ULM AND TRAFALGAR
"Napoleon is the only man in Europe that knows the value of
time."--Czartoryski.
Before describing the Continental campaign which shattered the old
European system to its base, it will be well to take a brief glance at
the events which precipitated the war of the Third Coalition. Even at
the time of Napoleon's rupture with England, his highhanded conduct
towards the Italian Republic, Holland, Switzerland, and in regard to
the Secularizations in Germany, had exposed him to the hostility of
Russia, Sweden, and Austria; but as yet it took the form of secret
resentment. The last-named Power, under the Ministry of Count Cobenzl,
had relapsed into a tame and undignified policy, which the Swedish
Ambassador at Vienna described as "one of fear and hope--fear of the
power of France, and hope to obtain favours from her."[1] At Berlin,
Frederick William clung nervously to neutrality, even though the
French occupation of Hanover was a threat to Prussia's influence in
North Germany. The Czar Alexander was, at present, wrapt up in home
affairs; and the only monarch who as yet ventured to show his dislike
of the First Consul was the King of Sweden. In the autumn of 1803
Gustavus IV. defiantly refused Napoleon's proposals for a
Franco-Swedish alliance, baited though they were with the offer of
Norway as an eventual prize for Sweden, and a subsidy for every
Swedish warship serving against England. And it was not the dislike of
a proud nature to receive money which prompted his refusal; for
Gustavus, while in Germany, hinted to Drake that he desired to have
pecuniary help from England for the defence of his province of
Pomerania.[2]
But a doughtier champion of European independence was soon to enter
the field. The earlier feelings of respect and admiration which the
young Czar had cherished towards Napoleon were already overclouded,
when the news of the execution of the Duc d'Enghien at once roused a
storm of passion in his breast. The chivalrous protection which he
loved to extend to smaller States, the guarantee of the Germanic
system which the Treaty of Teschen had vested in him, above all, his
horror at the crime, led him to offer an emphatic protest. The Russian
Court at once went into mourning, and Alexander expressed both to the
German Diet and to the French Government his indignation at the
outrage. It was ever Napoleon's habit to return blow with blow; and he
now instructed Talleyrand to reply that in the D'Enghien affair he had
acted solely on the defensive, and that Russia's complaint "led him to
ask if, at the time when England was compassing the assassination of
Paul I., the authors of the plot had been known to be one league
beyond the [Russian] frontiers, every effort would not have been made
to have them seized?" Never has a poisoned dart been more deftly sped
at the weak spot of an enemy's armour. The Czar, ever haunted by the
thought of his complicity in a parricidal plot, was deeply wounded by
this malicious taunt, and all the more so because, as the death of
Paul had been officially ascribed to a fit, the insult could not be
flung back.[3] The only reply was to break off all diplomatic
relations with Napoleon; and this took place in the summer of 1804.[4]
Yet war was not to break out for more than a year. This delay was due
to several causes. Austria could not be moved from her posture of
timid neutrality. In fact, Francis II. and Cobenzl saw in Napoleon's
need of a recognition of his new imperial title a means of assuring a
corresponding change of title for the Hapsburg Dominions. Francis had
long been weary of the hollow dignity of Elective Emperor of the Holy
Roman Empire. The faded pageantry of Ratisbone and Frankfurt was all
that remained of the glories of the realm of Charlemagne: the medley
of States which owned him as elected lord cared not for the decrees of
this ghostly realm; and Goethe might well place in the mouth of his
jovial toper, in the cellar scene of "Faust," the words:
"Dankt Gott mit jedem Morgen
Dass Ihr nicht braucht für's Röm'sche Reich zu sorgen!"
In that bargaining and burglarious age, was it not better to build a
more lasting habitation than this venerable ruin? Would not the
hereditary dominions form a more lasting shelter from the storm? Such
were doubtless the thoughts that prompted the assumption of the title
of Hereditary Emperor of Austria (August 11th, 1804). The
letter-patent, in which this change was announced, cited as parallels
"the example of the Imperial Court of Russia in the last century and
of the new sovereign of France." Both references gave umbrage to
Alexander, who saw no parallel between the assumption of the title of
Emperor by Peter the Great and the game of follow-the-leader played by
Francis to Napoleon.[5]
Prussian complaisance to the French Emperor was at this time to be
expected. Frederick William III. reigned over 10,000,000 subjects; he
could marshal 248,000 of the best trained troops in Europe, and his
revenue was more fruitful than that of the great Frederick. Yet the
effective power of Prussia had sadly waned; for her policy was now
marked by an enervating indecision. In the autumn of 1804, however,
the Prussian King was for a time spurred into action by the news that
Sir George Rumbold, British envoy at Hamburg, had been seized on the
night of October 24th, by French troops, and carried off to Paris.
This aggression upon the Circle of Lower Saxony, of which Frederick
William was Director, aroused lively indignation at Berlin; and the
King at once wrote to Napoleon a request for the envoy's liberation as
a proof of his "friendship and high consideration ...a seal on the past
and a pledge for the future."
To this appeal Napoleon returned a soothing answer that Sir George
would at once be released, though England was ever violating the
rights of neutrals, and her agents were conspiring against his life.
