans; and then he sat supine,
and refused to allow either the United States or Mexico to reap any
benefit from what had been done.
It is idle to say that such an amazing action was not war. It was an
utterly futile war and achieved nothing; but it was war. We had ample
justification for interfering in Mexico and even for going to war
with Mexico, if after careful consideration this course was deemed
necessary. But the President did not even take notice of any of the
atrocious wrongs Americans had suffered, or deal with any of the
grave provocations we had received. His statement of justification
was merely that “we are in Mexico to serve mankind, if we can find a
way.” Evidently he did not have in his mind any particular idea of
how he was to “serve mankind,” for, after staying eight months in
Mexico, he decided that he could not “find a way” and brought his
army home. He had not accomplished one single thing. At one time it
was said that we went to Vera Cruz to stop the shipment of arms into
Mexico. But after we got there we allowed the shipments to continue.
At another time it was said that we went there in order to exact an
apology for an insult to the flag. But we never did exact the apology,
and we left Vera Cruz without taking any steps to get an apology. In
all our history there has been no more extraordinary example of queer
infirmity of purpose in an important crisis than was shown by President
Wilson in this matter. His business was either not to interfere at
all or to interfere hard and effectively. This was the sole policy
which should have been allowed by regard for the dignity and honor of
the government of the United States and the welfare of our people.
In the actual event President Wilson interfered, not enough to quell
civil war, not enough to put a stop to or punish the outrages on
American citizens, but enough to incur fearful responsibilities. Then,
having without authority of any kind, either under the Constitution
or in international law or in any other way, thus interfered, and
having interfered to worse than no purpose, and having made himself
and the nation partly responsible for the atrocious wrongs committed
on Americans and on foreigners generally in Mexico by the bandit
chiefs whom he was more or less furtively supporting, President
Wilson abandoned his whole policy and drew out of Mexico to resume
his “watchful waiting.” When the President, who has made himself the
chief official exponent of the doctrine of unpreparedness, thus shows
that even in his hands unpreparedness has not the smallest effect in
preventing war, there ought to be little need of discussing the matter
further.
Preparedness for war occasionally has a slight effect in creating or
increasing an aggressive and militaristic spirit. Far more often it
distinctly diminishes it. In Switzerland, for instance, which we
can well afford to take as a model for ourselves, effectiveness in
preparation, and the retention and development of all the personal
qualities which give the individual man the fighting edge, have in no
shape or way increased the militarist or aggressive spirit. On the
contrary, they have doubtless been among the factors that have made the
Swiss so much more law-abiding and less homicidal than we are.
The ultrapacificists have been fond of prophesying the immediate
approach of a universally peaceful condition throughout the world,
which will render it unnecessary to prepare against war because there
will be no more war. This represents in some cases well-meaning
and pathetic folly. In other cases it represents mischievous and
inexcusable folly. But it always represents folly. At best, it
represents the inability of some well-meaning men of weak mind, and of
some men of strong but twisted mind, either to face or to understand
facts.
These prophets of the inane are not peculiar to our own day. A little
over a century and a quarter ago a noted Italian pacificist and
philosopher, Aurelio Bertela, summed up the future of civilized mankind
as follows: “The political system of Europe has arrived at perfection.
An equilibrium has been attained which henceforth will preserve peoples
from subjugation. Few reforms are now needed and these will be
accomplished peaceably. Europe has no need to fear revolution.”
These sapient statements (which have been paralleled by hundreds of
utterances in the many peace congresses of the last couple of decades)
were delivered in 1787, the year in which the French Assembly of
Notables ushered in the greatest era of revolution, domestic turmoil,
and international war in all history--an era which still continues and
which shows not the smallest sign of coming to an end. Never before
have there been wars on so great a scale as during this century and
a quarter; and the greatest of all these wars is now being waged.
Never before, except for the ephemeral conquests of certain Asiatic
barbarians, have there been subjugations of civilized peoples on so
great a scale.
During this period here and there something has been done for peace,
much has been done for liberty, and very much has been done for reform
and advancement. But the professional pacificists, taken as a class
throughout the entire period, have done nothing for permanent peace
and less than nothing for liberty and for the forward movement of
mankind. Hideous things have been done in the name of liberty, in the
name of order, in the name of religion; and the victories that have
been gained against these iniquities have been gained by strong men,
armed, who put their strength at the service of righteousness and who
were hampered and not helped by the futility of the men who inveighed
against all use of armed strength.
