THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
The Retreat of the Third Corps
Movement across the Crozat Canal--Fight of the 173rd Brigade--Forcing
of the Canal Line--Arrival of the French--Fight of Frières
Wood--Splendid work of the Cavalry--Loss of Noyon--Final
equilibrium--General retrospect of the Battle.
[Sidenote: March 22.]
We shall now complete this slight survey of a vast subject by
following the fortunes of Butler's Third Corps upon the extreme right
of the whole British Army. It has already been shown that the
condition of this corps at the end of the first day of battle was
most perilous, as its left flank in the region of Essigny, where the
battle zone of the Fourteenth Division had been deeply pierced, was
completely turned. The Eighteenth Division in the centre had, it is
true, retained its ground, but the left brigade of the Fifty-eighth
Division upon the right, the only brigade of that unit which was
engaged, had also after a very desperate resistance lost their front
positions at Quessy opposite to La Fère. Therefore orders had been
given to draw off the troops during the night of March 21 across the
Crozat Canal, and a covering line had been built up from the 54th
Brigade, the Second Cavalry Division, and the 12th and 18th
Entrenching Battalions in order to hold the German pursuit and {178}
to give the somewhat dishevelled troops time to re-organise their
ranks. By 5 A.M. on March 22 they were over the canal and the
bridges had been destroyed. The artillery had been got over first to
cover the crossings, and the 54th Brigade, which had covered the rear
of the Fourteenth Division, was lined up from Jussy to Mennessis.
The Eighteenth Division (less the 54th Brigade) fell back in the line
of Frières Wood, behind the canal. Many guns had been lost but the
cavalry had thrown the 3rd and 5th Brigades of the R.H.A. into the
firing-line to support the infantry, and two new batteries of the
96th R.F.A., only arrived the day before from England, came in at the
nick of time.
It was of the first importance to destroy the bridges along the
canal, but this was found to be no easy matter. They had all been
mined and prepared for destruction some time before by the French,
but either the lapse of time or faulty material had caused such
deterioration that the charges failed to explode, and had to be
renewed and discharged under circumstances of great difficulty and
danger. It was carried out none the less with great tenacity by the
British sappers, but several weak points remained, notably a canal
lock which had been so injured that the bed of the canal was exposed
for some distance. The railway bridges here, as elsewhere, were also
a source of weakness.
As the corps turned to face the enemy upon the south side of the
canal the general line of battle showed the 41st Brigade just south
of St. Simon, connected up on the left by the only surviving
battalion of the 42nd Brigade with the 61st Brigade of the Twentieth
Division who were in support of {179} the Thirty-sixth Ulsters at
that place. Then came the 43rd and 54th Brigades, facing Jussy and
Mennessis with the 3rd and 5th Dismounted Cavalry Brigades in
support. South of this point were the 4th Cavalry Brigade, the 55th
Brigade, and the 53rd Brigade, all in the Frières area. Then came
the 173rd Brigade in the Vouel neighbourhood with the 18th
Entrenching Battalion and the 6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade. This
force had already lost heavily, and many of the men were suffering
from gas, but they were sustained by the certainty that French
reinforcements would speedily reach them from the south, as a system
of mutual lateral support had been agreed upon between the commanders.
A line of trenches had been begun in this neighbourhood by the French
some time before, and it had been carried on by Italian labour, but
it was still very unfinished, with many gaps, so that the tired
soldiers had to lay down their rifles and take to their trenching
tools to get some cover. It was already clear that they would need
it, for with early daybreak on March 22 the Germans showed that they
had reached the north bank of the canal at Jussy. It was again very
misty, and they were able to bring up their machine-guns and small
artillery with perfect impunity and place them under cover. It was
not until between 10 and 11 A.M. that the mist began to lift, and the
British outposts peering through it could see the flash of the guns
among the plantations on the farther side. At an earlier hour the
Germans had tried to cross at Jussy, but had been driven back. It
was already evident, however, that they were in a position to repair
the bridges in such a way as to find a passage wherever they desired.
The general {180} situation might be described as a curious
reproduction of the first action of the war when the two armies lay
upon either side of the Mons Canal.
The French Sixth Army on the right had acted with loyal promptitude,
and the One hundred and twenty-fifth Division, under General Diebold,
was already moving up from the south. One would have imagined that
the most efficient relief would have been to replace the two British
brigades in the south of the Oise, and so re-unite the Fifty-eighth
Division. For some reason this was not done, and General Worgan's
173rd Brigade continued to be a lone unit. A very welcome
reinforcement consisted of nine batteries of French 75's. It was
understood also that the whole Fifth French Corps, under General
Pellé, was due at Noyon that evening, and that the Third British
Corps would be relieved by it as soon as possible, but further help
was slow in materialising.