The Emperor, in fact, saw that he had taken a false step, which might
throw Prussia into the arms of England and Russia. For this latter
Power had already (May, 1804) offered her armed help to the Court of
Berlin in case the French should violate any other German
territory.[6] But the King was easily soothed; and when, in the
following spring, Napoleon sent seven Golden Eagles of the Legion of
Honour to the Court of Berlin, seven Black Eagles of the renowned
Prussian Order were sent in return--an occurrence which led Gustavus
IV. to return his Order of the Black Eagle with the remark that he
could not recognize "Napoleon and his like" as comrades in an Order of
Chivalry and Religion.[7] Napoleon's aim was achieved: Prussia was
sundered from any league in which Gustavus IV. was a prominent member.
Thus, the chief steps in the formation of the Third Coalition were
taken by Sweden, England, and Russia. Early in 1804 Gustavus proposed
a League of the Powers; and, on the advent of the Pitt Ministry to
office, overtures began to pass between St. Petersburg and London for
an alliance. Important proposals were made by Pitt and our Foreign
Minister, the Earl of Harrowby, in a note of June 26th, 1804, in which
hopes were expressed that Russia, England, Austria, Sweden, and if
possible Prussia, might be drawn together.[8] Alexander and
Czartoryski were already debating the advantages of an alliance with
England. Their aims were certainly noble. International law and the
rights of the weak States bordering on France were to be championed,
and it was suggested by Czartoryski that disputes should be settled,
not by force, but by arbitration.[9]
The statement of these exalted ideas was intrusted to a special envoy
to London, M. Novossiltzoff, who propounded to Pitt the scheme of a
European polity where the States should be independent and enjoy
institutions "founded on the sacred rights of humanity." With this aim
in view, the Czar desired to curb the power of Napoleon, bring back
France to her old limits, and assure the peace of Europe on a firm
basis, namely on the principle of the _balance of power_. Pitt and
Lord Harrowby having agreed to these proposals, details were discussed
at the close of 1804. None of the allies were, in any case, to make a
separate peace; and England (said M. Novossiltzoff) must not only use
her own troops, but grant subsidies to enable the Powers to set on
foot effective forces.
This last sentence claims special notice, as it disposes of the
well-worn phrase, that the Third Coalition was _built up_ by Pitt's
gold. On the contrary, Russia was the first to set forth the need of
English subsidies, which Pitt was by no means eager to supply. The
phrase used by French historians is doubtless correct in so far as
English gold enabled our allies to arm efficiently; but it is wholly
false if it implies that the Third Coalition was merely trumped up by
our money, and that the Russian, Austrian, and Swedish Governments
were so many automatic machines which, if jogged with coins, would
instantly supply armies to the ready money purchaser. This is
practically the notion still prevalent on the Continent; and it is
clearly traceable to the endless diatribes against Pitt's gold with
which Napoleon seasoned his bulletins, and to the caricatures which he
_ordered to be drawn_. The following was his direction to his Minister
of Police, Fouché: "Have caricatures made--an Englishman purse in
hand, _entreating the various Powers to take his money. This is the
real direction to give the whole business._" How well he knew mankind:
he rightly counted on its gullibility where pictures were concerned;
and the direction which he thus gave to public opinion bids fair to
persist, in spite of every exposure of the trickery.[10]
But, to return to the plans of the allies, Holland, Switzerland, and
Italy were to be liberated from their "enslavement to France," and
strengthened so as to provide barriers to future aggressions: the King
of Sardinia was to be restored to his mainland possessions, and
receive in addition the Ligurian, or Genoese, Republic.[11]
On all essential topics the British Government was in full accord with
the views of the Czar, and Pitt insisted on the need of a system of
international law which should guarantee the Continent against further
rapacious acts. But Europe was not destined to find peace on these
principles until after ten years of desolating war.
Various causes hindered the formation of this league. On January 2nd,
1805, Napoleon sent to George III. an offer of peace; and those
persons who did not see that this was a device for discovering the
course of negotiations believed that he ardently desired it. We now
know that the offer was despatched a week after he had ordered
Missiessy to ravage the British West Indies.[12] And, doubtless, his
object was attained when George III. replied in the speech from the
throne (January 15th) that he could not entertain the proposal without
reference to the Powers with whom he was then engaged in confidential
intercourse, and especially the Emperor of Russia. Yet the British
Government discussed with the Czar the basis for a future pacification
of Europe; and the mission of Novossiltzoff at midsummer to Berlin, on
his way to Paris, was the answer, albeit a belated one, to Napoleon's
New Year's pacific appeal. We shall now see why this delay occurred,
and what acts of the French Emperor finally dispelled all hopes of
peace.
