THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
Attack upon the Fifth Army. March 21.
The Fifth Army front--The story of a Redoubt--Attack upon Congreve's
Seventh Corps--Upon Watts' Nineteenth Corps--Upon Maxse's Eighteenth
Corps--Upon Butler's Third Corps--Terrific pressure--Beginning of the
Retreat--Losses of Guns.
[Sidenote: Fifth Army. March 21.]
In dealing with the German attack upon the Fifth Army, the first
point which should be emphasised is, that heavy as the fighting was
in the north, still it was this southern advance which was the main
one. The official account of the disposition of the German forces
brings this fact out very clearly. From the Sensée River to the
Bapaume-Cambrai Road they are stated to have had nine divisions in
line and eight in close reserve, covering a front of nine miles. In
the eight miles from Cambrai Road to La Vacquerie they had four
divisions. In the southern area from La Vacquerie down to La Fère
they had twenty-three divisions in the line and seventeen in reserve,
covering a front of over forty miles. This front was defended by
eleven British divisions, with three divisions of infantry and three
of cavalry in reserve. So far as infantry was concerned the odds
were 40 to 14, while the German guns numbered about 3500 to 1300 on
the British {80} line. These odds were serious enough if directed
equally along the whole area, but when thrown in on special sectors
they became more crushing. To add to the total picture of German
strength, it should be added that twenty-five fresh divisions were
thrown into the fight during the first week, nine upon the Scarpe
front, three between the Ancre and the Somme, seven between the Somme
and Montdidier, and six between Montdidier and the Oise. Against
these have to be set British reinforcements, and the influx of French
from the south. It was only on the first five days of battle that
the odds were so overpoweringly with the Germans.
In this chapter we shall endeavour to gain a superficial view of the
general course of events upon the whole front of the Fifth Army upon
the fateful March 21. We shall then be in a position to appreciate
the situation as it was in the evening and to understand those
decisions on the part of General Gough and his subordinates which
influenced the subsequent operations.
The front of the Fifth Army extended from its junction with the Third
Army in the neighbourhood of La Vacquerie to Barisis, a village some
miles south of the Oise, the total frontage being nearly forty miles.
This was occupied by four corps. The northern was the Seventh, under
General Congreve, a well-known soldier, whose V.C. and shattered arm
proclaimed his past services to the Empire. This corps covered the
southern part of the dangerous Cambrai salient and extended to the
region of Ronssoy. From this point to Maissemy the line was held by
General Watts with the Nineteenth Corps. Upon his right, extending
as far as north of Essigny, {81} was General Maxse with the
Eighteenth Corps. From thence to Barisis lay the Third Corps under
General Butler. All four were soldiers of wide experience, their
leader, General Gough, had never failed in any task to which he had
laid his hand, and the troops in the line comprised some of the
flower of the British army, so that in spite of all disparity of
numbers there was a reasonable hope for success. Arrangements had
been made by which the French or British could send lateral help to
each other; but it must be admitted that the liaison work proved to
be defective, and that the succours were slower in arriving, and less
equipped for immediate action, than had been expected.
The fortifications along the front of the Fifth Army were of various
degrees of strength, depending upon the nature of the ground and upon
the time that it had been in British possession, the north being
stronger than the south. The Oise, which had been looked upon as an
obstacle, and the presence of which had seemed to justify the
extraordinarily long sector held by the Third Corps, had to some
extent dried up and had ceased to be a real protection. In the main,
the defences consisted of a forward line, a chain of small redoubts,
each with four machine-guns and all connected by posts; a battle-line
which was strongly wired and lay about 3000 yards behind the forward
line; and a rear zone, the fortifications of which were not complete.
If anything were wanting in the depth of the defences it has to be
remembered that we are speaking of a vast tract of country, and that
to dig a serviceable trench from London, we will say, to Guildford,
furnishing it with sand-bags and wire, is a mighty {82} task. There
were no enslaved populations who could be turned on to such work.
For months before the attack the troops, aided by the cavalry and by
several special entrenching battalions, were digging incessantly.
Indeed, the remark has been made that their military efficiency was
impaired by the constant navvy work upon which they were employed.
There is no room for criticism upon this point, for everything
possible was done, even in that southern sector which had only been a
few weeks in British possession.
Before beginning to follow the history of March 21, it would be well
to describe the position and number of the reserves, as the course of
events depended very much upon this factor. Many experienced
soldiers were of opinion that if they had been appreciably more
numerous, and considerably nearer the line, the positions could have
been made good. The three infantry divisions in question were the
Thirty-ninth, which was immediately behind the Seventh Corps, the
Twentieth, which was in the neighbourhood of Ham, and was allotted to
the Eighteenth Corps, and the Fiftieth, which was in general army
reserve, and about seven hours' march from the line. The First
Cavalry Division was in the rear of the Nineteenth Corps, while the
Second Cavalry Division was on the right behind the Third Corps. The
Third Cavalry Division was in billets upon the Somme, and it also was
sent to the help of the Third Corps. Besides these troops the
nearest supports were at a distance of at least three days' journey,
and consisted of a single unit, the Eighth Division.
The German preparations for the attack had not been unobserved and it
was fully expected upon the {83} morning of the battle, but what was
not either expected or desired was the ground mist, which seems to
have been heavier in the southern than in the northern portion of the
line. So dense was it that during the critical hours when the
Germans were pouring across No Man's Land it was not possible to see
for more than twenty yards, and the whole scheme of the forward
defence, depending as it did upon machine-guns, placed in depth and
sweeping every approach, was completely neutralised by this freak of
nature, which could not have been anticipated, for it was the first
time such a thing had occurred for two months. Apart from the
machine-guns, a number of isolated field-guns had been sown here and
there along the front, where they had lurked in silence for many
weeks waiting for their time to come. These also were rendered
useless by the weather, and had no protection from the German
advance, which overran and submerged them.
