Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Barbara Kosker, and the
Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net.
THE
TWO GREAT RETREATS OF HISTORY.
I. THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND.
II. NAPOLEON'S RETREAT FROM MOSCOW.
_WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES_
By
D. H. M.
BOSTON, U.S.A.: PUBLISHED BY GINN & COMPANY. 1889.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1889, by
GINN & COMPANY,
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
TYPOGRAPHY BY J. S. CUSHING & CO., BOSTON, U.S.A.
PREFATORY NOTE.
The two following selections contain, first, Grote's account of the
Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks, taken from his "History of Greece,"
and, secondly, an abridgment of Count Segur's narrative of Napoleon's
retreat from Russia.
Grote's History, based on Xenophon's, is given entire, with the
exception that, in a very few instances, some slight verbal change has
been made in order to better adapt the work to school use.
Two maps are furnished, an introduction is prefixed to each selection,
and all needed notes subjoined.
D. H. M.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
I. Retreat of the Ten Thousand.
PAGE
Sketch of Cyrus the Younger (Introductory to the Retreat of the
Ten Thousand) v
Sec. 1. Effect of the death of Cyrus on the Greeks; they resolve to
retreat 1
Sec. 2. Commencement of the retreat 6
Sec. 3. Negotiations with Tissaphernes 10
Sec. 4. Treachery of Tissaphernes 19
Sec. 5. Xenophon's dream and its results 29
Sec. 6. The Greeks cross the Zab 42
Sec. 7. The Greeks fight their way across the Karduchian Mountains 50
Sec. 8. March through Armenia; great suffering from cold and
hunger 60
Sec. 9. The Greeks come in sight of the Black Sea 70
Sec. 10. The Greek cities on the Black Sea; their feelings toward
the Ten Thousand 75
Sec. 11. Plans of the army for the future 79
Sec. 12. The Ten Thousand begin their march westward 82
Sec. 13. Plan of Xenophon for founding a city on the Black Sea 88
Sec. 14. Xenophon defends himself against false accusations 95
Sec. 15. The army passes by sea to Sinope 104
Sec. 16. The army crosses the Bosphorus to Byzantium; false promises
of Anaxibius and their results 116
Sec. 17. Mutiny of the army in leaving Byzantium 120
Sec. 18. Xenophon's speech to the soldiers 123
Sec. 19. The army finally leaves Byzantium; Seuthes offers to hire
them 128
Sec. 20. The army enters the service of Seuthes 135
Sec. 21. Xenophon crosses over with the army to Asia 138
Sec. 22. Xenophon takes leave of the army. Conclusion 143
II. Napoleon's Retreat from Moscow.
Sketch of Napoleon (Introductory to the Retreat from Moscow) 152
Sec. 1. Description of Moscow; arrival of the Czar 157
Sec. 2. Alarm in Moscow at the advance of the French army;
preparations for the destruction of the city 162
Sec. 3. Departure of the Russian governor from Moscow 168
Sec. 4. Napoleon's first view of Moscow; the French enter the city 175
Sec. 5. Napoleon takes up his quarters in the Kremlin; the city
discovered to be on fire 182
Sec. 6. The fire compels Napoleon to leave the city 190
Sec. 7. Napoleon returns to the Kremlin; plunder of the city 195
Sec. 8. Rostopchin sets fire to his country-seat; anxiety of
Napoleon at not hearing from the Czar 201
Sec. 9. Napoleon determines to leave Moscow 215
Sec. 10. Departure from Moscow; the first battle 224
Sec. 11. Napoleon holds a council of war, and decides to retreat
northward 233
Sec. 12. Napoleon's attempt to destroy the Kremlin; view of the
battle-field of Borodino 238
Sec. 13. Napoleon reaches Viazma; battle near that place 243
Sec. 14. Dreadful snow-storm on the 6th of November; its effect
upon the troops 247
Sec. 15. Defeat and entire dissolution of Prince Eugene's corps at
the passage of the Wop 253
Sec. 16. The Grand Army reaches Smolensk 257
Sec. 17. Napoleon leaves Smolensk; battle of Krasnoe 263
Sec. 18. Napoleon reaches Dombrowna and Orcha; he holds a
council 267
Sec. 19. Arrival of Marshal Ney 272
Sec. 20. Capture of Minsk by the Russians 277
Sec. 21. March through the forest of Minsk; passage of the Berezina 280
Sec. 22. Napoleon abandons the Grand Army, and sets out for Paris 291
Sec. 23. Sufferings of the Grand Army after Napoleon's departure;
arrival at Wilna 298
Sec. 24. Conclusion 308
Index to notes and list of proper names with their pronunciation 316
MAPS.