The delay was due to differences between Russia and England respecting
Malta and our maritime code. The Czar insisted on our relinquishing
Malta and relaxing the rigours of the right of search for deserters
from our navy. To this the Pitt Ministry demurred, seeing that Malta
was our only means of protecting the Mediterranean States, and our
only security against French aggressions in the Levant, while the
right of searching neutral vessels was necessary to prevent the
enfeebling of our navy.[13] Negotiations were nearly broken off even
after a treaty between the two Powers had been brought to the final
stage on April 11th, 1805; but in July (after the Czar had recorded
his solemn protest against our keeping Malta) it was ratified, and
formed the basis for the Third Coalition. The aims of the allies were
to bring about the expulsion of French troops from North Germany; to
assure the independence of the Republics of Holland and Switzerland;
and to reinstate the King of Sardinia in Piedmont. Half a million of
men were to be set in motion, besides the forces of Great Britain; and
the latter Power, as a set-off to her lack of troops, agreed to
subsidize her allies to the extent of; £1,250,000 a year for every
100,000 men actually employed in the war. It was further stipulated
that a European Congress at the close of the war should endeavour to
fix more surely the principles of the Law of Nations and establish a
federative system. Above all, the allies bound themselves not to
hinder the popular wish in France respecting the form of government--a
clause which deprived the war of the Third Coalition of that
monarchical character which had pervaded the league of 1793 and, to a
less extent, that of 1799.[14]
What was the attitude of Napoleon towards this league? He certainly
took little pains to conciliate the Czar. In fact, his actions towards
Russia were almost openly provocative. Thus, while fully aware of the
interest which Alexander felt in the restoration of the King of
Sardinia, he sent the proposal that that unlucky King should receive
the Ionian Isles and Malta as indemnities for his losses, and that too
when Russia looked upon Corfu as her own. To this offer the Czar
deigned not a word in reply. Napoleon also sent an envoy to the Shah
of Persia with an offer of alliance, so as to check the advances of
Russia on the shores of the Caspian.[15]
On the other hand, he used every effort to allure Prussia, by secretly
offering her Hanover, and that too as early as the close of July.[16]
For a brief space, also, he took some pains to conciliate Austria.
This indeed was necessary: for the Court of Vienna had already
(November 6th, 1804) framed a secret agreement with Russia to make war
on Napoleon if he committed any new aggression in Italy or menaced any
part of the Turkish Empire.[17] Yet this act was really defensive.
Francis desired only to protect himself against Napoleon's ambition,
and, had he been treated with consideration, would doubtless have
clung to peace.
For a time Napoleon humoured that Court, even as regards the changes
now mooted in Italy. On January 1st, 1805, he wrote to Francis,
stating that he was about to proclaim Joseph Bonaparte King of Italy,
if the latter would renounce his claim to the crown of France, and so
keep the governments of France and Italy separate, as the Treaty of
Lunéville required; that this action would enfeeble his (Napoleon's)
power, but would carry its own recompense if it proved agreeable to
the Emperor Francis.
But it soon appeared that Joseph was by no means inclined to accept
the crown of Lombardy if it entailed the sacrifice of all hope of
succeeding to the French Empire. He had already demurred to _le vilain
titre de roi_, and on January 27th announced his final rejection of
the offer. Napoleon then proposed to Louis that he should hold that
crown in trust for his son; but the suggestion at once rekindled the
flames of jealousy which ever haunted Louis; and, after a violent
scene, the Emperor thrust his brother from the room.
Perhaps this anger was simulated. He once admitted that his rage only
mounted this high--pointing to his chin; and the refusals of his
brothers were certainly to be expected. However that may be, he now
resolved to assume that crown himself, appointing as Viceroy his
step-son, Eugène Beauharnais. True, he announced to the French Senate
that the realms of France and Italy would be kept separate: but
neither the Italian deputies, who had been summoned to Paris to vote
this dignity to their master, nor the servile Senate, nor the rulers
of Europe, were deceived. Thus, when in the early summer Napoleon
reviewed a large force that fought over again in mimic war the battle
of Marengo; when, amidst all the pomp and pageantry that art could
devise, he crowned himself in the cathedral of Milan with the iron
circlet of the old Lombard Kings, using the traditional formula: "God
gave it me, woe to him who touches it"; when, finally, he incorporated
the Ligurian Republic in the French Empire, Francis of Austria
reluctantly accepted the challenges thus threateningly cast down, and
began to arm.[18] The records of our Foreign Office show conclusively
that the Hapsburg ruler felt himself girt with difficulties: the
Austrian army was as yet ill organized: the reforms after which the
Archduke Charles had been striving were ill received by the military
clique; and the sole result had been to unsettle rather than
strengthen the army, and to break down the health of the Archduke.[19]
Yet the intention of Napoleon to treat Italy as a French province was
so insultingly paraded that Francis felt war to be inevitable, and
resolved to strike a blow while the French were still entangled in
their naval schemes. He knew well the dangers of war; he would have
eagerly welcomed any sign of really peaceful intentions at Paris; but
no signs were given; in fact, French agents were sent into Switzerland
to intrigue for a union of that land with France. Here again the pride
of the Hapsburgs was cut to the quick, and they disdained to submit to
humiliations such as were eating the heart out of the Prussian
monarchy.
The Czar, too, was far from eager for war. He had sent Novossiltzoff
to Berlin _en route_ for Paris, in the hope of coming to terms with
Napoleon, when the news of the annexation of Genoa ended the last
hopes of a compromise. "This man is insatiable," exclaimed Alexander;
"his ambition knows no bounds; he is a scourge of the world; he wants
war; well, he shall have it, and the sooner the better," The Czar at
once ordered all negotiations to be broken off. Novossiltzoff, on July
10th, declared to Baron Hardenberg, the successor of Haugwitz at the
Prussian Foreign Office, that Napoleon had now passed the utmost
limits of the Czar's patience; and he at once returned his French
passports. In forwarding them to the French ambassador at Berlin,
Hardenberg expressed the deep regret of the Prussian monarch at the
breakdown of this most salutary negotiation--a phrase which showed
that the patience of Berlin was nearly exhausted.[20]
Clearly, then, the Third Coalition was not cemented by English gold,
but by Napoleon's provocations. While England and Russia found great
difficulty in coming to an accord, and Austria was arming only from
fear, the least act of complaisance on his part would have unravelled
this ill-knit confederacy. But no such action was forthcoming. All his
letters written in North Italy after his coronation are puffed up with
incredible insolence. Along with hints to Eugène to base politics on
dissimulation and to seek only to be feared, we find letters to
Ministers at Paris scorning the idea that England and Russia can come
to terms, and asserting that the annexation of Genoa concerns England
alone; but if Austria wants to find a pretext for war, she may now
find it.