At about 1 P.M. on March 22 the enemy made their first crossing of
the canal in the region of the 173rd Brigade. They advanced from
Fargniers in the direction of Tergnier village. The range of vision
in this water-sodden region was not more than fifty yards, which
greatly handicapped Colonel Dervicke-Jones of the 8th London, who was
in local command of this sector, as it put his machine-gun defence
out of action. The troops were spread over a front of 3000 yards, so
that the various companies were widely separated. The first German
advance was made across a lock gate by a number of men dressed in the
uniforms of some of the 1st London, taken the day before--a ruse
which was the more successful as a number of genuine stragglers had
actually been in in this fashion during the morning. An {181} attack
followed during which C Company of the 8th Londons, while holding the
enemy in front, were attacked by these pretended comrades upon the
right rear, so that they were almost entirely destroyed. A road was
thus opened across the canal, and the enemy opened out both north and
south of the Quessy-Tergnier Road, cutting off those of the 3rd and
8th London who were on the farther side. These men fought to a
finish, and only a few of them ever got back. Colonel Dervicke-Jones
had taken up a position in an old French reserve line called the Butt
line, with two companies of his battalion and some machine-guns, and
was able to hold up the enemy all day in his immediate front, and to
prevent several battalions from deploying out of Tergnier. The
artillery also got on to the German infantry in this part of the
field with good results. This Butt position was maintained until the
morning of March 23. Farther up the line, in the region of the
Fourteenth Division, other troubles had developed, and the pressure
of the enemy was great. At 4.30 P.M. the defenders were reinforced,
but the enemy were already across at several points and were
advancing upon Cugny. There was desultory fighting along the whole
corps front, and though there was promise of immediate French relief,
no French troops seem to have been actually engaged upon March 22.
About 6 o'clock in the evening the enemy was across at Jussy Bridge
and also at Montagne, but a fine counter-attack was made at this
point by the 7th Bedfords and 6th Northamptons of the 54th Brigade,
aided by the 16th Lancers, which drove the German infantry across
once more and caused considerable losses. In spite of this success
the general situation upon {182} the evening of March 22 was not
cheering, and the task of the Third Corps which had been ordered to
stand fast and form the southern hinge upon which the whole retreat
should turn, was clearly a very difficult one. It was the more
alarming, as the rapid progress of the enemy at Beauvais and Vaux at
the centre of the army led to a demand for cavalry which could not be
complied with without denuding the line to a dangerous and almost
impossible extent.
[Sidenote: March 23.]
It was soon clear on the morning of March 23 that the Butt position
on the right could not be maintained. The French had taken it over,
but they were unable to hold it. A line was built up near Noreuil,
where the remains of the 8th and 3rd Londons, aided by some French
details, endeavoured all day to check the German advance. The main
attacks were driving down from the north, and were heralded by a very
severe machine-gun barrage, which rained bullets over the British
position. The defence was much aided by a French armoured car upon
the Quessy-Rouez road, and by a battery of 75's. The 4th London were
to the south of the village and less exposed to the force of the
advance. About six, after an hour of intense shelling, the Germans
closed in upon Noreuil, the defenders, after a stout resistance which
occasionally came to hand-to-hand fighting, being driven westwards.
Colonel Burt, commanding the 6th Cavalry Brigade, barricaded his
headquarters in the village and held the Germans off a long time by
his deadly fire. It was not until long after the lines had been
withdrawn that this brave officer had to be specially summoned to
leave his post and fall back on Chauny. Finally, the retreat became
general, but was rallied at the end of the Noreuil valley, where
{183} some 200 men collected, and with a good field of fire to help
them, remained for some time on the defence. Late at night this
small force was ordered to fall back to a new line at Chauny.
It has already been stated that two companies (C and D) of the 8th
London (Post Office Rifles) had been cut off when the Germans got
across the lock gate on the afternoon of March 22. These men, under
Captain Gunning, had made a remarkable defence, crawling out with
Lewis guns on to the lock gates in order to enfilade the advancing
Germans. In the afternoon of March 23 they found themselves with the
Germans on three sides of them and the canal on the fourth. Captain
Gunning and Captain Kelly with the survivors then fought their way
through to Condren, where they still continued their resistance.
These soldiers, who made so admirable a resistance, were largely men
who had been combed from the Army Service Corps.