The effective workers for the peace of righteousness were men like
Stein, Cavour, and Lincoln; that is, men who dreamed great dreams, but
who were also pre-eminently men of action, who stood for the right, and
who knew that the right would fail unless might was put behind it. The
prophets of pacificism have had nothing whatever in common with these
great men; and whenever they have preached mere pacificism, whenever
they have failed to put righteousness first and to advocate peace as
the handmaiden of righteousness, they have done evil and not good.
After the exhaustion of the Napoleonic struggles there came thirty-five
years during which there was no great war, while what was called “the
long peace” was broken only by minor international wars or short-lived
revolutionary contests. Good, but not far-sighted, men in various
countries, but especially in England, Germany, and our own country,
forthwith began to dream dreams--not of a universal peace that should
be founded on justice and righteousness backed by strength, but of a
universal peace to be obtained by the prattle of weaklings and the
outpourings of amiable enthusiasts who lacked the fighting edge.
About 1850, for instance, the first large peace congress was held.
There were numbers of kindly people who felt that this congress, and
the contemporary international exposition, also the first of its kind,
heralded the beginning of a régime of universal peace. As a matter of
fact, there followed twenty years during which a number of great and
bloody wars took place--wars far surpassing in extent, in duration, in
loss of life and property, and in importance anything that had been
seen since the close of the Napoleonic contest.
Then there came another period of nearly thirty years during which
there were relatively only a few wars, and these not of the highest
importance. Again upright and intelligent but uninformed men began to
be misled by foolish men into the belief that world peace was about to
be secured, on a basis of amiable fatuity all around and under the lead
of the preachers of the diluted mush of make-believe morality. A number
of peace congresses, none of which accomplished anything, were held,
and also certain Hague conferences, which did accomplish a certain
small amount of real good but of a strictly limited kind. It was well
worth going into these Hague conferences, but only on condition of
clearly understanding how strictly limited was the good that they
accomplished. The hysterical people who treated them as furnishing a
patent peace panacea did nothing but harm, and partially offset the
real but limited good the conferences actually accomplished. Indeed,
the conferences undoubtedly did a certain amount of damage because
of the preposterous expectations they excited among well-meaning but
ill-informed and unthinking persons. These persons really believed
that it was possible to achieve the millennium by means that would not
have been very effective in preserving peace among the active boys
of a large Sunday-school--let alone grown-up men in the world as it
actually is. A pathetic commentary on their attitude is furnished by
the fact that the fifteen years that have elapsed since the first Hague
conference have seen an immense increase of war, culminating in the
present war, waged by armies, and with bloodshed, on a scale far vaster
than ever before in the history of mankind.
All these facts furnish no excuse whatever for our failing to work
zealously for peace, but they absolutely require us to understand that
it is noxious to work for a peace not based on righteousness, and
useless to work for a peace based on righteousness unless we put force
back of righteousness. At present this means that adequate preparedness
against war offers to our nation its sole guarantee against wrong and
aggression.
Emerson has said that in the long run the most uncomfortable truth is
a safer travelling companion than the most agreeable falsehood. The
advocates of peace will accomplish nothing except mischief until they
are willing to look facts squarely in the face. One of these facts is
that universal military service, wherever tried, has on the whole been
a benefit and not a harm to the people of the nation, so long as the
demand upon the average man’s life has not been for too long a time.
The Swiss people have beyond all question benefited by their system
of limited but universal preparation for military service. The same
thing is true of Australia, Chile, and Argentina. In every one of these
countries the short military training given has been found to increase
in marked fashion the social and industrial efficiency, the ability to
do good industrial work, of the man thus trained. It would be well for
the United States from every standpoint immediately to provide such
strictly limited universal military training.
But it is well also for the United States to understand that a system
of military training which from our standpoint would be excessive and
unnecessary in order to meet our needs, may yet work admirably for some
other nation. The two nations that during the last fifty years have
made by far the greatest progress are Germany and Japan; and they are
the two nations in which preparedness for war in time of peace has
been carried to the highest point of scientific development. The feat
of Japan has been something absolutely without precedent in recorded
history. Great civilizations, military, industrial, and artistic,
have arisen and flourished in Asia again and again in the past. But
never before has an Asiatic power succeeded in adopting civilization
of the European or most advanced type and in developing it to a point
of military and industrial efficiency equalled only by one power of
European blood.