Then he hurries back to Fontainebleau, covering the distance from
Turin in eighty-five hours; and, after a brief sojourn at St. Cloud,
he reaches Boulogne. There, on August the 22nd, he hears that Austria
is continuing to arm: a few hours later comes the news that Villeneuve
has turned back to Cadiz. Fiercely and trenchantly he resolves this
fateful problem. He then sketches to Talleyrand the outlines of his
new policy. He will again press, and this time most earnestly, his
offer of Hanover to Prussia as the price of her effective alliance
against the new coalition. Perhaps this new alliance will strangle the
coalition at its birth; at any rate it will paralyze Austria.
Accordingly, he despatches to Berlin his favourite aide-de-camp,
General Duroc, to persuade the King that his alliance will save the
Continent from war.[21]
Meanwhile the Hapsburgs were completely deceived. They imagined
Napoleon to be wholly immersed in his naval enterprise, and
accordingly formed a plan of campaign, which, though admirable against
a weak and guileless foe, was fraught with danger if the python's
coils were ready for a spring. As a matter of fact, he was far better
prepared than Austria. As late as July 7th, the Court of Vienna had
informed the allies that its army would not be ready for four months;
yet the nervous anxiety of the Hapsburgs to be beforehand with
Napoleon led them to hurry on war: and on August 9th they secretly
gave their adhesion to the Russo-British alliance.
Then, too, by a strange fatuity, their move into Bavaria was to be
made with a force of only 59,000 men, while their chief masses, some
92,000 strong, were launched into Italy against the strongholds on the
Mincio. To guard the flanks of these armies, Austria had 34,000 men in
Tyrol; but, apart from raw recruits, there were fewer than 20,000
soldiers in the rest of that vast empire. In fact, the success of the
autumn campaign was known to depend on the help of the Russians, who
were expected to reach the banks of the Inn before the 20th of
October, while it was thought that the French could not possibly reach
the Danube till twenty days later.[22] It was intended, however, to
act most vigorously in Italy, and to wage a defensive campaign on the
Danube.
Such was the plan concocted at Vienna, mainly under the influence of
the Archduke Charles, who took the command of the army in Italy, while
that of the Danube was assigned to the Archduke Ferdinand and Mack,
the new Quarter-Master-General. This soldier had hitherto enjoyed a
great reputation in Austria, probably because he was the only general
who had suffered no great defeat. Amidst the disasters of 1797 he
seemed the only man able to retrieve the past, and to be shut out from
command by Thugut's insane jealousy of his "transcendent
abilities."[23] Brave he certainly was: but his mind was always swayed
by preconceived notions; he belonged to the school of "manoeuvre
strategists," of whom the Duke of Brunswick was the leader; and he now
began the campaign of 1805 with the fixed purpose of holding a
commanding military position. Such a position the Emperor Francis and
Mack had discovered in the weak fortress of Ulm and the line of the
River Iller. Towards these points of vantage the Austrians now began
to move.
The first thing was to gain over the Elector of Bavaria. The Court of
Vienna, seeking to persuade or compel that prince to join the
Coalition, made overtures (September 3rd to 6th) with which he dallied
for a day or two until an opportunity came of escaping to the fortress
of Würzburg. Mack thereupon crossed the River Inn and sought, but in
vain, to cut off the Bavarian troops from that stronghold.
Accordingly, the Austrian leader marched on to Ulm, where he arrived
in the middle of September; and, not satisfied with holding this
advanced position, he pushed on his outposts to the chief defiles of
the Black Forest, while other regiments held the valley of the River
Iller and strengthened the fortress of Memmingen. Doubtless this would
have been good strategy, had his forces been equal in numbers to those
of Napoleon. At that time the Black Forest was the only physical barrier
between France and Southern Germany; the Rhine was then practically a
French river; and, only by holding the passes of that range could the
Austrians hope to screen Swabia from invasion on the side of Alsace.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF ULM.]
But Mack forgot two essential facts. Until the Russians arrived, he
was too weak to hold so advanced a position in what was hostile
ground, now that Bavaria and the other South German States obeyed
Napoleon's summons to range themselves on his side. Further, he was
dangerously exposed on the north, as a glance at the map will show.