Whilst the 23rd of March had brought this heavy fighting to the 173rd
Brigade, it had been a day of severe trial to all the other units of
the corps front. The 54th Brigade was still covering the crossing at
Jussy and Montagne, but the pressure was rapidly increasing as fresh
German divisions made their presence felt. The situation was the
more serious as General Butler already knew that the enemy were
across the canal at Ham and had turned his left flank, but it was
still hoped that a counter-attack in this quarter might throw him
back, and so it was determined to hold on to the line. An emergency
force of odds and ends, dismounted troopers, labour men, and returned
leave men were gathered together at Crisolles and placed under the
command of General {184} Harman to co-operate with General Greenly
who now led the remains of the Fourteenth Division, in guarding the
left wing. Meanwhile there was very brisk fighting at Jussy, where
the German infantry had once again, under the cover of many guns, got
a footing upon the south side of the canal. They were at once
vigorously attacked by a small body of the 11th Royal Fusiliers and
of the Scots Greys and penned up in the village of Jussy. At 11 A.M.
the Germans had also got across at Mennessis, but came under the fire
of four machine-guns of the Canadian Mounted Brigade which inflicted
heavy losses upon them. None the less at a second effort the Germans
were across once more, driving back by the weight of their attack the
worn ranks of the 7th Bedfords and of the 9th Scottish Rifles. At
11.30 they were half a mile south of Jussy, and might have got round
the flank of the Bedfords but for the interposition of 200 Canadian
dragoons. "These grim, square-faced men, with their parchment skins
and their granite features, were a glad sight to our weary eyes,"
says one who was fighting beside them. There was a time when it was
doubtful whether in this quarter there was anything but a line of
dismounted troops between the enemy and Paris.
Every man who could be spared was hurried up to hold the weak points
of the line, including the 8th Sussex, the pioneer battalion of the
Eighteenth Division, the rest of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, and
the 7th Cavalry Brigade, but the mischief had gone too far, and the
situation upon the right of the line was even worse than at Jussy.
The counter-attack of the French One hundred and twenty-fifth
Division in the direction of Tergnier had not been a {185} success,
which is not to be wondered at, for the French infantry had come fast
and far, their ammunition was not plentiful, and they were working
over strange ground against an aggressive and victorious enemy. Next
to the French on that front was the 7th Queen's. Colonel Bushell
found himself at one period in command of the left of the French as
well as of his own Surrey men, and he led on this mixed following
under an intense fire, being himself severely wounded and yet
rallying them again and again. Little progress could be made, but at
least he held the line firm for a time. This gallant colonel, after
having his wound dressed, returned to the field of battle, fell
insensible, and had at last to be carried off. Next to the 7th
Queen's was the 8th East Surreys (both of 55th Brigade), which was
also in the thick of the battle, as was the neighbouring 12th
Entrenching Battalion. This line made a very fine resistance, but
was slowly pressed back by weight of numbers until at 4 P.M. they
were on the line Noreuil-Frières-Faillouel, to the left of the spot
where the 173rd Brigade was still holding its ground. The remains of
the 7th Buffs fell back also with the rest of the 55th Brigade,
fighting hard, through Frières Wood, where to the south-west of the
wood they found some old French trenches, in which, with the aid of
the survivors of the Queen's, they, under Colonel Ransome, organised
a line for the rest of that arduous day. This resistance held up
some strong drives of the enemy which were evidently intended, in
conjunction with the attack from Jussy in the north, to cut off all
the troops in the woody country round Frières, and it acted as a most
efficient screen during the withdrawal of the rest of the line.
{186}
The whole eastern limit of the British area was spotted at this
period by small bodies of men who were working desperately to keep
the German infantry from sweeping in from that side. At Noreuil, as
has been shown, were the remains of the 173rd Brigade. At Frières
Wood were the decimated 55th Brigade. Opposite Jussy were the 54th
Brigade and the dismounted cavalry, slowly retiring before the
ever-increasing pressure. In between these organised bodies were
many smaller units all striving hard for the same end. Among these
may be mentioned two companies of sappers, 80th and 92nd Field
Companies R.E., who were extended upon the road north of Noreuil in
touch with the 173rd Brigade on one side. These valiant men not only
held their position all day, but actually made a counter-attack under
Lieutenant Richardson in the evening, when they advanced until they
were nearly surrounded. Finally they fought their way back to the
Caillouel area.
As evening drew in the situation had become more and more difficult.
The enemy had been driving in from every quarter all day without a
respite, and the troops, many of whom had been engaged for more than
two days without a moment for rest or re-organisation, were in a
great state of exhaustion. Only a handful of several battalions
remained as a fighting force. The confusion was made worse by the
fact that the light blue uniforms of the French were mistaken for the
grey of the Germans, so that misleading and alarming reports were
continually brought in to the commanders. All reserves were in the
fight, and the need of relief was urgent. About 4 o'clock the
Faillouel position was found to be no longer tenable, and the troops
fell {187} back through the village, which was immediately occupied
by the enemy who were pushing up their troops in motor-lorries in
this quarter. By 5 o'clock the right wing had come back 500 yards,
and by evening the main position was at Caillouel, when the 54th
assembled, numbering 650 bayonets all told, the three battalions of
Bedfords, Northamptons, and Royal Fusiliers being each a little over
200 strong. Detachments of the Scots Greys and 20th Hussars joined
them at that village.
