successfully executes, the crowning task of his life. Yet this was
Humboldt's case. The first two volumes of the _Kosmos_ were published,
and in the main composed, between the years 1845 and 1847. The idea of a
work which should convey, not only a graphic description, but an
imaginative conception of the physical world--which should support
generalization by details, and dignify details by generalization, had
floated before his mind for upwards of half a century. It first took
definite shape in a set of lectures delivered by him before the
university of Berlin in the winter of 1827-1828. These lectures formed,
as his latest biographer expresses it, "the cartoon for the great fresco
of the _Kosmos_." The scope of this remarkable work may be briefly
described as the representation of the unity amid the complexity of
nature. In it the large and vague ideals of the 18th are sought to be
combined with the exact scientific requirements of the 19th century.
And, in spite of inevitable shortcomings, the attempt was in an eminent
degree successful. Nevertheless, the general effect of the book is
rendered to some extent unsatisfactory by its tendency to substitute the
indefinite for the infinite, and thus to ignore, while it does not deny,
the existence of a power outside and beyond nature. A certain heaviness
of style, too, and laborious picturesqueness of treatment make it more
imposing than attractive to the general reader. But its supreme and
abiding value consists in its faithful reflection of the mind of a great
man. No higher eulogium can be passed on Alexander von Humboldt than
that, in attempting, and not unworthily attempting, to portray the
universe, he succeeded still more perfectly in portraying his own
comprehensive intelligence.
The last decade of his long life--his "improbable" years, as he was
accustomed to call them--was devoted to the continuation of this work,
of which the third and fourth volumes were published in 1850-1858, while
a fragment of a fifth appeared posthumously in 1862. In these he sought
to fill up what was wanting of detail as to individual branches of
science in the sweeping survey contained in the first volume.
Notwithstanding their high separate value, it must be admitted that,
from an artistic point of view, these additions were deformities. The
characteristic idea of the work, so far as such a gigantic idea admitted
of literary incorporation, was completely developed in its opening
portions, and the attempt to convert it into a scientific encyclopaedia
was in truth to nullify its generating motive. Humboldt's remarkable
industry and accuracy were never more conspicuous than in the erection
of this latest trophy to his genius. Nor did he rely entirely on his own
labours. He owed much of what he accomplished to his rare power of
assimilating the thoughts and availing himself of the co-operation of
others. He was not more ready to incur than to acknowledge obligations.
The notes to _Kosmos_ overflow with laudatory citations, the current
coin in which he discharged his intellectual debts.
On the 24th of February 1857 Humboldt was attacked with a slight
apoplectic stroke, which passed away without leaving any perceptible
trace. It was not until the winter of 1858-1859 that his strength began
to decline, and on the ensuing 6th of May he tranquilly expired, wanting
but six months of completing his ninetieth year. The honours which had
been showered on him during life followed him after death. His remains,
previously to being interred in the family resting-place at Tegel, were
conveyed in state through the streets of Berlin, and received by the
prince-regent with uncovered head at the door of the cathedral. The
first centenary of his birth was celebrated on the 14th of September
1869, with equal enthusiasm in the New and Old Worlds; and the numerous
monuments erected in his honour, and newly explored regions called by
his name, bear witness to the universal diffusion of his fame and
popularity.
Humboldt never married, and seems to have been at all times more social
than domestic in his tastes. To his brother's family he was, however,
much attached; and in his later years the somewhat arbitrary sway of an
old and faithful servant held him in more than matrimonial bondage. By a
singular example of weakness, he executed, four years before his death,
a deed of gift transferring to this man Seifert the absolute possession
of his entire property. It is right to add that no undue advantage
appears to have been taken of this extraordinary concession. Of the
qualities of his heart it is less easy to speak than of those of his
head. The clue to his inner life might probably be found in a certain
egotism of self-culture scarcely separable from the promptings of
genius. Yet his attachments, once formed, were sincere and lasting. He
made innumerable friends; and it does not stand on record that he ever
lost one. His benevolence was throughout his life active and
disinterested. His early zeal for the improvement of the condition of
the miners in Galicia and Franconia, his consistent detestation of
slavery, his earnest patronage of rising men of science, bear witness to
the large humanity which formed the ground-work of his character. The
faults of his old age have been brought into undue prominence by the
injudicious publication of his letters to Varnhagen von Ense. The chief
of these was his habit of smooth speaking, almost amounting to flattery,
which formed a painful contrast with the caustic sarcasm of his
confidential utterances. His vanity, at all times conspicuous, was
tempered by his sense of humour, and was so frankly avowed as to invite
sympathy rather than provoke ridicule. After every deduction has been
made, he yet stands before us as a colossal figure, not unworthy to take
his place beside Goethe as the representative of the scientific side of
the culture of his country.
The best biography of Humboldt is that of Professor Karl Bruhns (3
vols., 8vo, Leipzig, 1872), translated into English by the Misses
Lassell in 1873. Brief accounts of his career are given by A. Dove in
_Allgemeine deutsche Biographie_, and by S. Gunther in _Alexander von
Humboldt_ (Berlin, 1900). The _Voyage aux regions equinoxiales du
Nouveau Continent, fait en 1799-1804, par Alexandre de Humboldt et
Aime Bonpland_ (Paris, 1807, &c.), consisted of thirty folio and
quarto volumes, and comprised a considerable number of subordinate but
important works. Among these may be enumerated _Vue des Cordilleres et
monuments des peuples indigenes de l'Amerique_ (2 vols. folio, 1810);
_Examen critique de l'histoire de la geographie du Nouveau Continent_
(1814-1834); _Atlas geographique et physique du royaume de la Nouvelle
Espagne_ (1811); _Essai politique sur le royaume de la Nouvelle
Espagne_ (1811); _Essai sur la geographie des plantes_ (1805, now very
rare); and _Relation historique_ (1814-1825), an unfinished narrative
of his travels, including the _Essai politique sur l'ile de Cuba_. The
_Nova genera et species plantarum_ (7 vols. folio, 1815-1825),
containing descriptions of above 4500 species of plants collected by
Humboldt and Bonpland, was mainly compiled by C. S. Kunth; J. Oltmanns
assisted in preparing the _Recueil d'observations astronomiques_
(1808); Cuvier, Latreille, Valenciennes and Gay-Lussac cooperated in
the _Recueil d'observations de zoologie et d'anatomie comparee_
(1805-1833), Humboldt's _Ansichten der Natur_ (Stuttgart and Tubingen,
1808) went through three editions in his lifetime, and was translated
into nearly every European language. The results of his Asiatic
journey were published in _Fragments de geologie et de climatologie
asiatiques_ (2 vols. 8vo, 1831), and in _Asie centrale_ (3 vols. 8vo,
1843)--an enlargement of the earlier work. The memoirs and papers read
by him before scientific societies, or contributed by him to
scientific periodicals, are too numerous for specification.
Since his death considerable portions of his correspondence have been
made public. The first of these, in order both of time and of
importance, is his _Briefe an Varnhagen von Ense_ (Leipzig, 1860).
This was followed in rapid succession by _Briefwechsel mit einem
jungen Freunde_ (Friedrich Althaus, Berlin, 1861); _Briefwechsel mit
Heinrich Berghaus_ (3 vols., Jena, 1863); _Correspondance scientifique
et litteraire_ (2 vols., Paris, 1865-1869); "Lettres a Marc-Aug.
Pictet," published in _Le Globe_, tome vii. (Geneva, 1868); _Briefe an
Bunsen_ (Leipzig, 1869); _Briefe zwischen Humboldt und Gauss_ (1877);
_Briefe an seinen Bruder Wilhelm_ (Stuttgart, 1880); _Jugendbriefe an
W. G. Wegener_ (Leipzig, 1896); besides some other collections of less
note. An octavio edition of Humboldt's principal works was published
in Paris by Th. Morgand (1864-1866). See also Karl von Baer, _Bulletin
de l'acad. des sciences de St-Petersbourg_, xvii. 529 (1859); R.
Murchison, _Proceedings, Geog. Society of London_, vi. (1859); L.
Agassiz, _American Jour. of Science_, xxviii. 96 (1859); _Proc. Roy.
Society_, X. xxxix.; A. Quetelet, _Annuaire de l'acad. des sciences_
(Brussels, 1860), p. 97; J. Madler, _Geschichte der Himmelskunde_, ii.
113; J. C. Houzeau, _Bibl. astronomique_, ii. 168. (A. M. C.)
HUMBOLDT, KARL WILHELM VON (1767-1835), German philologist and man of
letters, the elder brother of the more celebrated Alexander von
Humboldt, was born at Potsdam, on the 22nd of June 1767. After being
educated at Berlin, Gottingen and Jena, in the last of which places he
formed a close and lifelong friendship with Schiller, he married
Fraulein von Dacherode, a lady of birth and fortune, and in 1802 was
appointed by the Prussian government first resident and then minister
plenipotentiary at Rome. While there he published a poem entitled _Rom_,
which was reprinted in 1824. This was not, however, the first of his
literary productions; his critical essay on Goethe's _Hermann und
Dorothea_, published in 1800, had already placed him in the first rank
of authorities on aesthetics, and, together with his family connexions,
had much to do with his appointment at Rome; while in the years 1795 and
1797 he had brought out translations of several of the odes of Pindar,
which were held in high esteem. On quitting his post at Rome he was made
councillor of state and minister of public instruction. He soon,
however, retired to his estate at Tegel, near Berlin, but was recalled
and sent as ambassador to Vienna in 1812 during the exciting period
which witnessed the closing struggles of the French empire. In the
following year, as Prussian plenipotentiary at the congress of Prague,
he was mainly instrumental in inducing Austria to unite with Prussia and
Russia against France; in 1815 he was one of the signatories of the
capitulation of Paris, and the same year was occupied in drawing up the
treaty between Prussia and Saxony, by which the territory of the former
was largely increased at the expense of the latter. The next year he was
at Frankfort settling the future condition of Germany, but was summoned
to London in the midst of his work, and in 1818 had to attend the
congress at Aix-la-Chapelle. The reactionary policy of the Prussian
government made him resign his office of privy councillor and give up
political life in 1819; and from that time forward he devoted himself
solely to literature and study.
