[Illustration: THE BRITISH FRONT IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS]
THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN
IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS
JANUARY TO JULY
1918
BY
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
AUTHOR OF
'THE GREAT BOER WAR,' ETC.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXIX
SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE'S
HISTORY OF THE WAR
Uniform with this Volume.
THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE
AND FLANDERS
VOL. I--1914
THE BREAKING OF THE PEACE.
THE OPENING OF THE WAR.
THE BATTLE OF MONS.
THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU.
THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE.
THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE.
THE LA BASSÉE-ARMENTIÈRES OPERATIONS.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES.
A RETROSPECT AND GENERAL SUMMARY.
THE WINTER LULL OF 1914.
VOL II.--1915
THE OPENING MONTHS OF 1915.
NEUVE CHAPELLE AND HILL 60.
THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES.
THE BATTLE OF RICHEBOURG-FESTUBERT.
THE TRENCHES OF HOOGE.
THE BATTLE OF LOOS.
VOL III.--1916
JANUARY TO JULY 1916.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME.
THE GAINING OF THE THIEPVAL RIDGE.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME.
THE BATTLE OF THE ANCRE.
VOL IV.--1917
THE BATTLE OF ARRAS.
THE BATTLE OF MESSINES.
THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.
THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI.
With Maps, Plans, and Diagrams
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON, NEW YORK, AND TORONTO
{v}
PREFACE
This fifth volume deals with one of the most tremendous episodes in
history, when the vigour of the German attack and the desperate
resistance of the British both on the Somme and in Flanders, held an
awestruck world in suspense. A million men released from the Russian
front, rolled across Europe and, swelling that great tide which was
already banked up before the British breakwater, it washed over all
the front line barriers and threatened at one time to sweep down to
the sea. The account of how the British Army, upon which
incomparably the greater pressure fell, rose to the occasion and
first slowed and then held the terrific flood is one of the most
wonderful of military epics. At the same time every credit must be
given to the loyalty of the French commanders who, while guarding
their own extended lines, endeavoured to spare all possible help to
their hard-pressed Allies. This volume carries the story of the
German attack to its close. The next and final one will describe the
enormous counter-attack of the Allies leading up to their final
victory.
The Chronicler has been faced by many obstacles in endeavouring to
preserve both accuracy and historical proportion while writing
contemporary history. He would gratefully acknowledge that his {vi}
critics in the press have shown a kindly indulgence, which arises, no
doubt, from an appreciation of these difficulties. There has,
however, been one conspicuous exception to which he would desire to
call attention, since a large question of literary etiquette is
involved. From the beginning a series of unflattering and anonymous
articles have appeared in _The Times_ Literary Supplement, commenting
adversely upon each volume in turn, and picking out the pettiest
details for animadversion. Upon enquiry, these articles--in whole or
part--are admitted to have been written by the Hon. J. W. Fortescue,
who is himself the official historian of the War. On being
remonstrated with, this gentleman could not be brought to see that it
is not fitting that he should make anonymous attacks, however _bonâ
fide_, upon a brother author who is working upon the same subject and
is therefore in the involuntary position of being a humble rival.
Having stated the facts they may be left to the judgment of the
public.
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE.
CROWBOROUGH,
_May_ 1, 1919.