As for Germany, we believers in democracy who also understand, as every
sound-thinking democrat must, that democracy cannot succeed unless it
shows the same efficiency that is shown by autocracy (as Switzerland
on a small scale has shown it) need above all other men carefully to
study what Germany has accomplished during the last half century. Her
military efficiency has not been more astounding than her industrial
and social efficiency; and the essential thing in her career of
greatness has been the fact that this industrial and social efficiency
is in part directly based upon the military efficiency and in part
indirectly based upon it, because based upon the mental, physical, and
moral qualities developed by the military efficiency. The solidarity
and power of collective action, the trained ability to work hard for an
end which is afar off in the future, the combination of intelligent
forethought with efficient and strenuous action--all these together
have given her her extraordinary industrial pre-eminence; and all of
these have been based upon her military efficiency.
The Germans have developed patriotism of the most intense kind, and
although this patriotism expresses itself in thunderous songs, in
speeches and in books, it does not confine itself to these methods
of expression, but treats them merely as incitements to direct and
efficient action. After five months of war, Germany has on the whole
been successful against opponents which in population outnumber her
over two to one, and in natural resources are largely superior. Russian
and French armies have from time to time obtained lodgement on German
soil; but on the whole the fighting has been waged by German armies on
Russian, French, and Belgian territory. On her western frontier, it is
true, she was checked and thrown back after her first drive on Paris,
and again checked and thrown slightly back when, after the fall of
Antwerp, she attempted to advance along the Belgian coast. But in the
west she has on the whole successfully pursued the offensive, and her
battle lines are in the enemies’ territory, although she has had to
face the entire strength of France, England, and Belgium.
Moreover, she did this with only a part of her forces. At the same time
she was also obliged to use immense armies, singly or in conjunction
with the Austrians, against the Russians on her Eastern frontier. No
one can foretell the issue of the war. But what Germany has already
done must extort the heartiest admiration for her grim efficiency.
It could have been done only by a masterful people guided by keen
intelligence and inspired by an intensely patriotic spirit.
France has likewise shown to fine advantage in this war (in spite
of certain marked shortcomings, such as the absurd uniforms of her
soldiers) because of her system of universal military training. England
has suffered lamentably because there has been no such system. Great
masses of Englishmen, including all her men at the front, have behaved
so as to command our heartiest admiration. But qualification must
be made when the nation as a whole is considered. Her professional
soldiers, her navy, and her upper classes have done admirably; but
the English papers describe certain sections of her people as making
a poor showing in their refusal to volunteer. The description of
the professional football matches, attended by tens of thousands of
spectators, none of whom will enlist, makes a decent man ardently
wish that under a rigid conscription law the entire body of players,
promoters, and spectators could be sent to the front. Scotland and
Canada have apparently made an extraordinary showing; the same thing
is true of sections, high and low, of society in England proper; but
it is also true that certain sections of the British democracy under
a system of free volunteering have shown to disadvantage compared to
Germany, where military service is universal. The lack of foresight
in preparation was also shown by the inability of the authorities to
furnish arms and equipment for the troops that were being raised. These
shortcomings are not alluded to by me in a censorious spirit, and least
of all with any idea of reflecting on England, but purely that our own
people may profit by the lessons taught. America should pay heed to
these facts and profit by them; and we can only so profit if we realize
that under like conditions we should at the moment make a much poorer
showing than England has made.
It is indispensable to remember that in the cases of both Germany and
Japan their extraordinary success has been due directly to that kind
of efficiency in war which springs only from the highest efficiency in
preparedness for war. Until educated people who sincerely desire peace
face this fact with all of its implications, unpleasant and pleasant,
they will not be able to better present international conditions. In
order to secure this betterment, conditions must be created which
will enable civilized nations to achieve such efficiency without being
thereby rendered dangerous to their neighbors and to civilization
as a whole. Americans, particularly, and, to a degree only slightly
less, Englishmen and Frenchmen need to remember this fact, for while
the ultrapacificists, the peace-at-any-price men, have appeared
sporadically everywhere, they have of recent years been most numerous
and noxious in the United States, in Great Britain, and in France.
Inasmuch as in our country, where, Heaven knows, we have evils enough
with which to grapple, none of these evils is in even the smallest
degree due to militarism--inasmuch as to inveigh against militarism
in the United States is about as useful as to inveigh against eating
horse-flesh in honor of Odin--this seems curious. But it is true.
Probably it is merely another illustration of the old, old truth
that persons who shrink from grappling with grave and real evils
often strive to atone to their consciences for such failure by empty
denunciation of evils which to them offer no danger and no temptation;
which, as far as they are concerned, do not exist. Such denunciation is
easy. It is also worthless.