During the busiest portion of his political career, however, he had
found time for literary work. Thus in 1816 he had published a
translation of the _Agamemnon_ of Aeschylus, and in 1817 corrections and
additions to Adelung's _Mithridates_, that famous collection of
specimens of the various languages and dialects of the world. Among
these additions that on the Basque language is the longest and most
important, Basque having for some time specially attracted his
attention. In fact, Wilhelm von Humboldt may be said to have been the
first who brought Basque before the notice of European philologists, and
made a scientific study of it possible. In order to gain a practical
knowledge of the language and complete his investigations into it, he
visited the Basque country itself, the result of his visit being the
valuable "Researches into the Early Inhabitants of Spain by the help of
the Basque language" (_Prufung der Untersuchungen uber die Urbewohner
Hispaniens vermittelst der vaskischen Sprache_), published in 1821. In
this work he endeavoured to show, by an examination of geographical
names, that a race or races speaking dialects allied to modern Basque
once extended through the whole of Spain, the southern coast of France
and the Balearic Islands, and suggested that these people, whom he
identified with the Iberians of classical writers, had come from
northern Africa, where the name of Berber still perhaps perpetuates
their old designation. Another work on what has sometimes been termed
the metaphysics of language appeared from his pen in 1828, under the
title of _Uber den Dualis_; but the great work of his life, on the
ancient Kawi language of Java, was unfortunately interrupted by his
death on the 8th of April 1835. The imperfect fragment was edited by his
brother and Dr Buschmann in 1836, and contains the remarkable
introduction on "The Heterogeneity of Language and its Influence on the
Intellectual Development of Mankind" (_Uber die Verschiedenheit des
menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige
Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts_), which was afterwards edited and
defended against Steinthal's criticisms by Pott (2 vols., 1876). This
essay, which has been called the text-book of the philosophy of speech,
first clearly laid down that the character and structure of a language
expresses the inner life and knowledge of its speakers, and that
languages must differ from one another in the same way and to the same
degree as those who use them. Sounds do not become words until a meaning
has been put into them, and this meaning embodies the thought of a
community. What Humboldt terms the inner form of a language is just that
mode of denoting the relations between the parts of a sentence which
reflects the manner in which a particular body of men regards the world
about them. It is the task of the morphology of speech to distinguish
the various ways in which languages differ from each other as regards
their inner form, and to classify and arrange them accordingly. Other
linguistic publications of Humboldt, which had appeared in the
_Transactions_ of the Berlin Academy, the _Journal_ of the Royal Asiatic
Society, or elsewhere, were republished by his brother in the seven
volumes of Wilhelm von Humboldt's _Gesammelte Werke_ (1841-1852). These
volumes also contain poems, essays on aesthetical subjects and other
creations of his prolific mind. Perhaps, however, the most generally
interesting of his works, outside those which deal with language, is his
correspondence with Schiller, published in 1830. Both poet and
philosopher come before us in it in their most genial mood. For, though
Humboldt was primarily a philosopher, he was a philosopher rendered
practical by his knowledge of statesmanship and wide experience of life,
and endowed with keen sympathies, warm imagination and active interest
in the method of scientific inquiry. (A. H. S.)
HUMBUG, an imposture, sham, fraud. The word seems to have been
originally applied to a trick or hoax, and appears as a slang term about
1750. According to the _New English Dictionary_, Ferdinando Killigrew's
_The Universal Jester_, which contains the word in its sub-title "a
choice collection of many conceits ... bonmots and humbugs," was
published in 1754, not, as is often stated, in 1735-1740. The principal
passage in reference to the introduction of the word occurs in _The
Student_, 1750-1751, ii. 41, where it is called "a word very much in
vogue with the people of taste and fashion." The origin appears to have
been unknown at that date. Skeat connects it (_Etym. Dict._ 1898) with
"hum," to murmur applause, hence flatter, trick, cajole, and "bug,"
bogey, spectre, the word thus meaning a false alarm. Many fanciful
conjectures have been made, e.g. from Irish _uim-bog_, soft copper,
worthless as opposed to sterling money; from "Hamburg," as the centre
from which false coins came into England during the Napoleonic wars; and
from the Italian _uomo bugiardo_, lying man.
HUME, ALEXANDER (c. 1557-1609), Scottish poet, second son of Patrick
Hume of Polwarth, Berwickshire, was born, probably at Reidbrais, one of
his family's houses, about 1557. It has been generally assumed that he
is the Alexander Hume who matriculated at St Mary's college, St Andrews,
in 1571, and graduated in 1574. In _Ane Epistle to Maister Gilbert
Montcreif_ (Moncrieff), _mediciner to the Kings Majestie, wherein is set
downe the Experience of the Authours youth_, he relates the course of
his disillusionment. He says he spent four years in France before
beginning to study law in the courts at Edinburgh (l. 136). After three
years' experience there he abandoned law in disgust and sought a post at
court (_ib._ l. 241). Still dissatisfied, he took orders, and became in
1597 minister of Logic, near Stirling, where he lived until his death on
the 4th of December 1609. His best-known work is his _Hymns, or Sacred
Songs_ (printed by Robert Waldegrave at Edinburgh in 1599, and dedicated
to Elizabeth Melvill, Lady Comrie) containing an epistle to the Scottish
youth, urging them to abandon vanity for religion. One poem of the
collection, entitled "A description of the day Estivall," a sketch of a
summer's day and its occupations, has found its way into several
anthologies. "The Triumph of the Lord after the Manner of Men" is a song
of victory of some merit, celebrating the defeat of the Armada in 1588.
His prose works include _Ane Treatise of Conscience_ (Edinburgh, 1594),
_A Treatise of the Felicitie of the Life to come_ (Edinburgh, 1594), and
_Ane Afold Admonitioun to the Ministerie of Scotland_. The last is an
argument against prelacy. Hume's elder brother, Lord Polwarth, was
probably one of the combatants in the famous "Flyting betwixt
Montgomerie and Polwart."
The editions of Hume's verse are: (a) by Robert Waldegrave (1599); (b)
a reprint of (a) by the Bannatyne Club (1832); and (c) by the Scottish
Text Society (ed. A. Lawson) (1902). The last includes the prose
tracts.
HUME, DAVID (1711-1776), English philosopher, historian and political
economist, was born at Edinburgh, on the 26th of April (O.S.) 1711. His
father, Joseph Hume or Home, a scion of the noble house of Home of
Douglas (but see _Notes and Queries_, 4th ser. iv. 72), was owner of a
small estate in Berwickshire, on the banks of the Whiteadder, called,
from the spring rising in front of the dwelling-house, Ninewells. David
was the youngest of a family of three, two sons and a daughter, who
after the early death of the father were brought up with great care and
devotion by their mother, the daughter of Sir David Falconer, president
of the college of justice.
Of Hume's early education little is known beyond what he has himself
stated in his _Life_. He appears to have entered the Greek classes of
the university of Edinburgh in 1723, and, he tells us, "passed through
the ordinary course of education with success." From a letter printed in
Burton's _Life_ (i. 30-39), it appears that about 1726 Hume returned to
Ninewells with a fair knowledge of Latin, slight acquaintance with Greek
and literary tastes decidedly inclining to "books of reasoning and
philosophy, and to poetry and the polite authors." We do not know,
except by inference, to what studies he especially devoted himself. It
is, however, clear that from his earliest years he began to speculate
upon the nature of knowledge in the abstract, and its concrete
applications, as in theology, and that with this object he studied
largely the writings of Cicero and Seneca and recent English
philosophers (especially Locke, Berkeley and Butler). His acquaintance
with Cicero is clearly proved by the form in which he cast some of the
most important of his speculations. From his boyhood he devoted himself
to acquiring a literary reputation, and throughout his life, in spite of
financial and other difficulties, he adhered to his original intention.
A man of placid and even phlegmatic temperament, he lived moderately in
all things, and sought worldly prosperity only so far as was necessary
to give him leisure for his literary work. At first he tried law, but
was unable to give his mind to a study which appeared to him to be
merely a barren waste of technical jargon. At this time the intensity of
his intellectual activity in the area opened up to him by Locke and
Berkeley reduced him to a state of physical exhaustion. In these
circumstances he determined to try the effect of complete change of
scene and occupation, and in 1734 entered a business house in Bristol.