Ulm and the line of the Iller formed a strong defence against the
south-west: but on the north that position is singularly open: it can
be turned from the valleys of the Main, the Neckar, and the Altmühl,
all of which conduct an invader to the regions east of Ulm. Indeed, it
passes belief how even the Aulic Council could have ignored the
dangers of that position. Possibly the fact that Ulm had been stoutly
held by Kray in 1796 now induced them to overrate its present
importance; but at that time the fortified camp of Ulm was the central
knot of vast operations, whereas now it was but an advanced
outpost.[24] If Francis and his advisers were swayed by historical
reminiscences it is strange that they forgot the fate of Melas in
Piedmont. The real parallel had been provided, not by Kray, but by the
general who was cut off at Marengo. Indeed, in its broad outlines, the
campaign of Ulm resembles that of Marengo. Against foes who had thrust
their columns far from their base, Napoleon now, as in 1800,
determined to deal a crushing blow. On the part of the Austrians we
notice the same misplaced confidence, the same lack of timely news,
and the same inability to understand Napoleon's plan until his
dispositions are complete; while his strategy and tactics in 1805
recall to one's mind the masterly simplicity of design, the subtlety
and energy of execution, which led up to his triumph in the plains of
Piedmont.
Meanwhile the allies were dissipating their strength. A Russian corps,
acting from Corfu as a base, and an English expedition from Malta,
were jointly to attack St. Cyr in the south of Italy, raise the
country at his rear and compel him to surrender. This plan was left
helplessly flapping in the air by a convention which Napoleon imposed
on the Neapolitan ambassador. On September 21st Talleyrand induced
that envoy to guarantee the neutrality of the kingdom of Naples, all
belligerents being excluded from its domains. Consequently St. Cyr's
corps evacuated that land and brought a welcome reinforcement to
Masséna on the Mincio. Equally skilful was Napoleon's action as
regards Hanover. On that side also the allies planned a formidable
expedition. From the fortress of Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania, a
force of Russians and Swedes, which Gustavus burned to command, was to
march into Hanover, and, when strengthened by an Anglo-Hanoverian
corps, drive the French from the Low Countries. It is curious to
contrast the cumbrous negotiations concerning this expedition--the
quarrels about the command, the anxiety at the outset lest Villeneuve
should perhaps sail into the Baltic, the delays of the British War
Office, the remonstrances of the Czar, and the efforts to avert the
jealousy of Prussia--with the serene indifference of Napoleon as to
the whole affair. He knew full well that the war would not be decided
by diversions at the heel of Italy or on the banks of the Ems, but by
the shock of great masses of men on the Danube. He denuded Hanover of
French troops, except at its southern fortress of Hameln, so that he
could overwhelm the levies of Austria before the Russians came up. In
brief, while the Coalition sought, like a Briareus, to envelop him on
all sides, he prepared to deal a blow at its heart.
As the first part of the campaign depended almost entirely on problems
of time and space, it will be well to follow the chief movements of
the hostile forces somewhat closely. The Austrian plan aimed at
forestalling the French in the occupation of Swabia; and its apparent
success puffed up Mack with boundless confidence. At Ulm he threw up
extensive outworks to strengthen that obsolete fortress, extended his
lines to Memmingen far on the south, and trusted that the Muscovites
would come up long before the French eagles hovered above the sources
of the Danube. But at that time the Russian vanguard had not reached
Linz in Upper Austria, and not before October 10th did it appear on
the banks of the River Inn.[25]
Far from being the last to move, the French Emperor outstripped his
enemies in the speed of his preparations. Whereas the Austrians
believed he would not be able to reach the Danube in force before
November 10th, he intended to have 200,000 men in Germany by September
18th. But he knew not at first the full extent of his good fortune: it
did not occur to him that the Austrians would cross the Inn: all he
asks Talleyrand, on August 23rd, is that such news may appear in the
"Moniteur" as will gain him twenty days and give General Bertrand time
to win over Bavaria, while "I make my 200,000 men pirouette into
Germany." On August 29th the _Army of England_ became the _Grand
Army_, composed of seven corps, led by Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust,
Soult, Lannes, Ney and Augereau. The cavalry was assigned to Murat;
while Bessières was in command of the Imperial Guard, now numbering
some 10,000 men.
Already the greater part of this vast array was beginning to move
inland; Davoust and Soult left some regiments, 30,000 strong, to guard
the flotilla, and Marmont detached 14,000 men to defend the coasts of
Holland; but the other corps on September 2nd began their march
Rhine-wards in almost their full strength. On that day Bernadotte
broke up his cantonments in Hanover, and began his march towards the
Main, on which so much was to turn. The Elector of Hesse-Cassel now
espoused Napoleon's cause. Thus, without meeting any opposition,
Bernadotte's columns reached Würzburg at the close of September; there
the Elector of Bavaria welcomed the Marshal and gave him the support
of his 20,000 troops; and at that stronghold he was also joined by
Marmont.
In order to mislead the Austrians, Napoleon remained up to September
23rd at St. Cloud or Paris; and during his stay appeared a _Senatus
Consultum_ ordering that, after January 1st, 1806, France should give
up its revolutionary calendar and revert to the Gregorian. He then set
out for Strassburg, as though the chief blows were to be dealt through
the passes of the Black Forest at the front of Mack's line of defence;
and, to encourage that general in this belief, Murat received orders
to show his horsemen in the passes held by Mack's outposts, but to
avoid any serious engagements. This would give time for the other
corps to creep up to the enemy's rear. Mack, meanwhile, had heard of
the forthcoming junction of the French and Bavarians at Würzburg, but
opined that it threatened Bohemia.[26]
Accordingly, he still clung to his lines, contenting himself with
sending a cavalry regiment to observe Bernadotte's movements; but
neither he nor his nominal chief, the Archduke Ferdinand, divined the
truth. Indeed, so far did they rely on the aid of the Russians as to
order back some regiments sent from Italy by the more sagacious
Archduke Charles; but 11,000 troops from Tyrol reached the Swabian
army. That force was now spread out so as to hold the bridges of the
Danube between Ingolstadt and Ulm; and on October 7th the Austrians
were disposed as follows: 18,000 men under Kienmayer were guarding
Ingolstadt, Neuburg, Donauwörth, Günzburg, and lesser points, while
Mack had about 35,000 men at Ulm and along the line of the Iller; the
arrival of other detachments brought the Austrian total to upwards of
70,000 men. Against this long scattered line Napoleon led greatly
superior forces.[27] The development of his plans proceeded apace.