American college presidents, clergymen, professors, and publicists
with much pretension--some of it founded on fact--to intelligence
have praised works like that of Mr. Bloch, who “proved” that war was
impossible, and like those of Mr. Norman Angell, who “proved” that it
was an illusion to believe that it was profitable. The greatest and
most terrible wars in history have taken place since Mr. Bloch wrote.
When Mr. Angell wrote no unprejudiced man of wisdom could have failed
to understand that the two most successful nations of recent times,
Germany and Japan, owed their great national success to successful war.
The United States owes not only its greatness but its very existence
to the fact that in the Civil War the men who controlled its destinies
were the fighting men. The counsels of the ultrapacificists, the
peace-at-any-price men of that day, if adopted, would have meant not
only the death of the nation but an incalculable disaster to humanity.
A righteous war may at any moment be essential to national welfare; and
it is a lamentable fact that nations have sometimes profited greatly by
war that was not righteous. Such evil profit will never be done away
with until armed force is put behind righteousness.
We must also remember, however, that the mischievous folly of the
men whose counsels tend to inefficiency and impotence is not worse
than the baseness of the men who in a spirit of mean and cringing
admiration of brute force gloss over, or justify, or even deify, the
exhibition of unscrupulous strength. Writings like those of Homer
Lea, or of Nietzsche, or even of Professor Treitschke--not to speak of
Carlyle--are as objectionable as those of Messrs. Bloch and Angell.
Our people need to pay homage to the great efficiency and the intense
patriotism of Germany. But they need no less fully to realize that this
patriotism has at times been accompanied by callous indifference to the
rights of weaker nations, and that this efficiency has at times been
exercised in a way that represents a genuine setback to humanity and
civilization. Germany’s conduct toward Belgium can be justified only
in accordance with a theory which will also justify Napoleon’s conduct
toward Spain and his treatment of Prussia and of all Germany during
the six years succeeding Jena. I do not see how any man can fail to
sympathize with Stein and Schornhorst; with Andreas Hofer, with the
Maid of Saragossa, with Koerner and the Tugendbund; and if he does so
sympathize, he must extend the same sympathy and admiration to King
Albert and the Belgians.
Moreover, it is well for Americans always to remember that what
has been done to Belgium would, of course, be done to us just as
unhesitatingly if the conditions required it.
Of course, the lowest depth is reached by the professional pacificists
who continue to scream for peace without daring to protest against any
concrete wrong committed against peace. These include all of our fellow
countrymen who at the present time clamor for peace without explicitly
and clearly declaring that the first condition of peace should be the
righting of the wrongs of Belgium, reparation to her, and guarantee
against the possible repetition of such wrongs at the expense of any
well-behaved small civilized power in the future. It may be that peace
will come without such reparation and guarantee but if so it will be
as emphatically the peace of unrighteousness as was the peace made at
Tilsit a hundred and seven years ago.
When the President appoints a day of prayer for peace, without
emphatically making it evident that the prayer should be for the
redress of the wrongs without which peace would be harmful, he cannot
be considered as serving righteousness. When Mr. Bryan concludes
absurd all-inclusive arbitration treaties and is loquacious to peace
societies about the abolition of war, without daring to protest against
the hideous wrongs done Belgium, he feebly serves unrighteousness.
More comic manifestations, of course entirely useless but probably
too fatuous to be really mischievous, are those which find expression
in the circulation of peace postage-stamps with doves on them, or in
taking part in peace parades--they might as well be antivaccination
parades--or in the circulation of peace petitions to be signed by
school-children, which for all their possible effect might just as well
relate to the planet Mars.
International peace will only come when the nations of the world form
some kind of league which provides for an international tribunal to
decide on international matters, which decrees that treaties and
international agreements are never to be entered into recklessly and
foolishly, and when once entered into are to be observed with entire
good faith, and which puts the collective force of civilization
behind such treaties and agreements and court decisions and against
any wrong-doing or recalcitrant nation. The all-inclusive arbitration
treaties negotiated by the present administration amount to almost
nothing. They are utterly worthless for good. They are however slightly
mischievous because:
1. There is no provision for their enforcement, and,
2. They would be in some cases not only impossible but improper to
enforce.
A treaty is a promise. It is like a promise to pay in the commercial
world. Its value lies in the means provided for redeeming the promise.
To make it, and not redeem it, is vicious. A United States gold
certificate is valuable because gold is back of it. If there were
nothing back of it the certificate would sink to the position of
fiat money, which is irredeemable, and therefore valueless; as in the
case of our Revolutionary currency. The Wilson-Bryan all-inclusive
arbitration treaties represent nothing whatever but international fiat
money. To make them is no more honest than it is to issue fiat money.
