THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
Retreat of the Seventh and Nineteenth Corps
Problem before General Gough--His masterful action--Arrival of
Thirty-ninth, Twentieth, and Fiftieth Divisions--Retreat of Tudor's
Ninth Scottish Division--Destruction of the South Africans--Defence
of the Somme--Arrival of the Eighth Division--Desperate fighting--The
Carey line--Death of General Feetham--"Immer fest daran"--Advance
Australia--Great achievement of General Watts.
[Sidenote: Fifth Army. March 22.]
The reader is now in a position to form some conception of the
situation of the Fifth Army upon the evening of March 21, and to
understand the problems which confronted its commander. He was of
opinion, and the opinion was shared by some at least of his corps
commanders, that had he had four or five divisions of reserves within
easy call, he could unquestionably have held the line. He had,
however, to deal with the situation as it stood, and no man could
have had a more difficult and responsible task. His own reserves
were already practically engaged. On the other hand, both his air
service and the reports of prisoners assured him that those of the
enemy were numerous and near. His line had been deeply dented in
four places: in the sector of the Sixteenth Division at Ronssoy, in
that of the {114} Twenty-fourth Division at Maissemy, in that of the
Fourteenth Division at Essigny, and in that of the Fifty-eighth
Division opposite La Fère. These various points are, it will be
observed, almost equidistant along the line, which tends to show that
the German attack was conducted upon a plan which threw such forces
upon limited areas that the result was almost a certainty, whatever
troops might be holding them. It was the misfortune and not the
fault of these gallant divisions that their thin ranks were in the
very places which huge hordes of the enemy had marked in advance as
their objectives.
It must have been clear to General Gough and to his corps commanders
that a second day of battle, with the German reserves pouring up,
would certainly mean a penetration of the line at these various weak
points, and that the enemy would then be in a position to cut off
large portions of the force. These units, be they divisions or
corps, would no doubt fight to the last, but the end must surely be
annihilation. In that case the general situation would have been an
appalling one. It might indeed have been decisive for the whole war.
There was nothing between the Germans and Amiens. Pouring westwards
they would have destroyed all reserves almost before they could have
alighted from their trains or their motors, and within a few days
would have entirely cut off the British from the French, with the
estuary of the Somme between the two armies. Any hesitation would
have been fatal. An immediate decision was imperative. That
decision could only be that the British Army should retard the German
advance by an obstinate rearguard action, that it should endeavour to
preserve its line, and allow no unit to be cut off, {115} that it
should fall back in an orderly fashion upon its reserves, and that
when it met them it should turn at bay and prevent the enemy from
reaching his objective. This was the plan which General Gough
instantly formed, and which he proceeded with firmness and moral
courage to carry out. Orders were at once given that the weaker
portions of the line should drop back behind the obstacles which had
already been marked out as the best defensive lines. At the same
time with great foresight he gave orders that the old French Somme
trenches, from the river southwards, should be set in order as a last
line of defence. He despatched his chief army engineer, General
Grant, to carry out this order, and it was eventually a very vital
one in ensuring the safety of the army in the last stages of its
retreat.
The orders to each corps commander were given in the form of general
indications, the details being left to his own judgment, for the
position of each corps and the pressure upon it formed a number of
independent problems. We shall turn to the north therefore, where,
upon the whole, the situation was least critical, and we shall follow
first the Seventh and then the Nineteenth Corps in their various
movements until a condition of equilibrium was at last safely
established. Let it be at once stated that the design was duly
carried out along the whole line, and that the operation, which at
the time was designated as a disaster, was really a remarkable
example of how by the coolness of commanders and the discipline of
their men, the most desperate situation may be saved and the most
powerful and aggressive foe foiled in his attempts. What complicated
the military problem of the Fifth Army was that the {116} German
threat was really aimed at Paris as much as at Amiens, and that if
they could have got through at Essigny and cut off the Fifty-eighth
Division there were hardly any reserves between them and the
all-important metropolis.
[Sidenote: Seventh Corps. March 22.]
The morning of March 22 again presented those conditions of fog and
low visibility which are favourable to the attack. There was no
advance in the early hours upon the new positions of the Ninth
Division, but the enemy directed his attention entirely to the Chapel
Hill front of the Twenty-first Division upon the right, which was
still held by the Lincolns. An attempt was made to relieve them by
the Scots battalion of the South Africans, who took over some of the
northern line. The defence was a splendid one, but by 4 o'clock in
the afternoon the Germans had gained most of this high ground by
outflanking it, and the South Africans at Revelon Farm, who had been
reinforced by the 11th Royal Scots Battalion from the 27th Brigade,
were badly enfiladed in consequence by rifle and machine-gun fire
from the south. Colonel M'Leod of the South African Scots, and many
officers and men, were among the casualties. There was a withdrawal
therefore of the right of the Ninth Division, and about 6.30 P.M. the
Germans had got as far as Heudicourt, and the brigade staff at Sorel
had to line up in order to resist his turning movement to the north.
So far round had the Germans penetrated that the Africans were
compelled to fall back due north for some distance until their rear
was clear, when they retreated with the rest of the division
westwards towards Nurlu. By two in the morning of March 23 the new
positions had been reached, and the attenuated {117} South African
Brigade, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, was taken into
divisional reserve. This difficult retreat was rendered possible by
the desperate resistance offered by the 6th Scots Borderers, who
formed a defensive flank south of Sorel and gave the troops to the
north time to gain the new position. One company of the 11th Royal
Scots was cut off in Revelon Farm, but managed to fight their way
back, bringing with them an officer and eighteen other prisoners. No
guns were lost by the Ninth Division save ten, which were without
teams and were therefore destroyed.
[Sidenote: Seventh Corps. March 23.]
At this period there was some dislocation between the left of the
Ninth Division and the right of the Forty-seventh, as is likely to
occur where each belongs to a different corps and army. For a time
there was a gap between them. This was partly overcome, however, on
the evening of the 22nd by means of the Second Division, which lay in
reserve behind the Forty-seventh and put its 99th Brigade under the
orders of the Ninth Division so as to ensure unity of command in this
position of danger.
Turning to the right wing of the Seventh Corps allusion has been made
in the last chapter to the severe pressure upon the Sixteenth
Division and its determined resistance. It will be remembered that
it was reinforced by the 116th Brigade of the Thirty-ninth Division,
and all three brigades were involved in the same heavy fighting on
the morning of March 22, the German attack being relentless in its
vigour. In the course of this severe action the village of St.
Emilie was lost, and was afterwards retaken in a very gallant fashion
by the 1st Hertfords, a battalion which had greatly distinguished
itself {118} already at St. Julien and elsewhere. The orders were to
retreat, however, and in this movement the switch line from Saulcourt
dug and manned by the 117th and 118th Brigades proved invaluable.
The army policy was to fight rearguards and delay the enemy, and this
was most efficiently done during the evening of March 22, the flank
of the Twenty-first Division being covered in its retirement, and the
line held against vigorous attacks. Many of the guns of the
Thirty-ninth Divisional artillery were lost through their extreme
devotion in covering the retreat of the Sixteenth Division, for they
frequently carried on until the infantry were behind them. The enemy
was pressing his attacks with great vigour, and every withdrawal was
followed up by strong bodies of troops and of field artillery.
[Sidenote: Seventh Corps. March 22.]