The devastating bombardment broke out along the line about five
o'clock, and shortly after ten it was known that the German infantry
had advanced and had invaded the whole of the forward zone, taking a
few of the redoubts, but in most cases simply passing them in the
fog, and pushing on to the main British line. As it is impossible to
give the experiences of each redoubt in detail, the story of one may
be told as being fairly typical of the rest. This particular one is
chosen because some facts are available, whereas in most of them a
deadly silence, more eloquent than words, covers their fate. The
Enghien redoubt was held by Colonel Wetherall with a company of the
2/4 Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry {84} upon the front of the
Sixty-first Division. The redoubt formed the battalion headquarters,
and was connected to brigade headquarters by a cable buried eight
feet deep. In front were two companies of the battalion in the
outpost line; behind was the fourth company ready for counter-attack.
Early in the morning heavy trench-mortar fire was raining bombs upon
the redoubt, and the wire was flying in all directions. At 6 the
redoubt was so full of gas that even the masks could not hold it out,
so the men were ordered below and put up gas blankets to fend it off.
This could be safely done, as when gas is so thick it is not possible
for the stormers to advance. At 6.15, what with fog and gas and
blurred respirators, it was hardly possible to see anything at all.
At 7.30 the gas cleared and there was a shower of high explosive
shells with shattering effect. At 9.30 the barrage lifted and the
garrison rushed up from their shelters and manned their posts, but
the fog rolled white and thick across their vision. The cloud banked
right up to their wire, while from behind it came all the noises of
the pit. So nerve-shaking was the effect that some of the outlying
men came creeping into the redoubt for human company. At 9.40 the
whizzing of bullets all around showed that the infantry was on the
move. The garrison fired back into the mist, whence came vague
shoutings and tramplings. A request was cabled back for a protective
barrage, but the inadequate reply showed that the British guns had
suffered in the shelling. Suddenly the mist darkened at one point;
it broke into running figures, and a wave of men rushed forward,
scrambled through the broken wire, and clambered into the redoubt.
The Oxfords {85} rushed across and bombed them back into the mist
again. There was a pause, during which the attack was reorganised,
and then at 11 o'clock the German stormers poured suddenly in from
three sides at once. The garrison stood to it stoutly and drove them
out, leaving many bodies on the broken wire. The fort was now
entirely surrounded, and there was a fresh attack from the rear which
added fifty or sixty more to the German losses. At 11.45 there was
some lifting of the fog, and Colonel Wetherall endeavoured to get
across to the village, 300 yards behind him, to see if help could be
obtained. He found it deserted. Stealing back to his fort he was
covered suddenly by German rifles, was dragged away as a prisoner,
but finally, late in the evening, escaped and rejoined the main body
of his own battalion. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Cunningham had taken
over the defence of Enghien redoubt, assisted by Lieutenant Richards
with the machine-guns. Hour after hour fresh attacks were repelled,
but showers of bombs fell in the confined space, and the garrison
were continually thinned out. Despairing messages--"What shall we
do? What shall we do?"--were sent back over the cable, but nothing
could be done, for these outliers are the _enfants perdus_ of the
army, marked from the first for destruction. Finally, at 4.30, the
great deep all around them sent one heavy wave to submerge them, and
the cable was for ever silent.
Such is the typical history of a redoubt. Some succumbed more
readily, some survived until the afternoon of the next day; but the
difference may sometimes have depended upon the various degrees of
severity of attack, which was by no means the {86} same upon all
sectors. The total effect was the complete destruction of the eleven
gallant battalions which held the advanced line of the Fifth Army,
and the loss of all material therein. One can but hope that the
enemy paid a full price. Occasionally a sudden rise of the mist gave
the defence a splendid opening for their machine-guns. On one
occasion such a chance exposed a German officer standing with a large
map in his hand within thirty yards of the fort, his company awaiting
his directions beside him. Few of them escaped.
[Sidenote: Seventh Corps. March 21.]
We shall now follow the line of the Fifth Army from the north. The
Seventh Corps upon the left consisted of the Ninth (Tudor), the
Twenty-first (Campbell), and the Sixteenth (Hull) Divisions in the
order named, and it carried the line down as far as Ronssoy, where it
joined on to Watts' Nineteenth Corps. The Ninth Division had two
brigades in the line, and all the battalions both of the Twenty-sixth
and of the South Africans were in the forward zone and exposed to the
usual devastating losses. Their front joined that of the
Forty-seventh Division at Fifteen Ravine in the north, and the
Twenty-first at Chapel Hill in the south. About eleven o'clock the
main advance of the Germans struck up against this front. There was
no action upon the left between Gauche Wood and the canal, though the
bombardment was exceedingly heavy. On the right in the neighbourhood
of Gauche Wood the fighting was very severe all day, and the stormers
were able to make little progress, although they attacked again and
again with the utmost resolution. This attack fell mainly upon the
South African Brigade, who held on with the same firm courage which
they had shown {87} at Delville Wood, and proved once more that there
are no better soldiers in all the vast army of the Empire. It was
only at this point, however, near the junction with the Twenty-first
Division that the Ninth Division was attacked, for the German
infantry was crushed by the artillery fire upon the left in front of
Gonnelieu, so that the total losses of the Ninth upon this murderous
day were probably less than those of other divisions in the Fifth
Army. Gauche Wood was continually attacked, but the Quentin redoubt
to the immediate north of it was left alone during the whole day. It
was the 2nd or Natal South African regiment which held the extreme
front, and after a very fine resistance they were driven through the
wood, until at 11.30 the Germans held it all, but the Africans still
clung to the system of Chapel trenches to the immediate west and
south of it. To this they held all day, being much helped by a local
rise in the mist about eleven, which enabled the guns in Quentin
redoubt to see their targets in the south. Finally, the Germans were
compelled to dig in in Gauche Wood, and give up the attempt to get
farther. No other point was gained upon the Ninth Divisional front.
Meanwhile, the enemy had pressed their attack with great violence
upon the immediate right, where it fell with special strength upon
the 2nd Lincolns of the Twenty-first Division. At 12 they were well
behind the right rear of the Africans, who were compelled to throw
back a flank. The Lincolns held on splendidly, however, and the
danger was arrested. At 3.30 a new concentration of the enemy
developed in front of Vaucelette Farm, and was heavily shelled by the
British guns. At 5 o'clock the fight was very desperate upon Chapel
{88} Hill on the southern limit of the South African area, where the
Lincolns were still holding out but were being gradually pressed
back. The 4th South African Regiment (South African Scots) was
therefore ordered to counter-attack in this direction, which was done
with great dash, the position upon Chapel Hill being re-established.