Mr. Bryan would not make a good Secretary of the Treasury, but he
would do better in that position than as Secretary of State. For his
type of fiat obligations is a little worse in international than in
internal affairs. The all-inclusive arbitration treaties, in whose free
and unlimited negotiation Mr. Bryan takes such pleasure, are of less
value than the thirty-cent dollars, whose free and unlimited coinage he
formerly advocated.
An efficient world league for peace is as yet in the future; and it may
be, although I sincerely hope not, in the far future. The indispensable
thing for every free people to do in the present day is with efficiency
to prepare against war by making itself able physically to defend its
rights and by cultivating that stern and manly spirit without which no
material preparation will avail.
The last point is all essential. It is not of much use to provide
an armed force if that force is composed of poltroons and
ultrapacificists. Such men should be sent to the front, of course, for
they should not be allowed to shirk the danger which their braver
fellow countrymen willingly face, and under proper discipline some use
can be made of them; but the fewer there are of them in a nation the
better the army of that nation will be.
A Yale professor--he might just as well have been a Harvard
professor--is credited in the press with saying the other day that
he wishes the United States would take the position that if attacked
it would not defend itself, and would submit unresistingly to any
spoliation. The professor said that this would afford such a beautiful
example to mankind that war would undoubtedly be abolished. Magazine
writers, and writers of syndicate articles published in reputable
papers, have recently advocated similar plans. Men who talk this way
are thoroughly bad citizens. Few members of the criminal class are
greater enemies of the republic.
American citizens must understand that they cannot advocate or
acquiesce in an evil course of action and then escape responsibility
for the results. If disaster comes to our navy in the near future it
will be directly due to the way the navy has been handled during the
past twenty-two months, and a part of the responsibility will be shared
by every man who has failed effectively to protest against, or in any
way has made himself responsible for, the attitude of the present
administration in foreign affairs and as regards the navy.
The first and most important thing for us as a people to do, in order
to prepare ourselves for self-defense, is to get clearly in our minds
just what our policy is to be, and to insist that our public servants
shall make their words and their deeds correspond. As has already been
pointed out, the present administration was elected on the explicit
promise that the Philippines should be given their independence, and
it has taken action in the Philippines which can only be justified
on the theory that this independence is to come in the immediate
future. I believe that we have rendered incalculable service to the
Philippines, and that what we have there done has shown in the most
striking manner the extreme mischief that would have followed if,
in 1898 and the subsequent years, we had failed to do our duty in
consequence of following the advice of Mr. Bryan and the pacificists
or anti-imperialists of that day. But we must keep our promises; and
we ought now to leave the islands completely at as early a date as
possible.
There remains to defend--the United States proper, the Panama Canal and
its approaches, Alaska, and Hawaii. To defend all these is vital to our
honor and interest. For such defense preparedness is essential.
The first and most essential form of preparedness should be making the
navy efficient. Absolutely and relatively, our navy has never been at
such a pitch of efficiency as in February, 1909, when the battle fleet
returned from its voyage around the world. Unit for unit, there was
no other navy in the world which was at that time its equal. During
the next four years we had an admirable Secretary of the Navy, Mr.
Meyer--we were fortunate in having then and since good Secretaries of
War in Mr. Stimson and Mr. Garrison. Owing to causes for which Mr.
Meyer was in no way responsible, there was a slight relative falling
off in the efficiency of the navy, and probably a slight absolute
falling off during the following four years. But it remained very
efficient.
Since Mr. Daniels came in, and because of the action taken by Mr.
Daniels under the direction of President Wilson, there has been a most
lamentable reduction in efficiency. If at this moment we went to war
with a first-class navy of equal strength to our own, there would be a
chance not only of defeat but of disgrace. It is probably impossible
to put the navy in really first-class condition with Mr. Daniels at
its head, precisely as it is impossible to conduct our foreign affairs
with dignity and efficiency while Mr. Bryan is at the head of the State
Department.
But the great falling off in naval efficiency has been due primarily
to the policy pursued by President Wilson himself. He has kept the
navy in Mexican waters. The small craft at Tampico and elsewhere could
have rendered real service, but the President refused to allow them
to render such service, and left English and German sea officers to
protect our people. The great war craft were of no use at all; yet at
this moment he has brought back from Mexico the army which could be
of some use and has kept there the war-ships which cannot be of any
use, and which suffer terribly in efficiency from being so kept. The
fleet has had no manœuvring for twenty-two months. It has had almost
no gun practice by division during that time. There is not enough
powder; there are not enough torpedoes; the bottoms of the ships are
foul; there are grave defects in the submarines; there is a deficiency
in aircraft; the under-enlistments indicate a deficiency of from ten
thousand to twenty thousand men; the whole service is being handled in
such manner as to impair its fitness and morale.
