THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
Attack upon the Seventeenth and Sixth Corps
Disposal of the Third Army--Attack upon the Third Division--Upon the
Thirty-fourth Division--Upon the Fifty-ninth Division--Terrible
losses--Loss of Henin Hill--Arrival of Thirty-first Division--Hard
fighting of the Fortieth Division--The East Yorkshires at
Ervillers--The 15th West Yorks at Moyenneville--Recapture of
Ayette--Grand resistance of Third, Fifteenth, and Fourth Divisions
before Arras--Final German check in the north.
[Sidenote: Third Army. March 21.]
Taking the account of this great action upon March 21 from the north,
we shall begin with Sir Julian Byng's Third Army. The left of this
force joined the Thirteenth Corps, which formed the flank of the
First Army, to the north of Fampoux, while the extreme right touched
the left of the Seventh Corps, the northern unit of the Fifth Army to
the east of Metz-en-Couture opposite to Cambrai.
The Seventeenth Corps consisted of the Fifteenth and Fourth Divisions
with the Guards Division in reserve. They extended as far south as
the Sensée River, and were not seriously engaged upon March 21,
though exposed to heavy shelling. We may for the time leave them out
of the narrative. It was immediately to the south of them, upon the
Sixth Corps commanded by General Haldane, that the storm {14} burst
in its full fury. Nothing can exaggerate the concentrated weight of
the blow which fell upon this and the next portion of the line. The
divisions from the north were the old fighting Third upon the Sensée
section, the Thirty-fourth to the south of it, and the Fifty-ninth
North Midland Territorials on the right. The Fortieth Division was
in close support. These were the devoted units who upon that
terrible day had to bear the heavy end of the load in the northern
half of the line. Let us turn first to the arduous experiences of
the Third Division.
This veteran division, still commanded by General Deverell, had all
three brigades in the line, the 76th upon the left, the 8th in the
centre, and the 9th upon the right, the battalions in the advanced
line being the 2nd Suffolks, 2nd Royal Scots, and 1st Northumberland
Fusiliers. The front covered was 8000 yards from Croisilles to the
Arras-Cambrai Road in the north, both inclusive. This front had been
strengthened by every device which experience could suggest, and was
organised, as already explained upon three lines, which may be called
the front, support, and reserve lines. Its backing of artillery was
formidable, its moral high, and it offered a solid barrier to any
enemy, however numerous.
[Sidenote: Sixth Corps. March 21.]
The preliminary bombardment here as elsewhere broke out shortly after
five in the morning, and contained a large proportion of gas-shells
which searched the rear lines and battery positions as well as the
front defences. So far as the 76th Brigade in the north was
concerned no serious infantry attack followed, and save for some
sporadic advances which were easily shot to pieces, there was no
organised attempt upon their sector. The same applies, though {15}
in a less degree, to the central unit, the 8th Brigade. Here there
were continual blasts of heavy fire during the day which decimated
but were unable to shake the Royal Scots in the front trenches.
Several times the enemy infantry made what was rather a menace than
an attack, but on each occasion it dissolved into nothing. It is
clear that nothing serious was intended and that these demonstrations
were to hold the troops to their ground. On the right, however, in
front of the 9th Brigade, the attempts were far more deadly and
earnest. The first of these lasted from 7.30 till 10, and gained a
footing in the front trenches, but failed before a determined attack
by bombing parties of the Northumberland Fusiliers. In the afternoon
the intermittent shelling became very severe, the trench mortar fire
upon the front lines being so heavy as to knock them to pieces and
stop all lateral communication. It was a nerve-shattering ordeal to
the garrisons of these posts, crouching hour after hour in the midst
of these terrible explosions. The bravest man on earth may find his
spirit wilt under such conditions. Finally, about half-past three,
there came a forward surge of grey infantry from Fontaine Wood which
reached and occupied the front line, or the irregular hummocks where
the front line had been. Every effort to extend this advantage was
crushed almost before it could get started. There was complete
stability here, but it was known that things were not altogether well
with the Thirty-fourth Division upon the right, and masses of German
infantry were seen moving down the Cherisy valley in that direction,
a fair mark for the heavy guns. The 4th Royal Fusiliers were brought
forward to reinforce their old comrades of {16} Northumberland, and
the line on the right was thrown back to get touch with the 11th
Suffolks of the 101st Brigade. In this support position they were
solidly linked with the units to right and left, so that the close of
the day found the whole of this portion of the front absolutely
intact, save for the loss of the obliterated front line.
We shall now turn to the fortunes of the next unit upon the right,
the Thirty-fourth Division, a composite hard fighting body composed
of Northumbrians, Scots, and East Anglian troops. General Nicholson,
commanding this division, had learned from a prisoner that the coming
German attack would begin at Bullecourt and then turn to the north.
Such incidents make one doubtful of the wisdom of that policy of
"teaching men to take an intelligent interest in the operations"
which is so often advocated. In this case flank defences were
arranged and all due preparation was made.
The blow fell even as had been foretold, but the portion of the line
which was crushed in was on the front of the Fifty-ninth Division, to
the right of the Thirty-fourth. The result was, however, that after
the capture of Bullecourt, which occurred about ten, the German
stormers began to work round the right rear of the 102nd Brigade, the
nearest unit of the Thirty-fourth Division. The flanking line of
defence was manned by the 22nd Northumberland Fusiliers and
strengthened by many Lewis guns, so that it took heavy toll from the
masses of German infantry who were moving across. This flanking line
was thickened by the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers and by the 1st
East Lancashires. The heavy blow had forced back the Fifty-ninth
Division, and by one {17} o'clock Ecoust also was in the hands of the
enemy, bringing them considerably to the rear of the Thirty-fourth.
Up to 4.30 in the afternoon the Germans were attacking the 102nd
Brigade from the flank, but up to that hour they had not succeeded in
shifting the solid Tynesiders who held the improvised line.