Such was the general situation when at 8.15 orders were issued for
the withdrawal of all units to the rear zone. This was done during
the night, the general line of retirement being towards Sorel and
Heudicourt, while the Scottish Brigade kept position upon the left.
The order to retire came as a complete surprise, as all was well upon
the immediate front, but the reason given was the penetration of the
line at other points.
Upon the right of the Scots and South Africans of the Ninth Division
the line was held by Campbell's Twenty-first Division, consisting of
the Leicester Brigade and two brigades of North Country troops, all
of them the veterans of many battles. They covered the ground from
south of Gauche Wood in the north to Epehy in the south. Two
brigades were in the line, the 62nd in the north and the 110th in the
south, and were exposed all day to a very severe attack which they
held up with great steadiness and resolution. Heudicourt, Peizière,
and Epehy were the scenes of particularly severe fighting. In the
evening these places, and the whole line through Quentin Ridge and
east of Gouzeaucourt, were still firmly held by the defenders. It
may truly be said that along the whole fifty-mile front of battle
there was no point where the enemy met with a more unyielding
resistance than in the area of the Twenty-first Division. During the
long day three {89} German divisions essayed the task of forcing
Epehy and overcoming the defence of Chapel Hill, but as the night
drew in all three lay exhausted in front of their objectives, and
there would certainly have been no British retirement had it not been
for the movements in the other sections of the line. Only at one
post had the enemy made any lodgment, namely at Vaucelette Farm, and
here he could have been thrown out by a counter-attack had the
general situation permitted it. The Leicesters and the
Northumberland Fusiliers upheld the fame of their historic regiments
on this day of battle, but two of the outstanding exploits in the
fight lie to the credit of the Lincolns, who kept an iron grip upon
Chapel Hill, and to the 15th Durhams, who made a dashing
counter-attack which swept back the German advance when it tried to
penetrate between Epehy and Chapel Hill. The village of Peizière was
held by the 7th Leicesters of the 110th Brigade, who fought as this
brigade has always fought and held the Germans out. Once with the
help of flame-throwers they gained a lodgment among the houses, but
the brave Midlanders came back to it and threw them out once more.
It was a party of this same Leicester regiment which held the farm of
Vaucelette, and fought it out to the very last man before they
suffered it to pass from their keeping.
The fighting upon Chapel Hill was particularly severe, and was the
more important as this eminence, lying almost upon the divisional
boundary, enfiladed the Ninth Division to the north. There was a
trench in front of the hill, called Cavalry Trench, and a farm behind
called Revelon Farm, and the battle swung and swayed all day,
sometimes the British holding {90} all the ground, and sometimes
being pushed back as far as the farm. The 1st Lincolns gained great
honour that day, but they could not have held the hill were it not
for the co-operation of the South Africans, who twice helped to
retake it when it had been temporarily lost. The 11th Royal Scots
from the Ninth Division Reserve Brigade struck in also with effect
when the enemy filtered round the north edge of the hill and worked
to the rear of it. They had got as far as Genin Copse when the Royal
Scots attacked and hunted them back once more. The weak point of the
Twenty-first Division lay upon their right where they had to throw
out a defensive flank 3000 yards deep. They had not troops enough to
cover this ground, and it was only the splendid work of the batteries
of the 94th Brigade R.F.A. which prevented a disaster.
The Sixteenth Irish Division (Hull) lay upon the right of the
Twenty-first Division, carrying the line to the south of Ronssoy.
This division had two brigades in the line, the 48th to the left and
the 49th to the right, and it appears to have sustained an attack
which was of a peculiarly crushing nature. It cannot be denied that
the wretched parochial politics which tear Ireland in two, and which
are urged with such Celtic extravagance of language, cannot have a
steadying effect upon national troops, but none the less every
soldier will admit that the men who carried Guillemont and breasted
the slope of the Messines Ridge have proved themselves to be capable
of rising to the highest exercise of military virtue. If, therefore,
they gave way upon this occasion while others stood, the reason is to
be sought rather in the extra severity of the attack, which had {91}
the same crushing effect upon other divisions both in the north and
in the south of the line. All these brigades were desperately
engaged during the day, as was the 116th Brigade of the Thirty-ninth
Division which came to the help of the Irish, while the other two
brigades of this supporting division endeavoured to strengthen the
line of defence in the rear zone with a switch line from Saulcourt to
Tincourt Wood. On the right the attack was too severe to be
withstood, and not only the advance line but the battle position also
was deeply penetrated, the Germans pouring in a torrent down the
Catelet valley and occupying Ronssoy and Lempire, by which they
turned the flanks both of the Twenty-first in the north and of the
Sixty-sixth Division in the south. Especially fierce was the
resistance offered by the 48th Brigade in the north, some units of
which were swung round until they found themselves sharing with the
Twenty-first Division in the defence of Epehy. The 2nd Munsters
lived up to their high reputation during a long day of hard fighting,
and were for the third or fourth time in the war practically
destroyed. Colonel Ireland was hit about 10.30 in the morning, and
one company, which counter-attacked near Malassise Farm, was
annihilated in the effort; but the survivors of the battalion were
undismayed, and under Major Hartigan they continued to oppose every
effort of the stormers. One of the features of the battle in this
area was the fight maintained all day by C Company scattered in
little parties over Ridge Reserve and Tetard Wood. Lieutenant Whelan
was the soul of this fine defence, contesting every bay of his
trench, and continuing to rally and lead his dwindling band until
noon of {92} the next day. A road ran past this position, and it was
all-important for the enemy to move their artillery down it in order
to press the retreat; but the Irishmen shot down the horse teams as
they came until the passage was blocked with their bodies. Finally,
all the scattered bands rallied near Epehy village, where, under
Captain Chandler, who was killed in the contest, they fought to the
last, until in the late evening their cartridges gave out, and the
gallant Hartigan, with the headquarter staff of the battalion, was
overwhelmed. Lieutenant Whelan, meanwhile, held his post near Epehy
until noon of March 22, when he and his men fired their last round
and threw their last bomb before surrender. The defence of Malassise
Farm by Lieutenant Kidd and his men was also a glorious bit of
fighting to the last man and the last cartridge.