Congress should summon before its committees the best naval experts
and provide the battle-ships, cruisers, submarines, floating mines,
and aircraft that these experts declare to be necessary for the full
protection of the United States. It should bear in mind that while
many of these machines of war are essentially to be used in striking
from the coasts themselves, yet that others must be designed to keep
the enemy afar from these coasts. Mere defensive by itself cannot
permanently avail. The only permanently efficient defensive arm is
one which can act offensively. Our navy must be fitted for attack,
for delivering smashing blows, in order effectively to defend our own
shores. Above all, we should remember that a highly trained personnel
is absolutely indispensable, for without it no material preparation is
of the least avail.
But the navy alone will not suffice in time of great crisis. If England
had adopted the policy urged by Lord Roberts, there would probably have
been no war and certainly the war would now have been at an end, as
she would have been able to protect Belgium, as well as herself, and
to save France from invasion. Relatively to the Continent, England was
utterly unprepared; but she was a miracle of preparedness compared to
us. There are many ugly features connected with the slowness of certain
sections of the English people to volunteer and with their deficiency
in rifles, horses, and equipment; and there have been certain military
and naval shortcomings; but until we have radically altered our
habits of thought and action we can only say with abashed humility
that if England has not shown to advantage compared to Germany, she
has certainly done far better than we would have done, and than, as
a matter of fact, we actually have done during the past twenty-two
months, both as regards Mexico and as regards the fulfilment of our
duty in the situation created by the world war.
Congress should at once act favorably along the lines recommended in
the recent excellent report of the Secretary of War and in accordance
with the admirable plan outlined in the last report of the Chief
of Staff of the army, General Wotherspoon--a report with which his
predecessor as Chief of Staff, General Wood, appears to be in complete
sympathy. Our army should be doubled in size. An effective reserve
should be created. Every year there should be field manœuvres on a
large scale, a hundred thousand being engaged for several weeks. The
artillery should be given the most scientific training. The equipment
should be made perfect at every point. Rigid economy should be demanded.
Every officer and man should be kept to the highest standard of
physical and moral fitness. The unfit should be ruthlessly weeded out.
At least one third of the officers in each grade should be promoted
on merit without regard to seniority, and the least fit for promotion
should be retired. Every unit of the regular army and reserve should be
trained to the highest efficiency under war conditions.
But this is not enough. There should be at least ten times the
number of rifles and the quantity of ammunition in the country that
there are now. In our high schools and colleges a system of military
training like that which obtains in Switzerland and Australia should
be given. Furthermore, all our young men should be trained in actual
field-service under war conditions; preferably on the Swiss, but if not
on the Swiss then on the Argentinian or Chilean model.
The Swiss model would probably be better for our people. It would
necessitate only four to six months’ service shortly after graduation
from high school or college, and thereafter only about eight days a
year. No man could buy a substitute; no man would be excepted because
of his wealth; all would serve in the ranks on precisely the same terms
side by side.
Under this system the young men would be trained to shoot, to march,
to take care of themselves in the open, and to learn those habits of
self-reliance and law-abiding obedience which are not only essential
to the efficiency of a citizen soldiery, but are no less essential to
the efficient performance of civic duties in a free democracy. My own
firm belief is that this system would help us in civil quite as much
as in military matters. It would increase our social and industrial
efficiency. It would help us to habits of order and respect for law.
This proposal does not represent anything more than carrying out the
purpose of the second amendment to the Federal Constitution, which
declares that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security
of a free nation. The Swiss army is a well-regulated militia; and,
therefore it is utterly different from any militia we have ever had.
The system of compulsory training and universal service has worked
admirably in Switzerland. It has saved the Swiss from war. It has
developed their efficiency in peace.