Nevertheless the heavy and constant shelling reduced the strength of
the defenders, who in many cases were quite cut off, and had to hold
their positions with bombs and rifles as best they could. Farther
south the Germans, passing Noreuil in their western advance, had
turned in considerable numbers to the north, well to the rear of the
flanking line, so that the British in reserve found themselves facing
south-west, but fought on none the less, the 22nd, 23rd, and 25th
Northumberland Fusiliers in a mixed line holding firmly to their
ground at the imminent risk of being cut off, while the 160th Brigade
R.F.A. were firing at ranges of 800 yards. As the German flood
rolled on it engulfed these guns, but the gunners withdrew the blocks
and retired slowly, fighting in line with the infantry. This
movement in turn affected the British garrisons of the more forward
trenches, who in any case were very severely pressed by the German
bombers, so that there was a general retirement towards the north in
the direction of Croisilles. Outside this village the remains of the
101st and 102nd Brigades formed a line, and with the aid of the 10th
Lincolns and 9th Northumberland Fusiliers of the 103rd Brigade held
the enemy off from occupying it. The Fortieth Division was, as will
be shown, coming up to fill the gap, and thus, although the
Thirty-fourth had been curled backwards as if a huge steel plough had
driven a furrow to the south {18} of them, there was still no
absolute fracture of the line. Towards evening patrols of the enemy
had succeeded in filtering through into the village of Croisilles,
but General Haldane had already seen that his corps front needed
reorganisation in view of what had occurred to the south. Orders
were given, therefore, to the 15th Royal Scots, who were still
holding on near Croisilles, to abandon the village and take up new
positions to the west of it. With the help of the 119th Brigade of
the Fortieth Division these changes were made, and a line built up in
front of Henin Hill for the next day's battle. The general result,
therefore, of the day's fighting was, so far as the Thirty-fourth
Division was concerned, that the left flank was still in touch with
the Third Division in the northern support line, but that the right
and centre had to hinge back upon it on account of the break through
to the south of them, and had been compelled to uncover Croisilles
and abandon it to the enemy. The casualties had been high,
especially in the 102nd Brigade upon the defensive flank. Of these,
about 1200 out of a total trench strength of 1800 were lost, some
being cut off but the greater number injured by the bombardment.
Three companies of the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers were engulfed in
the German tide and submerged, as were the field-guns already
mentioned, which were fought by their crews until the very last
instant. The 11th Suffolks upon the left flank of the 101st Brigade
held absolutely fast all day, and by their fire gave great help to
the Third Division to their north.
The next unit upon the line was the Fifty-ninth North Midland
Division (Romer) which had a front {19} of over 5000 yards. They
covered the important villages of Bullecourt, Ecoust, and Noreuil,
the former being in the very front line. The 178th Brigade of
Sherwood foresters were upon the right and the 176th of Staffords
upon the left, with the 177th of Lincolns and Leicesters in reserve.
In the southern section of this position was the long shallow slope
of the Noreuil valley, the nearer half of which came within the
Fifty-ninth area, while the farther was held by the Sixth Division.
It was speedily apparent by the intensity of the bombardment and by
the rumoured concentration of the infantry that this was the centre
of danger. About ten o'clock a demonstration was made against the
2/6 Sherwood Foresters upon the left, but the real attack came later
when on the right centre a heavy mass of the enemy surged through the
outpost line and established itself within the support line. At
about the same hour the German infantry struck in great force up the
channel of the Noreuil valley, and having pushed their way as far as
the western edge of Noreuil turned to the north-west, working along a
hollow road between Noreuil and Longatte. Two companies of the 2/5
Sherwoods, together with the 470th Field Company R.E., were caught
between the pincers of this double German attack, and were entirely
destroyed on the Noreuil-Ecoust Road, only one officer and six
sappers making their way safe to Vraucourt. The 2/5 Lincolns of the
supporting brigade, moving up to the support of their comrades, were
themselves involved in the tragedy and three companies were
practically annihilated. This rapid German advance, with the heavy
British losses, had all taken place by 11 A.M., and created the
situation which {20} reacted so unfavourably upon the Thirty-fourth
in the north. The Germans having got so far forward in the south
were able to assail the flank of the 176th Brigade in the north,
which threw out a defensive line as far as Ecoust and defended itself
strongly. Their position, however, was an almost impossible one, and
when later in the day the enemy took Ecoust and swung round to their
rear these battalions, already much reduced, were overwhelmed by the
attack, the survivors joining up with the Thirty-fourth Division in
their retreat. The machine-guns, so long as they were in action,
caused heavy casualties to the enemy, but the latter were swarming on
all sides, and eventually the guns had either to withdraw or were
captured.
With the two front brigades destroyed and the whole position
occupied, the Germans may well have thought that a long advance was
within their power, but in this they were soon undeceived. The
support brigade, the 177th, still barred their way, and it had been
strengthened by Headquarters staffs, bands, transport men and others,
and very especially by the pioneer battalion, the 6/7 Scots
Fusiliers. These men occupied the third defence line, and from the
Hog's Back on which it was sited, they defied every effort of the
Germans to get forward from Ecoust. This position was well covered
by artillery and supported by machine-guns. So strong was the
defence that the enemy were beaten back three times, and on the last
occasion, late in the afternoon, fairly took to their heels. Shortly
afterwards the 120th Brigade from the Fortieth Division came into
support, and the situation was saved for the day. How terrific had
been the strain upon the Fifty-ninth {21} Division may be reckoned
from the fact that their losses were close upon 5000 out of a
ten-battalion unit. It is true that they had been driven by vastly
superior numbers out of their two front lines with the attendant
villages, but evening found them still defiant, and, for the time,
victorious, with their right still linked up with the Sixth Division
and their left with the Thirty-fourth. There could not have been a
finer recovery under more arduous circumstances. It was the last of
the Fifty-ninth Division, however, for many a day to come, for the
Fortieth (Ponsonby) taking charge in this sector, gathered to itself
the fifteen field-guns still left of the artillery and the only
remaining brigade. It was as well, for they would need every gun and
every rifle in the dark days to come. Four German divisions, the
111th, 221st, 6th Bavarian, and 2nd Guards Reserve, had been engaged
in the attack. Even admitting that some of these divisions were
concerned also with the attack upon the Thirty-fourth Division, the
latter had the 234th and some smaller units in front of it, so that
it is within the mark to say that five German had attacked two
British divisions, and by the aid of a vastly superior light and
heavy artillery equipment had pushed them back to their reserve line,
but had failed to break them. It was not a fight of which either
nation need be ashamed.