The general situation upon the front of the Seventh Corps on the
night of March 21 was that the Sixteenth Division, reinforced by the
116th Brigade, held the main battle positions, save on the extreme
right, as far north as St. Emilie. Thence the line followed
approximately the railway round and east of Epehy, in the region of
the Twenty-first Division. East of Chapel Hill and Chapel Crossing
it entered the holding of the Ninth Division, and passed west of
Gauche Wood, through Quentin redoubt and so to the original line.
Behind this indented position the 118th and 117th Brigades with the
Sappers and Pioneers of the Thirty-ninth Division were hard at work
upon the switch line, which should form a cover for retreat or a
basis for reorganisation.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 21.]
Upon the right of the Seventh Corps lay Watts' Nineteenth Corps,
which had two divisions in the {93} line, the Sixty-sixth Lancashire
Territorial Division (Malcolm) in the north, and the Twenty-fourth
Division (Daly) in the south. They covered a front from south of
Ronssoy to south of Maissemy. The Lancashire Division, the same
which behaved so splendidly in the mud battle of Broodseinde, had all
three brigades in the front, covering 4000 yards, and were exposed
all day to a most terrific assault. From the north they were in the
order 197th, 199th, 198th. To the south of them an even more
strenuous attack was launched upon the Twenty-fourth Division, which
had two brigades in the line. These were the 17th upon the left and
the 72nd upon the right, with the 1st North Staffords, 8th West
Kents, 1st Rifle Brigade, and 8th Queen's in front. About 11 o'clock
the news came that the enemy was pushing through at the point of
junction with the Eighteenth Corps upon the right, where there seems
to have been a gap of some hundreds of yards between divisions, and
later that they had penetrated into the village of Hargicourt in the
rear of the Sixty-sixth Division. There was heavy fighting all day,
and by evening the whole forward zone held by the 2/3 Lancs
Fusiliers, East Lancashires, and Manchesters had passed into the
hands of the enemy, Colonel Stokes-Roberts of the former battalion
being among the casualties. The twelve redoubts which constituted
the main defences of the battle zone held out stoutly all day, all
three brigades fighting with great valour. The Germans were
continually pushing in, however, upon the right of the Twenty-fourth
Division and enlarging their gains in that direction, so that the
First Cavalry Division was called up, and the Pioneer Battalion of
the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was thrown in on the {94} right of the
Sixty-sixth Division near Roisel to form a defensive flank. By 1
o'clock the battle zone of the Twenty-fourth Division was seriously
compromised. The 72nd Brigade upon the right had been turned and the
village of Maissemy had been taken by the Germans. Stone's 17th
Brigade kept a tight grip, however, upon the hamlet of Le Verguier,
and though many assaults were made upon it the place remained untaken
in the evening. In the area of the Sixty-sixth Division the enemy
was still gaining ground, however, and they had pushed on from
Hargicourt to Templeux, where a counter-attack by the 6th Lancashire
Fusiliers held them for a time. The fighting continued to be very
bitter until late in the evening, for though the Germans had
infiltrated all the ground between the redoubts, they were unable to
overcome their resistance, or to take possession of their gains. At
10.15 the order from General Watts was that there should be no
retreat, and that however great the odds against them--and it was
manifest that they were indeed very great--the two divisions should
prepare for a fight to a finish. Meanwhile, the Fiftieth Division
(Stockley) in army reserve had been ordered, after a march of seven
hours, to support the line of the Nineteenth Corps, taking up a
position in the rear from the Omignon River to the Cologne River,
upon a front which had been partly wired. With the early morning of
March 22 there came a renewed German attack which forced back the
left of the Sixty-sixth, who were always much handicapped by the deep
incursion the enemy had made into the area of the Sixteenth Division
to the north, which continually endangered their flank and even their
rear. {95} The battle was soon general along the whole front, and
everywhere the resistance was most desperate, though the troops were
gradually pressed back by the ever-increasing weight of the attack as
Hindenburg's legions came rolling in from the east. Many a bitter
curse went up that day from overwrought men against the perjured
traitors on the Russian front, who to ease their own burden had
thrown a double weight upon those who had helped and trusted them.
At 11.30 in the morning the post of Le Verguier, which had been held
so long and so gallantly by the 8th West Surreys, was at last carried
by storm and its brave garrison destroyed or taken, though Colonel
Peirs, who had been the soul of this defence, dashed out, revolver in
hand, at this last moment, and got away in the mist. The whole line
of the Twenty-fourth Division was shaken by the gap thus created.
The pressure was very great also at Roisel, and the 151st Brigade
from the Fiftieth Division had to be hurried up in order to hold back
the advance down the valley of the Cologne, which would have turned
the right flank of the Lancashire men to the north. The 9th Sussex
was heavily engaged in this quarter and suffered severely. About
noon a valiant attempt was also made by some tanks and dismounted
troopers to turn the tide by recapturing the village of Hervilly,
which had some temporary success. The German penetration had been
too deep, however, and there was very pressing danger of isolation
unless the corps fell back. This they did in the late afternoon and
evening, passing through the ranks of the Fiftieth Division behind
them. "They were nearly all gassed and dead weary," said one who
observed them as {96} they passed. The 11th Hussars and 19th
Entrenching Battalion most gallantly covered the retreat. The enemy
were close at their heels, however, in great force and most
aggressive mood, as the Fiftieth Division soon discovered. This unit
will be remembered as the famous Yorkshire Territorial division who
helped to turn the tide at the second battle of Ypres, and have shown
their worth upon many fields; but on this occasion the odds were too
heavy, though they held the enemy for the rest of the day. The lower
half of the line between the Omignon and the Cologne rivers was held
by Riddell's 149th Brigade of Northumberland Fusiliers, while the
northern half was held by Rees' 150th Brigade, of Yorkshiremen.