In theory, President Wilson advocates unpreparedness, and in the actual
fact he practises, on our behalf, tame submission to wrong-doing
and refusal to stand for our own rights or for the rights of any
weak power that is wronged. We who take the opposite view advocate
merely acting as Washington urged us to act, when in his first annual
address he said: “To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual
means for preserving peace. A free people ought not only to be armed
but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is
requisite.” Jefferson was not a fighting man, but even Jefferson,
writing to Monroe in 1785, urged the absolute need of building up
our navy if we wished to escape oppression to our commerce and “the
present disrespect of the nations of Europe,” and added the pregnant
sentence: “A coward is much more exposed to quarrels than a man of
spirit.” As President, he urged our people to train themselves to arms,
so as to constitute a citizen soldiery, in terms that showed that his
object was to accomplish exactly what the Swiss have accomplished, and
what is advocated in this book. In one annual message he advocated
“the organization of 300,000 able-bodied men between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-five for offense or defense at any time or in any
place where they may be wanted.” In a letter to Monroe he advocated
compulsory military service, saying: “We must train and classify the
whole of our male citizenry and make military instruction a part of
collegiate education. We can never be safe until this is done.” The
methods taken by Jefferson and the Americans of Jefferson’s day to
accomplish this object were fatally defective. But their purpose was
the same that those who think as we do now put forward. The difference
is purely that we present efficient methods for accomplishing this
purpose. Washington was a practical man of high ideals who always
strove to reduce his ideals to practice. His address to Congress in
December, 1793, ought to have been read by President Wilson before
the latter sent in his message of 1914 with its confused advocacy
of unpreparedness and its tone of furtive apology for submission to
insult. Washington said: “There is much due to the United States
among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the
reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able
to repel it. If we desire to secure peace ... it must be known that we
are at all times ready for war,” and he emphasized the fact that the
peace thus secured by preparedness for war is the most potent method of
obtaining material prosperity.
The need of such a system as that which I advocate is well brought out
in a letter I recently received from a college president. It runs in
part as follows:
What the average young fellow of eighteen to thirty doesn’t know
about shooting and riding makes an appalling total. I remember
very well visiting the First Connecticut Regiment a day or two
before it left for service in the Spanish War. A good many of
my boys were with them and I went to see them off. One fellow
in particular, of whom I was and am very fond, took me to his
tent and proudly exhibited his rifle, calling attention to the
beautiful condition to which he had brought it. It certainly was
extremely shiny, and I commended him for his careful cleansing of
his death-dealing weapon. Then I discovered that the firing-pin
(it was an old Springfield) was rusted immovably into its place,
and that my boy didn’t know that there was any firing-pin. He had
learned to expect that if you put a cartridge into the breech,
pulled down the block, and pulled the trigger, it would probably
go off if he had previously cocked it; but he had never done any
of these things.
It was my fortune to grow up amid surroundings and in a time
when every boy had and used a gun. Any boy fourteen years old
who was not the proprietor of some kind of shooting-iron and
fairly proficient in its use was in disgrace. Such a situation
was unthinkable. So we were all fairly dependable shots with
a fowling-piece or rifle. As a result of this and subsequent
experience, I really believe that so long as my aging body would
endure hardship, and provided further that I could be prevented
from running away, I should be a more efficient soldier than most
of the young fellows on our campus to-day.
I have watched with much dissatisfaction the gradual
disappearance of the military schools here in the East. There
are some prominent and useful ones in the West, but they are far
too few, and I do not believe there is any preliminary military
training of any sort in our public schools. I fear that the
military training required by law in certain agricultural and
other schools receiving federal aid is more or less of a fake;
the object seeming to be to get the appropriation and make the
least possible return.
If in any way you can bring it about that our boys shall be
taught to shoot, I believe with you that they can learn the
essentials of drill very quickly when need arises. And even so,
however, our rulers must learn the necessity of having rifles
enough and ammunition enough to meet any emergency at all likely
to occur.
It is idle for this nation to trust to arbitration and neutrality
treaties unbacked by force. It is idle to trust to the tepid good-will
of other nations. It is idle to trust to alliances. Alliances change.
Russia and Japan are now fighting side by side, although nine years ago
they were fighting against one another. Twenty years ago Russia and
Germany stood side by side. Fifteen years ago England was more hostile
to Russia, and even to France, than she was to Germany. It is perfectly
possible that after the close of this war the present allies will fall
out, or that Germany and Japan will turn up in close alliance.
It is our duty to try to work for a great world league for righteous
peace enforced by power; but no such league is yet in sight. At present
the prime duty of the American people is to abandon the inane and
mischievous principle of watchful waiting--that is, of slothful and
timid refusal either to face facts or to perform duty. Let us act
justly toward others; and let us also be prepared with stout heart and
strong hand to defend our rights against injustice from others.
In his recent report the Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, has put the
case for preparedness in the interest of honorable peace so admirably
that what he says should be studied by all our people. It runs in part
as follows:
“This, then, leaves for consideration the imminent questions of
military policy; the considerations which, in my view, should be
taken into account in determining the same; and the suggestions
which occur to me to be pertinent in the circumstances.