The 53rd Brigade, fighting upon the left of the 55th Brigade, was as
heavily engaged on March 23 as the other units of the Third Corps on
the south side of the canal. At noon they had lent the 10th Essex to
support their neighbours, and they consisted henceforth of only two
weary battalions, the 6th Berks and 7th West Kents. At 3 o'clock in
the afternoon they were heavily attacked and were pushed slowly back,
struggling hard to keep the line. Major Tween led a counter-attack
of his battalion headquarters, and checked the German advance at a
critical moment, but was mortally wounded in the gallant endeavour.
The two battalions were so weak that they had been telescoped into
one, but good steel remains tough be it ever so thin, and the line
still held. At 5.30 the 9th French Cuirassiers, long-booted giants,
came up to help them, as did the 79th Field Company and various small
details. At 7 the remains of the 55th Brigade were falling back
through their ranks. When they had passed, the 53rd was also
withdrawn as far as Commenchon, while the 55th reassembled at
Bethencourt to the north. Three gallant Cuirassier regiments of the
1st French Cavalry Division covered the rear. All {188} the troops
that night were worn to rags, for it is to be remembered always that
the great local disparity of force enabled the Germans to bring up
perpetually lines of perfectly fresh men with a new impetus and
inspiration, against men, many of whom had been gassed on the first
day, and who were now weary to death and hardly able either to stand
or to think, to order or to understand an order. On the whole long,
tormented, struggling line there was no time or place where the
pressure was greater than here. In spite of all the ardour of the
attack the stubborn constancy of the defence may be measured by the
fact that, save for one battery which was destroyed by shell-fire
upon the afternoon of the 23rd, no guns were lost in this corps
either upon March 22 or 23. On the other hand, so great had been the
destruction of machine-guns, especially upon the first day, that only
two were left out of forty-eight in the Eighteenth Division, though
these were augmented by six new ones on March 24.
The Sixth French Army, on the right of the British, was doing all it
could to send up help, but it seems certain that none of this force
was actually engaged before March 23, though it is stated upon good
authority that in the liaison plans of the army the aid from the
south was promised for the very first day. Any delay was not due to
want of energy or loyalty of officers and men upon the spot. By the
evening of March 23 the French units in the fighting-line were the
One hundred and twenty-fifth Division, which made the unsuccessful
counter-attack towards Tergnier, the First French Dismounted Cavalry
Division, who fought side by side with the Eighteenth British
Division, the Ninth and the Tenth French {189} Divisions, both of
which were on the extreme left of the Third Corps, and can hardly be
said to have been engaged. As the French troops were now
predominating in this sector, the command passed on the evening of
March 23 to General Humbert, a dark, wiry little French veteran,
commanding the Third Army. General Butler continued, of course, to
command his own corps.
[Sidenote: March 24.]
On the morning of March 24 the situation to the south of the Crozat
Canal was as follows. The Fifty-eighth Division still held its
original line from Barisis to the Buttes de Rouy, with a party
holding the bridgehead at Condren. Then on the general line north
and north-east of Chauny were the broken but indomitable remains of
the Londoners of the 173rd Brigade, mixed up with fragments of the
French One hundred and twenty-fifth Division, the 18th Entrenching
Battalion, and troopers of the 6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade,
together with the dust of smaller broken units. Up to La Neuville
was covered by the worn brigades of the Eighteenth Division
supporting the French Cuirassiers. North of that was the 326th
Regiment of the Ninth French Division, and north of that what was
left of the British Fourteenth Division up to a point within a mile
of Cugny, which was in German hands. On the extreme left flank on
this sector the Thirty-sixth Division and the 61st Brigade were in
Ollezy and Eaucourt. There had been some fighting on the front of
the Fifty-eighth Division during the night, but otherwise it was
quiet, and the soldiers were able to snatch a few hours of sleep.