{vii}
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
EVENTS UPON THE BRITISH FRONT UP TO MARCH 21, 1918
The prospects of the Allies--Great dangers from the Russian
collapse--State of the British line--Huge German preparations--Eve of
the Great Offensive
CHAPTER II
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
Attack on the Seventeenth and Sixth Corps
Disposal of the Third Army--Attack upon the Third Division--Upon the
Thirty-fourth Division--Upon the Fifty-ninth Division--Terrible
losses--Loss of Henin Hill--Arrival of Thirty-first Division--Hard
fighting of the Fortieth Division--The East Yorkshires at
Ervillers--The 15th West Yorks at Moyenneville--Recapture of
Ayette--Grand resistance of Third, Fifteenth, and Fourth Divisions
before Arras--Final German check in the north
CHAPTER III
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
Attack on the Fourth and Fifth Corps
Attack on Sixth and Fifty-first Divisions--Engagement of the
Twenty-fifth and Forty-first Divisions--Attack on Forty-seventh,
Sixty-third, Second, and Nineteenth Divisions--The German
torrent--Serious situation--Arrival of Sixty-second
Division--Fighting before Albert--Gallant defence by Twelfth
Division--Arrival of the New Zealanders, of the Australians, of the
Thirty-fifth Division--Equilibrium
{viii}
CHAPTER IV
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
Attack on the Fifth Army. March 21
The Fifth Army front--The story of a Redoubt--Attack upon Congreve's
Seventh Corps--Upon Watts' Nineteenth Corps--Upon Maxse's Eighteenth
Corps--Upon Butler's Third Corps--Terrific pressure--Beginning of the
Retreat--Losses of Guns
CHAPTER V
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
Retreat of the Seventh and Nineteenth Corps
Problems before General Gough--His masterful action--Arrival of
Thirty-ninth, Twentieth, and Fiftieth Divisions--Retreat of Tudor's
Ninth Scottish Division--Destruction of the South Africans--Defence
of the Somme--Arrival of the Eighth Division--Desperate fighting--The
Carey line--Death of General Feetham--"Immer fest daran"--Advance,
Australia--Great achievement of General Watts
CHAPTER VI
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
The Retreat of the Eighteenth Corps
Retreat of the Sixty-first Division--The Gloucesters at
Beauvais--Fall of Ham--Retreat of the Thirtieth and Thirty-sixth
Divisions--Great privations of the men--Fine feat at Le
Quesnoy--Summary of the experience of Maxse's Corps
CHAPTER VII
THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME
The Retreat of the Third Corps
Movement across the Crozat Canal--Fight of the 173rd Brigade--Forcing
of the Canal Line--Arrival of the French--Fight of Frières
Wood--Splendid work of the Cavalry--Loss of Noyon--Final
equilibrium--General retrospect of the Battle
CHAPTER VIII
THE SOMME FRONT FROM APRIL 1 ONWARDS
The last waves of the storm--The Twelfth Division at Albert--The
Forty-seventh Division at Aveluy Wood--The Australians in the {ix}
south--Capture of Villers-Bretonneux by the Germans--Recapture by
Australians and Eighth Division--Fierce fighting--The first turn of
the tide
CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE OF THE LYS
April 9-12
The Flanders front--Great German onslaught--Disaster of the
Portuguese--Splendid stand at Givenchy of the Fifty-fifth
Division--Hard fight of the Fortieth Division--Loss of the
Lys--Desperate resistance of the Fiftieth Division--Thirty-fourth
Division is drawn into the Battle--Attack in the north upon the
Ninth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fifth Divisions--British
retreat--General survey of the situation
CHAPTER X
THE BATTLE OF THE LYS
April 13 to May 8
Desperate situation--Sir Douglas Haig's "Win or Die" message--Epic of
the 4th Guards Brigade at Hazebrouck--Arrival of First Australian
Division--Splendid services of Thirty-third Division--Loss of
Armentières, Bailleul, and Neuve Eglise--The First Division at
Givenchy--Fall of Kemmel--Battle of Ridge Wood--Great loss of
ground--Equilibrium
CHAPTER XI
THE BATTLES OF THE CHEMIN DES DAMES AND OF THE ARDRES
May 27 to June 2
The rest cure of the Aisne--Attack upon the Fiftieth Division--Upon
the Twenty-first--Fifth Battery R.F.A.--Glorious Devons--Adventure of
General Rees--Retreat across the Aisne--Over the Vesle--Arrival of
Nineteenth Division--Desperate fighting--Success of 4th
Shropshires--General Pellé's tribute--General prospect of the Allies
midway through 1918
INDEX
{xi}
MAPS AND PLANS
British Battle Line, March 21
Position at the Close of the Great Retreat, March 30
Rough Sketch of the General Position of Troops at the Battle of
Villers-Bretonneux, April 24-25
Rough Sketch of Guards' Position, April 13
Defence of Givenchy by the First Division, April 18
Position of the Line in Flanders, April 9
British Line on Chemin des Dames
Map to illustrate the British Campaign in France and Flanders
{1}
CHAPTER I
EVENTS UPON THE BRITISH FRONT UP TO MARCH 21, 1918
The prospects of the Allies--Great dangers from the Russian
collapse--State of the British line--Huge German preparations--Eve of
the Great Offensive.