During these operations General Hornby had been in command of the
division, but on March 23 General Feetham returned from leave and
took over the duties. All day the Thirty-ninth Division was fighting
rearguard actions as it fell back upon the Somme. In the course of
them General Hornby, now in command of the 116th Brigade, was
severely wounded. The roads running westwards to Peronne and Clery
were crowded with traffic, but the Thirty-ninth Division turned at
bay again and again, giving them time to get clear. By evening the
remains of the Sixteenth Division had been practically squeezed out
of the line, and the Thirty-ninth had the Sixty-sixth Division on its
right and the Twenty-first on its left. At night it held a line from
La Maisonnette along the canal to south of Ommiecourt. The enemy
appeared to be much exalted by the capture of Peronne, and the 118th
Brigade {119} on the right heard them singing lustily during the
night.
[Sidenote: Seventh Corps. March 23.]
On March 23 the German attack continued to be very heavy upon the
front of the two Scottish brigades of the Ninth Division, which were
in touch with the Fifth Corps in the north and with the Twenty-first
Division in the south. So close and violent was the fighting that
the 6th Scots Borderers were only extricated with difficulty. At 2
P.M. the line was east of Bouchavesnes, but by 4 P.M. the
Twenty-first Division on the right had lost ground, and the flank and
even the rear of the Ninth was for a time exposed until the Natal
Regiment was thrown out south of Bouchavesnes to cover it. The three
brigades of the Twenty-first Division were engaged all day as they
slowly retreated before the swarming enemy.
March 23 was a most arduous day for both the Highland and the Lowland
brigades, for each of them was attacked again and again with the
utmost violence. Though the attacks were repulsed each of them had
the effect of weakening still further these units which were already
much exhausted by hard fighting and incessant exertion. Gradually
they were pushed to the westward until they found themselves lining
the eastern edge of St. Pierre Vaast Wood, and manning the ridge
which extended from that forest to the ruins of Saillisel. Their
left at this period seems to have been in the air, as the 99th
Brigade had been returned to its division, and they had failed to
make contact with the Seventeenth Division, who were at the time just
west of Saillisel. At this period the front of the Ninth Division
seems to have covered 11,000 yards, and to have extended for at least
two miles into the area of the Third Army, {120} showing how
desperate were the exertions needed to cover the ground and to
prevent a break through.
[Sidenote: Seventh Corps. March 24.]
In the morning of March 24 the Scots could see the German infantry
streaming forward over the open ground which had been evacuated upon
the evening before. It was clear that a great attack was imminent,
and at 9 o'clock, after a very heavy cannonade, it developed along
the whole line. For three hours the Germans made repeated efforts to
force their way through the Ninth Division, but on each occasion they
were repulsed, and their losses at this point were exceedingly heavy.
About mid-day, however, they had gained so much ground upon the
flanks that the South Africans were almost surrounded, and shot into
from north and south. The general British line had fallen back to
the ridge east of Combles, 1000 yards behind, but General Dawson
found it impossible to withdraw in daylight, so that his brigade was
compelled to defend itself in its isolated position at Marrières Wood
as best it could. The result was a disaster, but one of a most
glorious kind, for the men fought until their last cartridges had
been expended, and a large proportion of the survivors were wounded
men. General Dawson was among the prisoners. It was reported
afterwards from German sources that he was taken while working a
machine-gun with his brigade-major lying dead beside him. The whole
defence was said by the Germans to have been one of the finest things
in the war. From that time forward the South African Brigade had
practically ceased to exist until it was reorganised in Flanders.
The supporting parties alone were left, and these were formed at once
into a composite battalion under Colonel Young, for no rifle {121}
could be spared from the fighting line at such a time. Whilst the
South Africans had been engaged in this death struggle the 27th
Lowland Brigade had been in a similar plight. All these battalions,
the 6th Scots Borderers and the 11th and 12th Royal Scots, were very
hard pressed, particularly the former. The Lowlanders extricated
themselves from an almost desperate situation and fell back from St.
Pierre Vaast to the position covering Combles. So great was the
general dislocation of troops that one portion of the 5th Camerons
found themselves that evening fighting with the Forty-seventh
Division, while another was with the Seventeenth.
The main effort of the enemy upon March 24 was directed against the
Fifth and Seventh Corps in the centre of the British line, though his
energy at other points was sufficient to engage the full attention of
all the other units. Heavy and fresh masses were poured in at the
centre and the pressure was great. For the Seventh Corps it was the
fourth day of incessant and desperate fighting. There were few men
left, and these were very exhausted. Towards evening the left of the
Seventh had been turned, and had been compromised by the occupation
of Sailly Saillisel. All attempts at counter-attack, however
gallant, were destined to failure, or at the best evanescent success,
for there was not the weight to carry them through. At 4.15 the
report was: "The enemy is through on the right flank and has occupied
Combles, Morval, and Lesbœufs." The Seventh Corps then fell back
to the line Hem-Maurepas and threw out every stray unit it could get
together--troops of cavalry, Canadian motor-guns, crews and
machine-guns of tanks, and all the powdered débris {122} of broken
formations, in the direction of Bernafoy Wood to cover the exposed
flank. It was still out of touch with the Fifth Corps. This
movement gave the line an awkward angle from Peronne and made it
almost impossible to hold the stretch of river. For the time the
right of the Third Army was a good five miles behind the left of the
Fifth Army--the result, as Sir Douglas Haig has stated, of an
unauthorised local withdrawal due to misunderstanding of orders. The
line near Peronne was still held by the Thirty-ninth Division.
Throughout the morning of the 24th strong enemy forces were seen by
them pushing forwards between Clery and Rancourt, where they were
harassed by the British fire in enfilade, particularly on the roads,
where the artillery of the Sixteenth and Thirty-ninth Divisions
caused much havoc and confusion, doing great work at short range over
open sights. Many excellent targets were missed, however, owing to
that difficulty in liaison between the infantry and the guns, which
was one of the greatest problems of the operations. During the day
the average number of rounds fired per battery was 3000, most of
which were observed fire.
As March 24 wore on the position of the Thirty-ninth Division became
untenable, as they heard upon one side of the loss of Saillisel, and
on the other of the forcing of the Somme at Brie, Pagny, and
Bethencourt. They moved back, therefore, at night with orders to
hold the line from Buscourt to Feuilleres. The average strength of
brigades at this time was not more than 20 officers and 600 men.
From the morning of March 25 the Thirty-ninth Division passed to the
command of the Nineteenth Corps, and its {123} further arduous work
will be found under that heading. During all this day Campbell's
Twenty-first Division, still fighting hard in a succession of
defensive positions, had its right upon the Somme, while its left was
in intermittent touch with the Ninth Division.
The Ninth Division had fallen back, the two Scottish brigades being
continually in action until they reached the Maricourt-Montauban
line, where they supported the First Cavalry Division who were in
front of Bernafoy Wood. The general line at this period from
Montauban southwards was held by the Ninth Division, the First
Cavalry, the newly-arrived and most welcome Thirty-fifth Division
(Franks), the Twenty-first Division, now reduced to a single
composite brigade under General Headlam, and then some oddments under
Colonel Hunt. This brought the line to the Somme, on the south side
of which were the remains of the Sixteenth and Thirty-ninth
Divisions. This might sound an imposing force upon so short a front,
but save for the Thirty-fifth each division was _nominis magni
umbra_, none of them stronger than brigades. The Forty-seventh
Division was retiring at this time upon Contalmaison, and a gap of
several miles was appearing between the Fifth and Seventh Corps.
During the movements upon March 24 the guns of the 65th and 150th
R.F.A. did great work and earned the warm gratitude of the weary
infantry. The enemy targets round Combles were all that a gunner
could wish.