In a few months he found "the scene wholly unsuitable" to him, and about
the middle of 1734 set out for France, resolved to spend some years in
quiet study. He visited Paris, resided for a time at Rheims and then
settled at La Fleche, famous in the history of philosophy as the school
of Descartes. His health seems to have been perfectly restored, and
during the three years of his stay in France his speculations were
worked into systematic form in the _Treatise of Human Nature_. In the
autumn of 1737 he was in London arranging for its publication and
polishing it in preparation for the judgments of the learned. In January
1739 appeared the first and second volumes of the _Treatise of Human
Nature, being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of
Reasoning into Moral Subjects_, containing book i., _Of the
Understanding_, and book ii., _Of the Passions_. The third volume,
containing book iii., _Of Morals_, was published in the following year.
The publisher of the first two volumes, John Noone, gave him L50 and
twelve bound copies for a first edition of one thousand copies. Hume's
own words best describe its reception. "Never literary attempt was more
unfortunate; it fell _dead-born from the press_, without reaching such
distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots." "But," he
adds, "being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I very soon
recovered the blow, and prosecuted with great ardour my studies in the
country." This brief notice, however, is not sufficient to explain the
full significance of the event for Hume's own life. The work undoubtedly
failed to do what its author expected from it; even the notice,
otherwise not unsatisfactory, which it obtained in the _History of the
Works of the Learned_, then the principal critical journal, did not in
the least appreciate the true bearing of the _Treatise_ on current
discussions. Hume naturally expected that the world would see as clearly
as he did the connexion between the concrete problems agitating
contemporary thought and the abstract principles on which their solution
depended. Accordingly he looked for opposition, and expected that, if
his principles were received, a change in general conceptions of things
would ensue. His disappointment at its reception was great; and though
he never entirely relinquished his metaphysical speculations, though all
that is of value in his later writings depends on the acute analysis of
human nature to which he was from the first attracted, one cannot but
regret that his high powers were henceforth withdrawn for the most part
from the consideration of the foundations of belief, and expended on its
practical applications. In later years he attributed his want of success
to the immature style of his early exposition, to the rashness of a
young innovator in an old and well-established province of literature.
But this has little foundation beyond the irritation of an author at his
own failure to attract such attention as he deems his due. None of the
principles of the _Treatise_ is given up in the later writings, and no
addition is made to them. Nor can the superior polish of the more mature
productions counterbalance the concentrated vigour of the more youthful
work.
After the publication of the _Treatise_ Hume retired to his brother's
house at Ninewells and carried on his studies, mainly in the direction
of politics and political economy. In 1741 he published the first volume
of his _Essays_, which had a considerable and immediate success. A
second edition was called for in the following year, in which also a
second volume was published. These essays Butler, to whom he had sent a
copy of his _Treatise_, but with whom he had failed to make personal
acquaintance, warmly commended. The philosophical relation between
Butler and Hume is curious. So far as analysis of knowledge is concerned
they are in harmony, and Hume's sceptical conclusions regarding belief
in matters of fact are the foundations on which Butler's defence of
religion rests. Butler, however, retained, in spite of his destructive
theory of knowledge, confidence in the rational proofs for the existence
of God, and certainly maintains what may be vaguely described as an a
priori view of conscience. Hume had the greatest respect for the author
of the _Analogy_, ranks him with Locke and Berkeley as an originator of
the experimental method in moral science, and in his specially
theological essays, such as that on _Particular Providence and a Future
State_, has Butler's views specifically in mind. (See BUTLER.)
The success of the _Essays_, though hardly great enough to satisfy his
somewhat exorbitant cravings, was a great encouragement to him. He began
to hope that his earlier work, if recast and lightened, might share the
fortunes of its successor; and at intervals throughout the next four
years he occupied himself in rewriting it in a more succinct form with
all the literary grace at his command. Meantime he continued to look
about for some post which might secure him the modest independence he
desired. In 1744 we find him, in anticipation of a vacancy in the chair
of moral philosophy at Edinburgh university, moving his friends to
advance his cause with the electors; and though, as he tells us, "the
accusation of heresy, deism, scepticism or theism, &c., &c., was
started" against him, it had no effect, "being bore down by the contrary
authority of all the good people in town." To his great mortification,
however, he found out, as he thought, that Hutcheson and Leechman, with
whom he had been on terms of friendly correspondence, were giving the
weight of their opinion against his election. The after history of these
negotiations is obscure. Failing in this attempt, he was induced to
become tutor, or keeper, to the marquis of Annandale, a harmless
literary lunatic. This position, financially advantageous, was absurdly
false (see letters in Burton's _Life_, i. ch. v.), and when the matter
ended Hume had to sue for arrears of salary.
In 1746 Hume accepted the office of secretary to General St Clair, and
was a spectator of the ill-fated expedition to France in the autumn of
that year. His admirable account of the transaction has been printed by
Burton. After a brief sojourn at Ninewells, doubtless occupied in
preparing for publication his _Philosophical Essays_ (afterwards
entitled _An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding_), Hume was again
associated with General St Clair as secretary in the embassy to Vienna
and Turin (1748). The notes of this journey are written in a light and
amusing style, showing Hume's usual keenness of sight in some directions
and his almost equal blindness in others. During his absence from
England, early in the year 1748, the _Philosophical Essays_ were
published; but the first reception of the work was little more
favourable than that accorded to the _Treatise_. To the later editions
of the work Hume prepared an "Advertisement" referring to the
_Treatise_, and desiring that the _Essays_ "may alone be regarded as
containing his philosophical sentiments and principles." Some modern
critics have accepted this disclaimer as of real value, but in fact it
has no significance; and Hume himself in a striking letter to Gilbert
Elliott indicated the true relation of the two works. "I believe the
_Philosophical Essays_ contain everything of consequence relating to the
understanding which you would meet with in the _Treatise_, and I give
you my advice against reading the latter. By shortening and simplifying
the questions, I really render them much more complete. _Addo dum
minuo_. The philosophical principles are the same in both." The Essays
are undoubtedly written with more maturity and skill than the
_Treatise_; they contain in more detail application of the principles to
concrete problems, such as miracles, providence, immortality; but the
entire omission of the discussion forming part ii. of the first book of
the _Treatise_, and the great compression of part iv., are real defects
which must always render the _Treatise_ the more important work.
In 1749 Hume returned to Ninewells, enriched with "near a thousand
pounds." In 1751 he removed to Edinburgh, where for the most part he
resided during the next twelve years of his life. These years are the
richest so far as literary production is concerned. In 1751 he published
his _Political Discourses_, which had a great and well-deserved success
both in England and abroad. It was translated into French by Mauvillon
(1753) and by the Abbe le Blanc (1754). In the same year appeared the
recast of the third book of the _Treatise_, called _Inquiry concerning
the Principles of Morals_, of which he says that "of all his writings,
philosophical, literary or historical, it is incomparably the best." At
this time also we hear of the _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_, a
work which Hume was prevailed on not to publish, but which he revised
with great care, and evidently regarded with the greatest favour. The
work itself, left by Hume with instructions that it should be published,
did not appear till 1779.
In 1751 Hume was again unsuccessful in the attempt to gain a professor's
chair. In the following year he received, in spite of the usual
accusations of heresy, the librarianship of the Advocates' Library in
Edinburgh, small in emoluments (L40 a year) but rich in opportunity for
literary work. In a playful letter to Dr Clephane, he describes his
satisfaction at his appointment, and attributes it in some measure to
the support of "the ladies."
In 1753 Hume was fairly settled in Edinburgh, preparing for his _History
of England_. He had decided to begin the _History_, not with Henry VII.,
as Adam Smith recommended, but with James I., considering that the
political differences of his time took their origin from that period. On
the whole his attitude in respect to disputed political principles seems
not to have been at first consciously unfair. As for the qualities
necessary to secure success as a _writer_ on history, he felt that he
possessed them in a high degree; and, though neither his ideal of an
historian nor his equipment for the task of historical research would
now appear adequate, in both he was much in advance of his time. "But,"
he writes in the well-known passage of his _Life_, "miserable was my
disappointment. I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation,
and even detestation; ... what was still more mortifying, the book
seemed to sink into oblivion. Mr Millar told me that in a twelvemonth he
sold only forty-five copies of it." This account must be accepted with
reservations. It expresses Hume's feelings rather than the real facts.
In Edinburgh, as we learn from one of his letters, the book succeeded
well, no fewer than 450 copies being disposed of in five weeks. Nor is
there anything in Hume's correspondence to show that the failure of the
book was so complete as he declared. Within a very few years the sale of
the _History_ was sufficient to gain for the author a larger revenue
than had ever before been known in his country to flow from literature,
and to place him in comparative affluence. He seems to have received
L400 for the first edition of the first volume, L700 for the first
edition of the second and L840 for the copyright of the two together. At
the same time the bitterness of Hume's feelings and their effect are of
importance in his life. It is from the publication of the _History_ that
we date his virulent hatred of everything English, towards society in
London, Whig principles, Whig ministers and the public generally (see
Burton's _Life_, ii. 268, 417, 434). He was convinced that there was a
conspiracy to suppress and destroy everything Scottish.[1] The remainder
of the _History_ became little better than a party pamphlet. The second
volume, published in 1756, carrying on the narrative to the Revolution,
was better received than the first; but Hume then resolved to work
backwards, and to show from a survey of the Tudor period that his Tory
notions were grounded upon the history of the constitution. In 1759 this
portion of the work appeared, and in 1761 the work was completed by the
history of the pre-Tudor periods. The numerous editions of the various
portions--for, despite Hume's wrath and grumblings, the book was a great
literary success--gave him an opportunity of careful revision, which he
employed to remove from it all the "villainous seditious Whig strokes,"
and "plaguy prejudices of Whiggism" that he could detect. In other
words, he bent all his efforts toward making his _History_ more of a
party work than it had been, and in his effort he was entirely
successful. The early portion of his _History_ may be regarded as now of
little or no value. The sources at Hume's command were few, and he did
not use them all. None the less, the _History_ has a distinct place in
the literature of England. It was the first attempt at a comprehensive
treatment of historic facts, the first to introduce the social and
literary aspects of a nation's life as only second in importance to its
political fortunes, and the first historical writing in an animated yet
refined and polished style.[2]
While the _History_ was in process of publication, Hume did not entirely
neglect his other lines of activity. In 1757 appeared _Four
Dissertations: The Natural History of Religion, Of the Passions, Of
Tragedy, Of the Standard of Taste_. Of these the dissertation on the
passions is a very subtle piece of psychology, containing the essence of
the second book of the _Treatise_. It is remarkable that Hume does not
appear to have been acquainted with Spinoza's analysis of the
affections. The last two essays are contributions of no great importance
to aesthetics, a department of philosophy in which Hume was not strong.