This completes a superficial view of the experiences of the Sixth
Corps upon March 21. In order to get the full picture one should
understand that the Sixth Division upon the right had also been
driven from their sector, including several important villages. For
the sake of continuity of narrative it will be best {22} to merely
indicate this fact for the moment, and to continue to follow the
fortunes of Haldane's Corps during the fateful days which followed,
casting a glance also to the north where the Seventeenth Corps was
gradually involved in the fight. We shall bear in mind, then, the
long slanting front from the old positions on the left to Henin Hill
and the Hog's Back upon the right, and we shall return to the Third
Division at the northern end of the line.
[Sidenote: Sixth Corps. March 22.]
The night had been quiet along the whole corps front, which seemed to
imply some exhaustion of the attack. In the morning this lull still
continued in the region of the Third Division, which had up to now
been just outside the track of the storm. During the morning and
afternoon of March 22 no serious attack was made upon this point, but
in the evening the enemy, having made a lodgment upon Henin Hill in
the south-west, was able to make a powerful onslaught from the flank
which met with very little success. Its first onrush pushed back the
20th K.R.R., pioneer battalion of the division, in the trench called
Hind Avenue, but the ground was regained by the 13th King's
Liverpool, while the 4th Royal Fusiliers loosened the German grip of
another small corner of trench. Up to nightfall the attempts
continued, alternating with bombardments, but no progress was made,
the 9th Brigade beating down every new advance.
About ten o'clock at night orders reached the division that as the
Seventeenth Corps were falling back for strategic reasons to the west
of Monchy on the north, while the Thirty-fourth were also retreating
upon the south, the Third Division must retire in conformity with
them. It was no easy task under {23} a heavy shell fall and with an
elated enemy in close contact. It was of importance that the
telephoned orders should not be tapped, and it is suggestive of the
world-wide services of the British soldier that they were sent over
the wires in Arabic and Hindustani. Before morning the weary troops
had been quickly withdrawn without confusion or mishap, and all were
safely aligned in their new positions. Their defence of their
battle-ground had been a splendid one, and though they had no huge
mass attack to contend with, such as had dashed the line of the
Fifty-ninth to pieces, still they had constant severe pressure and
had withstood it completely.
[Sidenote: Sixth Corps. March 21.]
We left the Thirty-fourth Division upon the evening of March 21 still
holding its reserve lines, with its three brigades in line, the 103rd
on the right in touch with the Fortieth Division, and the 101st on
the left where the Third Division joined it. A spirited little body,
the J Special Company R.E., had joined the fighting line of the
Thirty-fourth, and did good work with it. About 8 A.M. upon March
22nd the enemy attacked the 102nd Brigade in the Croisilles sector,
but two attempts had no result, though the general British line was
now 500 yards west of the village. About ten o'clock a misfortune
occurred, for a heavy column of the enemy, moving up through a dense
mist, broke through the 101st Brigade and carried the greater part of
Henin Hill, a most important strategic point. The possession of the
hill was, however, contested most strongly by the Fortieth Division
machine-gun company and by the 11th Suffolks, who by their valiant
resistance prevented the enemy from gaining the whole crest, though
they could not stop them from extending north and south, which {24}
turned the line of the troops at the flanks and caused them to fall
back. The troops to the south, the 15th and 16th Royal Scots,
withdrew slowly to a new position west of Boyelles; the remains of
the 102nd Brigade (it was but 500 strong at the beginning of the
action) fell back upon the supports; while the valiant men of
Suffolk, aided by Colonel Roberts' machine-guns, still fought stoutly
upon the top of the incline, though entirely isolated upon the right
flank. Finally the shattered remains of this staunch battalion
withdrew towards the north-west, their slow retreat being covered by
Lieutenant Woods, who met his death in the venture, and by a handful
of machine-gunners.
The chief evil result from the capture of Henin Hill was in the
south, where it enabled the enemy by a joint frontal and flank attack
at the junction of the Thirty-fourth and Fortieth Divisions, to push
back the 9th Northumberland Fusiliers and 13th Yorkshire, and to get
possession of the village of St. Leger. The 103rd Brigade moved back
to Judas' Farm to the west of St. Leger, while the 119th Brigade
prolonged the line to the south. A few machine-guns, with their feed
blocks removed, were lost on Henin Hill, but otherwise no booty was
obtained by the enemy. On the evening of the 22nd the infantry of
the Thirty-first Division was rushed to the front, and the
Thirty-fourth Division after their two days of desperate and
honourable battle, were drawn back for a rest. During March 22 the
103rd Brigade held on to St. Leger and St. Leger Wood, and so blocked
the valley of the Sensée.
To the south of the Thirty-fourth Division the Fifty-ninth Division
had now been entirely replaced {25} by the Fortieth, save for the
177th Brigade, the artillery, and machine-guns, some of which
rendered splendid service during the day. There was little fighting
in the morning of March 22, but about mid-day it was found that some
hundreds of Germans with a profusion of machine-guns ("many bullets
but few men" was the key-note of the new advanced tactics) were close
to the divisional front in the region of St. Leger Wood. These were
driven back, and fourteen of their guns taken, after some confused
but vigorous fighting, in which Lieutenant Beal captured four guns
himself before meeting a glorious death. Several times the enemy
pushed strong patrols between the Sixth and Fortieth Divisions in the
Vaux-Vraumont sector, but these were always expelled or digested.
Shortly after mid-day, however, a very strong attack broke upon this
line, pushing back the left of the Sixth Division and causing heavy
losses to the Highlanders of the 120th Brigade upon the right of the
Fortieth Division. The 14th Argyll and Sutherlands, with the 10/11
Highland Light Infantry, were the units concerned, and they restored
their line, which had been bent backwards. Finding, however, that
they had lost touch with the Sixth Division to the south, they fell
back until communication was restored. All day groups of German
machine-gunners could be seen rushing forward, their crouching
figures darting from cover to cover, while all day also the guns of
the division observed and shattered the various nests which were
constructed. Major Nesham distinguished himself in this work.