PAGE
1. The advance and the retreat of the Ten Thousand, facing 1
2. The advance and the retreat of Napoleon in his Russian
campaign, facing 1
SKETCH OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER.
(INTRODUCTORY TO THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.)
In the year 423 B.C. Darius Nothus ascended the throne of Persia. That
country was then the greatest empire in the world, and had an area
nearly equal to that of the United States. The capital of this seemingly
powerful realm was the ancient city of Babylon on the lower Euphrates.
Here the Great King, as he was styled, had his principal palace, from
which he issued orders to his twenty or more satraps or governors whose
provinces extended in name at least from the shores of the Mediterranean
to the banks of the Indus, and from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea.
Darius had married his half-sister Parysatis, a high-spirited but
unscrupulous woman, by whom he had two sons, destined to be known in
history. The eldest was Artaxerxes, a youth of but little character; and
the second, Cyrus, who inherited the decided qualities of his mother. In
order to distinguish him from Cyrus the Great, the founder of the
Persian Empire, who died more than a hundred years earlier, he is
commonly called Cyrus the Younger.
He was his mother's favorite, and as he was born after Darius assumed
the crown, while Artaxerxes was born before that date, Parysatis seems
to have encouraged Cyrus to consider himself the true heir to the
throne, since he was in fact the _king's_ eldest son. Through her
influence he was appointed satrap of Lydia and the adjacent provinces of
western Asia Minor when he was but sixteen. This position, since it made
him the military ruler of that populous and wealthy section of country,
was one of great importance, and doubtless had no small influence in
shaping the young man's future career.
In 404 Cyrus was summoned from Sardis, the capital of Lydia, to Babylon,
and shortly after, his father died, leaving his crown to Artaxerxes,
who, from his remarkable memory which appears to have been his chief
characteristic, got the title of Artaxerxes Mnemon. But Cyrus certainly
was not deficient in this mental quality, for he seems to have
remembered his mother's suggestions about his being the rightful heir to
the throne so well, that at the coronation of Artaxerxes he plotted his
assassination; or at least, Tissaphernes, a neighboring satrap,[1]
accused him of it. Cyrus, who appears to have had no adequate defence to
make, was forthwith arrested and would probably have been summarily put
to death--for in Persia the law's delays were unknown--had not Parysatis
interfered. Realizing her son's imminent peril, she rushed forward and,
clasping him in her arms, wound her long flowing hair about him, and
pressed his neck to hers in such a way that the executioner must have
beheaded her with the same stroke with which he decapitated Cyrus.
The prayers and entreaties of Parysatis saved the young man's life, and
he was even permitted to return to Sardis and resume his power. He went;
but with no intention of remaining in that subordinate position. Not
only was he resolved to be revenged on Tissaphernes, but he was equally
determined to overthrow the mild Artaxerxes and convince him of the
mistake of yielding to a woman's tears.
Cyrus had learned from his residence on the Mediterranean coast, how far
superior Greek soldiers were to the troops of Persia. The former would
not only fight from patriotic motives, but what was more, they would
readily fight outside of Greece, if they were paid well for it; the
latter would only fight when they were flogged to it, and officers had
to carry whips to drive them into battle by the sting of the lash.
Under the pretext that he was about to engage in a local and private
war with his enemy Tissaphernes, Cyrus managed to gradually collect an
army of about ten thousand Greeks whom Klearchus, an ex-governor of
Byzantium, hired for him. These ten thousand were the real core of the
expedition, though in addition a hundred thousand Asiatics were to form
the bulk of it. With this force the young satrap believed that he could
take Babylon and with it that title of Great King which he coveted. It
was true that Artaxerxes would meet him with an army of ten men to his
one; but, as Cyrus said, mere "numbers and noise" did not tell on the
battle-field, and "numbers and noise" were all that the Persian
sovereign had to rely on.