It would be premature to attempt now to draw the ultimate lessons
from the war in Europe. It is an imperative duty, however, to
heed so much of what it brings home to us as is incontrovertible
and not to be changed by any event, leaving for later and
more detailed and comprehensive consideration what its later
developments and final conclusions may indicate.
For orderly treatment certain preliminary considerations may be
usefully adverted to. It is, of course, not necessary to dwell on
the blessings of peace and the horrors of war. Every one desires
peace, just as every one desires health, contentment, affection,
sufficient means for comfortable existence, and other similarly
beneficent things. But peace and the other states of being just
mentioned are not always or even often solely within one’s own
control. Those who are thoughtful and have courage face the facts
of life, take lessons from experience, and strive by wise conduct
to attain the desirable things, and by prevision and precaution
to protect and defend them when obtained. It may truthfully be
said that eternal vigilance is the price which must be paid in
order to obtain the desirable things of life and to defend them.
In collective affairs the interests of the group are confided
to the government, and it thereupon is charged with the duty to
preserve and defend these things. The government must exercise
for the nation the precautionary, defensive, and preservative
measures necessary to that end. All governments must therefore
have force--physical force--_i. e._, military force, for these
purposes. The question for each nation when this matter is under
consideration is, How much force should it have and of what
should that force consist?
In the early history of our nation there was a natural, almost
inevitable, abhorrence of military force, because it connoted
military despotism. Most, if not all, of the early settlers
in this country came from nations where a few powerful persons
tyrannically imposed their will upon the people by means of
military power. The consequence was that the oppressed who
fled to this country necessarily connected military force with
despotism and had a dread thereof. Of course, all this has
long since passed into history. No reasonable person in this
country to-day has the slightest shadow of fear of military
despotism, nor of any interference whatever by military force
in the conduct of civil affairs. The military and the civil are
just as completely and permanently separated in this country as
the church and the state are; the subjection of the military
to the civil is settled and unchangeable. The only reason for
adverting to the obsolete condition is to anticipate the action
of those who will cite from the works of the founders of the
republic excerpts showing a dread of military ascendancy in
our government. Undoubtedly, at the time such sentiments were
expressed there was a very real dread. At the present time such
expressions are entirely inapplicable and do not furnish even a
presentable pretext for opposing proper military preparation.
It also seems proper, in passing, to refer to the frame of
mind of those who use the word “militarism” as the embodiment
of the doctrine of brute force and loosely apply it to any
organized preparation of military force, and therefore deprecate
any adequate military preparation because it is a step in the
direction of the contemned “militarism.” It is perfectly apparent
to any one who approaches the matter with an unprejudiced mind
that what constitutes undesirable militarism, as distinguished
from a necessary, proper, and adequate preparation of the
military resources of the nation, depends upon the position in
which each nation finds itself, and varies with every nation
and with different conditions in each nation at different
times. Every nation must have adequate force to protect itself
from domestic insurrections, to enforce its laws, and to repel
invasions; that is, every nation that has similar characteristics
to those of a self-respecting man. (The Constitution obliges the
United States to protect each State against invasion.) If it
prepares and maintains more military force than is necessary for
the purposes just named, then it is subject to the conviction, in
the public opinion of the world, of having embraced “militarism,”
unless it intends aggression for a cause which the public
opinion of the world conceives to be a righteous one. To the
extent, however, that it confines its military preparedness
to the purposes first mentioned, there is neither warrant nor
justification in characterizing such action as “militarism.”
Those who would thus characterize it do so because they have
reached the conclusion that a nation to-day can properly dispense
with a prepared military force, and therefore they apply the word
to any preparation or organization of the military resources of
the nation. Not being able to conceive how a reasonable, prudent,
patriotic man can reach such a conclusion, I cannot conceive any
arguments or statements that would alter such a state of mind. It
disregards all known facts, flies in the face of all experience,
and must rest upon faith in that which has not yet been made
manifest.
Whatever the future may hold in the way of agreements between
nations, followed by actual disarmament thereof, of international
courts of arbitration, and other greatly-to-be-desired measures
to lessen or prevent conflict between nation and nation, we all
know that at present these conditions are not existing. We can
and will eagerly adapt ourselves to each beneficent development
along these lines; but to merely enfeeble ourselves in the
meantime would, in my view, be unthinkable folly. By neglecting
and refusing to provide ourselves with the necessary means of
self-protection and self-defense we could not hasten or in any
way favorably influence the ultimate results we desire in these
respects.”