Though Prussia had proclaimed her strict neutrality, he did not
scruple to violate it by sending Bernadotte's corps through her
principality of Ansbach, which lay in their path. He charged
Bernadotte to "offer many assurances favourable to Prussia, and
testify all possible affection and respect for her--and then rapidly
cross her land, asserting the impossibility of doing anything else."
Accordingly, that Marshal was lavish in his regrets and apologies, but
ordered his columns to defile past the battalions and squadrons of
Prussia, that were powerless to resent the outrage.[28]
The news of this trespass on Prussian territory reached the ears of
Frederick William at a critical time, when the Czar sent to Berlin a
kind of ultimatum, intimating that, even if Prussia deserted the cause
of European independence, Russian troops must nevertheless pass
through part of Prussian Poland. Stung by this note from his usually
passive demeanour, the King sent off an answer that such a step would
entail a Franco-Prussian alliance against the violators of his
territory, when the news came that Napoleon had actually done at
Ansbach what Alexander had announced his intention of doing in the
east. The revulsion of feeling was violent: for a short space the King
declared he would dismiss Duroc and make war on Napoleon for this
insult, but in the end he called a cabinet council and invited the
Czar to come to Berlin.[29]
While the Gallophil counsellors, Haugwitz and Lombard, were using all
their arts to hinder the Prusso-Russian understanding, the meshes were
being woven fast around Mack and the Archduke Ferdinand. Bernadotte's
corps, after making history in its march, was detached to the
south-east so as to hold in check the Russian vanguard, and to give
plenty of room to the troops that were to cut off Mack from Austria, a
move which may be compared with the march of Bonaparte to Milan before
he essayed the capture of Melas. Both steps bespeak his desire to have
ample space at his back before circling round his prey.
On October 6th the corps of Soult and Lannes, helped by Murat's
powerful cavalry, cut the Austrian lines on the Danube at Donauwörth,
and gained a firm footing on the right bank. Over the crossing thus
secured far in Mack's rear, the French poured in dense array, and
marched south and south-west towards the back of the Austrian
positions, while Ney's corps marched to seize the chief bridges over
the Danube.
A study of the processes of Mack's brain at this time is not without
interest. It shows the danger of intrusting the fate of an army to a
man who cannot weigh evidence. Mack was not ignorant of the course of
events, though his news generally came late. The mischief was that his
brain warped the news. On October 6th he wrote to Vienna that the
enemy seemed about to aim a blow at his communications: on October
7th, when he heard of the loss of Donauwörth, he described it as an
unfortunate event, which no one thought to be possible. The Archduke
now urged the need of an immediate retreat towards Munich, and marched
in an easterly direction on Günzburg: another Austrian division of
8,000 men moved on Wertingen, where, on October 8th, it was furiously
attacked by the troops of Murat and Lannes. At first the Imperialists
firmly kept their ranks; but the unequal contest closed with a hasty
flight, which left 2,000 men in the hands of the French Then Murat,
pressing on through the woods, cut off Mack's retreat to Augsburg. Yet
that general still took a cheerful view of his position. On that same
day he wrote from Günzburg that, as soon as the enemy had passed over
the Lech, he would cross the Danube and cut their communications at
Nördlingen. He wrote thus when Ney's corps was striving to seize the
Danube bridges below Ulm. If Mack were to march north-east against the
French communications it was of the utmost importance for him to hold
the chief of these bridges: but Ney speedily seized three of them, and
on the 9th was able to draw closer the toils around Ulm.
From his position at Augsburg the French Emperor now directed the
final operations; and, as before Marengo, he gave most heed to that
side by which he judged his enemy would strive to break through, in
this case towards Kempten and Tyrol. This would doubtless have been
Mack's safest course; for he was strong enough to brush aside Soult,
gain Tyrol, seal up its valleys against Napoleon, and carry
reinforcements to the Archduke Charles. But he was still intent on his
Nördlingen scheme, even after the loss of the Danube bridges exposed
his march thither to flank attacks from the four French corps now
south of the river. Nevertheless, Napoleon's miscalculation of Mack's
plans, or, as Thiers has striven to prove, a misunderstanding of his
orders by Murat, gave the Austrians a chance such as fortune rarely
bestows.[30]
In spite of Ney's protests, one of his divisions, that led by Dupont,
had been left alone to guard the northern bank of the Danube, a
position where it might have been overwhelmed by an enterprising foe.