All troops north of the Somme were upon March 25 transferred to the
Fifth Corps, and became part of the Third Army. The 27th Brigade was
drawn out of the line, and the 26th was under the orders of the {124}
Thirty-fifth Division which took over the defence of this sector,
relieving the exhausted Twenty-first Division. March 25 saw heavy
attacks on Bernafoy which was lost once, but regained by the 106th
Brigade. There was still a gap to the north, and no touch had been
made with the Seventeenth Division, though the cavalry had built up a
defensive flank in that direction. At 2 P.M. the Germans attacked
from Ginchy towards Trones Wood, names which we hoped had passed for
ever from our war maps. In the first onset they pressed back the
12th and 18th Highland Light Infantry of the 106th Brigade, but there
was a strong counter-attack headed by the 9th Durhams which retook
Favière Wood and restored the situation. A second attack about 3
P.M. upon the Thirty-fifth Division was also repulsed. The German
pressure was so great, however, that the line of defence was taken
back during the night to the Bray-Albert position. The enemy
followed closely at the heels of the rearguards, though the guns were
active to the last so as to conceal the retreat as long as possible.
Early in the morning of March 26 the Lowland Brigade was again
attacked with great violence, but the 12th Royal Scots, upon whom the
main assault fell, drove it back with loss. Changes in other parts
of the line, however, necessitated a withdrawal across the Ancre, so
as to keep in touch with the Twelfth Division which had now come up
on the left. The Ninth Division upon this date numbered 1540 rifles
with 20 machine-guns. It was shortly afterwards drawn from the line
after as severe a spell of service as troops could possibly endure.
The story of the retreat of the Seventh Corps has been indicated
mainly from the point of view of this {125} northern unit, but it
will be understood that the Twenty-first, as tried and as worn as its
Scottish neighbour, was keeping its relative position to the south,
while the Sixteenth was conforming in the same way until the time
when it passed into the Nineteenth Corps.
The Thirty-fifth Division, newly arrived from Flanders, did great and
indeed vital work in upholding the weakening line at the moment of
its greatest strain. A consecutive account of its work may make this
clear. Pushing through the remains of the Twenty-first Division on
March 24, Franks threw his men instantly into the thick of the fight,
attacking the Germans in front of Clery. Marindin's 105th Brigade
did great work that day, the 15th Cheshires on the right and 15th
Sherwood Foresters on the left, attacking and, for a time, carrying
the ridge of Clery, though it was impossible in view of the general
retreat to hold it for long. The Germans were staggered by the
sudden, unexpected blow, and they poured troops against their new
antagonist, losing very heavily in their reconquest of the ridge.
Finally the front line of the Sherwoods was practically annihilated,
and the Cheshires were in almost as bad a way, but with the help of
some Sussex men who were formed into an emergency unit, together with
some signallers, they were able to draw off, and a line of defence
was organised under General Marindin, but general orders arrived for
a withdrawal to the front Curlu-Maurepas, which was safely carried
out, the 17th Royal Scots covering the rear. It was a most ticklish
business, as touch had been lost with the Ninth Division, but the
wounded were safely evacuated, and all withdrew in good order, the
12th {126} Highland Light Infantry finally bridging the gap upon the
left. This battalion had lost in these operations its splendid
Colonel, Anderson, whose work has earned a posthumous V.C. The enemy
followed closely, and attacked again before dusk, but was driven off.
The attack was renewed on the morning of March 25, but still without
success, the 4th North Staffords bearing the brunt. The weary troops
of the Scottish division, who had been engaged for four long days,
were rallied here and formed into provisional fighting units, which
did good service by relieving the 106th Brigade at Maricourt, when it
was forced back. The pressure upon the division was desperately
severe, but was slightly eased by the arrival of a Northumberland
Fusilier battalion from the Twenty-first Division. That night the
order was to withdraw to the line Bray-Albert.
[Sidenote: Seventh Corps. March 25. March 30.]
The general command of the retiring line in this section, including
the Ninth, Twenty-first, and Thirty-fifth Divisions had for the time
fallen to General Franks, who handed his own division over to General
Pollard. The position was exceedingly critical, as not only were the
units weak, but ammunition had run low. The line was still falling
back, and the enemy was pressing on behind it with mounted scouts in
the van. In this retreat tanks were found of the greatest service in
holding the German advance. The route was through Morlancourt and
Ville-sur-Ancre to a defensive position upon the right bank of the
Ancre in the Dernancourt area, the orders being to hold the line
between that village and Buire. Both villages were attacked that
evening, but the Thirty-fifth Division on the right and the 26th
{127} Brigade on the left, drove back the enemy. By the morning of
March 28 the line seemed to have reached equilibrium in this part,
and the welcome sight was seen of large bodies of troops moving up
from the rear. This was the head of the Australian reinforcements.
During the day the enemy got into Dernancourt, but was thrown out
again by the 19th Northumberland Fusiliers Pioneer Battalion. The
104th Brigade also drove back an attack in front of Treux Wood. It
was clear that the moving hordes were losing impetus and momentum.
That same evening the Australians were engaged upon the right and
inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. On the night of March 30 the
Thirty-fifth Division, which had lost nearly half its numbers, was
relieved by the Third Australians.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 23.]
We shall now follow the Nineteenth Corps in its perilous retreat. It
will be remembered that on the evening of the first day of the battle
it had been badly outflanked to the north, where the Sixty-sixth
Division had made so stout a resistance, and had also lost a great
deal of the battle zone in the south, which was made more disastrous
by the fall of Le Verguier at nine on the morning of March 22. The
supporting line formed by the Fiftieth Division had also been pushed
in at Pœuilly and other points, and it was with no little
difficulty that the depleted and exhausted corps was able to get
across the Somme on the morning of March 23, where they were ordered
to hold the whole front of the river, including the important
crossings at Brie. This, as a glance at the map will show, was a
very considerable retreat, amounting to no less than ten miles in two
days, but it was of the first importance to get a line {128} of
defence, and also to lessen the distance between the sorely tried
army and its reserves. It was hard indeed to give up ground and to
be back on the line of Peronne, but there was at least the small
solace that this was the ravaged ground which the Germans had
themselves turned into a waste land, and that there was no town of
any consequence nor any military point of importance in its whole
extent.
By the late afternoon of March 23 the bulk of the Nineteenth Corps
was across the Somme. The Germans had followed closely, and there
was rearguard fighting all the way in which the Fiftieth Division
slowed down the pursuit of the enemy. The officers who were
entrusted with the defence of the line of river soon realised that
they had a difficult task, for the dry weather had shrunk it into
insignificance in this section, and owing to trees and thick
undergrowth the fields of fire were very limited, while the thin line
of defenders scattered over some twelve miles of front offered, even
after the advent of the Eighth Division, an ineffective screen
against the heavy advance from the east. Heneker's Eighth Division,
a particularly fine unit consisting entirely of Regular battalions,
had made heroic exertions to reach the field of battle, and fitted
itself at once into its correct position in that very complicated
operation in a way which seemed marvellous to soldiers on the spot.