[Sidenote: Events upon the British Front to March 21]
The New Year of 1918, the fourth of the world war, opened with
chequered prospects for the Allies. Upon all subsidiary fields of
action the developments were good. In Palestine, General Allenby,
the victor of Arras, had shown himself to be a fine soldier upon the
larger scale, and had fought his way up the old highway of history
which leads from Egypt by Gaza to Jerusalem. Homely crusaders in
tattered khaki stood where once Godfrey de Bouillon and his chivalry
had worshipped before the shrine of religion, and the cavalry of
Australia, the yeomen of the Shires, and the infantry of London won
once more the ground which Richard of the Lion Heart with his knights
and bowmen had contested in the long ago. Surely in all the strange
permutations and combinations of the world war there could be none
more striking than that! By April the British force covered all the
northern approaches to the city and extended its right wing to the
Jordan, where our Arab allies in the land of Moab were pushing {2}
the Turks back along the line of the Damascus railway.
On another road of world conquest, that from British Bagdad to
Nineveh, the British and Indian columns were also both active and
victorious. The knightly Maude had perished from cholera contracted
by his own courtesy in drinking a proffered cup of village water.
His successor, General Marshall, formerly his Chief of Staff, and as
such conversant with his aims and his methods, carried on both one
and the other, moving his men north until the spectator who compared
their numbers with the immensity of the spaces around them, was
appalled at the apparent loneliness of their position. By May his
raiding cavalry were not far from the Turkish supply depot of Mosul,
where the barren mounds, extending over leagues of desert, proclaim
both the greatness and the ruin of Nineveh. Salonica continued in
its usual condition of uneasy and malarial somnolence, but gratifying
reports came of the belated rally of the Greeks, who, acting with the
French, won a smart little victory against their Bulgarian enemies
upon May 31. German East Africa had at last been cleared of German
forces, but General Lettow Vorbeck, to whom we cannot deny remarkable
fortitude and leadership, wandered with his piebald commands in the
depths of the forests and marshes of Mozambique, still evading his
inevitable capture, and master only of the ground on which he camped.
But these distant campaigns had only a remote and indirect effect
upon the war in Europe. Here the late winter and the early spring of
1918 saw the balance tilted against the British and their comrades in
the West, through causes over which they had no {3} control. Russia
had completely broken down. In her case, with a rapidity which made
it difficult to realise the situation, autocracy had changed to
liberty, liberty to license, and license to chaos. The absolute
dissolution of all fighting power was partly due to national folly
and partly to deliberate treachery. The leaders of the extreme party
had arrived from Switzerland with a free pass granted by the German
authorities. Instantly they set to work to subvert the comparatively
sane government with which the name of Kerensky is chiefly
associated. Lenin and his associates seized the reins of power and
guided their mad team up to and over the precipice. It was clear to
any observer that such a frenzy of insanity must have its reaction,
and great pity was felt for those more honourable Russians who were
compelled to look on at the degradation of their country. The new
super-democracy began its career by repudiating its debts of honour,
and by betraying all the other democracies of the world. Such
conditions could not last; but meanwhile the Germans overran the
country at their pleasure, practically annexed both Finland and the
Ukraine, and helped themselves to harvests, warships, or anything
else they might desire. Chivalrous little Roumania, with the foe in
front and the traitor in the rear, was compelled to make such hard
terms as she might--surely one of the most bitter tragedies of
history.