What is more extraordinary, Dupont, with only 6,000 men, was charged
to advance on Ulm, and carry it by storm. On the 11th he accordingly
advanced against Mack's fortified camp north of that city. The
Austrians met him in force, and, despite the utmost heroism of his
troops, finally wrested the village of Hasslach from his grasp; later
in the day a cloud of their horsemen, swooping round his right wing,
cut up his tired troops, took 1,000 prisoners, and left 1,500 dead and
wounded on the field. Among the booty was found a despatch of Napoleon
ordering Dupont to carry Ulm by storm--which might have shown them
that the French Emperor believed that city to be all but deserted.[31]
In truth, Napoleon's miscalculation opened for Mack a path of safety;
and had he at once marched away to the north, the whole aspect of
affairs might have changed. The Russian vanguard was on the banks of
the Inn: all the French, except the relics of Dupont's division, were
south of the Danube, and a few vigorous blows at their communications
might have greatly embarrassed troops that had little artillery, light
stores of ammunition, and lived almost entirely on the produce of the
country. We may picture to ourselves the fierce blows that, in such a
case, Frederick the Great would have rained on his assailants as he
wheeled round on their rear and turned their turning movements. With
Frederick matched against Napoleon, the Lech and the Danube would have
witnessed a very cyclone of war.
But Mack was not Frederick: and he had to do with a foe who speedily
made good an error. On October 13th, when Mack seemed about to cut off
the French from the Main, he received news through Napoleon's spies
that the English had effected a landing at Boulogne, and a revolution
had broken out in France. The tidings found easy entrance into a brain
that had a strange bias towards pleasing falsities and rejected
disagreeable facts. At once he leaped to the conclusion that the moves
of Soult, Murat, Lannes, Marmont, and Ney round his rear were merely
desperate efforts to cut back a way to Alsace. He therefore held fast
to his lines, made only feeble efforts to clear the northern road, and
despatched reinforcements to Memmingen. The next day brought other
news; that Memmingen had been invested by Soult; that Ney by a
brilliant dash across the Danube at Elchingen had routed an Austrian
division there, and was threatening Ulm from the north-east; and that
the other French columns were advancing from the south-east. Yet Mack,
still viewing these facts in the twilight of his own fancies, pictured
them as the efforts of despair, not as the drawing in of the hunter's
toils.
He was now almost alone in his reading of events. The Archduke
Ferdinand, though nominally in supreme command, had hitherto deferred
to Mack's age and experience, as the Emperor Francis enjoined. But he
now urged the need of instantly marching away to the north with all
available forces. Still Mack clung to his notion that it was the
French who were in sore straits; and he forbade the evacuation of Ulm;
whereupon the Archduke, with Schwarzenberg, Kollowrath, Gyulai, and
all whose instincts or rank prompted and enabled them to defy the
madman's authority, assembled 1,500 horsemen and rode off by the
northern road. It was high time; for Ney, firmly established at
Elchingen, was pushing on his vanguard towards the doomed city: Murat
and Lannes were charged to support him on the north bank, while across
the river Marmont, and further south Soult, cut off the retreat on
Tyrol.
At last the scales fell from Mack's eyes. Even now he protested
against the mere mention of surrender. But again he was disappointed.
Ney stormed the Michaelsberg north of Ulm, a position on which the
Austrians had counted; and on October 17th the hapless commander
agreed to terms of capitulation, whereby his troops were to march out
and lay down their arms in six days' time, if an Austro-Russian army
able to raise the siege did not come on the scene. These conditions
were afterwards altered by the captor, who, wheedling his captive with
a few bland words, persuaded him to surrender on the 20th on condition
that Ney and his corps remained before Ulm until the 25th. This was
Mack's last offence against his country and his profession; his assent
to this wily compromise at once set free the other French corps for
offensive operations; and that too when every day was precious to
Austria, Russia, and Prussia.
On October 20th the French Emperor, with a brilliant staff, backed by
the solid wall of his Guard and flanked by eight columns of his
troops, received the homage of the vanquished. First came their
commander, who, bowed down by grief, handed his sword to the victor
with the words, "Here is the unfortunate Mack." Then there filed out
to the foot of the Michaelsberg 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse, who laid
down their arms before the Emperor, some with defiant rage, the most
part in stolid dejection, while others flung them away with every sign
of indecent joy.[32] As if the elements themselves conspired to
enhance the brilliance of Napoleon's triumph, the sun, which had been
obscured for days by storm-clouds and torrents of rain, now shone
brightly forth, bathing the scene in the mild radiance of autumn,
lighting up the French forces disposed on the slopes of that natural
amphitheatre, while it cast deep shadows from the long trail of the
vanquished beneath. The French were electrified by the sight: the
fatigues of their forced marches through the dusty heats of September,
and the slush, swamps, and torrents of the last few days were all
forgotten, and they hailed with jubilant shouts the chief whose
sagacity had planned and achieved a triumph hitherto unequalled in the
annals of war. "Our Emperor," said they, "has found out a new way of
making war: he no longer makes it with our arms, but with our
legs."[33]
Meanwhile the other Austrian detachments were being hunted down. Only
a few men escaped from Memmingen into Tyrol: the division, which, if
properly supported, might have cut a way through to Nördlingen three
days earlier, was now overwhelmed by the troops of Murat and Lannes;
out of 13,000 foot-soldiers very few escaped. Most of the horsemen
succeeded in joining the Archduke Ferdinand, on whose track Murat now
flung himself with untiring energy. The _beau sabreur_ swept through
part of Ansbach in pursuit, came up with Ferdinand near Nuremberg, and
defeated his squadrons, their chief, with about 1,700 horse and some
500 mounted artillerymen, finally reaching the shelter of the Bohemian
Mountains. All the rest of Mack's great array had been engulfed.