Towards evening of the 22nd it was known that Vraumont to the south
was in German possession, and orders were given to withdraw to the
new general line which this change {26} and the capture of Henin Hill
must entail. In the new position the Fortieth was still in close
touch with the Sixth in the neighbourhood of Beugnâtre, the general
line of the withdrawal being in a south-westerly direction. The
losses had been heavy during the day, and included Colonel
Eardley-Wilmot of the 12th Suffolks.
The line of the Seventeenth and of the Sixth Corps, upon the morning
of March 23, stretched from the south of Fampoux, west of Heninel and
of St. Leger down to Mory. The Seventeenth Corps had not yet been
seriously attacked. We shall continue with the record of the Sixth
Corps, which now consisted of the Third Division in the north, part
of the Guards Division, which had formed up to their right, the
Thirty-first Division north of Mory, and the Fortieth Division to the
west of Mory, with outposts in the village. We shall again trace the
events from the northern flank. No serious movement occurred during
the day in front of the Third Division or of the Guards, but there
was a report of concentrations of infantry and other signs which
indicated that the storms of the south would soon spread upwards in
that direction. The Thirty-first Division, the well-tried Yorkshire
unit, still retained two of its old brigades, but had an additional
4th Brigade of Guards, cut from the old Guards Division by the new
system of smaller units. General Bridgford had taken over command
just before the battle and would be the first to admit that the
splendid efficiency of his troops was due to General Wanless O'Gowan,
who had been associated with them so long. They carried a high
reputation into this great battle and an even higher one out of it.
On the morning of March 23 the division faced {27} the Germans to the
north of Mory Copse, having the 4th Guards Brigade upon the right and
the 93rd Brigade upon the left. Two German divisions which had
already been engaged, the 111th and the 2nd Guards Reserve, tried to
break this fresh line and were each in turn broken themselves, as
were the German batteries which pushed to the front and found
themselves under the double fire of the Thirty-first and
Thirty-fourth divisional artillery. Prisoners taken in this repulse
gave the information that the Germans were already a full day behind
their scheduled programme in this quarter. All attacks upon the
Thirty-first met with the same fate during the day, but the enemy, as
will be shown, had got a grip of Mory for a time, and pushed back the
Fortieth in the south. Instead of a retirement the 92nd Brigade was
brought from reserve and placed upon the exposed flank, while the
Guards and Yorkshiremen still stood firm. In the evening the general
line extended from north of Ervillers, where the 92nd Brigade was on
watch, to the region of Hamelincourt, where the 93rd had their line.
[Sidenote: Sixth Corps. March 23.]
The heaviest work of the day had fallen upon the Fortieth Division,
which had dug itself in west of Mory and of Mory Copse, with strong
posts in the village itself. The enemy attacked in the morning of
March 23 in great force and got complete possession of Mory. A
splendid counter-attack, however, by the 13th East Surreys and 21st
Middlesex at 2.30 P.M. regained the village. A deep cutting ran up
to Mory from Vraucourt in the south-east, and along this the Germans
sent their reinforcements, but the artillery of the British got the
range of it and caused heavy losses. The village was held all day,
under the local {28} direction of Colonel Warden of the Surreys, and
was violently attacked by the enemy after dark, with the result that
desultory hand-to-hand fighting went on among the houses during the
whole night. At one time the British had won to the eastern edge,
and then again they were forced back to the centre. When one
remembers that these men had been fighting for three days, with
little food and less sleep, it was indeed a fine performance. One
small post of the 18th Welsh under Sergeant O'Sullivan was isolated
for nearly two days and yet cut its way out, the gallant Irishman
receiving a well-deserved honour. The morning of March 24 found
little change along the line of the corps. If the Germans were
already a day behind they showed no signs of making up their time.
The 40th Machine-gun Battalion had done particularly fine work during
the day. As an example of the gallantry which animated this unit it
may be recorded that two of the guns having been rushed by the
Germans near Ervillers, Lance-Corporal Cross volunteered to recover
them single-handed, which ne did in such fashion that seven German
prisoners appeared carrying them and marching at the point of his
revolver, an exploit for which he was decorated.
[Sidenote: Sixth Corps. March 24.]
March 24 was marked by considerable activity in the Mory district,
but no strong attack developed to the north of it. On the front of
the Thirty-first and Fortieth Divisions, however, the battle raged
with great intensity. The enemy had full possession of Mory by 9
A.M., and was attacking the depleted battalions opposed to them along
the whole divisional front so that they were compelled to fall slowly
back, by the late afternoon held a line about half a {29} mile east
of the Arras-Bapaume Road. The situation to the south had been such
that the Fourth Corps had to arrange to withdraw to the west of
Bapaume, so that in any case the Sixth Corps would have been
compelled to throw back its right flank. The Sixth Division on the
immediate right had been relieved by the Forty-first, but touch had
been lost and a gap formed, the enemy pushing on to Favreuil. The
Forty-second Division was on the march up, however, in order to
relieve the Fortieth, and two brigades of this formed a defensive
line covering Gomiecourt.
These events had their reaction upon the Thirty-first Division to the
north. When the enemy were seen in Mory at 9 A.M. they were upon the
flank of the 4th Guards Brigade, which at the same time could see
heavy columns massing to the east of St. Leger. The Guards at once
dug in a new support switch line towards Ervillers and so kept touch
with the Fortieth in its new position. The 93rd upon the left was in
the meanwhile heavily attacked in front, the enemy coming on again
and again with a powerful support from trench mortars. These attacks
were all beaten back by the stout Yorkshire infantry, but nothing
could prevent the enemy from working round in the south and occupying
Behagnies and Sapignies. The British artillery was particularly
masterful in this section, and no direct progress could be made by
the Germans.
[Sidenote: Sixth Corps. March 25.]