Once again there was a thick morning fog, under cover of which the
German infantry broke suddenly {190} upon the One hundred and
twenty-fifth French Division, north-east of Chauny, driving them back
towards Abbecourt. This placed the British troops at Condren in a
perilous position, but it was essential to hold the line of the Oise,
and any abandonment of the bridge would have been fatal. The
Fifty-eighth Division was ordered to stand fast therefore, and the
173rd Brigade was reinforced by the 16th and 18th Entrenching
Battalions. These entrenching battalions are, it may be remarked,
entirely apart from the Labour Corps, and were soldiers, well
officered and organised, formed from those units which remained over
after the re-organisation of the three-battalion brigades. Apart
from these were the labour battalions who also in those hard days
were occasionally the final weight which tilts the balance where the
fate of armies and finally of empires was in the scale. Manfully
they rose to the occasion, and the Empire owes them a very special
word of thanks. During the afternoon all the British and French
troops in this quarter passed over the Oise, mostly in the Abbecourt
district, blowing up the bridges behind them and passing under the
command of General Duchesne of the Sixth French Army. This left a
blank upon the right of the Eighteenth Division upon the north of the
river, but General Seely brought up his cavalry and endeavoured to
cover it, while the Second Dismounted Cavalry Division was pushed out
upon the left of the Fourteenth Division in the north, to preserve
the connection between the Third and Eighteenth Corps. The Third
Cavalry Division under General Harman was thrown in also at this
point, and about 2.30, having mounted their horses, they charged most
gallantly in order to re-establish {191} the line north of Villeselve
on the front of the Ulster Division. The Royal Dragoons were
prominent in this fine charge in which they sabred many of the enemy,
took over 100 prisoners, and relieved the pressure upon the Irish
Fusiliers of the 109th Brigade at a time when it was very heavy.
The whole corps front was slowly falling back during the day, partly
on account of the steady pressure of the German attack and partly in
order to conform with the line to the north. The Fourteenth
Division, moving south-west through Crisolles, found itself in the
evening on the west side of the Noyon Canal, covering the two
crossings at Haudival and Beaurains. A vamped-up detachment of
stragglers and nondescripts under Colonel Curling were placed to fill
up the gap between the Fourteenth Division and Noyon. The left of
the Fourteenth Division at Guiscard was covered by General Harman's
detachment, and it is characteristic of the adaptability of the
British soldier that seventy Northumberland Hussars who had become
cyclists were suddenly whipped off their machines, put upon horses
and sent up to reinforce the thin ranks of the cavalry.
The centre of the line covering Caillouel was held all day by the
Eighteenth Division, with the First French Cavalry Division still
acting as a breakwater before the advancing flood. In spite of the
gallant Cuirassiers the pressure was very great from the 54th Brigade
who were in the north, through the 55th and down to the 53rd, which
covered the north of Noyon. Some of the edge was taken from the
German attack by the efficient work of the 82nd Brigade Royal Field
Artillery and the 3rd and 5th Royal Horse Artillery, who were hard at
it from {192} morning to night. The French infantry on the left of
the Eighteenth Division lost Guivry towards evening, but they held
fast to Beaugies until after nightfall. About ten o'clock, however,
the German infantry was into Beaugies, and the situation became
dangerous as they were getting round the left flank of the Eighteenth
Division, so that there was a general retreat to the rearward
position called the Crepigny Ridge, which was not fully reached and
occupied until 3 A.M. on March 25. That evening the Fifty-eighth
Division reported that early in the day they had blown up all bridges
and also the Royal Engineer dump at Chauny. So intersected is the
whole country at the back of the line of the Fifth Army by
watercourses, that the total number of bridges blown up during the
retreat amounted to about 250; and only in two cases, that of the Ham
Road bridge and that at Chipilly, was the result unsatisfactory.
[Sidenote: March 25.]
In the early morning of March 25 the Germans, who were still marching
rapidly and fighting hard, were close to Guiscard, pushing on so
swiftly that special troops had to be detailed to cover the heavy
guns. General Butler had so far as possible pulled his dismounted
troopers out of the fight and had restored them to their proper role,
so that now he possessed a force of about 2000 horsemen, who were
ready to execute the all-important functions of mounted infantry, so
invaluable in a retreat. Under Generals Greenly and Pitman these
horsemen did great work during the remainder of the operations.
Since the German pressure was still very heavy and the enemy were
sweeping onwards in the north, it was necessary to continue the
withdrawal of {193} the line north of the Oise, while holding fast to
the southern bank along its whole length. The first movement in this
withdrawal was to the line Mondescourt-Grandru, and the second to the
line Appilly-Babœuf-Mont de Béthéricourt. By 8.30 the Eighteenth
Division in the middle of the line was effecting this retirement, the
northern flank, which was the post of danger, being covered by the
11th Royal Fusiliers of the 54th Brigade. It was a most difficult
and delicate business with the enemy pressing down continually
through the woods and villages with which the country is studded. On
the south the 53rd Brigade and the French Cuirassiers were
withdrawing through Mondescourt in some disorder. When the troops
were rallied and rearranged, there were no French troops upon the
right. At 10 A.M. the 54th Brigade had reached the Grandru position,
but were out of touch both with the French on their left and with the
55th Brigade on their right. They therefore continued to fall back
upon Béthéricourt. At 1 o'clock a strong German infantry attack, in
many lines, developed upon the right near Appilly and a heavy
machine-gun barrage burst out over the 53rd Brigade and their
immediate comrades upon the right, the 289th French Regiment. Up to
3 o'clock the Allies in this quarter were retiring under a very heavy
fire, much helped by four valiant cars of the French Cavalry's
Mitrailleuses Automobiles, who did splendid service in covering the
exhausted infantry. The German infantry, pressing eagerly forward in
expectation of that general débacle which never occurred, was riddled
by the fire of these motor-guns and left swathes of dead behind them.