Thus closed the first scene of the War of the Third Coalition. Hasty
preparations, rash plans, and, above all, Mack's fatal ingenuity in
reading his notions into facts--these were the causes of a disaster
which ruined the chances of the allies. The Archduke Charles, who had
been foiled by Masséna's stubborn defence, was at once recalled from
Italy in order to cover Vienna; and, worst of all, the Court of Berlin
now delayed drawing the sword.
Yet, even amidst the unstinted boons that she showered on Napoleon by
land, Fortune rudely baffled him at sea. When he was hurrying from Ulm
towards the River Inn, to carry the war into Austria, he heard that
the French navy had been shattered. Trafalgar was fought the day after
Mack's army filed out of Ulm. The greatest sea-fight of the century
was the outcome of Napoleon's desire that his ships should carry
succour to his troops in Italy. For this voyage the Emperor was about
to substitute Admiral Rosily for Villeneuve: and the unfortunate
admiral, divining that resolve, sought by a bold stroke to retrieve
his fortunes. He put to sea, and Trafalgar was the result. It would be
superfluous to describe this last and most splendid of Nelson's
exploits; but a few words as to the bearing of this great victory on
the events of that time may not be out of place. It is certain that
Villeneuve at Trafalgar fought under more favourable conditions than
in the conflict of July 22nd. He had landed his very numerous sick,
his crews had been refreshed and reinforced, and, above all, the worst
of the Spanish ships had been replaced by seaworthy and serviceable
craft. Yet out of the thirty-three sail of the line, he lost eighteen
to an enemy that numbered only twenty-seven sail; and that fact alone
absolves him from the charge of cowardice in declining to face
Cornwallis and Calder in July with ships that were cumbered with sick
and badly needed refitting.
Then again: it is often stated that Trafalgar saved England from
invasion. To refute this error it is merely needful to remind the
reader that all immediate fear of invasion was over, when, at the
close of August, Napoleon wheeled the Grand Army against Austria. Not
until the Continent was conquered could the landing in Kent become
practicable. That opportunity occurred two years later, after Tilsit;
then, in truth, the United Kingdom was free from panic because
Trafalgar had practically destroyed the French navy. For these
islands, then, the benefits of Trafalgar were prospective. But, for
the British Empire, they were immediate. Every French, Dutch, and
Spanish colony that now fell into our hands was in great measure the
fruit of Nelson's victory, which heralded the second and vaster stage
of imperial growth.
Finally, the decisive advantage which Britain now gained over Napoleon
at sea compelled him, if he would realize the world-wide schemes ever
closest to his heart, to adopt the method of warfare against us which
he had all along contemplated as an effective alternative. As far back
as February, 1798, he pointed out that there were three ways of
attacking and ruining England, either a direct invasion, or a French
control of North Germany which would ruin British commerce, or an
expedition to the Indies. After Trafalgar the first of these
alternatives was impossible, and the last receded for a time into the
background. The second now took the first place in his thoughts; he
could only bring England to his feet and gain a world-empire by
shutting out her goods from the whole of the Continent, and thus
condemning her to industrial strangulation. In a word, Trafalgar
necessitated the adoption of the Continental System, which was built
up by the events now to be described.
Note to the Third Edition.--An American critic has charged me with
inconsistency in saying that the Third Coalition was not built up
by English gold, because I state (p. 5) that the first advances
were made by England to Russia. I ought to have used the phrase
"the first _written_ proposals that I have found were made," etc.
Czartoryski's "Memoirs" (vol. ii., chs. ii.-iii.), to which I
referred my readers for details, show clearly that Alexander and
his advisers looked on a rupture with France as inevitable, but
wished to temporize for some three months or so, until certain
matters were cleared up; they therefore cautiously sounded the
position at Vienna and London. This passage from Czartoryski (vol.
ii., ch. iii.) proves that Russia wanted the English alliance:
"After the diplomatic rupture consequent upon the execution of the
Duc d'Enghien, it became indispensable to come to an understanding
with the only Power, except Russia, which thought herself strong
enough to contend with France--to ascertain as thoroughly as
possible what were her inclinations and designs, the principles of
her policy, and those which she could be led to adopt in certain
contingencies. It would have been a great advantage to obtain the
concurrence in our views of so powerful a State as England, and to
strive with her for the same objects; but for this it was
necessary, not only to make sure of her present inclinations, but
to weigh well the possibilities of the future after the death of
George III. and the fall of the Pitt Ministry. We had to make
England understand that the wish to fight Napoleon was not in
itself sufficient to establish an indissoluble bond between her
Government and that of St. Petersburg...."
In "F.O.," Russia, No. 55, is a despatch of our ambassador at St.
Petersburg, Admiral Warren, of June 30, 1804, in which he reports
Czartoryski's concern at rumours of negotiations between England
and France: "The prince [Czartoryski] remarked that he could not
suppose, after what had passed between the two Courts, and the
manner in which the Emperor [Alexander] had explained himself to
England, and after the measures which Russia had since proposed,
that Great Britain would make a peace at once by herself."
Of these earlier negotiations I have found no trace; but obviously
the first proposals for an alliance must have come from Russia.
Sweden was the first to propose a monarchical league against
Napoleon. (See my article in the "Revue Napoléonienne" for June,
1902.)
* * * * *