In the evening of March 23 a number of Germans, some of them cavalry,
were observed upon the farther side of the Somme and were heavily
punished by artillery fire. None got across before dark, but during
the night numerous bodies established themselves upon the western
side. Local reserves had {129} been placed near the probable
crossings, and these in several cases hunted the enemy across again;
but the fact was that the river could be forded anywhere, and that a
German concentration on a given point could always overpower the thin
local defence. The line of resistance was further weakened by the
First Cavalry Division, which had linked up the Nineteenth Corps with
the Eighteenth Corps on the south, being now ordered to join the
Seventh Corps in the north. The general order of the troops at this
moment was, that the newly arrived Eighth Division was on the extreme
right touching elements of the Eighteenth Corps at Bethencourt and
extending with the aid of one brigade of the Fiftieth as far as
Eterpigny, nearly eight miles. From Eterpigny to Biaches, south of
Peronne, were the remains of the Sixty-sixth Division, covering about
four miles, and joining the Thirty-ninth Division on the right of the
Seventh Corps near that point. The Twenty-fourth was lining up
between Hattencourt and Chaulnes.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 24. March 25.]
It was on the front of the Eighth Division, at Bethencourt, at
Pargny, and at St. Christ, that the Germans made their chief
lodgments upon the western banks of the river on the morning of March
24. The Bethencourt attack was particularly formidable, both for its
energy and because it aimed at the junction of the two corps. By two
in the afternoon the German infantry were across in considerable
numbers, and had forced back the right flank of the Eighth Division,
which fell back hinging upon the river farther north, so as to oppose
the repeated efforts which were made to enfilade the whole line.
General Watts' responsibilities were added to next morning, March 25,
for the two much exhausted {130} divisions of the Seventh Corps which
were holding the northern bend of the river from Biaches to beyond
Frise were handed over to him when the rest of Congreve's Corps was
incorporated in the Third Army. These two divisions were the
Thirty-ninth and the Sixteenth, the former holding as far as Frise
and the latter the Somme crossings to the west of that point. March
25 was a day of great anxiety tor General Watts, as the enemy were
pressing hard, many of his own units were utterly exhausted, and the
possibilities of grave disaster were very evident. A real fracture
of the line at either end might have led to a most desperate
situation. The French were now at the south end of the river
position, but their presence was not yet strongly felt, and with
every hour the pressure was heavier upon the bent line of the Eighth
Division, on which the whole weight of the central battle had fallen.
By 10 o'clock on the morning of March 25, the defensive flank of the
Eighth Division had been pushed back to Licourt, and had been broken
there, but had been mended once more by counter-attack, and was still
holding with the aid of the Fiftieth. The cyclists of the Nineteenth
Corps, the armoured-car batteries, and other small units were thrust
in to stiffen the yielding line, which was still rolled up, until
after one o'clock it lay back roughly from Cizancourt to Marchelepot
and the railway line west of that place. Later in the day came the
news of fresh crossings to the north at St. Christ and Eterpigny
where the Sixty-sixth Division had been pushed back to Maisonette.
It was evident that the line was doomed. To stay in it was to risk
destruction. At 4.15 the order was given to withdraw to a second
position which had been prepared farther westward, {131} but to
retain the line of the Somme as the left flank. During these
operations the Eighth Division had performed the remarkable feat of
holding back and defeating fourteen separate German divisions during
thirty-six hours on a nine-mile front, and finally withdrew in
perfect order. Every unit was needed to cover the ground, and the
general disposition of divisions was roughly as drawn:
Hattencourt. Estrees. Herbecourt.
Chantres. Assevillers. Frise.
_R._ 24 8 50 66 39 16 _L._
It will be seen that General Watts' command had increased from two
divisions to six, but it is doubtful whether the whole six had the
normal strength of two. The new line had not yet been completed and
was essentially unstable, but none the less it formed a rallying
point for the retreating troops. It should be noted that from the
morning of March 25 General Fayolle took over the command south of
the Somme.
The Twenty-fourth Division, which had suffered so severely in the
first two days of the action, was again heavily engaged during this
arduous day. In the morning it had been directed to counter-attack
in the direction of Dreslincourt in co-operation with the French
Twenty-second Division. In the meantime, however, the whole
situation had been changed by the right flank of the Eighth Division
being turned, so that General Daly's men as they went up for the
attack were themselves heavily attacked near Curchy, while the
junction with the French could not be made. They fell back therefore
upon their original position where hard fighting ensued all day, and
a most anxious situation developed upon the southern flank, where a
wide gap existed and the enemy was mustering {132} in force. Colonel
Walker, C.R.E. of this division, was killed that day.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 26.]
On the morning of March 26 the new line had been occupied. The
Seventeenth Corps had retired in the night to the Bray-Albert line,
which left a considerable gap in the north, to the west of Frise, but
this was filled up by an impromptu line made up of stragglers and
various odds and ends from the rear of the army. It was in the
south, however, that the attack was most severe, and here it soon
became evident that the line was too long and the defenders too weak,
so that it could not be maintained against a determined assault.
Before the sun had risen high above the horizon it had been shaken
from end to end, the Twenty-fourth Division being hard put to it to
hold Fonches, while the Sixty-sixth were driven out of Herbecourt.
At 9.30 the order was given to withdraw, and with their brave
rearguards freely sacrificing themselves to hold back the swarming
enemy, the troops--some of them in the last stage of exhaustion--fell
back upon a second position. It was at this period of the battle
that Major Whitworth, the gallant commander of the 2/6 Manchester's,
stood at bay with his battalion, which numbered exactly 34 men. He
and 17 of his men were dead or wounded after this last stand, and 17
survivors were all that could be mustered that evening.
Before the right wing fell back to Vrely there had been a good deal
of fighting. The Twenty-fourth Division, which was now a mere
skeleton, was strongly attacked in the morning of March 27, and
Dugan's 73rd Brigade was pushed back towards Caix, the 8th Sussex
having very heavy losses, including Colonel Hill, and Banham, the
second-in-command.
{133}
The situation upon the other flank of the Twenty-fourth Division was
also particularly desperate, and the 9th East Surrey, under Major
Clark, sacrificed itself to cover the withdrawal of the 72nd Brigade.
There were few more gallant actions in the war. Major Clark, writing
from a German prison, gave a small account which enables us to get a
glimpse of the actual detail of such a combat. The enemy's infantry
were in force, he says, within 100 yards of his scattered line. "We
managed to get back some hundred yards when I saw that our position
was really desperate. The enemy were sweeping up from the south, and
several lines of them were in between us and our next defensive
line.... We were seen and the enemy began to surround us, so I
decided to fight it out. We took up position in a communication
trench, and used our rifles with great effect. Grant was doing good
work till shot through the head, and Warre-Dymond behaved admirably.
It was a fine fight, and we held them until ammunition gave out.
They then charged and mopped up the remainder. They were infuriated
with us. My clothing had been riddled with shrapnel, my nose
fractured, and my face and clothing smothered with blood. There are
3 officers and 59 men unwounded. The rest of the battalion are
casualties. It was a great fight, and the men were simply splendid.
I have the greatest admiration for them. It was a glorious end."
Such were the class of men whom the East End of London sent into the
New Army.
The new position on March 26 may be depicted as follows:
Rosières. Framerville. Froissy.
Rouvroy. Vauvillers. Proyart.
_R._ 24 8 50 66 39 16 _L._
{134}
The Germans followed up closely all along the line, the pressure
being great everywhere, but greatest on the left, where the
Thirty-ninth and Sixty-sixth disengaged themselves with difficulty,
both of them being heavily attacked, and the Cambridgeshires fighting
a fine rearguard action in Biaches. About two in the afternoon the
troops were solidly established in their new positions, but the
extreme north of the line was in a very unstable condition, as the
Sixteenth were fired upon from the north of the river and their left
was in no condition to meet an attack. On the right, however, there
was earlier in the day some very spirited fighting, for the Eighth
and Fiftieth Divisions, though very worn, were in far better shape
than their comrades who had endured the gassings and the losses of
the first day.