The _Natural History of Religion_ is a powerful contribution to the
deistic controversy; but, as in the case of Hume's earlier work, its
significance was at the time overlooked. It is an attempt to carry the
war into a province hitherto allowed to remain at peace, the theory of
the general development of religious ideas. Deists, though raising
doubts regarding the historic narratives of the Christian faith, had
never disputed the general fact that belief in one God was natural and
primitive. Hume endeavours to show that polytheism was the earliest as
well as the most natural form of religious belief, and that theism or
deism is the product of reflection upon experience, thus reducing the
validity of the historical argument to that of the theoretical proofs.
In 1763 he accompanied Lord Hertford to Paris, doing the duties of
secretary to the embassy, with the prospect of the appointment to that
post. He was everywhere received "with the most extraordinary honours."
The society of Paris was peculiarly ready to receive a great philosopher
and historian, especially if he were known to be an avowed antagonist of
religion, and Hume made valuable friendships, especially with D'Alembert
and Turgot, the latter of whom profited much by Hume's economical
essays. In 1766 he left Paris and returned to Edinburgh. In 1767 he
accepted the post of under-secretary to General Conway and spent two
years in London.
He settled finally in Edinburgh in 1769, having now through his pension
and otherwise an income of L1000 a year. The solitary incident of note
in this period of his life is the ridiculous quarrel with Rousseau,
which throws much light upon the character of the great sentimentalist.
Hume certainly did his utmost to secure for Rousseau a comfortable
retreat in England, but his usually sound judgment seems at first to
have been quite at fault with regard to his protege. The quarrel which
all the acquaintances of the two philosophers had predicted soon came,
and no language had expressions strong enough for Rousseau's anger. Hume
came well out of the business, and had the sagacity to conclude that his
admired friend was little better than a madman. In one of his most
charming letters he describes his life in Edinburgh. The new house to
which he alludes was built under his own directions at the corner of
what is now called St David Street after him; it became the centre of
the most cultivated society of Edinburgh. Hume's cheerful temper, his
equanimity, his kindness to literary aspirants and to those whose views
differed from his own won him universal respect and affection. He
welcomed the work of his friends (e.g. Robertson and Adam Smith), and
warmly recognized the worth of his opponents (e.g. George Campbell and
Reid). He assisted Blackwell and Smollett in their difficulties and
became the acknowledged patriarch of literature.
In the spring of 1775 Hume was struck with a tedious and harassing
though not painful illness. A visit to Bath seemed at first to have
produced good effects, but on the return journey more alarming symptoms
developed themselves, his strength rapidly sank, and, little more than a
month later, he died in Edinburgh on the 25th of August 1776.
No notice of Hume would be complete without the sketch of his
character drawn by his own hand:--"To conclude historically with my
own character, I am, or rather was (for that is the style I must now
use in speaking of myself, which emboldens me the more to speak my
sentiments),--I was, I say, a man of mild dispositions, of command of
temper, of an open, social and cheerful humour, capable of attachment,
but little susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my
passions. Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never
soured my temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments. My
company was not unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to
the studious and literary; and as I took a particular pleasure in the
company of modest women, I had no reason to be displeased with the
reception I met with from them. In a word, though most men anywise
eminent have found reason to complain of calumny, I never was touched,
or even attacked, by her baleful tooth; and, though I wantonly exposed
myself to the rage of both civil and religious factions, they seem to
be disarmed on my behalf of their wonted fury. My friends never had
occasion to vindicate any one circumstance of my character and
conduct; not but that the zealots, we may well suppose, would have
been glad to invent and propagate any story to my disadvantage, but
they could never find any which they thought would wear the face of
probability. I cannot say there is no vanity in making this funeral
oration of myself, but I hope it is not a misplaced one; and this is a
matter of fact which is easily cleansed and ascertained." The more his
life has become known, the more confidence we place in this admirable
estimate.
The results of Hume's speculations may be discussed under two
heads:--(1) philosophical, (2) economical.
Philosophy.
1. The philosophical writings, which mark a distinct epoch in the
development of modern thought, can here be considered in two only of
the many aspects in which they present themselves as of the highest
interest to the historian of philosophy. In the _Treatise of Human
Nature_, which is in every respect the most complete exposition of
Hume's philosophical conception, we have the first thorough-going
attempt to apply the fundamental principles of Locke's empirical
psychology to the construction of a theory of knowledge, and, as a
natural consequence, the first systematic criticism of the chief
metaphysical notions from this point of view. Hume, in that work,
holds the same relation to Locke and Berkeley as the late J. S. Mill
held with his _System of Logic_ to Hartley and James Mill. In certain
of the later writings, pre-eminently in the _Dialogues on Natural
Religion_, Hume brings the result of his speculative criticism to bear
upon the problems of current theological discussion, and gives in
their regard, as previously with respect to general philosophy, the
final word of the empirical theory in its earlier form. The
interesting parallel between Hume and J. S. Mill in this second
feature will not be overlooked.
In the first instance, then, Hume's philosophical work is to be
regarded as the attempt to supply for empiricism in psychology a
consistent, that is, a logically developed theory of knowledge. In
Locke, indeed, such theory is not wanting, but, of all the many
inconsistencies in the _Essay on the Human Understanding_, none is
more apparent or more significant than the complete want of harmony
between the view of knowledge developed in the fourth book and the
psychological principles laid down in the earlier part of the work.
Though Locke, doubtless, drew no distinction between the problems of
psychology and of theory of knowledge, yet the discussion of the
various forms of cognition given in the fourth book of the _Essay_
seems to be based on grounds quite distinct from and in many respects
inconsistent with the fundamental psychological principle of his work.
The perception of relations, which, according to him, is the essence
of cognition, the demonstrative character which he thinks attaches to
our inference of God's existence, the intuitive knowledge of self, are
doctrines incapable of being brought into harmony with the view of
mind and its development which is the keynote of his general theory.
To some extent Berkeley removed this radical inconsistency, but in his
philosophical work it may be said with safety there are two distinct
aspects, and while it holds of Locke on the one hand, it stretches
forward to Kantianism on the other. Nor in Berkeley are these
divergent features ever united into one harmonious whole. It was left
for Hume to approach the theory of knowledge with full consciousness
from the psychological point of view, and to work out the final
consequences of that view so far as cognition is concerned. The terms
which he employs in describing the aim and scope of his work are not
those which we should now employ, but the declaration, in the
introduction to the _Treatise_, that the science of human nature must
be treated according to the experimental method, is in fact equivalent
to the statement of the principle implied in Locke's _Essay_, that the
problems of psychology and of theory of knowledge are identical. This
view is the characteristic of what we may call the English school of
philosophy.
Theory of knowledge.
In order to make perfectly clear the full significance of the
principle which Hume applied to the solution of the chief
philosophical questions, it is necessary to render somewhat more
precise and complete the statement of the psychological view which
lies at the foundation of the empirical theory, and to distinguish
from it the problem of the theory of knowledge upon which it was
brought to bear. Without entering into details, which it is the less
necessary to do because the subject has been recently discussed with
great fulness in works readily accessible, it may be said that for
Locke as for Hume the problem of psychology was the exact description
of the contents of the individual mind, and the determination of the
conditions of the origin and development of conscious experience in
the individual mind. And the answer to the problem which was furnished
by Locke is in effect that with which Hume started. The conscious
experience of the individual is the result of interaction between the
individual mind and the universe of things. This solution presupposes
a peculiar conception of the general relation between the mind and
things which in itself requires justification, and which, so far at
least as the empirical theory was developed by Locke and his
successors, could not be obtained from psychological analysis. Either
we have a right to the assumption contained in the conception of the
individual mind as standing in relation to things, in which case the
grounds of the assumption must be sought elsewhere than in the results
of this reciprocal relation, or we have no right to the assumption, in
which case reference to the reciprocal relation can hardly be accepted
as yielding any solution of the psychological problem. But in any
case,--and, as we shall see, Hume endeavours so to state his
psychological premises as to conceal the assumption made openly by
Locke,--it is apparent that this psychological solution does not
contain the answer to the wider and radically distinct problem of the
theory of knowledge. For here we have to consider how the individual
intelligence comes to know any fact whatsoever, and what is meant by
the cognition of a fact. With Locke, Hume professes to regard this
problem as virtually covered or answered by the fundamental
psychological theorem; but the superior clearness of his reply enables
us to mark with perfect precision the nature of the difficulty
inherent in the attempt to regard the two as identical. For purposes
of psychological analysis the conscious experience of the individual
mind is taken as given fact, to be known, i.e. observed,
discriminated, classified and explained in the same way in which any
one special portion of experience is treated. Now if this mode of
treatment be accepted as the only possible method, and its results
assumed to be conclusive as regards the problem of knowledge, the
fundamental peculiarity of cognition is overlooked. In all cognition,
strictly so-called, there is involved a certain synthesis or relation
of parts of a characteristic nature, and if we attempt to discuss this
synthesis as though it were in itself but one of the facts forming the
_matter_ of knowledge, we are driven to regard this relation as being
of the quite external kind discovered by observation among matters of
knowledge. The difficulty of reconciling the two views is that which
gives rise to much of the obscurity in Locke's treatment of the theory
of knowledge; in Hume the effort to identify them, and to explain the
synthesis which is essential to cognition as merely the accidental
result of external relations among the elements of conscious
experience, appears with the utmost clearness, and gives the keynote
of all his philosophical work. The final perplexity, concealed by
various forms of expression, comes forward at the close of the
_Treatise_ as absolutely unsolved, and leads Hume, as will be pointed
out, to a truly remarkable confession of the weakness of his own
system.