When all was ready, Cyrus set out from Sardis on his memorable march in
the spring of 401. Among the Greeks was a volunteer named Xenophon, who
had been persuaded to go by his friend Proxenus, a general in the army
of Cyrus. Xenophon, as we shall see, eventually saved his countrymen
from destruction, and became not only the leader, but the historian of
the expedition.
With the exception of Klearchus, none of the army seem to have known the
real object of the campaign, but supposed that Cyrus was going to attack
the Pisidians, robber tribes that inhabited the mountainous country
southeast of Sardis. Artaxerxes appears to have been equally in the
dark, and though he knew Cyrus was advancing in the direction of
Babylon, he thought that his ultimate purpose was to make war on
Tissaphernes, and so gave himself no more trouble about the matter.
All went well with Cyrus and his Greek mercenaries until they reached
that city of Tarsus in Cilicia, which was later to become famous as the
birthplace of the apostle Paul. When they reached that place, Xenophon's
countrymen saw that they had been deceived, and that Cyrus evidently had
some greater foe in view than the rough banditti of the Pisidian
highlands. At first they were on the point of mutinying, and of stoning
Klearchus to give proper emphasis to their feelings; but sober second
thought showed them that it was doubtful whether they would gain
anything by such a course. Klearchus, who was quite equal to the
emergency, bade them reflect that they were now a long distance from
home, and that Cyrus had it in his power to make it difficult for them
to get back without his permission. Next, they were promised a decided
increase of pay if they would keep on. These considerations so
influenced the Greeks that they finally resolved to continue their march
and take the chances of war. Cyrus still refused to divulge his real
purpose; and though there cannot be much doubt that the Ten Thousand
felt pretty reasonably certain what it was, yet they probably believed
he had chances enough of success to make it worth their while to run the
risk with him.
Accordingly the army resumed their forward movement, following the trend
of the coast round the Gulf of Issus, and then striking southeasterly
again, until some time in the summer they reached and crossed the
Euphrates at Thapsacus. From that point they marched down the left bank
of the river, through the hilly desert of Arabia, toward the great city
of Babylon. Early in September they reached a point on the Tigris,
nearly opposite Bagdad, and about two days' march from Kunaxa, a place
not very far northwest of the Persian capital.
Up to this time Cyrus had met with no opposition, though he was daily
expecting to see the advance-guard of his brother's army. Before going
further he thought it prudent to hold a grand review of his troops,
which he did at midnight, as it was now reported that Artaxerxes, with
an army of over a million, was coming to give him battle.
But the million did not make their appearance, and so Cyrus decided to
keep on until he should encounter them. The next day the invading army
reached a trench which had evidently been recently dug to obstruct their
advance. It stretched across the plain between the Euphrates and the
Tigris, in connection with the ruins of the old Median Wall, built
probably in the days of Nebuchadnezzar as one of the defences of
Babylon. This trench was eighteen feet deep, thirty feet wide, and
upwards of forty miles in length; it stopped short of the Euphrates by
only twenty feet. Over that narrow strip of ground, which the Persian
king might easily have held with a small number of resolute men, the
Cyreian forces passed, with no one to hinder them. The great trench, on
which so much labor had been expended, was, therefore, not only useless
as a defence to Artaxerxes, but it was a positive encouragement to Cyrus
and his men, for it revealed the inefficiency and the cowardice of the
Persians. The whole army now moved rapidly forward, confident of an easy
victory, many even supposing that Artaxerxes would make no stand at all,
but abandon his capital to them. The Great King, however, was not so
hopelessly pusillanimous as that; for, when Cyrus reached Kunaxa, scouts
brought word that the enemy's hosts were not far behind. This time the
intelligence was correct. That very afternoon a great cloud of white
dust rolled up from the plain, and as it kept advancing the invaders
caught sight of the flash of brazen armor and a forest of spears.
When all was ready for the battle to begin, the Greeks, not waiting to
be attacked, charged on the run against the Persian left wing. The
Persians, who seem to have thought that on such an occasion absence of
body was a good deal better than presence of mind, waited just long
enough to hear the Greeks give a fierce shout to Mars, accompanied by a
significant clatter of spears and shields. That satisfied them, and,
turning like a flock of frightened sheep, they ran for their lives.