Against this thin wall dashed the full tide of the German advance as
it swept on in the wake of the Nineteenth Corps. It was a long and
hard fight in which the enemy had heavy losses, especially in front
of Pœuilly, where considerable sheets of wire lay in front of the
position of the 6th Northumberland Fusiliers. It was a most gallant
affair--gallant on both sides. Their Colonel, Robinson, laid out his
machine-guns in the long grass upon each side of this wire and
enfiladed the German line with most murderous results. In the south
the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers were attacked in front and on the
right flank, and the pressure was so great that they had to abandon
Caulaincourt, which was then recaptured and again abandoned by the
6th Northumberland Fusiliers from the supporting line. The enemy,
with his usual wile, telephoned from the mausoleum, a central
building, that reinforcements be sent to that point. Upon asking the
name of the officer and getting no reply, General Riddell, in local
command, {97} turned on five batteries of 18-pounders and blew the
mausoleum to pieces. At Poeuilly also there had been two successful
counter-attacks, but the enemy was swarming round the southern flank
in great numbers, and the river, which is not more formidable than an
average South of England trout stream, was of little use as a
protection. An important point named Nobescourt Farm, lying near the
junction of brigades, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and the
village of Poeuilly was also taken. By evening the Fiftieth Division
had done its work, however, as it had held up the pursuit and enabled
the Nineteenth Corps to reach the line of the Somme without severe
pressure. That night they received orders to withdraw, which were
carried out in the morning of March 23, Martin's 149th Brigade in the
south making a show of fighting in order to cover the movements of
their companions in the north who were moving over a perfectly flat
plain from Mons to Brie. Finally, General Riddell destroyed Tertry
bridge and dropped back to St. Christ. During all these operations
the German infantry were moving slowly forward in successive lines of
skirmishers, about a thousand yards from the British, who retired in
leisurely fashion, continually turning and holding them up, so that
the whole spectacle was exactly that of a well-ordered field-day.
When the main body had reached the bridges, a single company of the
5th Northumberland Fusiliers lay out in the higher ground, under the
leadership of Captain Proctor, who received the D.S.O. for his able
conduct of the operation. This company held up a brigade for two
hours, and then, their comrades being safely across, they withdrew in
their turn, leaving half their number behind {98} them. Every one
being across, both the St. Christ and Brie bridges were blown up.
The latter was a brand-new construction and was in charge of an
American officer of engineers who distinguished himself by his cool
courage, starting out alone, and bringing across the river a train
full of ammunition which lay upon the farther side. The
Twenty-fourth Division had crossed at Falvy, the rearguard action
being fought by the depleted battalions of the 72nd Brigade. Colonel
Pope of the 1st North Staffords, Colonel Charlton of the 4th Yorks,
and Colonel Le Fleming of the 9th East Surreys were among those who
had fallen.
[Sidenote: Nineteenth Corps. March 23.]
The Nineteenth Corps was now covering a total front of 20,000 yards
along the western bank of the stream, which is shallow and marshy in
these reaches. Their line was from Rouy-le-Crane in the south to
near Peronne, with some small outposts to the east of the river. The
Eighth Division (Heneker) had come up on the morning of March 23, and
occupied the southern end of the line, with the remains of the
Twenty-fourth, the Sixty-sixth, and the Fiftieth extending to the
north. There we shall leave them while we return to the history of
the front line upon March 21.
[Sidenote: Eighteenth Corps. March 21.]
On the right of the Nineteenth Corps was Maxse's Eighteenth Corps
covering the ground from the Omignon valley to a point just west of
St. Quentin, with three divisions in the line. These were the
Sixty-first on the left, the Thirtieth in the centre, and the
Thirty-sixth in the south. The Sixty-first Division, under General
Colin Mackenzie, was one of those fine second-line Territorial units
which have done so well in the later stages of the war. All {99}
three brigades were in the line, the 183rd Brigade of Scottish troops
in the north, the 184th in the centre, and the 182nd in the south,
both of the last being from the South Midlands. The 2/4th Oxfords,
2/5th Gordons, and 2/8th Worcesters were the devoted battalions which
held the forward line, and so fierce was their defence that the
battle-line was able to maintain itself along the whole divisional
front, in spite of very valiant efforts upon the part of the German
stormers, who showed absolute contempt of death in their efforts to
cut the wire at those points where their artillery had failed to do
so. The story of the Enghien redoubt and its devoted defence has
already been told, but belongs to the record of this division. The
battle zone ran in the main along the eastern edge of the Bois
d'Holnon, and this was desperately defended from morning to night.
In the afternoon the high ground south of Maissemy, in the left rear
of the division and outside their area, had been captured, and the
2/4th Berkshires endeavoured to help the Twenty-fourth Division in
their counter-attack. The Berkshires lost heavily in this venture,
and their gallant Colonel, Dimmer, who had won the V.C. in the early
days of the war, was shot through the head leading his men on
horseback to the very lip of a trench full of Germans. Horse and
groom fell before the same volley. The Sixty-first resumed its line
after this action in the north, and it maintained it intact until
evening, the three divisions of the German attack being practically
held up by the three heroic battalions in the front line, so that the
full weight of attack never reached the main line. It was as solidly
established in the evening as in the morning. The position of the
enemy on their left {100} rear had become more and more menacing, as
after taking Maissemy they had pressed on to Villescholes. This led
to dangerous attacks from the north on the early morning of March 22,
in the course of which the 183rd Brigade had to fight desperately to
preserve the flank of the division. The weight of this fighting fell
chiefly upon the 8th Argyll and Sutherlands, who counter-attacked
most valiantly, aided by the remains of the gallant 2/4 Berkshire's,
who had suffered so severely the day before. Colonel M'Alpine Downie
of the Argylls was wounded, and died next day. Even when the enemy
had got as far westward as Vermand, the Sixty-first Division was
still rooted to its ground, and the Highlanders on the left flank
recovered by a spirited advance nine guns which had been overrun by
the German advance between Maissemy and Villescholes. The 9th Royal
Scots extended their line to the westward, and facing north presented
an unbroken front to the constant hordes of Germans who were moving
down the northern slopes of the Omignon valley in the direction of
Caulaincourt. It was not until late in the afternoon of March 22
that the Sixty-first Division retired, still fighting, to a prepared
position north of Vaux.