In the late afternoon of the 24th the Germans made a new and violent
attack upon the exhausted Fortieth Division and upon the 4th Guards
Brigade on the right of the Thirty-first. In this attack the enemy
succeeded in forcing their way into Ervillers, while the Fortieth
reformed upon the west of it, so {30} as to cover Hamelincourt and
Moyenneville. The situation in the morning of March 25 was
exceedingly critical for the two advanced brigades of the
Thirty-first, the Guards and the 93rd, who had not budged from their
position. The enemy were now to the right rear, and if they advanced
farther northwards there was imminent danger that the defenders would
be cut off. As usual the best defence of a dashing commander is an
attack, so the reserve brigade, the 92nd, was ordered to advance upon
Ervillers, which had already been consolidated by the 91st German
Infantry Regiment. The 10th East Yorkshires led the attack and
seized the village once again, but the situation was still critical,
for the enemy were round the south-west, so that they enveloped the
whole right wing of the division, which was stretched to cracking
point with every man in the line. Touch had for the moment been lost
with the troops on the right. As the Germans poured past the right
wing of the Thirty-first they presented a menace for the future, but
a most tempting mark for the present, and ten machine-guns were kept
in continuous action for three hours upon ideal targets ranging from
300 to 1500 yards. The enemy losses upon this occasion were
undoubtedly very heavy, but with fine persistency they kept upon
their way, as one-idea'd and undeviating as a swarm of ants in a
tropical forest. A thick trail of their dead marked their westward
road.
There had been comparative quiet at the north of the line so that the
narrative may still concern itself with the situation which centred
round the Thirty-first Division. The relief of the Fortieth upon the
right was now long overdue, and the men had been worked to the bone,
but the fact that Solly-Flood's {31} Forty-second Division had been
deflected to the south withheld their succours. The Forty-first
(Lawford), however, was gradually coming into action and thickening
their shredded lines. Sapignies in the extreme south of the corps
area had been taken by the Germans, but was recaptured in the morning
of March 25 by parts of the 120th Brigade working with the 127th
Brigade of the Forty-first Division. Strong German reinforcements
came up, however, and the British line was pushed back in this
quarter to the north-west until it crossed the high ground east of
Gomiecourt. This southern sector was handed over before noon from
the Sixth Corps to the Fourth, and in the evening the remains of the
Fortieth Division were finally drawn out, having finished a splendid
spell of service. The strain upon General Ponsonby, and upon his
three Brigadiers, Crozier, Campbell, and Forbes, had been enormous,
but under the most extreme pressure their units had always maintained
the line. Part of the 126th Brigade of the Forty-second Division was
now on the immediate right of the Thirty-first Division, the 10th
Manchesters connecting up with the 11th East Yorks and doing great
work in covering that flank.
It has already been recorded how the 92nd Brigade, all of East
Yorkshire, had beaten the 91st Prussian Regiment out of the village
of Ervillers. A second regiment of the 2nd Guards Reserve Division,
the 77th, essayed the adventure of turning the Yorkshiremen out, but
met with a bloody repulse. "It was a sight to see," says one who was
present. "We were only a battalion, probably 800 strong, while he
had massed artillery and many thousands of infantry. They came over
to us in columns, and they {32} kept coming. They swarmed towards
us, but they made no progress, and we could not shoot fast enough.
For three and a half hours they came, and for three and a half hours
we knocked them out. They were falling like ripe corn before the
reaper. As fast as they fell others took their places, but they
could not move the East Yorks." The 2nd Guards Reserve were worn out
by this experience, and it must be admitted that their service in the
battle had been long and arduous. They were relieved by the 16th
Bavarians and the 239th Division, so that there was no surcease in
the endless pressure.
At 1.15 the 93rd West Yorkshires upon the left of the line were
attacked, but could no more be shifted than their brother Tykes in
the south. The German stormers never reached the line, partly owing
to the excellent barrage and partly to the steady rifle-fire. After
a long interval of following false gods, such as bombs and rifle
grenades, the British soldier was reasserting himself once more as
the best average shot of all the forces engaged, though it must be
admitted that the specialised German snipers with their weapons of
precision were of a high excellence. All day the division stood its
ground and hit back hard at every attack, but by evening the salient
had become so extreme that it was necessary to readjust the line.
They fell back, therefore, the 92nd covering the operation, and took
up the line from Moyenneville to Ablainzeville, where they faced
round on the morning of March 26, the 92nd on the right of the line,
the 93rd upon the left, and the 4th Guards in reserve. On their
north lay the division of Guards, on their south the Forty-second
Division.
It was on this morning that an incident occurred {33} leading to the
loss of a village, but also to a singular instance of military
virtue. It is the episode of Moyenneville and of the 15th West
Yorkshire Battalion. It appears that an officer in a state of
concussion from the explosion of a shell, sent an order to the left
of the line that they should retire. The Guards and other observers
were surprised to see two British battalions walking back with sloped
arms under no pressure from the enemy. By some chance the mistaken
order did not reach the 15th West Yorkshires, who remained isolated
in their position, and Colonel Twiss refused to follow the brigade
until a positive command should arrive. In their loneliness they
extended each flank in search of a friend, and finally stretched
their left into Moyenneville village, which they found already
strongly occupied by the Germans. To many minds this would have
appeared to be an excellent excuse for retirement, but its effect
upon the Yorkshire temperament was that they instantly attacked the
village and drove the intruders out. One considerable body of
Germans was driven down into a hollow and pelted with bullets until
the survivors raised the white flag. Very large numbers of German
wounded lay in and around the village, but it was not possible to
send them to the rear. The enemy attacked Moyenneville again, but
the battalion covered the western exits and denied all egress. For
the whole of that day, the whole night, and up to the afternoon of
March 27, this heroic body of infantry held their ground, though shot
at from every side and nearly surrounded. Not one yard backwards
would they budge without a definite written order. Not only did they
hold their own front but their machine-guns {34} played upon nine
successive waves of Germans advancing from Courcelles to Ayette, and
sorely hampered their movements to the south. They covered 2000
yards for thirty-six hours and relieved the front of the Thirty-first
Division from pressure during that time. When at last the survivors
made their way back only four officers and forty men represented that
gallant battalion. Colonel Twiss was among the missing. "This
battalion," says the official record, "by its brave action relieved
the pressure on our front throughout the whole day and gave the
division time to establish its position near Ayette." It was as well
that this pressure should have been taken off, for both upon the 26th
and the 27th the ammunition question had become serious, and disaster
might have followed a more extended action.