The Fiftieth Division fought particularly hard to stop the enemy's
advance, turning at every rise, and hitting back with all the
strength that was left it. A very fine little delaying action was
fought by its rearguard this day upon the line
Lihons-Vermandovillers--Foucaucourt. The 5th and 8th Durhams, with a
few of the 5th Northumberland Fusiliers and a couple of batteries,
held up the advance for several hours and stood their ground with
such resolution that two platoons of the Northumberlands were never
seen again, for they held on to Foucaucourt until both they and the
village were submerged. As the day wore on and the pressure
increased, the Sixty-sixth Division was forced to let go of
Framerville, for these men had fought without sleep for five days and
nights. They staggered back through the rear ranks of the Fiftieth
Division, consisting of the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers, who at
once, under the {135} personal leading of General Riddell and Colonel
Anstey, both of them on horseback and in red-banded caps, rushed the
village once again. It was a fine advance which was much helped by
the way in which Captain Thompson in Vauvillers brought his
machine-guns to bear upon the flank of the Germans advancing to the
south of him. Brigade-Major Paget, a very rising officer, was killed
in this spirited affair.
No gains could ever be held, as the general line was receding, but
all such successful blows were of use as slowing down the German
advance, teaching him caution, and gaining time--for time was the
very essence of the matter. If there were time the line could be
built up behind. If there were no time Amiens must fall. "I will
fight before Amiens, in Amiens, or behind Amiens!" cried Foch. Brave
words, but if Amiens went, the future was dark indeed.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 27.]
At eight on the morning of March 27 the Germans were raging once more
along the whole line of the British breakwater. The gallant weary
Eighth Division was heavily attacked near Rosières and the stormers
reached the village, but Heneker's men counter-attacked in most
heroic fashion, and cleared them out again, taking a number of
prisoners. The 2nd Devons, 1st Sherwoods, and 22nd Durham Light
Infantry were the units engaged in this fine action.
News was bad from the north end of the line, and it was understood
that the Germans were in Proyart, so both the Eighth and Fiftieth
Divisions, out of their scanty ranks, sent reinforcements (R.E.
details and the 2nd Devons) to help the Thirty-ninth Division. At 3
P.M. on March 27 the Germans were in Framerville, and an hour later
were on the top of the {136} Eighth and Fiftieth once more, in front
of Harbonnière. The rearguard of the latter were the 4th and 6th
Northumberland Fusiliers. The German guns were in full blast that
morning, and the infantry full of ginger, but they could not break
that protective line, thin, disciplined, and flexible. The two
battalions could not cover the ground, and the Germans streamed past
their flank. In order to support the advanced line every available
man was assembled on the reverse slope of a rise, just out of sight
of the Germans. In front of them they could hear the roar of the
battle, ever growing nearer as the British line was rolled back. "We
were a mixed crowd," says one who was among them. "Staff officers in
red caps, clerks in spectacles, signalling officers, cooks, sappers,
and that extraordinary never-beaten infantry." It was indeed one of
the crises of the war, for the situation was desperate just south of
the Somme, and if the enemy was through at this point also the line
would be in fragments. The whole array waited over the curve of the
hill, and as the enemy, in eight or ten waves, poured over the brow
they fired at close range in the traditional Busaco fashion of the
peninsula. A bayonet charge as of old completed the transaction, and
the enemy broke and fled, with a barrage beating down upon his
supports. The British infantry from the top of the rise was treated
to the welcome, and, as it must be confessed, unusual sight of a
large force of Germans all shredded out and hurrying for the nearest
shelter, "like a football crowd caught in the rain." It is an
instance of the incurable levity of British troops that they broke
into the refrain of "Goodbyee! Goodbyee! There's a silver lining in
the skyee!"
{137}
In spite of their cheerfulness, however, the losses had been heavy,
both Colonel Robinson of the 6th and Colonel Wright of the 5th
Northumberland Fusiliers being among the casualties. Each of the
battalions now numbered little more than a hundred men.
This brisk counter-attack was a healthy little reminder to the
Germans upon this section of the line that the British infantry might
be overborne by numbers or by strategy, but that they were still the
men who had in the previous year chased them again and again from the
most formidable positions which they could construct. But these
points of aggressive resistance were now rare and the men were worn
out. It does indeed seem to be an extreme example of the weakness of
the reserves at this period in France, that in spite of the fact that
the battle broke out upon March 21, no help save the one division had
in the course of a week reached the overmatched and exhausted troops.
It is true that the Higher Command may well have reckoned upon the
French as reserves, and this would have been perfectly true had they
been able to take over the ground in the south and contract the
British line. They did take over the ground, but they took over most
of the two British Corps as well, so that the Nineteenth Corps was
little the better for their presence. Unaided by either their own
people or by the French, the Nineteenth Corps still held on
desperately with dwindling numbers to a line which was far beyond
their strength.
Bad as was the position of the Nineteenth Corps, it was made worse by
the ever-changing position in the north. When the Seventh Corps fell
back to the line of Bray it was behind the left flank of the
Nineteenth Corps. But now it was compelled to make {138} a further
move to the line Chipilly-Morlancourt, while all bridges were ordered
to be destroyed up to Cherisy. This disposition was absolutely
necessary in view of what was happening in the Third Army area; but
it made the position more and more difficult for the men in the
south, who had either to fall back or to see the gap of undefended
river upon their left rear grow wider and wider. General Watts is a
stubborn fighter with no idea of going back if it can be in any way
avoided, so he held on in the south and fought a brisk, successful
action there, while he sent such poor reinforcements as he could to
the Sixteenth Division in the north, stopping the dangerous rent with
any odds and ends upon which he could lay his hands. Three hundred
improvised infantry, six Lewis guns, and a battery in armoured cars
were the best that he could do, and these troops actually did hold
the river line in the north from the early morning of March 27 until
nightfall, against an ever-growing menace. But they could not cover
all the ground, and the enemy, as was foreseen, was coming over the
river and getting behind the British line. The Sixteenth Division
was practically destroyed, and the Thirty-ninth was in little better
case, though General Feetham showed great energy in re-organising all
the débris of units upon the road, so that the line of resistance was
very weak. In the afternoon a considerable party of Germans with
machine-guns had got across the river at Cherisy, west of Morcourt,
held by seventy men of the Sixteenth Division, and pushed on in the
most daring way south-west to Lamotte and Bayonvillers. They were
right across the rear of the Nineteenth Corps, and a great disaster
seemed inevitable, but weary as the {139} men were, and tired as were
their leaders, they were still capable of clear decision and swift
action. The river was for the moment abandoned, the left of the line
was swung south, and early upon March 28 they faced north in this
sector, along the track of the Amiens-La Fère railway. Roughly, the
new position may be traced as follows:
Vrely. Gillancourt.
Warvillers. Caix. Wiencourt. Marcelcave.
+---------------------+
_R._ 24 8 60 66 39 _L._
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 28.]
This very difficult and remarkable disengagement was particularly
trying for the Thirty-ninth Division since it had farthest to go and
was in close contact with the enemy. It was carried out in broad
daylight in the morning of March 28, and with such skill that there
was no great loss in the 118th Brigade which covered it, but so close
was the enemy that both General Bellingham and his brigade-major,
Major F. Gunner, were captured while personally supervising the
withdrawal. After this operation the remains of the Thirty-ninth
Division were occupying the line from Marcelcave to Wiencourt
inclusive, along the railway track. Germans were found in Wiencourt,
and the two brigades, now reduced to two composite battalions under
Colonel Saint, attacked them with success, but eventually occupied a
line to the west. All the guns had been saved and were in action
once more.
