1799-1800.
Difficulties of a new Government--State of Europe--Bonaparte's wish
for peace--M. de Talleyrand Minister for Foreign Affairs--
Negotiations with England and Austria--Their failure--Bonaparte's
views on the East--His sacrifices to policy--General Bonaparte
denounced to the First Consul--Kléber's letter to the Directory--
Accounts of the Egyptian expedition published in the Moniteur--
Proclamation to the army of the East--Favour and disgrace of certain
individuals accounted for.
When a new Government rises on the ruins of one that has been
overthrown, its best chance of conciliating the favour of the nation, if
that nation be at war, is to hold out the prospect of peace; for peace
is always dear to a people. Bonaparte was well aware of this; and if in
his heart he wished otherwise, he knew how important it was to seem to
desire peace. Accordingly, immediately after his installation at the
Luxembourg he notified to all the foreign powers his accession to the
Consulate, and, for the same purpose, addressed letters to all the
diplomatic agents of the French Government abroad.
The day after he got rid of his first two colleagues, Sieyès and Roger
Ducos, he prepared to open negotiations with the Cabinet of London. At
that time we were at war with almost the whole of Europe. We had also
lost Italy. The Emperor of Germany was ruled by his Ministers, who in
their turn were governed by England. It was no easy matter to manage
equally the organization of the Consular Government and the no less
important affairs abroad; and it was very important to the interests of
the First Consul to intimate to foreign powers, while at the same time
he assured himself against the return of the Bourbons, that the system
which he proposed to adopt was a system of order and regeneration,
unlike either the demagogic violence of the Convention or the imbecile
artifice of the Directory. In fulfilment of this object Bonaparte
directed M. de Talleyrand, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, to make
the first friendly overtures to the English Cabinet: A correspondence
ensued, which was published at the time, and which showed at once the
conciliatory policy of Bonaparte and the arrogant policy of England.
The exchange of notes which took place was attended by no immediate
result. However, the First Consul had partly attained his object: if the
British Government would not enter into negotiations for peace, there
was at least reason to presume that subsequent overtures of the Consular
Government might be listened to. The correspondence had at all events
afforded Bonaparte the opportunity of declaring his principles, and
above all, it had enabled him to ascertain that the return of the
Bourbons to France (mentioned in the official reply of Lord Grenville)
would not be a sine qua non condition for the restoration of peace
between the two powers.
Since M. de Talleyrand had been Minister for Foreign Affairs the
business of that department had proceeded with great activity. It was
an important advantage to Bonaparte to find a nobleman of the old regime
among the republicans. The choice of M. de Talleyrand was in some sort
an act of courtesy to the foreign Courts. It was a delicate attention to
the diplomacy of Europe to introduce to its members, for the purpose of
treating with them, a man whose rank was at least equal to their own,
and who was universally distinguished for a polished elegance of manner
combined with solid good qualities and real talents.
It was not only with England that Bonaparte and his Minister endeavoured
to open negotiations; the Consular Cabinet also offered peace to the
House of Austria; but not at the same time. The object of this offer
was to sow discord between the two powers. Speaking to me one day of
his earnest wish to obtain peace Bonaparte said, "You see, Bourrienne, I
have two great enemies to cope with. I will conclude peace with the one
I find most easy to deal with. That will enable me immediately to assail
the other. I frankly confess that I should like best to be at peace with
England. Nothing would then be more easy than to crush Austria. She has
no money except what she gets through England."
For a long time all negotiations proved abortive. None of the European
powers would acknowledge the new Government, of which Bonaparte was the
head; and the battle of Marengo was required before the peace of Amiens
could be obtained.
Though the affairs of the new Government afforded abundant occupation to
Bonaparte, he yet found leisure to direct attention to the East--to that
land of despotism whence, judging from his subsequent conduct, it might
be presumed he derived his first principles of government. On becoming
the head of the State he wished to turn Egypt, which he had conquered
as a general, to the advantage of his policy as Consul. If Bonaparte
triumphed over a feeling of dislike in consigning the command of the
army to Kléber, it was because he knew Kléber to be more capable than
any other of executing the plans he had formed; and Bonaparte was not
the man to sacrifice the interests of policy to personal resentment. It
is certainly true that he then put into practice that charming phrase of
Molière's--"I pardon you, but you shall pay me for this!"
With respect to all whom he had left in Egypt Bonaparte stood in a very
singular situation. On becoming Chief of the Government he was not only
the depositary of all communications made to the Directory; but letters
sent to one address were delivered to another, and the First Consul
received the complaints made against the General who had so abruptly
quitted Egypt. In almost all the letters that were delivered to us
he was the object of serious accusation. According to some he had not
avowed his departure until the very day of his embarkation; and he had
deceived everybody by means of false and dissembling proclamations.