[Sidenote: Sixth Corps. March 27.]
If we continue to follow the fortunes of the Thirty-first Division,
so as to bring them to their natural term, we find it now covering
the line from Ayette in the south to Ablainzeville. The enemy were
driving up on the right of the division between Courcelles and
Ablainzeville, a space which was covered by the 92nd Brigade, who
were fighting as brilliantly as ever. Touch had been lost with the
Forty-second upon March 27. The East Yorkshires lost their outpost
line four times this morning and four times they cleared it with the
bayonet. Colonel Rickman, the senior officer on the spot, fought for
every inch of ground as he retired before the ever-increasing
pressure. Finally the 92nd, worn to rags, were ordered to reform
behind the 4th Guards Brigade at Ayette, but so high was their spirit
that when during the night there was word that the Guards {35} were
themselves hard pressed they eagerly sent help forward to them, while
the Guards, with equal chivalry of spirit, strictly limited the
number who should come. About six in the evening the Guards threw
out a line to the south and joined up with the 10th Manchesters of
the Forty-second Division to the west of Ablainzeville, so that the
line was once more complete.
[Sidenote: Sixth Corps. March 28.]
March 28 found the battle still raging in front of the division,
which had now been engaged for four days without a break and had
beaten off the attacks of five separate German divisions. Two
attacks were made, the one upon the 93rd Brigade, the other upon the
Guards. Each attack got into the line and each was pitchforked out
again. So broken was the enemy that they were seen retiring in
crowds towards the north-east under a canopy of shrapnel. The
British barrage was particularly good that day, and many assaulting
units were beaten into pieces by it. The division was terribly worn,
and the men could hardly stand for exhaustion, and yet it was a glad
thought that the last glimpse which their weary and bloodshot eyes
had of their enemy was his broken hordes as they streamed away from
the front which they had failed to break. So thin were the ranks
that the pioneer battalion, the 12th Yorkshire Light Infantry, was
brought up to form the line. The Guards had taken their position
somewhat to the west of Ayette, and some of the enemy from the south
filtered into the village, but they were shortly afterwards put out
again by Shute's Thirty-second Division, which had come up for the
relief. There was no attack upon the 29th, and upon the 30th the
Thirty-first was able to withdraw, having established {36} a record
which may have been equalled but cannot have been surpassed by any
division in this great battle. Five German divisions, the 111th, 2nd
Guards Reserve, 239th and 16th Bavarians, and 1st Guards Reserve, had
been wholly or partially engaged with the Thirty-first. Both sides
had lost heavily and were exhausted. It was here, near Ervillers,
that a German war correspondent has described how he saw the long
line of German and British wounded lying upon either side of the main
road.
It has been stated that the Thirty-second Division carried Ayette
after this unit had relieved the Thirty-first Division, and the
operation may be treated here to preserve continuity of narrative.
It was of more than local importance, as it was one of the earliest
indications that the British army was still full of fight and that in
spite of every disadvantage it meant to hit back at every
opportunity. On taking over his section of the front, General Shute
found before him the village of Ayette, which was strongly held, but
was on the forward slope of a hill so that it could obtain little
help from the German guns. He at once determined to attack. The
15th Highland Light Infantry of the 14th Brigade were directed upon
the village on the night of April 2, while the 96th Brigade continued
the attack to the south. The result was a very heartening little
success. Three companies of the Highlanders, numbering under 300 in
all, carried the village, though it was held by a German battalion.
On the right, the 16th Lancashire Fusiliers made the attack, and in
spite of one check, which was set right by the personal intervention
of General Girdwood of the 96th Brigade, the objectives were reached.
The two attacks were {37} skilfully connected up by the 5/6th Royal
Scots, while a party of sappers of the 206th Field Company under
Lieutenant Cronin followed on the heels of the infantry and quickly
consolidated.
[Sidenote: Sixth Corps. March 24.]
Whilst these stirring events had been in progress in the south, the
north of the line had slowly drawn back in order to preserve
conformity. The Seventeenth Corps, as already stated, were to the
west of Monchy, and the left of the Sixth Corps was on the line of
Henin, where the Third Division occupied a strong defensive position.
This was strongly attacked upon the forenoon of March 24; especially
on the 8th Brigade front, which was the right of the line, the
Germans swarming up from the south-east of Henin and trying hard to
work up the Henin-Neuville Vitasse Road. This attack fell
particularly upon the 1st Scots Fusiliers, and it was completely
repulsed with heavy losses, though it was facilitated by the sunken
roads which converged upon Henin. The Germans in their retirement
had to pass along a slope where once again they lost heavily.
Shortly after noon the left of the Third Division was also attacked,
and the enemy obtained a temporary footing between the 1st Gordons
and 8th Royal Lancasters of the 76th Brigade. From this he was very
soon ejected, and though many bombing attacks were pushed with great
resolution they had no results. March 25 was quiet upon the front of
the Third Division, though the right of the Guards Division to the
south near Boyelles was subjected to one heavy unsuccessful attack.
That evening both the Guards and the Third Division had to make some
retraction of their line in order to conform to the situation already
described in the south, but March 26 {38} passed without an attack,
the soldiers listening with anxious impatience to the roar of battle
on their right, unable to see the fight, and yet keenly conscious
that their own lives might depend upon its results. The 27th was
also a day of anxious expectancy, culminating upon the 28th in a very
severe battle, which was the greater test coming after so long a
period of strain. All three brigades were in the line, the 8th upon
the right, 9th in the centre, and 76th in the north. Still farther
to the north was the 44th Highland Brigade of Reed's Fifteenth
Division upon which the storm first burst.