[Sidenote: Eighteenth Corps. March 22.]
Next to the Sixty-first Division was the Thirtieth under General
Williams. This division had two brigades--the 21st (Goodman) and the
90th (Poyntz)--in the line, the latter officer being known to all
sportsmen as the famous Somerset batsman. The front of 4000 yards
was from the immediate west of St. Quentin to the Somme, and included
two notable strong points, Manchester Hill and the Epine du Dullon.
The 89th Brigade under General Stanley was in the immediate rear. It
was {101} not used as a unit during the day, but the three fine
battalions of the King's Liverpool Regiment, the 17th, 18th, and
19th, were dispersed in the evening to reinforce three separate units.
The fighting along the front of the Thirtieth Division was of a very
desperate character. The forward battalions were the 2nd Wilts and
the 16th Manchesters. Rushing through the gaps in their line of
defence, the Germans flung themselves upon the battle zone, where
after long fighting which lasted into the afternoon they gained
possession of the two posts already mentioned, and worked into the
main battle-line at Savy. Both brigades lost very heavily during
these attacks, but the addition of the 18th and 19th King's from
Stanley's brigade helped them to carry on under most trying
conditions. Both these reinforcing battalions came in for severe
fighting in the evening, and the 18th King's, which joined in a
counter-attack by the 21st Brigade, was particularly hard hit, while
the 19th had hardly an officer left, the colonel falling at the head
of his men. As a final result of the day's battle both the brigades
were somewhat driven in upon the front, but each held its line and
was ready to renew the battle next morning. The 2nd Bedfords
particularly distinguished themselves during this day of incessant
fighting, making no less than six successful counter-attacks in order
to clear their sector when it was partly occupied by the Germans. Up
to 4 o'clock in the afternoon of March 22 the Thirtieth were still
firm in their positions, and it was only the general situation of the
Army which finally compelled them to abandon them. They dropped back
upon the general line of Ham, where the three scattered {102}
battalions of the 89th Brigade had been ordered to form one unit once
more. Of the Manchester men in the front rank upon the day of battle
hardly a man ever got away, and their splendid Colonel Elstob lay
dead with the greater part of his battalion around him. He had said:
"The Manchesters will defend Manchester Hill to the last," and he
lived and died true to his word. A superior officer reporting upon
this episode said: "At about 11 o'clock Colonel Elstob informed me
that the Germans had broken through and were swarming round the
redoubt. At about 2 P.M. he said that most of his men were killed or
wounded, including himself; that they were all getting dead beat,
that the Germans had got into the redoubt and hand-to-hand fighting
was going on. He was still quite cheery. At 3.30 he was spoken to
on the telephone and said very few were left and that the end was
nearly come. After that no further answer could be got."
On the right of the Thirtieth Lancashire Division was the
Thirty-sixth Ulster Division under the command of General Nugent, one
of the many good soldiers who were trained by South Africa for this
greater ordeal. That scrambling and difficult campaign has, though
its lessons were most imperfectly apprehended, proved to be an
invaluable preparation for the leaders in the world's war of the
future. The Ulster division had all three brigades in the line, the
109th (Ricardo) to the north, the 107th (Witteycombe) in the centre,
and the 108th (Griffiths) in the south. The three outlying
battalions were the 12th and 15th Irish Rifles and the 2nd
Inniskilling Fusiliers, which suffered the common fate of all who
held that post of danger. Not a man returned, save a few of {103}
the Irish Rifles, who swam down the canal that night.
[Sidenote: Eighteenth Corps. March 21.]
The front held by the Ulstermen was from the Somme on the left to the
neighbourhood of Urvillers on the right, a distance of 6000 yards.
Three German divisions attacked upon this frontage, but the edge of
their onslaught was blunted by the splendid resistance of the three
doomed battalions in the van. None the less, it surged with great
violence all along the edge of the battle zone, but it was everywhere
held save only at the hamlet of Contescourt, where the Germans
obtained a lodgment. The whole defence of the division was
imperilled, however, by the fact that the Germans had bitten deeply
into the British line to the south of the 108th Brigade, getting as
far as Essigny on their right rear, with the effect that a deep
defensive flank had to be thrown back in this direction, which used
up all the reserves of the division. Thus, when the Germans late
that day and in the following morning pressed their advantage at
Contescourt, and were stopped by the magnificent resistance of the
1st Inniskilling Fusiliers at the neighbouring village of
Fontairie-les-Clercs, they should have been permanently held, as they
were driven back in twelve successive attacks. As there were no
reserves available for a counter-attack, however, the defence was
gradually worn down by a great disparity of numbers, so that by March
22 the Germans had advanced into the sector of the line which ran
down the course of the rivulet which is dignified by the name of the
Somme.
[Sidenote: Eighteenth Corps. March 22.]
Such, in brief, was the experience of the three divisions which held
the line of the Eighteenth Corps on March 21. The Twentieth Division
in {104} reserve was not employed during the day, nor were its
services needed, for Maxse's Corps, though attacked by eight German
divisions, was able to hold its ground, thanks largely to the
splendid resistance of the shock-absorbing battalions in the front
line. Up to 4 P.M. of March 22 the enemy had made no permanent
advance into the battle zone, but at that hour both flanks of the
Corps had been turned at Maissemy in the north and at Essigny in the
south, and the alternative was retirement or absolute isolation and
destruction. It may then briefly be said that, thanks to the
resolute resistance of the battalions in the forward zone, and to the
solidity of those in the battle zone, the Eighteenth Corps was able
to maintain its ground until it was ordered to leave it, and that
save for some indentation of its front, especially at Contescourt,
its main positions remained inviolate.
[Sidenote: Third Corps. March 21.]