On the occasion of the reforming of the line as already described on
March 28, the Fiftieth Division had fallen back upon Caix, where it
held fast to the important bridge across the River Luce upon which a
number of troops from various units were converging. Many of these
were disorganised, and some, {140} to use the expression of a
spectator, "stone-cold"; but the same witness has recorded the
splendid moral effect produced by one battalion which, marching in
fours and with everything in most precise order, came swinging down
the road, with no change after its seven days of purgatory save that
two-thirds of its personnel had disappeared. This was Colonel
Hancock's 1st Battalion of Royal Fusiliers from the Twenty-fourth
Division--an object-lesson to all who saw it as to how discipline can
outlast the most terrific tests which a soldier can be asked to
endure.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 28.]
The enemy, still working down from the north, had threatened the new
defensive flank at a point between Caix and Cayeux, but were held by
a very spirited attack made by the men of the 22nd Entrenching
Battalion. With considerable loss both to themselves and to the
Germans, they held the line of the river until reinforcements
arrived. The Thirty-ninth from the north and the Eighth and
Twenty-fourth from the south were all converging upon the one point
to take up their new positions. A Brigadier in command of the
infantry, with 800 men and 3 batteries, held the bridge; but the
Germans might have rushed it had it not been for a charge by the
151st Brigade, when the 5th and 7th Durhams drove back their
advancing line. This spirited attack was led by General Jackson in
person, who encouraged his men by blasts upon his hunting-horn.
Speaking of one of their military heroes, a French historian has
said: "Il avait la graine de folie dans sa bravoure que les Français
aiment." All soldiers love it, and it is a wise leader who knows how
to employ it. It was a time when every possible device was needed to
hold the men, for the enemy was close upon the bridge, {141} and the
safety of the remains of several divisions depended upon the bridge
being held.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 27.]
Returning to the general survey of the line of the Nineteenth Corps
the Sixteenth Division was now rather a crowd of warlike particles
than an organised unit. It was ordered, however, that every
individual particle should be reassembled at Hamel so that the
nucleus of a division should exist once more. Hard marching and hard
fighting had reduced the Twenty-fourth Division to almost the same
condition, though, thanks to a miraculous survival of most of the
senior officers, the unit was still efficient. On the other hand,
the Sixty-first Division from the Eighteenth Corps, numbering at this
period 2400 men, was given to General Watts to help to form his new
line. It was at first intended with the aid of these new troops to
endeavour to clear the left flank, and for this purpose a
counter-attack upon Lamotte was ordered. The newly-arrived men from
the south, the 183rd and 184th Brigades, who could hardly stagger a
mile, did actually carry the twin village of Warfusee and hold the
edge of it for a time under very heavy fire--an operation in which
Major Bennett of the Oxfords did conspicuously fine work. Several
grand soldiers fell in this attack, including Captain Willick who had
commanded the 2/4 Berkshires after the fall of the heroic Dimmer.
His last speech to his men is worth recording. It was, "I know how
you feel, boys, tired and worn out, but we have to stop them from
breaking through." The support to this brave attack is said to have
been "one gun, firing wildly."
The line sloped back now from Demuin in the south to the Somme at a
point opposite Sailly-le-Sec, the Sixty-first occupying the general
sector {142} just south of the Lamotte-Amiens Road. From there to
the river had been a gap which it was absolutely vital to fill. An
old line of trench existed here, extending from the river to Demuin,
and early in the battle General Gough, amid all his preoccupations,
had realised that it might be of great importance to have it ready as
a rallying place. He had therefore deputed General Grant, his own
chief of engineers, together with Colonel Harvey, his chief of staff,
to organise it and to endeavour to man it, with any spare troops that
they could find. This had been done, and after three days of
feverish work, Grant had prepared a line and had thrust into it a
most curious assortment of all sorts of details, made up of
entrenching troops, American sappers, the staffs of various army
schools, reinforcing units, and stragglers. On the third day General
Grant was recalled to his official duties, but General Carey happened
to be passing from the front to take over a divisional command, and
he was deflected and placed in charge of this assembly of military
samples, which included 500 cases out of hospital. There was a
sprinkling of machine-guns with trained instructors to use them, but
the line was thin and there was a want of cohesion in the elements
which formed it. The great thing, however, was that the gulf was
spanned between Watts in the south and Congreve in the north. There
was still a trench and a line of British soldiers between the Germans
and the open country that led to Amiens.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 28.]
March 28 was a day of destiny along the line, for upon that date were
the first definite signs that the assault had failed so far as its
ultimate objective was concerned, and that the Germans were not
destined to overcome the British resistance. In the north, {143}
this was clearly indicated by the victory in front of Arras. In the
south, the situation was still obscure and dangerous; but the mere
fact that the day was got over without a catastrophe was in itself a
success, for on March 27 the prospects were very ominous. The line
now ran from Demuin to Marcelcave, and thence the improvised trench
garrison carried it on to the river. The First Cavalry Division,
which had come across from the north bank, formed a link between the
Sixty-first in the north of Watts' line, and what we will now call
the Carey line. The cavalry men were still full of fight, but they
had done wonderful work since the first day of the battle, cementing
every weak seam, and they were terribly reduced in numbers if not in
spirit. Nothing can exaggerate the debt which the infantry owed to
all three divisions of cavalry for their tireless support during that
awful week. They now tried to advance towards Lamotte, but they came
upon the right flank of a very strong German force moving south-west
from Cherisy, and though they endeavoured to harass it they were
unable to make much impression. The 61st was also terribly worn.
Upon this day the 184th Brigade lost Colonel Belton, its fifth
commander, and was taken over by Colonel Pagan of the Gloucesters.
The southern end of the British line had troubles enough before, but
they were now accentuated by the fact that the Germans had made a
very rapid advance in the Montdidier sector which placed them in the
right rear of the Nineteenth Corps. On this right flank there was
much confused fighting, and a mixture of units which reached such a
point before the morning of March 29 that the Twenty-fourth, or what
remained of it, found that it had unwittingly {144} changed from the
right to the left flank of the Eighth Division. There could perhaps
be no clearer illustration of the dimensions to which the division
had shrunk. These confused movements caused loss of touch, and there
was a time when Corps Headquarters had completely lost the right of
the line, which was badly disorganised. It was a time of great
danger. Yet another division, however, the Twentieth, was given to
Watts, and though it was already worn to the bone, and could not
reckon a thousand men in all three brigades, it was still
battleworthy and formed an invaluable asset at such a time. They
were lined up, or perhaps dotted along would be a fitter term, upon
the front of Mezières-Demuin, and formed a frail barrier behind which
the hard-pressed men could have a brief breathing space while they
endeavoured to reform. By the late afternoon of March 28 this
operation was in progress, and before 11 P.M. the new positions were
actually occupied. The line, which was partly wired, now ran from
Mezières, through Demuin, Marcelcave, and Hamel to the Somme, but it
would be hard to add the exact alignment of the units, as in many
places they were inextricably mixed. The Sixty-first and the Cavalry
had been placed behind Carey's line, in order to support it should it
weaken. South of this was the Twentieth Division, reinforced by
fragments of other divisions, which among them had the strength and
spirit to beat off a strong German attack delivered by the force
which had been engaged by the cavalry in the morning. The country
here was seamed by the old French trenches, which were woefully out
of repair but none the less were of great value to the defence.