While, then, the general idea of a theory of knowledge as based upon
psychological analysis is the groundwork of the _Treatise_, it is a
particular consequence of this idea that furnishes to Hume the
characteristic criterion applied by him to all philosophical
questions. If the relations involved in the fact of cognition are only
those discoverable by observation of any particular portion of known
experience, then such relations are quite external and contingent. The
only necessary relation which can be discovered in a given fact of
experience is that of non-contradiction (i.e. purely formal); the
thing must be what it is, and cannot be conceived as having qualities
contradictory of its nature. The universal test, therefore, of any
supposed philosophical principle is the possibility or impossibility
of imagining its contradictory. All our knowledge is but the sum of
our conscious experience, and is consequently material for
imagination. "Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as
possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens or to the utmost
limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond
ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those
perceptions which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the
universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there
produced." (_Works_, ed. of 1854, i. 93, cf. i. 107.)
The course of Hume's work follows immediately from his fundamental
principle, and the several divisions of the treatise, so far as the
theoretical portions are concerned, are but its logical consequences.
The first part of the first book contains a brief statement of the
contents of mind, a description of all that observation can discover
in conscious experience. The second part deals with those judgments
which rest upon the formal elements of experience, space and time. The
third part discusses the principle of real connexion among the
elements of experience, the relation of cause and effect. The fourth
part is virtually a consideration of the ultimate significance of this
conscious experience, of the place it is supposed to occupy in the
universe of existence, in other words, of the relations between the
conscious experience of an individual mind as disclosed to observation
and the supposed realities of self and external things.
Ideas and impressions.
In the first part Hume gives his own statement of the psychological
foundations of his theory. Viewing the contents of mind as matter of
experience, he can discover among them only one distinction, a
distinction expressed by the terms _impressions_ and _ideas_. Ideas
are secondary in nature, copies of data supplied we know not whence.
All that appears in conscious experience as primary, as arising from
some unknown cause, and therefore relatively as original, Hume
designates by the term _impression_, and claims to imply by such term
no theory whatsoever as to the origin of this portion of experience.
There is simply the fact of conscious experience, ultimate and
inexplicable. Moreover, if we remain faithful to the fundamental
conception that the contents of the mind are merely matters of
experience, it is evident in the first place that as impressions are
strictly individual, ideas also must be strictly particular, and in
the second place that the faculties of combining, discriminating,
abstracting and judging, which Locke had admitted, are merely
expressions for particular modes of having mental experience, i.e. are
modifications of _conceiving_ (cf. i. 128 n., 137, 192). By this
theory, Hume is freed from all the problems of abstraction and
judgment. A comparative judgment is simplified into an isolated
perception of a peculiar form, and a series of similar facts are
grouped under a single symbol, representing a particular perception,
and only by the accident of custom treated as universal (see i. 37,
38, 100).
Such, in substance, is Hume's restatement of Locke's empirical view.
Conscious experience consists of isolated states, each of which is to
be regarded as a fact and is related to others in a quite external
fashion. It remains to be seen how knowledge can be explained on such
a basis; but, before proceeding to sketch Hume's answer to this
question, it is necessary to draw attention, first, to the peculiar
device invariably resorted to by him when any exception to his general
principle that ideas are secondary copies of impressions presents
itself, and, secondly, to the nature of the substitute offered by him
for that perception of relations or synthesis which even in Locke's
confused statements had appeared as the essence of cognition. Whenever
Hume finds it impossible to recognize in an idea the mere copy of a
particular impression, he introduces the phrase "manner of
conceiving." Thus general or abstract ideas arc merely copies of a
particular impression conceived in a particular manner. The ideas of
space and time, as will presently be pointed out, are copies of
impressions conceived in a particular manner. The idea of necessary
connexion is merely the reproduction of an impression which the mind
_feels_ itself compelled to conceive in a particular manner. Such a
fashion of disguising difficulties points, not only to an
inconsistency in Hume's theory as stated by himself, but to the
initial error upon which it proceeds; for these perplexities are but
the consequences of the doctrine that cognition is to be explained on
the basis of particular perceptions. These external relations are, in
fact, what Hume describes as the natural bonds of connexion among
ideas, and, regarded subjectively as principles of association among
the facts of mental experience, they form the substitute he offers for
the synthesis implied in knowledge. These principles of association
determine the imagination to combine ideas in various modes, and by
this mechanical combination Hume, for a time, endeavoured to explain
what are otherwise called judgments of relation. It was impossible,
however, for him to carry out this view consistently. The only
combination which, even in appearance, could be explained
satisfactorily by its means was the formation of a complex idea out of
simpler parts, but the idea of a relation among facts is not
accurately described as a complex idea; and, as such relations have no
basis in impressions, Hume is finally driven to a confession of the
absolute impossibility of explaining them. Such confession, however,
is only reached after a vigorous effort had been made to render some
account of knowledge by the experimental method.
Association.
The psychological conception, then, on the basis of which Hume
proceeds to discuss the theory of knowledge, is that of conscious
experience as containing merely the succession of isolated impressions
and their fainter copies, ideas, and as bound together by merely
natural or external links of connexion, the principles of association
among ideas. The foundations of cognition must be discovered by
observation or analysis of experience so conceived. Hume wavers
somewhat in his division of the various kinds of cognition, laying
stress now upon one now upon another of the points in which mainly
they differ from one another. Nor is it of the first importance, save
with the view of criticizing his own consistency, that we should adopt
any of the divisions implied in his exposition. For practical purposes
we may regard the most important discussions in the _Treatise_ as
falling under two heads. In the first place there are certain
principles of cognition which appear to rest upon and to express
relations of the universal elements in conscious experience, viz.
space and time. The propositions of mathematics seem to be independent
of this or that special fact of experience, and to remain unchanged
even when the concrete matter of experience varies. They are formal.
In the second place, cognition, in any real sense of that term,
implies connexion for the individual mind between the present fact of
experience and other facts, whether past or future. It appears to
involve, therefore, some real relation among the portions of
experience, on the basis of which relation judgments and inferences as
to matters of fact can be shown to rest. The theoretical question is
consequently that of the nature of the supposed relation, and of the
certainty of judgments and inferences resting on it.
Hume's well-known distinction between relations of ideas and matters
of fact corresponds fairly to this separation of the formal and real
problems in the theory of cognition, although that distinction is in
itself inadequate and not fully representative of Hume's own
conclusions.
With regard, then, to the first problem, the formal element in
knowledge, Hume has to consider several questions, distinct in nature
and hardly discriminated by him with sufficient precision. For a
complete treatment of this portion of the theory of knowledge, there
require to be taken into consideration at least the following points:
(a) the exact nature and significance of the space and time relations
in our experience, (b) the mode in which the primary data, facts or
principles, of mathematical cognition are obtained, (c) the nature,
extent and certainty of such data, in themselves and with reference to
the concrete material of experience, (d) the principle of inference
from the data, however obtained. Not all of these points are discussed
by Hume with the same fulness, and with regard to some of them it is
difficult to state his conclusions. It will be of service, however, to
attempt a summary of his treatment under these several heads,--the
more so as almost all expositions of his philosophy are entirely
defective in the account given of this essential portion. The brief
statement in the _Inquiry_, S iv., is of no value, and indeed is
almost unintelligible unless taken in reference to the full discussion
contained in part ii. of the _Treatise_.
Space and time.
(a) The nature of space and time as elements in conscious experience
is considered by Hume in relation to a special problem, that of their
supposed infinite divisibility. Evidently upon his view of conscious
experience, of the world of imagination, such infinite divisibility
must be a fiction. The ultimate elements of experience must be real
units, capable of being represented or imagined in isolation. Whence
then do these units arise? or, if we put the problem as it was
necessary Hume should put it to himself, in what orders or classes of
impressions do we find the elements of space and time? Beyond all
question Hume, in endeavouring to answer this problem, is brought face
to face with one of the difficulties inherent in his conception of
conscious experience. For he has to give some explanation of the
nature of space and time which shall identify these with impressions,
and at the same time is compelled to recognize the fact that they are
not identical with any single impression or set of impressions.