The attack had the effect, however, of driving back {194} the Allied
line to such a point that a French force which was defending Mont
Béthéricourt was entirely isolated and in great peril of destruction.
Under these circumstances the French officer in command appealed to
General Sadleir-Jackson of the 54th Brigade to make a great effort to
rescue his imperilled men. Sadleir-Jackson without hesitation led
back his men into the village of Babœuf, cleared it of the
Germans, captured ten machine-guns with nearly 300 prisoners, and
regained touch with the French, who were enabled to withdraw. The
7th Bedfords and 11th Royal Fusiliers were the heroes of this
chivalrous exploit, where we were able to repay the loyalty which the
French have so often shown to us. It should be added that a company
of the 12th Entrenching Battalion, which like all the other
entrenching units had gone through this severe infantry fighting
without light artillery, signals, or any of the ordinary adjuncts of
well-equipped infantry, was still so full of military spirit that
without orders it joined in this victorious charge.
On March 25 the Germans were within shelling distance of Noyon, and
the British evacuated successfully nearly 2000 wounded from that
town. The counter-attack of the 54th Brigade had stopped the German
advance for a time, and the Eighteenth Division was able to get
across the river Oise, the guns and transport passing in the
afternoon while the infantry got across that night and in the morning
of March 26, without serious molestation, being covered by their
sappers and pioneers, who blew up the bridges as soon as the troops
were safely across. At two in the morning of March 26 the French
abandoned Noyon. At this time there were no {195} British troops
upon the north of the river save the remains of the Fourteenth
Division which were finally relieved upon this date, and the Second
and Third Cavalry Divisions, now under Generals Pitman and Portal,
who harassed the German advance at every opportunity, and rendered
constant help to the French rearguards. The Second Cavalry Division
secured the high ground immediately west of Noyon, and held it until
it could be handed over to the French infantry. The general line of
the cavalry was facing north-east from west of Noyon, through Suzoy
to Lagny, where they were in touch with the Tenth French Division.
The left of the Second Cavalry Division had been prolonged by the
addition of the Canadian Dismounted Brigade. These men soon found
themselves involved in some hard fighting, for the Germans attacked
the French at Lagny and drove them out. On one occasion this day, at
the Bois des Essarts, the troopers of the Second British Cavalry
Division galloped through the French infantry to hold off the
attacking Germans, an episode in which Lieutenant Cotton and other
officers gained the honour of mention in the French order of the day.
The left of the cavalry was compelled to fall back finally to Dives,
and the Canadians after a determined struggle were driven out of the
woods which they occupied. Finally, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade
(Bell-Smyth), consisting of the 5th and 16th Lancers with the 4th
Hussars were nearly surrounded, and had the greatest difficulty in
fighting their way out. Before night they were in touch once more
both with the French and with their comrades of the 4th Brigade. On
the morning of March 27 word came that the British cavalry was
imperatively {196} needed at the junction between the French and
British armies. It was despatched forthwith to do splendid service
in the north after having played a glorious part in the south.
[Sidenote: March 28.]
From now onwards the fighting upon the Roye and Montdidier front
(both towns passed soon into German possession) was no longer
connected with the Third Corps. The position to the south of the
Oise showed that the Fifty-eighth British Division held from Barisis
to Manicamp. Thence to Bretigny was the One hundred and twenty-fifth
French Division. Thence to the east of Varennes were the Fifty-fifth
French Division, with cavalry, and the First French Division up to
Sempigny. Thence the line ran in an irregular curve through Lassigny
to Canny, the enemy being well past that line on the north, and the
direction of attack being rather from the north-west. On the morning
of March 28 orders were issued that the remains of the Third Corps
should be transferred to the north, where they should join their
comrades of the Fifth Army, from whom they were now separated by a
considerable distance. Within the next two days, after some
difficulties and delays in extricating the artillery, these orders
were carried out, though it was not till some days later that the
Fifty-eighth London Division could be relieved. This unit had not,
save for the 173rd Brigade, been engaged in the recent fighting, but
it had held a line of over ten miles of river, along the whole of
which it was within touch with the enemy. One effort of the Germans
to get across at Chauny on March 31 was met and repelled by the 16th
Entrenching Battalion, who killed many of the assailants and captured
nearly 100 prisoners.