Upon the right of the Eighteenth Corps lay the Third Corps, which
covered the enormous front of 30,000 yards. Of the nine brigades in
the corps, eight were in the line and only one in reserve, so that
between the tenuity of the line and its want of support it was an
extremely tempting mark for the German assault, especially as by
ignoring the two brigades south of the Oise they could concentrate
their whole force upon the six brigades in line in the north. It is
true that the wide marshes of the Oise offered an impediment which
covered part of the British line, but as already remarked, the waters
were exceedingly low for the time of year, and the Germans very
cleverly overcame whatever obstacle was left.
The three divisions which formed Butler's Third Corps were the
Fourteenth Light Division (Cowper), which extended as far south as
Moy, the Eighteenth {105} Division (Lee) covering the ground between
Moy and Travecy, and finally the Fifty-eighth Division (Cator)
extending to Barisis, five or six miles south of the Oise. As usual,
we will take them from the north, confining the narrative to the
point at which the fighting in the front line came to an end.
The Fourteenth Division had all three brigades in the line, their
order being 41st, 42nd, and 43rd from the north. This division,
composed entirely of light infantry battalions, has had more than its
share of desperate adventures during its service in France. Again
and again, notably in the fire-attack before Ypres in 1915, in the
third battle of Ypres, and upon the present occasion, they have been
exposed to ordeals of the most tremendous kind. Their frontage was
5500 yards, which was not excessive as compared with that of other
divisions, and it contained some high ground north of Essigny which
should have been valuable for observation and defence, but none the
less the attack was so severe and so concentrated that it rapidly
made an impression upon the defence, which became more serious as the
day wore on. The three outlying battalions were the 8th and 9th
King's Royal Rifles and the 6th Somerset Light Infantry, and these,
as usual, were sacrificed almost to a man. The enemy then stormed in
upon the line, making his advance here, as elsewhere, with a
systematic skill which showed how thoroughly he had been drilled and
exercised behind the line. This process of infiltration by which
small bodies here, there, and everywhere extend their advance where
they find a cranny into which to push and establish machine-gun posts
which, unless they be instantly rooted out, soon grow into formidable
{106} positions, shows the remarkable adaptability of the German
soldier--a quality with which, it must be admitted, the world had not
credited him in the past. It may also be admitted that we yielded
too easily to such tactics, and that there was a tendency, as was
pointed out in a memorandum from the Higher Command, to consider a
position as untenable because it was outflanked, instead of closing
in upon the intruders and pressing each side of the nut-crackers
against the intrusive nut. In many cases this was done, but in
others small bodies of daring men with a few machine-guns were able
to dislodge whole lines which they had managed to enfilade. On this
occasion the Germans pushed in upon both flanks of the Fourteenth
Division, but their most serious gains occurred about mid-day, when
they captured Manufacture Farm north of Essigny, and, shortly
afterwards the weighbridge west of that village. The 41st Brigade on
the left were driven out of their headquarters, while the 43rd on the
right were pushed back to the Gibercourt Road. A very weak point was
evidently developing, so General Butler hurried up part of the Second
Cavalry Division (Greenly), and also his only spare infantry brigade,
the 54th (Sadleir-Jackson) in order to make a line of resistance at
the switch line between Camas and Lizerolles. About 1.30 the Germans
had got in between Essigny and Benay and taken Lambay Wood. In view
of their accelerating advance and the ominous reports which were also
coming in from the 173rd Brigade on the right, General Butler
continued to build up his rear line, putting into it not only all
three brigades of the Second Cavalry and the 54th Infantry Brigades,
but also the 12th and {107} 13th Entrenching Battalions, thus
covering the whole rear zone of the corps. Isolated parties of the
41st Brigade were holding out in the main position upon the left, but
Hinacourt had also fallen and the line was slowly rolling westward,
so that by evening the Fourteenth Division had practically lost its
hold of the whole of its battle position.
Things were going better, however, with the Eighteenth Division,
which held 9000 yards of front in the centre of the Third Corps. As
this great frontage was maintained by only two brigades, the 53rd
(Higginson) in the north and the 55th (Wood) in the south, it must
have been very thinly held, and even admitting that the pressure was
less than on either of the wing divisions, it was none the less a
fine achievement to keep a grip on so wide an area. Three battalions
were in the forward zone, the 8th Berks on the left, the 7th West
Kents in the centre, and the 7th Buffs on the right, all of whom did
splendidly, so that the defence of Fort Vendeuil, Cork, Cardiff,
Durham, and other redoubts upon this point form a whole series of
epics. Besides the infantry, the 79th Company Royal Engineers shared
in the peril and the glory of this defence. The wires connecting up
these forward garrisons were speedily cut, and no news came back all
day, save the rattle of their rifle-fire. The first definite tidings
of the German advance came back through the fog about 12 o'clock,
when some gunners emerged from its folds and announced that the
advanced guns had been overrun by the enemy. Soon after came a
runner with a message from Colonel Crosthwaite of the West Kents to
say that his headquarters was surrounded, and asking for a barrage on
one side {108} of it. A second message arrived from him: "Still
holding, 12.30 P.M. Boche all round within fifty yards except rear.
Can only see forty yards, so it is difficult to kill the blighters."
It was the last word from the post. At 1.30 the enemy had closed in
on the battle zone, and the high ground at Cerisy in the area of the
53rd Brigade had been lost. On the front of the 55th Brigade at the
same hour strong parties of the enemy who had pushed between the
redoubts in the fog had occupied Vendeuil, while a section of guns in
Ronquenet Wood had been rushed by them. The reserve company of the
Buffs in front of the battle zone fought desperately against these
intruders, while near the Dublin redoubt Captain Dennis fought his
guns till 5 P.M., inflicting heavy losses upon the Germans, who
collected in masses in front of the wire at this point. Eventually
his gun-pits were rushed, all the gunners being killed or taken. The
main weight of the attack fell upon the 53rd Brigade upon the left,
and by the middle of the afternoon all the redoubts upon this front
had gone, while the 55th was still well covered. The battle zone,
however, was still intact, though the enemy massed heavily in front
of Moulin Farm and opposite the switch line from Vendeuil to
Ly-Fontaine. They came forward several times, but the mist had risen
and the rifle-fire was accurate so that they made no progress. At
Caponne Farm there was also a brisk attack, but the 10th Essex, the
only battalion left in the brigade, held firmly to its position,
though much plagued by low-flying aeroplanes who skimmed their very
heads, while the British Headquarters was equally disturbed by a
captured anti-tank gun with which the Germans kept up a point-blank
fire. To {109} ease the pressure upon this wing, General Lee put in
the 8th East Surreys from divisional reserve to thicken the line in
the neighbourhood of Remigny.