Carey's force was involved in this German {145} attack on March 28,
but with the help of the First Cavalry Division they managed to hold
their line. Upon that date the exhausted troops received the
following well-timed message from the Fifth Army commander: "By the
grand and stubborn way you are holding out and delaying the advance
of the enemy, the British and French reserves are being given the
necessary time to come up and assume the offensive. Your great
exertions and sacrifices are not being thrown away: they are of
immense importance, and your resistance and your deeds in this great
battle will live for all time, and will save our country."
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 29.]
March 29 was another eventful and critical day for the Nineteenth
Corps, and began badly for them, since the remains of the Eighth and
Twenty-fourth Divisions had, as already explained, been thrust out of
their positions and were mostly on the west side of the Avre and out
of the line. The Fiftieth Division was only partly in position, the
fighting strength of the Sixty-sixth was reckoned at 750 bayonets,
and that of the Thirty-ninth at 500 bayonets. The Nineteenth Corps
at this moment was nominally composed of eight infantry
divisions--Eighth, Twentieth, Twenty-fourth, Sixteenth, Thirty-ninth,
Fiftieth, Sixty-first, and Sixty-sixth; but it is questionable
whether their united strength greatly exceeded that of a single full
division, to such a point had the army been reduced. On the other
hand, there was no direct evidence of excessive wastage upon the part
of the Germans, who could be seen in large well-organised bodies
moving in front of the British lines. The one consolation lay in the
fact that their heavy guns, and even a good many of their field-guns,
had been {146} left behind. The machine-guns, however, and their
newly-developed light field artillery were as energetic as ever. The
British artillery had been weakened by capture and destruction, but
it was greatly supplemented by several armoured-car batteries,
Canadian and British, which did splendid service during these
all-important days.
About mid-day on March 29 the French, and the remains of the
Thirtieth Division under the French Higher Command, had abandoned
Mezières upon the right flank of the Nineteenth Corps, and by so
doing they exposed the right of the steadfast Twentieth Division.
The fighting extended from the River Avre to Demuin. The 59th
Brigade, which was in the south of the line, was forced to fall back,
but two battalions of the 60th Brigade were thrown out to cover the
flank and hold the German advance from getting behind the British
line. At 2 o'clock these two brigades gathered their thin ranks
together for a counter-attack, aided by the Fiftieth Division, which
had now been telescoped into a single weak brigade. It was a
remarkable attack, for most of the men were stumbling with utter
fatigue, and could hardly totter forward with their rifles at the
port. It was the Riflemen and Shropshires who made the advance upon
Mezières while their comrades stormed the surrounding woods. The 5th
Durhams, 6th Northumberland Fusiliers, and 22nd Entrenching Battalion
of the Fiftieth Division also did great things. There is evidence
from the prisoners that the Germans at that particular point had lost
very heavily and were much distressed, so that the combat was like
those closing rounds of a hard-fought boxing contest, where the two
exhausted combatants can {147} but push and paw as they lurch against
each other. The village was actually carried by the British, and a
temporary easement secured, together with a handful of the 352nd
Regiment, who stated that they had lost three entire companies in
their first advance upon Mezières. This spirited counter-attack was
covered by the guns of the Fiftieth Division which, under Major
Johnson, had worked very hard during those last trying days.
About 2 o'clock on March 29 Watts' Corps was reinforced by another
skeleton division, the Eighteenth--2000 bayonets, in all. It was
merged with the Sixty-first and placed in the Berteaucourt-Bois de
Blangy line. The thin ranks of the Twenty-fourth were still able to
muster at the south end of the position, but only one brigade of the
Eighth Division, the Twenty-fifth, was in a condition for service.
This unit moved to the edge of Moreuil Wood, and co-operated with the
French One hundred and thirty-third Division which was holding the
line at that point. From this time onwards the
Moreuil-Ailly-sur-Noye Road and everything south of it was French.
As the British force dwindled its front also contracted, otherwise
the situation would have indeed been impossible.
As it was, it continued to be desperately critical, for beyond the
telescoping of units and the contraction of front there was no help
for the British line, while the assailants were still very numerous
and aggressive. About noon on this day, March 29, the Thirty-ninth
Division, and indeed the whole army, sustained a severe loss in the
person of General Feetham, a leader of great valour and experience,
who was killed by a shell while walking with Colonel {148} Gosset,
his chief of staff, in the village of Demuin. His death was to some
extent revenged at once by his devoted troops, for a German attack
which followed at once down the valley of the Luce was driven back
with heavy loss by the rifles of the infantry. General Feetham was
replaced next day by General Blacklock. It is a remarkable fact that
Feetham was the second commander of the Thirty-ninth Division killed
within a fortnight, for General Cape, his _locum tenens_, fell upon
the 13th of March.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 30.]
On the morning of March 30 the 61st Brigade of the Twentieth Division
was on the south end of the line covering the bridge over the Luce at
Hangard, while the 59th covered that at Dornart, the 60th lining up
from Dornart to Berteaucourt. The Fiftieth Division had been now
incorporated in the Twentieth. All the bridges had been prepared for
demolition. The enemy were slowly pushing the French out of the
Moreuil Wood upon the extreme right, small bodies of infantry
gradually infiltrating the whole position. The Germans soon
developed activity also in the Luce valley, and finally along the
whole corps front. The Second Cavalry Division was sent into Moreuil
Wood to help the French, but the whole right of the line began
gradually to crumble in face of the repeated assaults. The remains
of the Sixty-sixth and Twentieth Divisions were bent back, though the
latter continued for a long time to hold the Demuin-Marcelcave line
of road, but about 8 A.M. the Sixty-sixth Division was pushed out of
Aubercourt. There was some weakness farther north also, between
Villers and Marcelcave, but the never-failing First Cavalry Division
stiffened the yielding line. At 10 {149} o'clock the situation had
improved in Moreuil Wood, where Seely's Canadian cavalry, with the
3rd Cavalry Brigade in support, were making their presence felt.
They held the line along the edge of the wood from east of Moreuil,
but had lost touch with the Twentieth upon their left. Later in the
morning there was a strong German counter in this quarter which drove
the cavalry back into the wood. Here at a later hour they were
reinforced by the Eighth Division, if such a sonorous name can be
given to a handful of dazed and exhausted men. The line at mid-day
ran roughly as follows:
Moreuil Wood. Demuin. W. of Aubercourt. W. of Marcelcave.
2nd Cav. 20th. 66th. Carey. 61st. 1st Cav.
The great bulk of the British force lay to the north of the Luce
River, and the Germans were making every effort to push the flank
backwards or aside and to ford the stream. A wood named Little Wood
lay in such a position as to help or hinder, such an attempt, and it
was the scene of some fierce fighting. It was first occupied by one
of the enemy's advanced parties. It was then retaken by some of the
West Yorkshires of the 60th Brigade. These in turn were pushed out
by the enemy. Finally, in the evening the 12th Rifles and 12th Rifle
Brigade, with some French and scattered units of the Fiftieth
Division, charged forward through the twilight, recaptured the wood,
and re-established the whole line in this quarter. Nine machine-guns
and fifty-three prisoners were taken. Well might General Watts
telegraph: "Well done, the Twentieth! Such a counter-attack after
all your hard work is splendid."
Now at last there were signs of some relaxation {150} in the dreadful
strain. On this, the ninth day of the battle, the first British
reserves, save only the Eighth Division, began to appear in the line.