[Sidenote: Sixth and Seventeenth Corps. March 28.]
This brigade at 6.45 was assailed by a bombardment of so severe a
character that its trenches were completely destroyed. The German
infantry pushed home behind this shattering fire and drove back the
front line of the Highlanders. This enabled them to get behind the
left flank of the 2nd Suffolks and nearly surround them, while at the
same time they pierced the front of the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers
on their right. The front line of the 8th Royal Lancasters had also
been penetrated, and the British infantry were pushed back and split
up into various small squads of men, intermingled in the north with
Highlanders of the 44th Brigade, and all fighting desperately with
the enemy swarming thickly upon them. By 9.45 the whole front was in
German hands. Enemy field-guns were lining Wancourt Ridge, and as
the shattered formations tried to form a new line they were heavily
shelled by them. The loss in officers and men was very heavy,
Colonel James of the Royal Lancasters being among the dead. The
withdrawal was made to the reserve line, which the 44th Brigade had
already occupied in the north. {39} This included the village of
Neuville Vitasse which became untenable from shell-fire, and into the
northern portion of which the enemy was able to push, but in the main
the reserve system was occupied, the movement being covered by some
of the 1st Gordons. At this point an equilibrium was attained and
the enemy held after as desperate a conflict as any troops could be
called upon to endure.
[Sidenote: Sixth Corps. March 28.]
On the right of the 76th Brigade the 9th Brigade had also been
fighting very hard, and been compelled to yield some ground before
the overpowering weight of the attack, especially that of the
preliminary trench-mortar fire. The first enemy advance in the
morning was completely beaten off with great loss. A second attack
had driven in the 8th Brigade on the right, which enabled the Germans
to get behind the two companies of the 13th King's Liverpool who were
in the front line. These men fought to the end and were last seen
standing on the parapet without a thought of surrender. At the same
time a company of the Northumberland Fusiliers on their left shared
their fate, save for one officer and twelve men who survived. The
front line of the 8th Brigade had now ceased to exist, but the
reserve line still held. An attack upon the 7th Shropshires who,
with the remains of the other battalions, held on to it, was
successfully shattered, even the battalion headquarters being brought
into the desperate battle, while the guns on each side fought as hard
as the infantry, barrage and attack succeeding each other with
mechanical accuracy, and being answered by an equally efficient
barrage and defence, for the British guns were extraordinarily well
handled that day. About mid-day the enemy got a lodgment {40} on the
right of the reserve line, but the Fusiliers, whose Colonel, Moulton
Barrett, had been hit, and the 13th King's still fought furiously for
what was left, and retained their ground until dusk, when they were
drawn back into the reserve line in order to conform with the 76th
Brigade.
The 8th Brigade upon the extreme right of the division had also
endured heavy losses in men and some loss in ground. The front line
was held by companies of the 1st Scots Fusiliers and of the 7th
Shropshires. The enemy, after an unsuccessful attempt, got into the
trenches of the latter and bombed their way along them, clearing that
section of the front. It was bomb against rifle in the tortuous
ditches, and the bomb proved the more handy weapon. The Scots
Fusiliers, who were the next to be assailed, made shift with
rifle-grenades, but these also ran short, and they were forced back,
so that the survivors of the two front companies were driven across
the Arras-Bapaume Road. Finally, as in the case of the other
brigades, the reserve line was successfully maintained until evening.
No soldiers could have fought with greater bravery and skill than did
the Third Division on March 28. They were assailed by at least three
German divisions and by a crushing artillery, but they disputed every
inch of ground, and finally fought their formidable adversary to such
a complete standstill that he could not, with several hours of
daylight at his disposal, and disorganised ranks before him, continue
his attacks. It is true that he secured Henin and Neuville Vitasse,
but he paid a rich price in blood. So broken were the enemy that the
British wounded came back through their ranks without let or {41}
hindrance. A strong counter would have swept them out of the ground
that they had gained, but neither the Third nor the Fifteenth, which
had endured an equal attack upon the left, was in a condition to
advance, while the Guards had been already withdrawn in accordance
with the situation on their right. The blow which the Germans had
received was shown even more clearly by their failure to attack upon
the next day. On March 30 the Third Division was relieved by the
Second Canadians. Their record was a great one, and their losses,
139 officers and 3500 men, were a measure of their services. In nine
days, before a vastly superior force, they had only gone back 7000
yards, most of which was strategic withdrawal. Well might General
Byng say, "By their conduct they have established a standard of
endurance and determination that will be a model for all time."
[Sidenote: Seventeenth Corps. March 28.]
This desperate German attack on March 28 to the north of the British
line had spread right across the face of the Fifteenth Scottish
Division through the line of Orange Hill and on to Telegraph Hill,
finally involving the Fourth Division on the other side of the
Scarpe, and the right-hand unit of the Thirteenth Corps on their
left, so that Horne's First Army was now drawn into the fray, which
reached as far north as Oppy and Gavrelle. Along the whole of this
long front there was constant fighting, which in the case of the
Fifteenth Division was as desperate as that of the Third. All three
brigades were in the line, each of them having two battalions in
front and one in reserve. Never has the grand tough Scottish fibre
been more rudely tested than on this terrible day of battle, and
never has it stood the strain more splendidly. General Reed's men
{42} undoubtedly saved Arras and held up at least six German
divisions which broke themselves on that rugged and impenetrable
line, formed in the first instance by the 7th Camerons upon the
right, the 13th Royal Scots in the centre, the 9th Black Watch and
7/8 Scots Borderers on the left. As already told, the shattering
bombardment destroyed a large part of the right front, burying the
garrison amid the ruins of their trenches, near their junction with
the Third Division. Some fifty Camerons, under Colonel MacLeod,
fought most desperately round their headquarters, and then fell back
slowly upon the 8/10 Gordons, who were holding the Neuville Vitasse
trench behind them. This was about 6 A.M. By 7.40 the whole front
line, shot to pieces and with their right flank gone, readjusted
their line to correspond, winding up near the Feuchy Road. There was
no rest nor respite, however, for the whole German plan of campaign
depended upon their getting Arras, so they poured forward their waves
of attack regardless of losses. It was a really desperate battle in
which the Scots, lying in little groups among the shell-holes and
ditches, mowed the Germans down as they swarmed up to them, but were
themselves occasionally cut off and overpowered as the stormers found
the gaps and poured through them. The pressure was very great on the
front of the Black Watch, north of the Cambrai Road, and there
General Reed determined upon a counter-attack, for which he could
only spare a single company of the 10th Scottish Rifles. In spite of
the small numbers it was carried out with such dash, under the
personal lead of Colonel Stanley Clarke, that the front was cleared
for a time, and the Germans thrown back east of Feuchy.