Putting aside, then, the various obscurities of terminology, such as
the distinction between the objects known, viz. "points" or several
mental states, and the impressions themselves, which disguise the full
significance of his conclusion, we find Hume reduced to the following
as his theory of space and time. Certain impressions, the sensations
of sight and touch, have in themselves the element of space, for these
impressions (Hume skilfully transfers his statement to the _points_)
have a certain order or mode of arrangement. This mode of arrangement
or manner of disposition is common to coloured points and tangible
points, and, considered separately, is the impression from which our
idea of space is taken. All impressions and all ideas are received, or
form parts of a mental experience only when received, in a certain
order, the order of succession. This manner of presenting themselves
is the impression from which the idea of time takes its rise.
It is almost superfluous to remark, first, that Hume here deliberately
gives up his fundamental principle that ideas are but the fainter
copies of impressions, for it can never be maintained that order of
disposition is an impression, and, secondly, that he fails to offer
any explanation of the mode in which _coexistence_ and _succession_
are possible elements of cognition in a conscious experience made up
of isolated presentations and representations. For the consistency of
his theory, however, it was indispensable that he should insist upon
the real, i.e. presentative character of the ultimate units of space
and time.
Mathematics.
(b) How then are the primary data of mathematical cognition to be
derived from an experience containing space and time relations in the
manner just stated? It is important to notice that Hume, in regard to
this problem, distinctly separates geometry from algebra and
arithmetic, i.e. he views extensive quantity as being cognized
differently from number. With regard to geometry, he holds
emphatically that it is an empirical doctrine, a science founded on
observation of concrete facts. The rough appearances of physical
facts, their outlines, surfaces and so on, are the data of
observation, and only by a method of approximation do we gradually
come near to such propositions as are laid down in pure geometry. He
definitely repudiates a view often ascribed to him, and certainly
advanced by many later empiricists, that the data of geometry are
hypothetical. The ideas of perfect lines, figures and surfaces have
not, according to him, any existence. (See _Works_, i. 66, 69, 73, 97
and iv. 180.) It is impossible to give any consistent account of his
doctrine regarding number. He holds, apparently, that the foundation
of all the science of number is the fact that each element of
conscious experience is presented as a unit, and adds that we are
capable of considering any fact or collection of facts as a unit. This
_manner of conceiving_ is absolutely general and distinct, and
accordingly affords the possibility of an all-comprehensive and
perfect science, the science of discrete quantity. (See _Works_, i.
97.)
(c) In respect to the third point, the nature, extent and certainty
of the elementary propositions of mathematical science, Hume's
utterances are far from clear. The principle with which he starts and
from which follows his well-known distinction between relations of
ideas and matters of fact, a distinction which Kant appears to have
thought identical with his distinction between analytical and
synthetical judgments, is comparatively simple. The _ideas_ of the
quantitative aspects of phenomena are exact representations of these
aspects or quantitative impressions; consequently, whatever is found
true by consideration of the ideas may be asserted regarding the real
impressions. No question arises regarding the _existence_ of the fact
represented by the idea, and in so far, at least, mathematical
judgments may be described as hypothetical. For they simply assert
what will be found true in any conscious experience containing
coexisting impressions of sense (specifically, of sight and touch),
and in its nature successive. That the propositions are hypothetical
in this fashion does not imply any distinction between the abstract
truth of the ideal judgments and the imperfect correspondence of
concrete material with these abstract relations. Such distinction is
quite foreign to Hume, and can only be ascribed to him from an entire
misconception of his view regarding the ideas of space and time. (For
an example of such misconception, which is almost universal, see
Riehl, _Der philosophische Kriticismus_, i. 96, 97.)
(d) From this point onwards Hume's treatment becomes exceedingly
confused. The identical relation between the ideas of space and time
and the impressions corresponding to them apparently leads him to
regard judgments of continuous and discrete quantity as standing on
the same footing, while the ideal character of the data gives a
certain colour to his inexact statements regarding the extent and
truth of the judgments founded on them. The emphatic utterances in the
_Inquiry_ (iv. 30, 186), and even at the beginning of the relative
section in the _Treatise_ (i. 95) may be cited in illustration. But in
both works these utterances are qualified in such a manner as to
enable us to perceive the real bearings of his doctrine, and to
pronounce at once that it differs widely from that commonly ascribed
to him. "It is from the idea of a triangle that we discover the
relation of equality which its three angles bear to two right ones;
and this relation is invariable, so long as our idea remains the same"
(i. 95). If taken in isolation this passage might appear sufficient
justification for Kant's view that, according to Hume, geometrical
judgments are analytical and therefore perfect. But it is to be
recollected that, according to Hume, an idea is actually a
_representation_ or individual picture, not a notion or even a
_schema_, and that he never claims to be able to extract the predicate
of a geometrical judgment by analysis of the subject. The properties
of this individual subject, the idea of the triangle, are, according
to him, discovered by observation, and as observation, whether actual
or ideal, never presents us with more than the rough or general
appearances of geometrical quantities, the relations so discovered
have only approximate exactness. "Ask a mathematician what he means
when he pronounces two quantities to be equal, and he must say that
the idea of _equality_ is one of those which cannot be defined, and
that it is sufficient to place two equal quantities before any one in
order to suggest it. Now this is an appeal to the general appearances
of objects to the imagination or senses" (iv. 180). "Though it (i.e.
geometry) much excels, both in universality and exactness, the loose
judgments of the senses and imagination, yet [it] never attains a
perfect precision and exactness" (i. 97). Any exactitude attaching to
the conclusions of geometrical reasoning arises from the comparative
simplicity of the data for the primary judgments.
So far, then, as geometry is concerned, Hume's opinion is perfectly
definite. It is an experimental or observational science, founded on
primary or immediate judgments (in his phraseology, _perceptions_), of
relation between facts of intuition; its conclusions are hypothetical
only in so far as they do not imply the existence at the moment of
corresponding real experience; and its propositions have no exact
truth. With respect to arithmetic and algebra, the science of numbers,
he expresses an equally definite opinion, but unfortunately it is
quite impossible to state in any satisfactory fashion the grounds for
it or even its full bearing. He nowhere explains the origin of the
notions of unity and number, but merely asserts that through their
means we can have absolutely exact arithmetical propositions (_Works_,
i. 97, 98). Upon the nature of the reasoning by which in mathematical
science we pass from data to conclusions, Hume gives no explicit
statement. If we were to say that on his view the essential step must
be the establishment of identities or equivalences, we should probably
be doing justice to his doctrine of numerical reasoning, but should
have some difficulty in showing the application of the method to
geometrical reasoning. For in the latter case we possess, according to
Hume, no standard of equivalence other than that supplied by immediate
observation, and consequently transition from one premise to another
by way of reasoning must be, in geometrical matters, a purely verbal
process.
Hume's theory of mathematics--the only one, perhaps, which is
compatible with his fundamental principle of psychology--is a
practical condemnation of his empirical theory of perception. He has
not offered even a plausible explanation of the mode by which a
consciousness made up of isolated momentary impressions and ideas can
be aware of coexistence and number, or succession. The relations of
ideas are accepted as facts of immediate observation, as being
themselves perceptions or individual elements of conscious experience,
and to all appearance they are regarded by Hume as being in a sense
analytical, because the formal criterion of identity is applicable to
them. It is applicable, however, not because the predicate is
contained in the subject, but on the principle of contradiction. If
these judgments are admitted to be facts of immediate perception, the
supposition of their non-existence is impossible. The ambiguity in his
criterion, however, seems entirely to have escaped Hume's attention.
Real cognition and causation.
A somewhat detailed consideration of Hume's doctrine with regard to
mathematical science has been given for the reason that this portion
of his theory has been very generally overlooked or misinterpreted. It
does not seem necessary to endeavour to follow his minute examination
of the principle of real cognition with the same fulness. It will
probably be sufficient to indicate the problem as conceived by Hume,
and the relation of the method he adopts for solving it to the
fundamental doctrine of his theory of knowledge.
Real cognition, as Hume points out, implies transition from the
present impression or feeling to something connected with it. As this
thing can only be an impression or perception, and is not itself
present, it is represented by its copy or idea. Now the supreme,
all-comprehensive link of connexion between present feeling or
impression and either past or future experience is that of causation.
The idea in question is, therefore, the idea of something connected
with the present impression as its cause or effect. But this is
explicitly the idea of the said thing as having had or as about to
have existence,--in other words, belief in the existence of some
matter of fact. What, for a conscious experience so constituted as
Hume will admit, is the precise significance of such belief in real
existence?
Clearly the real existence of a fact is not demonstrable. For whatever
is may be conceived not to be. "No negation of a fact can involve a
contradiction." Existence of any fact, not present as a perception,
can only be proved by arguments from cause or effect. But as each
perception is in consciousness only as a contingent fact, which might
not be or might be other than it is, we must admit that the mind can
conceive no necessary relations or connexions among the several
portions of its experience.