As a result of this huge defection the whole force of Germany and of
Austria, together with a good deal of captured Russian artillery, was
available for the Western war, and from November to March an endless
succession of troop trains were bearing the divisions which had
extended from the Baltic to {4} the southern frontiers of Russia, in
order to thicken the formidable array already marshalled across
France. A great Austrian army assembled on the line of the Piave,
where the Italians had formed their new front, while a second force
in the mountains upon their flank seemed to hang suspended like an
avalanche, ready at any instant to crash down into the valleys. In
spite of this imminent danger the situation was so threatening in
France that half of the British and French force in Italy had to be
recalled, while the gallant Italians actually sent some divisions of
their own best troops to aid the Allies in the more vital theatre of
war. It was not only the vast concentration of infantry which formed
the immediate menace, but it was the addition to the German gun
power, in which the Austrians greatly assisted. The enemy was acting
also upon internal lines and with excellent radiating communications,
so that by assembling large bodies in certain central points he could
hurl them against any portion of a long arc of the Allied line and
depend upon several days of battle before the reinforcements could
intervene. This, as it proved, was a very great advantage. He had
also used his Russian experiences to initiate and improve a new form
of attack by which he was confident, with a confidence which proved
to be well justified, that he could certainly make a deep impression
upon the Allied line, and turn the war, for a time, at least, into
one of open movement. Such was the very favourable position of the
German army at the opening of the tremendous campaign of 1918, which
was enhanced by the fact that they had reduced to slavery the
population in their rear, and had thus gained a very {5} solid
present advantage at the cost of a universal hatred and execration of
which no man now living will see the end. In the hope of being a
nation of victors they took steps which will brand them as a nation
of monsters so long as history is read--a nation with modern minds
but with worse than mediaeval souls.
The Allies were not without their consolations, though they lay
rather in the future than in the present. Their veteran armies,
though somewhat outnumbered, had done so well in the offensive of the
year before that they had good reason to believe that, acting upon
the defensive, they would either hold the German onslaught, or at
worst inflict such losses that they would gradually bring them to an
equilibrium. Neither France nor Britain had called upon its last
reserves to the same extent as Germany, and behind both was the
mighty power of America. Up to date the American forces landed in
France had not been sufficiently trained or numerous to influence the
course of events, but from the spring onwards there was a steady
flow, and hardly a day elapsed without one or more transports laden
with troops arriving in the British or French ports. The men were of
splendid spirit and physique, and the mere sight of them revived the
weary souls of those who had fought the hard fight so long. It was
the knowledge of these reinforcements and the constant drafts from
Britain which stiffened men's courage and steeled their breasts in
the desperate days to come.
Turning our eyes now from the general prospect and concentrating our
attention upon the dispositions of the British army, it may be said
that the ranks had been filled once more after the very {6} expensive
fighting of the autumn. Divisions were, however, weaker than before
for, following the German model, one battalion had been taken out of
each brigade, so that in future a division consisted of nine ordinary
units and one pioneer. Of the six divisions lent to Italy three had
been brought back in view of the German menace. The line still ran
from Houthulst Forest and Passchendaele in the north along the
familiar curve by La Bassée and Lens to the east of Vimy Ridge, and
thence along the first Hindenburg Line, with the one six-mile breach
in front of Cambrai. The Third Army, under Sir Julian Byng, covered
the ground between Arras and Cambrai, whilst the Fifth, under Sir
Hubert Gough, carried it south from that point. His junction with
the French was an indeterminate one and was twice moved to the south,
the second move on February 15 carrying his right wing across the
Oise as far south as Barisis, eight miles beyond La Fère. There is
no doubt that in lengthening his line to this extent Sir Douglas Haig
took on more ground than his troops could be reasonably expected to
hold, and that General Gough was given a hard task. It was done, as
was shown in a subsequent debate, against the better judgment of the
British at the urgent behest of M. Clemenceau. We must remember,
however, that our Allies had frequently taken risks in order to help
us, and that it was for us to reciprocate even though it might
occasionally, as in this instance, lead to trouble. There was a
tendency at the time for soldiers and politicians to put the blame
upon each other, whereas all were equally the victims of the real
cause, which was the crushing burden placed upon us by the defection
of our Ally. It is {7} easy to be wise after the event, but it was
impossible to tell with any certainty where the impending blow might
fall, and M. Clemenceau was very naturally anxious about the French
line in Champagne, which was strengthened by this extension of the
British flank. There is in truth no need for mutual reproach, as
every one acted for the best under the almost intolerable
circumstances imposed by the new conditions.