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So ended the vicissitudes of the Third Corps, which had the strange
experience of being swept entirely away from the army to which it
belonged, and finding itself under French command, and with French
troops fighting upon either wing. Its losses were exceedingly heavy,
including 20 heavy and 100 field-guns, with about 15,000 killed,
wounded, or missing. The Fourteenth Division was the chief sufferer
with 5880 casualties, 4500 of which came under the head of "Missing,"
and represent the considerable detachments which were cut off in the
first day of the battle. The losses of some of the battalions
approached annihilation. In spite of all pressure and all
misfortunes there was never a time when there was a break, and the
whole episode was remarkable for the iron endurance of officers and
men in the most trying of all experiences--an enforced retirement in
the face of an enemy vastly superior both in numbers and in artillery
support. When we realise how great was the disparity it is amazing
how the line could have held, and one wonders at that official
reticence which allowed such glorious epics to be regarded as part of
a great military disaster. Against the two and a half British
divisions which were in the line on March 21 there were arrayed seven
German divisions, namely, the Fifth Guards, First Bavarians,
Thirty-fourth, Thirty-seventh, One hundred and third, Forty-seventh,
and Third Jaeger. There came to the Third Corps as reinforcements up
to March 26 two British cavalry divisions, one French cavalry
division, and three French infantry divisions, making eight and a
half divisions in all, while seven more German divisions, the Tenth,
Two hundred and eleventh, Two hundred and twenty-third, Eleventh
{198} Reserve, Two hundred and forty-first, Thirty-third, and
Thirty-sixth, came into line, making fourteen in all. When one
considers that these were specially trained troops who represented
the last word in military science and efficiency, one can estimate
that an unbroken retreat may be a greater glory than a victorious
advance.
Every arm--cavalry, infantry, and artillery--emerged from this
terrible long-drawn ordeal with an addition to their fame. The
episode was rather a fresh standard up to which they and others had
to live than a fault which had to be atoned. They fought impossible
odds, and they kept on fighting, day and night, ever holding a fresh
line, until the enemy desisted from their attacks in despair of ever
breaking a resistance which could only end with the annihilation of
its opponents. Nor should the organisation and supply services be
forgotten in any summing up of the battle. The medical arrangements,
with their self-sacrifice and valour, have been already dealt with,
but of the others a high General says: "A great strain was also cast
upon the administrative staffs of the army, of corps and of
divisions, in evacuating a great mass of stores, of hospitals, of
rolling stock, of more than 60,000 non-combatants and labour units,
while at the same time supplying the troops with food and ammunition.
With ever varying bases and depots, and eternal rapid shifting of
units, there was hardly a moment when gun or rifle lacked a
cartridge. It was a truly splendid performance."
We have now traced the movements and the final positions of the eight
corps which were involved in this terrible battle from the foggy
morning which {199} witnessed the German attack, up to those rainy
days of early April which showed a stable line--a line which in spite
of occasional oscillations continued from that date until the great
British victory in August, to mark the point of equilibrium of the
giant forces which leaned from east and from west. In this account
we have seen the Seventeenth and Sixth Corps in the north fall back
upon Arras and the Vimy Ridge, where they turned and dealt their
pursuers such a blow that the battle in that sector was at an end.
We have seen the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Corps struggling hard to
make a line from Arras to Albert and down to the Somme; we have seen
the Nineteenth Corps covering a huge front and finally holding firm
near Villers-Bretonneux, and we have seen the Eighteenth and Third
Corps intermixed with our French Allies helping to determine the line
in the southern area of the great field of battle. That line running
just to the west of Montdidier, Moreuil, and Albert was destined for
four months to be a fixed one, though it was advanced during that
time by the splendid audacity of the Australians, who gave their
opponents no rest, and finally, with the help of the British Eighth
Division, entirely re-won the town of Villers-Bretonneux when it was
temporarily lost, and extended our outposts a mile or more to the
east of it, as will be presently described. Save for this action
there was no movement of importance during that time, though the
general set of the tide was rather eastwards than westwards.
One cannot leave so vast a theme as the second battle of the Somme
without a few words as to the general impression left upon the mind
of the writer by the many documents bearing upon the subject {200}
which he has had to peruse. In the first place, we cannot possibly
deny that it was a great German victory, and one which was well
earned, since it depended upon clever and new dispositions entailing
laborious preparation with the intelligent and valiant co-operation
of officers and men. The overpowering force of the blow, while it
removed all reproach from those who had staggered back from it,
depended upon the able way in which it was delivered. Having said so
much, we must remind the German commentator that he cannot have it
both ways, and that if a gain of guns, prisoners, and ground which
fails to break the line is, as we admit, a victory to the Germans,
then a similar result is a victory to the British also. He cannot
claim the second battle of the Somme to be a victory, and yet deny
the term to such battles as Arras, Messines, and Passchendaele. The
only difference is that the Germans really did try to break the line
upon March 21, and failed to do so, while no such design was in
General Haig's mind during the battles of 1917, save perhaps in the
last series of operations.