If, therefore, a present perception leads us to assert the existence
of some other, this can only be interpreted as meaning that in some
natural, i.e. psychological, manner the idea of this other perception
is excited, and that the idea is viewed by the mind in some peculiar
fashion. The natural link of connexion Hume finds in the similarities
presented by experience. One fact or perception is discovered by
experience to be uniformly or generally accompanied by another, and
its occurrence therefore naturally excites the idea of that other. But
when an idea is so roused up by a present impression, and when this
idea, being a consequence of memory, has in itself a certain vivacity
or liveliness, we regard it with a peculiar indefinable feeling, and
in this feeling consists the immense difference between mere
imagination and belief. The mind is led easily and rapidly from the
present impression to the ideas of impressions found by experience to
be the usual accompaniments of the present fact. The ease and rapidity
of the mental transition is the sole ground for the supposed necessity
of the causal connexion between portions of experience. The idea of
necessity is not intuitively obvious; the ideas of cause and effect
are correlative in our minds, but only as a result of experience.
Hobbes and Locke were wrong in saying that the mind must find in the
relation the idea of Power. We mistake the subjective transition
resting upon custom or past experience for an objective connexion
independent of special feelings. All reasoning about matters of fact
is therefore a species of feeling, and belongs to the sensitive rather
than to the cogitative side of our nature. It should be noted that
this theory of Causation entirely denies the doctrine of Uniformity in
Nature, so far as the human mind is concerned. All alleged uniformity
is reduced to observed similarity of process. The idea is a mere
convention, product of inaccurate thinking and custom.
While it is evident that some such conclusion must follow from the
attempt to regard the cognitive consciousness as made up of
disconnected feelings, it is equally clear, not only that the result
is self-contradictory, but that it involves certain assumptions not in
any way deducible from the fundamental view with which Hume starts.
For in the problem of real cognition he is brought face to face with
the characteristic feature of knowledge, distinction of self from
matters known, and reference of transitory states to permanent objects
or relations. Deferring his criticism of the significance of self and
object, Hume yet makes use of both to aid his explanation of the
belief attaching to reality. The reference of an idea to past
experience has no meaning, unless we assume an identity in the object
referred to. For a past impression is purely transitory, and, as Hume
occasionally points out, can have no connexion of fact with the
present consciousness. His exposition has thus a certain plausibility,
which would not belong to it had the final view of the permanent
object been already given.
The final problem of Hume's theory of knowledge, the discussion of the
real significance of the two factors of cognition, self and external
things, is handled in the _Treatise_ with great fulness and
dialectical subtlety.
The self in cognition.
As in the case of the previous problem, it is unnecessary to follow
the steps of his analysis, which are, for the most part, attempts to
substitute qualities of feeling for the relations of thought which
appear to be involved. The results follow with the utmost ease from
his original postulate. If there is nothing in conscious experience
save what observation can disclose, while each act of observation is
itself an isolated feeling (an impression or idea), it is manifest
that a permanent identical thing can never be an object of experience.
Whatever permanence or identity is ascribed to an impression or idea
is the result of association, is one of those "propensities to feign"
which are due to natural connexions among ideas. We regard as
successive presentations of one thing the resembling feelings which
are experienced in succession. Identity, then, whether of self or
object, there is none, and the supposition of _objects_, distinct from
impressions, is but a further consequence of our "propensity to
feign." Hume's explanation of the belief in external things by
reference to association is well deserving of careful study and of
comparison with the more recent analysis of the same problem by J. S.
Mill.
Negative result of Hume's treatise.
The weak points in Hume's empiricism are so admirably realized by the
author himself that it is only fair to quote his own summary in the
_Appendix_ to the _Treatise_. He confesses that, in confining all
cognition to single perceptions and supplying no purely intellectual
faculty for modifying, recording and classifying their results, he has
destroyed real knowledge altogether:
"If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by
being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences
are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only _feel_ a
connexion or determination of the thought to pass from one object to
another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone feels personal
identity, when, reflecting on the train of past perceptions that
compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together
and naturally introduce each other.
"However extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprise
us. Modern philosophers seem inclined to think that personal identity
_arises_ from consciousness, and consciousness is nothing but a
reflected thought or perception. The present philosophy, therefore,
has a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish when I come to
explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our
thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory which gives me
satisfaction on this head....
"In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent,
nor is it in my power to renounce either of them; viz. _that all our
distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never
perceives any real connexion among distinct existences_. Did our
perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did
the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no
difficulty in the case" (ii. 551).
The closing sentences of this passage may be regarded as pointing to
the very essence of the Kantian attempt at solution of the problem of
knowledge. Hume sees distinctly that if conscious experience be taken
as containing only isolated states, no progress in explanation of
cognition is possible, and that the only hope of further development
is to be looked for in a radical change in our mode of conceiving
experience. The work of the critical philosophy is the introduction of
this new mode of regarding experience, a mode which, in the technical
language of philosophers, has received the title of _transcendental_
as opposed to the psychological method followed by Locke and Hume. It
is because Kant alone perceived the full significance of the change
required in order to meet the difficulties of the empirical theory
that we regard his system as the only sequel to that of Hume. The
writers of the Scottish school, Reid in particular, did undoubtedly
indicate some of the weaknesses in Hume's fundamental conception, and
their attempts to show that the isolated feeling cannot be taken as
the ultimate and primary unit of cognitive experience are efforts in
the right direction. But the question of knowledge was never
generalized by them, and their reply to Hume, therefore, remains
partial and inadequate, while its effect is weakened by the uncritical
assumption of principles which is a characteristic feature of their
writings.
Theology and ethics.
The results of Hume's theoretical analysis are applied by him to the
problems of practical philosophy and religion. For the first of these
the reader is referred to the article Ethics, where Hume's views are
placed in relation to those of his predecessors in the same field of
inquiry. His position, as regards the second, is very noteworthy. As
before said, his metaphysic contains _in abstracto_ the principles
which were at that time being employed, uncritically, alike by the
deists and by their antagonists. There can be no doubt that Hume has
continually in mind the theological questions then current, and that
he was fully aware of the mode in which his analysis of knowledge
might be applied to them. A few of the less important of his
criticisms, such as the argument on miracles, became then and have
since remained public property and matter of general discussion. But
the full significance of his work on the theological side was not at
the time perceived, and justice has barely been done to the admirable
manner in which he reduced the theological disputes of the century to
their ultimate elements. The importance of the _Dialogues on Natural
Religion_, as a contribution to the criticism of theological ideas and
methods, can hardly be over-estimated. A brief survey of its contents
will be sufficient to show its general nature and its relations to
such works as Clarke's _Demonstration_ and Butler's _Analogy_. The
_Dialogues_ introduce three interlocutors, Demea, Cleanthes and Philo,
who represent three distinct orders of theological opinion. The first
is the type of a certain a priori view, then regarded as the safest
bulwark against infidelity, of which the main tenets were that the
being of God was capable of a priori proof, and that, owing to the
finitude of our faculties, the attributes and modes of operation of
deity were absolutely incomprehensible. The second is the typical
deist of Locke's school, improved as regards his philosophy, and
holding that the only possible proof of God's existence was a
posteriori, from design, and that such proof was, on the whole,
sufficient. The third is the type of completed empiricism or
scepticism, holding that no argument, either from reason or
experience, can transcend experience, and consequently that no proof
of God's existence is at all possible. The views of the first and
second are played off against one another, and criticized by the third
with great literary skill and effect. Cleanthes, who maintains that
the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God is hardly
distinguishable from atheism, is compelled by the arguments of Philo
to reduce to a minimum the conclusion capable of being inferred from
experience as regards the existence of God. For Philo lays stress upon
the weakness of the analogical argument, points out that the demand
for an ultimate cause is no more satisfied by thought than by nature
itself, shows that the argument from design cannot warrant the
inference of a perfect or infinite or even of a single deity, and
finally, carrying out his principles to the full extent, maintains
that, as we have no experience of the origin of the world, no argument
from experience can carry us to its origin, and that the apparent
marks of design in the structure of animals are only results from the
conditions of their actual existence. So far as argument from nature
is concerned, a total suspension of judgment is our only reasonable
resource. Nor does the a priori argument in any of its forms fare
better, for reason can never demonstrate a matter of fact, and, unless
we know that the world had a beginning in time, we cannot insist that
it must have had a cause. Demea, who is willing to give up his
abstract proof, brings forward the ordinary theological topic, man's
consciousness of his own imperfection, misery and dependent condition.
Nature is throughout corrupt and polluted, but "the present evil
phenomena are rectified in other regions and in some future period of
existence." Such a view satisfies neither of his interlocutors.
Cleanthes, pointing out that from a nature thoroughly evil we can
never prove the existence of an infinitely powerful and benevolent
Creator, hazards the conjecture that the deity, though all-benevolent,
is not all-powerful. Philo, however, pushing his principles to their
full consequences, shows that unless we assumed (or knew) beforehand
that the system of nature was the work of a benevolent but limited
deity, we certainly could not, from the facts of nature, infer the
benevolence of its creator. Cleanthes's view is, therefore, an
hypothesis, and in no sense an inference.
The _Dialogues_ ought here to conclude. There is, however, appended
one of those perplexing statements of personal opinion (for Hume
declares Cleanthes to be his mouthpiece) not uncommon among writers of
this period. Cleanthes and Philo come to an agreement, in admitting a
certain illogical force in the a posteriori argument, or, at least, in
expressing a conviction as to God's existence, which may not perhaps
be altogether devoid of foundation. The precise value of such a
declaration must be matter of conjecture. Probably the true statement
of Hume's attitude regarding the problem is the somewhat melancholy
utterance with which the _Dialogues_ close.