Before referring in detail to the tremendous storm which was visibly
banking up in the East, and which broke upon March 21 along the
British lines from the Scarpe to the Oise, some allusion should be
made to one or two sharp German attacks in the extreme north, by
which the enemy endeavoured to draw the attention of the Allies away
from the district in which their first real attack was planned. In
the first of these, delivered upon March 8 to the south of Houthulst
Forest, in the area formerly occupied by the Second Army, the German
stormers, attacking on a mile of front, gained a footing in the
advanced trenches over a space of 500 yards, but were driven out
again and past their own front line by a spirited counter-attack.
The losses of the Thirty-sixth Reserve Division, who carried out the
operation, were considerable, and their gains were nil. The second
attack was made upon the same evening in the neighbourhood of
Polderhoek Château, to the south of the Ypres front. Here again some
trench elements were secured in the first rush, but were entirely
regained by the 10th K.R.R. and 13th Fusiliers of the 111th Brigade,
who restored the line. Neither attempt was serious, but they were
operations on a considerably larger scale than any others during the
winter. These attacks were delivered upon the front {8} of Jacob's
Second Corps, which belonged to Rawlinson's Fourth Army, but within a
few days Plumer had returned from Italy, and he, with the Second
Army, took over this sector once again.
We must now turn to the long stretch from Monchy in the north to La
Fère in the south, a front of fifty miles, upon which the great
German blow was about to fall. It is said that after a tour of the
whole line General Ludendorff determined upon this as being the most
favourable region for a grand attack. Granting that for general
motives of policy the assault should be on the British rather than on
the French army, it is clear that he could have come to no other
decision since Flanders at that time of year might have been a
morass, and the rest of the line was to a large extent upon
commanding ground. On the other hand the desolate country which had
been already occupied and abandoned by the Germans was in front of
their new advance, and it was likely that this would act as a
shock-absorber and take the momentum off a victorious advance before
it could reach any point of vital strategic importance. The German
Staff seems, however, to have placed great confidence upon their
secrecy, their numbers, and their new methods. Their ambitious plan
was to break right through to Amiens, to seize the line of the Somme
so as to divide the Allied armies, and then to throw their weight to
right or to left as might seem best, the one movement threatening the
Channel ports and the other Paris. Their actual success, though it
was considerable, fell so far short of their real intentions that
disappointment rather than triumph must have been their prevailing
emotion. Looking first upon their side of the line one can {9}
appreciate in a general way the efficient methods which they took to
ensure success. The troops had been exercised in the back areas
during the whole winter in the new arts of attack, which will be more
fully indicated when the battle opens. They were then assembled at
various railway junctions, such as Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Wassigny,
and Vervins, sufficiently far from the front to escape direct
observation. Then for seven nights in successive marches the troops
were brought forward, finally reaching the front lines on the night
before the attack, while the guns, the mine-throwers, and the
munition dumps had already been prepared. The whole affair was upon
a gigantic scale, for sixty divisions, or half a million of infantry,
were thrown into the battle upon the first day, with half as many in
immediate reserve. Secrecy was preserved by every possible
precaution, though the British aeroplanes, casting down their flare
lights upon crowded roads, gave few hopes that it could be sustained.
Three of the most famous generals in the German service were in
immediate charge of the operations. General Otto von Below, the
victor of the Italian disaster, with the Seventeenth Army in the
north; General von Marwitz, who had distinguished himself at Cambrai,
with the Second Army in the centre; and General von Hutier, the
conqueror of Riga and the inventor of the new tactics, with the
Eighteenth Army in the south. It was to the last, which was under
the nominal command of the Crown Prince, that the chief attack was
allotted. Forty divisions, with large reserves, were placed under
his command for an assault upon General Gough's lines between Cambrai
and the Oise, while twenty divisions, with corresponding reserves,
{10} were thrown against the British Third Army, especially that
section of it opposite Croisilles and Bullecourt. Never in the
history of the world had a more formidable force been concentrated
upon a fixed and limited objective. The greatest possible
expectations were founded upon the battle, which had already been
named the "Kaiser Schlacht," while the day chosen had been called
Michael's day, or the day of Germany's revenge.