[Illustration: Position at the Close of the Great Retreat, March 30]
There was a regrettable tendency after the battle to recriminations
in the Press, and General Gough, who had been the head of the Fifth
Army, was sacrificed without any enquiry as to the dominant force
which he had to face, or as to the methods by which he mitigated what
might have been a really crushing disaster. It can be safely stated
that in the opinion of many of those who are in the best position to
know and to judge, there was absolutely nothing upon the military
side which could have been bettered, nor has any suggestion ever been
made of anything which was left undone. {201} The entrenching had
been carried out for several months with an energy which raised
protests from the men who had to do it. There might almost be room
for the opposite criticism that in the constant work of the navvy the
training of the soldier had been unduly neglected; but that was the
result of the unavoidable scarcity of non-military labour. The
extension of the front was undoubtedly too long for the number of men
who had to cover it; but this was done at the express request of the
French, who had strong military reasons for drawing out and training
a number of their divisions. It was taking a risk undoubtedly, but
the risk was forced upon the soldiers, and in any case the French
have taken risks before now for us. The blowing up of the bridges
was well done, and the only exception seems to have been in the case
of railway bridges which, for some reason, were taken out of the
hands of the army commander. The reserves were insufficient and were
perhaps too far back, but the first item at least depended upon the
general weakness of manpower. Nowhere can one lay one's hand upon
any solid ground for complaint, save against the rogues and fools of
Brest-Litovsk, who by their selfish and perjured peace enabled the
Germans to roll a tidal wave of a million men from east to west, with
the certainty that they would wash away the first dam against which
they struck. If there is any military criticism to be made, it lies
rather in the fact that the French help from the south was nearly
sixty hours before it made itself felt at the nearest part of the
British line, and also in the surprising number of draft reserves
kept in England at that date. Within a month of the battle 350,000
had been sent to the {202} front--a very remarkable feat, but a sign,
surely, of an equally remarkable omission. Had ten emergency
divisions of infantry been made out of the more forward of these
drafts, had they been held ready in the rear zones, and had the
actual existing reserves been pushed up to the front, it is safe to
say that the German advance would have been stopped earlier and would
probably not have got beyond the Peronne-Noyon line. If, as was
stated in Parliament, it was confidently expected that the German
attack would strike exactly where it did, then it does seem
deplorable that the nearest reserve to the Fifth Army, a single
division, had, through our weak man-power, to be kept at a three
days' journey from the point of danger. If, instead of searching the
record of the General for some trace of weakness, our critics had
realised the rapidity of his decision, with the moral courage and
grasp of actuality which he showed by abandoning his positions--no
easy thing for one of his blood and record--and falling back unbroken
upon a new line of defence beyond the German heavy artillery, they
could not have failed to admit that the country owes a deep debt of
gratitude to General Gough. Had he hesitated and his army been
isolated and destroyed, the whole war might well have taken a most
sinister turn for the worse.
Granting, however, that the disaster was minimised by the prompt
appreciation of the situation by the General in command, by the
splendid work of his four corps-commanders, and by the co-operation
of every one concerned, it is still undeniable that the losses were
very heavy, and the result, even after making every allowance for
German wastage, a considerable military disaster. In killed, {203}
wounded, and missing in the Fifth Army alone the figures could not be
less than 50,000, including Feetham and Malcolm, army divisional
generals, with Dawson, Bailey, White, Bellingham, and numerous other
brigadiers and senior officers. In field-guns 235 were so lost or
destroyed out of 600, in medium heavies 108 out of 494, in 8-inch or
over pieces 19 out of 98. Great quantities of stores, especially at
Ham, fell into the hands of the enemy, but so far as possible they
were burned or made useless. Bad as the episode seemed at the time,
it is clear now to any one who looks back upon it that it had no evil
effect upon the result of the war. The Germans were exposed to very
heavy losses which they could ill afford. They have admitted to
180,000 in documents published since the armistice but this may be an
understatement. They were drawn away from their famous lines to
which they did not return until they were so reduced that they could
not hold them. Finally, it led to that concentration of power in the
hands of Marshal Foch which was worth many sacrifices to attain. Sir
Douglas Haig, from his many services and long experience, might well
have put forward claims to the supreme place, and it is
characteristic of the nobility of this great soldier that it was in
response to a telegram from him to the Prime Minister, in which he
named General Foch for the position, that the change was eventually
carried through.
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