It is apparent, even from the brief summary just given, that the
importance of Hume in the history of philosophy consists in the vigour
and logical exactness with which he develops a particular metaphysical
view. Inconsistencies, no doubt, are to be detected in his system, but
they arise from the limitations of the view itself, and not, as in the
case of Locke and Berkeley, from imperfect grasp of the principle, and
endeavour to unite with it others radically incompatible. In Hume's
theory of knowledge we have the final expression of what may be called
psychological individualism or atomism, while his ethics and doctrine
of religion are but the logical consequences of this theory. So far as
metaphysic is concerned, Hume has given the final word of the
empirical school, and all additions, whether from the specifically
psychological side or from the general history of human culture, are
subordinate in character, and affect in no way the nature of his
results. It is no exaggeration to say that the later English school of
philosophy represented by J. S. Mill made in theory no advance beyond
Hume. In the _logic_ of Mill, e.g., we find much of a special
character that has no counterpart in Hume, much that is introduced _ab
extra_, from general considerations of scientific procedure, but, so
far as the groundwork is concerned, the _System of Logic_ is a mere
reproduction of Hume's doctrine of knowledge. It is impossible for any
reader of Mill's remarkable posthumous essay on theism to avoid the
reflection that in substance the treatment is identical with that of
the _Dialogues on Natural Religion_, while on the whole the
superiority in critical force must be assigned to the earlier work.
Economics.
2. Hume's eminence in the fields of philosophy and history must not be
allowed to obscure his importance as a political economist. Berkeley
had already, in the _Querist_, attacked the mercantile theory of the
nature of national wealth and the functions of money, and Locke had,
in a partial manner, shown that political economy could with advantage
be viewed in relation to the modern system of critical philosophy. But
Hume was the first to apply to economics the scientific methods of his
philosophy. His services to economics may be summed up in two heads:
(1) he established the relation between economic facts and the
fundamental phenomena of social life, and (2) he introduced into the
study of these facts the new historical method. Thus, though he gave
no special name to it, he yet describes the subject-matter, and
indicates the true method, of economic science. His economic essays
were published in the volumes entitled _Political Discourses_ (1752)
and _Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects_ (1753); the most
important are those on Commerce, on Money, on Interest and on the
Balance of Trade, but, notwithstanding the disconnected form of the
essays in general, the other less important essays combine to make a
complete economic system. We have said that Berkeley and Locke had
already begun the general work for which Hume is most important; in
details also Hume had been anticipated to some extent. Nicholas Barbon
and Sir Dudley North had already attacked the mercantile theory as to
the precious metals and the balance of trade; Joseph Massie and Barbon
had anticipated his theory of interest. Yet when we compare Hume with
Adam Smith, the advance which Hume had made on his predecessors in
lucidity of exposition and subtlety of intellect becomes clear, and
modern criticism is agreed that the main errors of Adam Smith are to
be found in those deductions which deviate from the results of the
_Political Discourses_. A very few examples must suffice to illustrate
his services to economics.
Money.
Interest.
Free trade.
Taxation and national debt.
In dealing with money, he refutes the Mercantile School, which had
tended to confound it with wealth. "Money," said Hume, "is none of the
wheels of trade; it is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels
more smooth and easy." "Money and commodities are the real strength of
any community." From the internal, as distinct from the international,
aspect, the absolute quantity of money, supposed as of fixed amount,
in a country, is of no consequence, while a quantity larger than is
required for the interchange of commodities is injurious, as tending
to raise prices and to drive foreigners from the home markets. It is
only _during the period of acquisition_ of money, and before the rise
in prices, that the accumulation of precious metals is advantageous.
This principle is perhaps Hume's most important economic discovery
(cf. F. A. Walker's _Money in its Relations to Trade and Industry_,
London, 1880, p. 84 sqq.). He goes on to show that the variations of
prices are due solely to money and commodities in circulation.
Further, it is a misconception to regard as injurious the passage of
money into foreign countries. "A government," he says, "has great
reason to preserve with care its _people_ and its _manufactures_; its
_money_ it may safely trust to the course of human affairs without
fear or jealousy." Dealing with the phenomena of interest, he exposes
the old fallacy that the rate depends upon the amount of money in a
country; low interest does not follow on abundance of money. The
reduction in the rate of interest must, in general, result from "the
increase of industry and frugality, of arts and commerce." In
connexion with this he emphasizes a too generally neglected factor in
economic phenomena, "the constant and insatiable desire of the mind
for exercise and employment." "Interest," he says in general, "is the
barometer of the state, and its lowness an almost infallible sign of
prosperity," arising, as it does, from increased trade, frugality in
the merchant class, and the consequent rise of new lenders: low
interest and low profits mutually forward each other. In the matter of
free trade and protection he compromises. He says on the one hand,
"not only as a man, but as a British subject I pray for the
flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy and even France itself,"
and condemns "the numerous bars, obstructions and imposts which all
nations of Europe, and none more than England, have put upon trade."
On the other hand, he approves of a protective tax on German linen in
favour of home manufactures, and of a tax on brandy as encouraging the
sale of rum and so supporting our southern colonies. Indeed it has
been fairly observed that Hume retains an attitude of refined
mercantilism. With regard to taxation he takes very definite views.
The best taxes, he says, are those levied on consumption, especially
on luxuries, for these are least heavily felt. He denies that all
taxes fall finally on the land. Superior frugality and industry on the
part of the artisan will enable him to pay taxes without mechanically
raising the price of labour. Here, as in other points, he differs
entirely from the physiocrats, and his criticism of contemporary
French views are, as a whole, in accordance with received modern
opinion. For the modern expedient of raising money for national
emergencies by way of loan he has a profound distrust. He was
convinced that what is bad for the individual credit must be bad for
the state also. A national debt, he maintains, enriches the capital at
the expense of the provinces; further, it creates a leisured class of
stockholders, and possesses all the disadvantages of paper credit.
"Either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will
destroy the nation." To sum up, it may be said that Hume enunciated
the principle that "everything in the world is purchased by labour,
and our passions are the only causes of labour"; and further, that, in
analysing the complex phenomena of commerce, he is superior sometimes
to Adam Smith in that he never forgets that the ultimate causes of
economic change are the "customs and manners" of the people, and that
the solution of problems is to be sought in the elementary factors of
industry.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.--1. Life.--J. H. Burton's _Life and Correspondence of
David Hume_ (2 vols., 1846); Dr G. Birkbeck Hill, _Letters of Hume to
William Strahan_; C. J. W. Francke, _David Hume_ (Haarlem, 1907).
2. Works.--Until 1874 the standard edition was that of 1826 (reprinted
1854), in 4 vols. The best modern edition is that in 4 vols. by T. H.
Green and T. H. Grose (containing a valuable introduction and
excellent bibliographical matter); the _Enquiry_ and the _Treatise_
(1894 and 1896, Oxford), edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge.
3. Philosophic (the more important only can be quoted).--Huxley's
_Hume_ (a popular reproduction of Hume's views in "English Men of
Letters" series); Sir L. Stephen's _English Thought in the XVIIIth
Century_ (1876, especially ch. vi.); J. Orr, _David Hume and his
Influence on Philosophy and Theology_ (1903, especially ch. ix. on
"Moral Theory of Hume"); H. Calderwood, _David Hume_ (1898, especially
ch. vii. on Hume's attitude to religion); A. Seth, _Scottish and
German Answers to Hume_; F. Jodl, _Leben und Philosophie D. Humes_
(1872); E. Pfleiderer, _Empirismus und Skepsis in D. Humes
Philosophie_ (1874); G. Spicker, _Kant, Hume und Berkeley_ (1875); G.
Compayre, _La Philosophie de D. Hume_ (1873); A. Meinong,
_Hume-Studien_ (1877, especially Hume's nominalism); G. von Gizycki (a
thorough exposition of Hume's utilitarianism), _Die Ethik D. Humes_
(1878); G. Lechartier, _D. Hume, moraliste et sociologue_ (1900); M.
Klemme, _Die volkswirtschaftlichen Anchauungen D. Humes_ (1900); E.
Marcus, _Kants Revolutionsprinzip. Eine exakte Losung des
Kant-Hume'schen Erkenntnisproblems_ (1902); C. Hedvall, _Humes
Erkenntnistheorie_ (1906); R. Honigswald, _Uber die Lehre Humes von
der Realitat der Aussendinge_ (1904); O. Quast, _Der Begriff des
Belief bei David Hume_ (1903). Hume's relation to the society of his
time is described in the Rev. H. G. Graham's _Social Life in Scotland_
and _Scottish Men of Letters_; "Jupiter" in Carlyle's _Autobiography_.
J. MacCosh published a short pamphlet (1884) containing interesting
but perhaps not conclusive arguments on the _Agnosticism of Hume and
Huxley_.
4. Economic.--J. Bonar, _Philosophy and Political Economy_ (London,
1893), chapter on Hume; notes to W. G. F. Roscher's _Principles of
Political Economy_ (J. Lalor's trans. of 13th ed., New York, 1878); F.
A. Walker's _Money_ (New York, 1877) gives an account of Hume's views
on interest and money; H. H. Gibbs (Lord Aldenham), _Colloquy on the
Currency_; for Hume's relation to Adam Smith, John Rae's _Life of Adam
Smith_ (London, 1895). See also M. Teisseire, _Les Essais economiques
de David Hume_ (1902; a critical study); A. Schatz, _L'Oeuvre
economique de David Hume_ (1902). (R. Ad.; J. M. M.)