We shall now turn from the German preparations and examine that
British position upon which the attack was about to fall. It was
divided into two sections, a point north of Gauche Wood upon the
Cambrai front being roughly the point of division between the Third
and the Fifth Armies. These armies were of equal strength, each
having twelve divisions of infantry in the line or in immediate
support. These divisions with their respective positions and varying
experiences will presently be enumerated. For the moment it may be
stated that the Third Army consisted of four corps, the Seventeenth
(Fergusson) in the Arras-Monchy sector, the Sixth (Haldane) carrying
the line past Bullecourt, the Fourth (Harper) continuing it to near
the Cambrai district, and the Fifth (Fanshawe) covering that
important point where the gap in the Hindenburg Line seemed to make
an attack particularly likely. The Fifth Army in turn consisted of
the Seventh Corps (Congreve) in the southern part of the Cambrai
district, the Nineteenth Corps (Watts) from south of Ronssoy to
Maissemy, the Eighteenth Corps (Maxse) in front of St. Quentin, and
the Third Corps (Butler) covering the great frontage of 30,000 yards
from Urvillers, across the Oise, down to Barisis, eight miles {11}
south of La Fère. This long curve of fifty miles was strongly
fortified throughout its whole length, but the position was stronger
in the north where the British had been in their lines for a year or
more. In the southern sector the new ground which had been taken
over was by no means so strongly organised as its defenders desired,
either in the portion formerly held by the British or in the French
sector, where only two lines existed. In the north a system of
successive lines had been adopted, called respectively the forward
line, the corps line, and the army line. In the south there was less
depth to the defence, but every possible effort was made to improve
it, the work proceeding night and day, and the soldiers being tied to
it to an extent which gave little time for military exercises. In
this work the cavalry and special entrenching battalions gave
valuable help. As a result, by the third week of March the south was
as well prepared as the number of men available would allow. There
were not enough to man continuous lines of trenches over so great a
front. A system was adopted, therefore, by which there was an
advanced zone, consisting of a thin line of infantry supported by
numerous small redoubts, each of which contained several machine-guns
and a company of infantry. These were to take off the edge of the
assault, and it was hoped, as half a mile separated the two armies,
and the fields of fire were good, that before reaching the position
at all the enemy would suffer severely. A thousand yards behind the
advance zone was the true battle zone, where the main body of the
infantry lay behind barbed wire with the support of isolated forts.
Beyond these again was a third zone, 2000 yards farther to the rear,
but this had not yet been {12} completed. Behind the whole position
in the southern part of the line was the great bend of the River
Somme, which was also being organised as a reserve line, but was very
incomplete. It should be emphasised that these deficiencies were in
no way due to the British command, which was so assiduous in its
preparations that it rather raised the ridicule of certain
unimaginative people upon the spot who cannot see a danger until it
actually materialises in front of them. The fact that General Gough
had been a cavalry general, and that his actions in the war had been
aggressive rather than defensive, gave a false impression at the time
in certain quarters. It is certain that nothing was neglected in the
way of defence which skill could devise or industry carry out.
The general situation then upon the night of March 20, when the
German preparations were complete, was that along the whole front the
Germans were crouching for their spring, and that their first line
consisted of sixty divisions, or more than half a million infantry,
against the twenty-four divisions, or about 200,000 infantry, who
awaited them. The odds were greatly increased by the fact that the
Germans held some thirty divisions in immediate reserve, whereas the
British reserves, especially in the south of the line, were few and
distant. The German concentration of gun power was more than twice
that of the British. The published account of a German officer
claims it as fourfold, but this is probably an over-statement. In
describing the results of this great attack we shall deal first with
the sequence of events in the sector of the Third Army in the north,
and then turn to those connected with the Fifth Army in the south.
{13}