Others canvassed his conduct while in Egypt: the army which had
triumphed under his command he had abandoned when reduced to two-thirds
of its original force and a prey to all the horrors of sickness and
want. It must be confessed that these complaints and accusations were
but too well founded, and one can never cease wondering at the chain
of fortunate circumstances which so rapidly raised Bonaparte to the
Consular seat. In the natural order of things, and in fulfilment of
the design which he himself had formed, he should have disembarked at
Toulon, where the quarantine laws would no doubt have been observed;
instead of which, the fear of the English and the uncertainty of the
pilots caused him to go to Fréjus, where the quarantine laws were
violated by the very persons most interested in respecting them. Let us
suppose that Bonaparte had been forced to perform quarantine at Toulon.
What would have ensued? The charges against him would have fallen into
the hands of the Directory, and he would probably have been suspended,
and put upon his trial.
Among the letters which fell into Bonaparte's hands, by reason of
the abrupt change of government, was an official despatch (of the 4th
Vendemiaire, year VIII.) from General Kléber at Cairo to the Executive
Directory, in which that general spoke in very stringent terms of the
sudden departure of Bonaparte and of the state in which the army in
Egypt had been left. General Kléber further accused him of having
evaded, by his flight, the difficulties which he thus transferred to his
successor's shoulders, and also of leaving the army "without a sou in
the chest," with pay in arrear, and very little supply of munitions or
clothing.
The other letters from Egypt were not less accusatory than Kléber's; and
it cannot be doubted that charges of so precise a nature, brought by the
general who had now become commander-in-chief against his predecessor,
would have had great weight, especially backed as they were by similar
complaints from other quarters. A trial would have been inevitable;
and then, no 18th Brumaire, no Consulate, no Empire, no conquest of
Europe--but also, it may be added, no St. Helena. None of these events
would have ensued had not the English squadron, when it appeared off
Corsica, obliged the Muiron to scud about at hazard, and to touch at the
first land she could reach.
The Egyptian expedition filled too important a place in the life of
Bonaparte for him to neglect frequently reviving in the public mind the
recollection of his conquests in the East. It was not to be forgotten
that the head of the Republic was the first of her generals. While
Moreau received the command of the armies of the Rhine, while Massena,
as a reward for the victory of Zurich, was made Commander-in-Chief
in Italy, and while Brune was at the head of the army of Batavia,
Bonaparte, whose soul was in the camps, consoled himself for his
temporary inactivity by a retrospective glance on his past triumphs. He
was unwilling that Fame should for a moment cease to blazon his
name. Accordingly, as soon as he was established at the head of the
Government, he caused accounts of his Egyptian expedition to be from
time to time published in the Moniteur. He frequently expressed his
satisfaction that the accusatory correspondence, and, above all,
Kléber's letter, had fallen into his own hands. Such was Bonaparte's
perfect self-command that immediately after perusing that letter he
dictated to me the following proclamation, addressed to the army of the
East:
SOLDIERS!--The Consuls of the French Republic frequently direct
their attention to the army of the East.
France acknowledges all the influence of your conquests on the
restoration of her trade and the civilisation of the world.
The eyes of all Europe are upon you, and in thought I am often with
you.
In whatever situation the chances of war may place you, prove
yourselves still the soldiers of Rivoli and Aboukir--you will be
invincible.
Place in Kléber the boundless confidence which you reposed in me.
He deserves it.
Soldiers, think of the day when you will return victorious to the
sacred territory of France. That will be a glorious day for the
whole nation.
Nothing can more forcibly show the character of Bonaparte than the above
allusion to Kléber, after he had seen the way in which Kléber spoke
of him to the Directory. Could it ever have been imagined that the
correspondence of the army, to whom he addressed this proclamation,
teemed with accusations against him? Though the majority of these
accusations were strictly just, yet it is but fair to state that
the letters from Egypt contained some calumnies. In answer to the
well-founded portion of the charges Bonaparte said little; but he seemed
to feel deeply the falsehoods that were stated against him, one of which
was, that he had carried away millions from Egypt. I cannot conceive
what could have given rise to this false and impudent assertion. So far
from having touched the army chest, Bonaparte had not even received all
his own pay. Before he constituted himself the Government the Government
was his debtor.
Though he knew well all that was to be expected from the Egyptian
expedition, yet those who lauded that affair were regarded with a
favourable eye by Bonaparte. The correspondence which had fallen into
his hands was to him of the highest importance in enabling him to
ascertain the opinions which particular individuals entertained of him.
It was the source of favours and disgraces which those who were not in
the secret could not account for. It serves to explain why many men of
mediocrity were elevated to the highest dignities and honours, while
other men of real merit fell into disgrace or were utterly neglected.