At 3.30 the covering forts upon the front of the 55th Brigade were
still holding out. Fort Vendeuil had made a particularly fine
defence and broke up a heavy attack. There was lamp signalling from
this fort till 6 P.M., when the lamp went out for ever. The 7th
Buffs, who had charge of all this portion of the battle front, did a
magnificent day's work, and the famous regiment to which this
battalion belongs has won no prouder laurels in all the centuries.
Little is known of their fate save the pregnant facts that the front
was screened all day, that repeated messages for help were received
up to 8.30 in the evening, and that rifle-fire was heard from their
posts till midnight. Bald words--and yet to him who can see they
convey a sure picture of fading light, dwindling cartridges, and
desperate men, baited from all sides and dying with clenched teeth
amid the ever-flowing German hordes.
About 4 o'clock the Germans had not only penetrated deeply into the
battle zone of the Fourteenth Division to the north, but had also
dented that of the Fifty-eighth in the south, so that both wings of
the Eighteenth were in a perilous state. The East Surreys were
pushed forward, therefore, into the switch line from Gibercourt to
Ly-Fontaine. Two regiments of dismounted cavalry from the Second
Division were sent also to form a defensive flank upon the right of
the 55th Brigade. At 6 P.M. the attack upon the battle zone of the
Eighteenth had ceased, but it was being pushed hard upon the two wing
divisions, and the Fifty-eighth had lost both Quessy {110} and
Fargniers. Orders were then issued to get behind the Crozat Canal
after dark, this having always been chosen as the second line of
defence. The 54th Brigade, which behaved with great steadiness, was
directed to cover the retirement of the Fourteenth Division, and the
guns were withdrawn first, so as to cover the infantry at the canal
crossings. A few of the outlying posts were gathered up and brought
back in safety. The East Surreys covered the withdrawal of the poor
remains of the 53rd Brigade, while the 3rd Hussars covered the 55th
Brigade on the right. It was a most difficult and delicate operation
with a victorious and elated enemy swarming upon the rear, but it was
successfully carried out, and by 6 A.M. the Third Corps were all
across the canal, and the bridges in that sector had been destroyed.
The performance of the Eighteenth Division had been a very fine one,
and it was one of the units which could boast that on the evening of
that terrible day they still held the main position which they had
covered in the morning. The main German attack seems to have been
conducted by four divisions, the Thirty-fourth, Thirty-seventh, One
hundred and third, and Two hundred and eleventh, while four more were
identified as either partly engaged or in immediate reserve. The
direction of the attack was mainly from the north and came upon the
front and flank of the 53rd Brigade, which could hardly call itself a
battalion in the evening. The gunners had to fire by guess until the
mist lifted, after which time they did great execution, and stuck to
their pieces to the last moment. A particularly notable performance
was that of Captain Haybittle of C Battery, 83rd Brigade Royal Field
Artillery, whose guns, just {111} south of Benay, were rushed in the
mist at noon. He and his crews removed the blocks and held a
neighbouring position with their rifles, directing at the same time
the fire of two guns in the rear which played upon the German masses
as they debouched from Lambay Wood. Afterwards he and his men fell
back upon these guns and fought them until late in the evening, when
both of them were knocked out. Nineteen hundred rounds were fired,
and this stubborn defence did much to hold the northern flank of the
battle zone.
It only remains now to give some account of the events upon the front
of the 173rd Brigade (Worgan) of the Fifty-eighth London Division
(Cator) upon the extreme right, in order to complete this rapid
bird's-eye view of the events of March 21 upon the front of the Fifth
Army. This brigade, which filled the space between Travecy on the
left and the Oise upon the right, had the 2/1 Londons in the forward
zone, the 2/4 Londons in the battle zone opposite La Fère, and the
2/3 Londons in the rear zone upon the Crozat Canal.[1] The single
battalion in front was attacked by the impossible odds of three
German divisions, but held out for a long time with great constancy.
Their brave Colonel, Richardson, was last seen surrounded by the
enemy, but still fighting with his headquarters troops around him.
The Germans stormed forward to the battle zone, but there on the high
ground across the Oise they also met with a very vigorous resistance
from the 4th Londons, aided by some sappers and a company of
pioneers. It was indeed {112} a great achievement of Colonel Dann
and his men to hold up the attack with such disparity of numbers, for
according to the official German account several divisions took part
in the attack. Finally, as the afternoon wore on the enemy obtained
a lodgment in the left of the position, and before evening they had
occupied Travecy and part of Fargniers, winding up by the capture of
Quessy. The 2/3 Londons had been drawn into the fight, and now the
2/8 Londons from the 174th Brigade were brought north and placed in
reserve along the line of the Crozat Canal, across which the troops
were now ordered to fall back. This battalion with the 18th
Entrenching Battalion guarded the whole canal line from Condren
Crossing on the right to the junction with the Eighteenth Division on
the left. By 5 A.M. all troops were across and the bridges had been
destroyed. The 2/4th Londons succeeded in removing all their stores
and munitions, and their remarkable achievement in holding the high
ground of La Fère against ten times their numbers for as many hours,
during which they inflicted very heavy losses upon their assailants
and repulsed six separate attacks, was among the outstanding military
feats of that difficult day.
[1] When two numbers are given to a Territorial battalion, for
instance 2/4 Londons, it means that the 4th Londons have two
battalions and that this is the second of them.
It is needless to say that the losses in men were very heavy on March
21, though it is difficult to separate them from the general losses
of the retreat, which will be recorded later. Among senior officers
of note who died for their country that day, besides those already
mentioned, were Colonels Acklom of the Northumberland Fusiliers,
Thorne of the North Staffords, Wrenford of the East Lancashires, and
Stewart of the Leicesters.
[Illustration: General line of Army on March 21st.]
{113}