{43}
[Sidenote: Seventeenth Corps.]
Meanwhile the Germans had made some advance to the north of the
Scarpe, and the 7/8 Scots Borderers on the left wing had to fall back
to preserve the line. At 11 A.M. the enemy were raging in the centre
of the line, and the 6th Camerons, north of the Cambrai Road, were
forced backwards, the enemy piercing their front. Up to 1.45 the
weight of the attack was mostly in the north, and ended by all three
brigades moving back, with the enemy still striving with the utmost
fury and ever fresh relays of men to burst the line. At 3 P.M. the
German stormers had won the Bois des Bœufs, but were driven out
again by the 9th Black Watch and by the 11th Argylls, who had lost
their C.O., Colonel Mitchell. The division was worn to a shadow, and
yet the moment that the German attack seemed to ease both they and
the Fourth Division on their north advanced their front. In this
single bloody day the Fifteenth Division lost 94 officers and 2223
men, but there can be no doubt that their action, with that of the
Third Division and the Fourth on either side of them, was the main
determining factor in the whole of this vast battle. General Reed (a
V.C. of Colenso) with his Brigadiers, Hilliard, Allgood, and Lumsden,
might well be proud of the way they held the pass.
North of the Scarpe all three brigades of the Fourth Division were
exposed to a furious attack, and lost the village of Rœux, which
was defended literally to the death by the 2nd Seaforths of the 10th
Brigade, but the 1st Hants in the front line of the 11th Brigade and
the 2nd Essex of the 12th stood like iron, and in a long day's
fighting the enemy was never able to make any serious lodgment in the
position, though the rushes of his bombing parties {44} were said by
experienced British officers to have been extraordinarily determined
and clever. Very little ground was gained by the Germans, and of
this a section upon the left flank near Gavrelle was regained by a
sudden counter-attack of the Fourth Division.
[Sidenote: Sixth and Seventeenth Corps. March 28.]
Of the attack to the north of the Third Army in the Bailleul and Oppy
district, it should be noted that it fell upon the Fifty-sixth London
Territorial Division, who for once had the pleasant experience of
being at the right end of the machine-gun. They took every advantage
of their opportunity, and there are few places where the Germans have
endured heavier losses with no gains to show in return. The
Westminsters and L.R.B.'s of the 169th Brigade were particularly
heavily engaged, and a party of the former distinguished themselves
by a most desperate defence of an outlying post, named Towy Post,
near Gavrelle, which they held long after it was passed by the enemy,
but eventually fought their way to safety. The attack lasted from
seven in the morning till six at night, and the Londoners had full
vengeance for their comrades of July 1916 or August 1917, who had
died before the German wire even as the Germans died that day.
It was a successful day for the British arms, so successful that it
marked the practical limit of the German advance in that quarter,
which was the vital section, covering the town of Arras. There is no
doubt that the attempt was a very serious one, strongly urged by six
divisions of picked infantry in front and four in support, with a
very powerful concentration of artillery, which was expected to smash
a way through the three divisions chiefly {45} attacked. The
onslaught was whole-hearted and skilful, but so was the defence. The
German losses were exceedingly high, and save for a strip of
worthless ground there was really nothing to show for them. It was
the final check to the German advance in this quarter of the field,
so that the chronicler may well bring his record to a pause while he
returns to the first day of the battle and endeavours to trace the
fortunes of the Fourth and Fifth Corps, who formed the right half of
the Third Army. We have fixed the northern sector of the
battle-field from Bailleul in the north right across the Scarpe and
down to the Cojeul in its position, from which it was destined to
make no change for many months to come. It was the first
solidification of the lines, for to the south all was still fluid and
confused.
[Sidenote: Sixth and Seventeenth Corps.]
A word should be said before one finally passes from this portion of
the great epic, as to the truly wonderful work of the Army Medical
Corps. In spite of the constant fire the surgeons and bearers were
continually in the front line and conveying the wounded to the rear.
Many thousands were saved from the tortures of a German prison camp
by the devotion which kept them within the British lines. It may be
invidious to mention examples where the same spirit of self-sacrifice
animated all, but one might take as typical the case of the Fortieth
Division, some details of which are available. Colonel M'Cullagh and
his men conveyed to the rear during five days, always under heavy
fire, 2400 cases of their own or other divisions, the whole of the
casualties of the Fortieth being 2800. M'Carter, a British, and
Berney, an American surgeon, both had dressing-posts right up to the
battle-line, the latter being {46} himself wounded twice. Wannan, a
stretcher-bearer, carried thirty cases in one day, and ended by
conveying a wounded friend several miles upon his shoulders. Private
M'Intosh, attacked by a German while binding an injured man, killed
the cowardly fellow with his own bayonet, and then completed his
task. It is hard to work detail into so vast a picture, but such
deeds were infinitely multiplied along that great line of battle.
Nor can one omit mention of the untiring work of the artillery, which
was in action often for several days and nights on end. Occasionally
in some soldier's letter one gets a glimpse of the spirit of the
gunners such as no formal account can convey: "Our battery fired two
days and nights without ceasing until spotted by the German
observers. They then kept up a terrible fire until the British guns
were silenced in succession. One officer was left standing when I
was wounded. He shook my hand as they carried me away. I went
leaving him with about seven men and two guns, still carrying on as
if nothing had happened. This is only one battery among hundreds
which showed as great pluck and tenacity as we did."
{47}