They were the 9th Australian Brigade, who came into the fight between
Demuin and Aubercourt with their usual brisk gallantry. Their attack
made some progress, and the 12th Lancers who advanced with them
shared something of the glory. Although the final objectives were
not attained, the line north of the Luce was stayed by their presence
and made firm for the morrow. On this evening several of those
heroic units which had fought themselves to the last point of human
endurance from the beginning of the battle were taken from that stage
where they had played so glorious and tragic a part. The remains of
the Thirty-ninth, the Fiftieth, the Sixteenth, and the Sixty-sixth
were all drawn back for re-organisation. It was theirs to take part
in what was a defeat and a retreat, but their losses are the measure
of their endurance, and the ultimate verdict of history upon their
performance lies in the one single undeniable fact that the Germans
could never get past them. Speaking of these troops an observer
remarked: "They had been fighting for nine days, but were very
cheerful and still full of vigour." The losses of some units and the
exertions of the individuals who composed them can seldom have been
matched in warfare. The 2/6th Lancashire Fusiliers, for example, had
fought in the rearguard of the Sixty-sixth Division for the whole
retreat under Captain Porter, the only officer left standing. They
were now reduced to about a hundred men. Many battalions were in no
better condition. Carey's nondescript force was also broken up on
the evening of March 30. They had {151} served a most useful purpose
at a critical moment of the battle, and their formation may have
prevented a disaster, but it should be emphasised that their
existence was not some impromptu effort, but had been pre-arranged by
the wise foresight of General Gough.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 31.]
On March 31 there were signs that the German flood was reaching full
tide. They had acted to a wonderful degree up to their own saying:
"Immer fest daran!" but they had now far outstripped their artillery
support and the tenacious elastic British defence had worn them down.
There was no attack on the morning of this day, but about noon the
fighting broke out once more in the Moreuil Woods, the enemy pushing
their way through them and slowly driving back the line of the Eighth
and the Twentieth, while the French were again driven out of the
village of Moreuil. North of Marcelcave there was a day of quiet and
re-organisation. The Sixty-first was still holding the
Berteaucourt-Gentilles line, while the Eighteenth was holding the
line of the Luce. In the evening the Eighth and Twentieth were again
reinforced by the cavalry, and by the superior and heroic exertions
of every one concerned the position on the right flank was
maintained. The 2nd Berkshires distinguished themselves in this
fighting. There is something more than a name even in this stage of
the war in the old Regular battalions, for the chronicler finds that
they stand out amidst the other units out of all proportion to their
numbers. The 2nd Bedfords, 1st Royal Fusiliers, 2nd Scots Fusiliers,
and many others upheld the honour of the grand old force.
The right wing had been considerably hustled in {152} the Moreuil
quarter on March 31, but on April 1 the Second Cavalry Division,
which included the Canadian Brigade, made a sudden fierce
counter-attack which threw the enemy back. Fifty prisoners and
thirteen machine-guns were the fruits of this action. The British
guns had played upon the wood during the whole night, and the enemy
had suffered severely, for the assailants found the brushwood to be
full of dead Germans. There was no other movement of importance on
this day. The reformed Fourteenth Division was brought back into the
battle and took the place of the Twentieth, the Fiftieth, and of the
cavalry upon the front to the south of the Luce. Speaking of the
latter troops after their nine days of martyrdom, a senior officer
who saw them at this stage said: "In the last attack they were driven
back about a mile towards Amiens, but after the first Bosch onrush
they stood like rocks, repelling attack after attack,
counter-attacking and regaining ground in such a manner that every
day I marvelled at the doing of it, and at the men who did it."
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. April 4.]
April 2 and 3 were quiet days, but on the 4th there was a very
violent and general attack along the line of the Nineteenth Corps,
and of the Thirty-sixth French Corps (General Nollet) which lay to
the immediate south. The main weight of the battle fell upon the
Fourteenth Division in their new positions, and by nine o'clock in
the morning the Germans had gained some success to the north of the
main Amiens Road. The Australian 9th Brigade, which was south of the
road, held their line, but had to fall back 500 yards in order to
conform with the general position. At 11.30 the enemy was still
making progress, mostly {153} on the front of the Fourteenth
Division, and had reached the east edge of Hamel and of Bois de
Vaire. The Third Cavalry Division, those indomitable troops, were
thrown in to thicken the line of the Fourteenth, and the Canadian
motor guns from Villers-Bretonneux were also brought into the battle.
Later two battalions of the invaluable Australian infantry came up at
the double from the 15th Australian Brigade. If ever the arrival of
strong loyal men in a time of darkness brought joy and comfort with
it, it was when the Australians relieved the British line in these
later days of the second battle of the Somme. "God bless them!" was
the silent prayer that went down the weary line. Ground had been
lost south of Villers-Bretonneux, and the line was bent, but the
whole of the Third and Fifth Australian Divisions were streaming down
to their places in the defence. The end of the retreat was at hand.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. April.]
Upon the evening of April 4, the line which was to be permanent for
many months to come began to define itself, and order gradually
evolved out of ever-shifting chaos. Lee's Eighteenth Division was
now in touch with the Thirty-sixth French Corps at Hangard. Then at
the Bois l'Abbé lay the 9th Australian Brigade. North of this, at
the Bois de Gentilles, was the Third Cavalry Division. Thence in
succession came the 15th Australian Brigade, the 43rd Brigade, the
remains of the Twenty-fourth Division, the 8th Australian Brigade,
the other elements of the Fourteenth Division, the Fifth Australian
Division near Aubigny, and the Fifty-eighth Division in the north.
This summary will show how Australia had braced the line. Upon the
next day, April 5, Butler's Third Corps took over {154} the whole
area of the Nineteenth Corps, and the episode was at an end.
The retreat of General Watts across the ravaged country, his attempt
to hold the long front of the Somme, his successive short retreats,
his continual stands, and his eventual success, will always remain
one of the most remarkable incidents in the war. This officer, who
at the beginning of hostilities was a "dug-out," hardly rescued from
a premature ending of his military career, showed in the highest
degree those qualities of never despairing, and of rapidly adapting
means to an end, which mark the competent soldier. He began with two
units under his control, and he ended with fifteen, but no general
ever had to handle more weary troops, or had more need of a clear
head and a high heart. The strain upon him had been
extraordinary--though indeed that is true of every corps and
divisional commander in the line. As to the special features of this
operation, it may be said to be remarkable for the improvisations of
troops, for the continual use of entrenching battalions as
combatants, for the work of the dismounted cavalry, for the
self-sacrifice and energy of the motor batteries, and very specially
for the degree of mobility attained by the heavy artillery and the
rapidity with which it came into action in successive positions.
Military critics will draw many deeper lessons from these operations,
but these at least are sufficiently obvious to catch the eye of the
least experienced student.
The total losses of the Nineteenth Corps during this fourteen days of
battle came to from 35,000 to 40,000, killed, wounded, and missing.
The losses in guns were 41 heavy pieces and 73 field-guns, twelve
{155} of which were anti-tank guns in the forward line. The pressure
sustained by some of the divisions would be incredible if the facts
were not fully authenticated. Thus the Eighth English Division was
attacked from first to last by eighteen different German divisions,
including three of the Guards. Prisoners were taken from each so
that their identity could not be disputed. Yet this same Eighth
Division was engaged within three weeks in the victorious advance at
Villers-Bretonneux. The German oracle Clausewitz has said that a
retreating army should go back not like a hunted deer but like a
wounded lion. His commentators would hardly find a better example
than the British armies in the second battle of the Somme.
{156}