Cyrus, who had refused to put on a helmet, now dashed into the fight
with uncovered head, making straight for King Artaxerxes, who occupied
the centre of his army. "I see the man!" he cried, and, hurling his
lance, he struck and slightly wounded the Great King; but that
fratricidal blow was the last, for just then a javelin pierced Cyrus
under the eye, and he fell from his horse and was slain. His head and
right hand were then cut off to serve as a warning to traitors. The
native or Asiatic troops, seeing the disaster, fled, and did not stop
till they had reached a former camp eight miles away.
Meanwhile the victorious Ten Thousand, knowing nothing of what had
happened to Cyrus, pursued the Persians as long as light lasted; then
when the sun had set they returned to find that their camp had been
plundered by the enemy, and that they must go to bed supperless. It was
not until sunrise of the next day that they learned that Cyrus was dead;
that their companions in arms had fled; and that they were left a mere
handful of men without a leader, and without provisions, in the heart of
the enemy's country.
How to retreat from such a position was the supreme question. They could
not return the way they came, for that road led them through the desert,
where it would be impossible to get food. If they were to get back alive
they must take the northern route to the shores of the Black Sea. This
would lead them through a fertile but rough country, in which they would
have to find their way as best they could across rivers and over
mountains, harassed by the Persians in the rear, and encountering savage
tribes who would dispute their progress. At the shortest such a march
would be about six hundred miles even in an air line, with prospect of
something like six hundred more before they reached the Mediterranean.
After many delays, this latter course was the one they finally resolved
to take, and owing to Xenophon's courage and resolution it turned out
successfully.
After eight months of wandering, hardships, and peril, they all came in
sight of the Euxine, and perhaps no shipwrecked sailors clinging to a
raft ever cried "Land!" "Land!" with more joy than those Greeks who had
climbed a hill-top shouted "The Sea!" "The Sea!"
Thanks to their own bravery, to their able leader, and finally to
Persian vacillation and cowardice, this little army had now reached a
place of safety. It was long, however, before they got back to their
native country, and when they did, they were not to arrive at its shores
asleep, on shipboard, as the much wandering and storm-tossed Ulysses
came to his beloved Ithaca.
It is doubtful, indeed, how many of them ever got back to their Spartan
or Athenian homes, for we know that most of them could not make up their
minds to live quiet lives of peace again; but preferred fighting in
behalf of the independence of the Ionian cities which Greece had planted
on the coast of Asia Minor.
Such was the Retreat of the Ten Thousand. If we may accept the judgment
of Rollin, a once noted historian, it has never had a parallel in
history. If we consider its results, it certainly merits all that Rollin
claims for it, for it convinced the Greek people that the apparent power
of the Persian empire was utterly unreal. They saw that, as Cyrus had
said, its only strength was in "numbers and noise." This conviction
grew, and two generations after Xenophon's return, it led to that grand
invasion of Persia by Alexander the Great which was to revolutionize the
ancient world.
What, then, had the retreat of the Greeks accomplished? First, it proved
that ten thousand men not afraid to die are worth more than a million
who lack that courage; and next, though it was a retreat, yet it
suggested that advance which eventually spread the Greek language, Greek
culture and Greek civilization in countries where they were before
unknown.
D. H. M.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Tissaphernes was a satrap of Caria, a province of Asia Minor south
of Lydia.
[Illustration: MARCH OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS. FOR XENOPHON'S
ANABASIS.]
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP OF EUROPE SHOWING PRINCIPAL BATTLES OF
NAPOLEON.]
RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
Sec. 1. Effect of the death of Cyrus on the Greeks; they resolve to
retreat.
The first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa[2] was
exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay and
sorrow; accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture into which
he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus himself too
repented, and with good reason, of having displayed, in his manner of
fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so little regard either to
the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus. Nevertheless he still
maintained the tone of a victor in the field, and after expressions of
grief for the fate of the young prince, desired Prokles and Glus to
return to Ariaeus, with the reply, that the Greeks on their side were
conquerors without any enemy remaining; that they were about to march
onward against Artaxerxes; and that if Ariaeus would join them, they
would place him on the throne which had been intended for Cyrus. While
this reply was conveyed to Ariaeus by his particular friend Menon along
with the messengers, the Greeks procured a meal as well as they could,
having no bread, by killing some of the baggage animals; and by kindling
fire to cook their meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields
which had been thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts.
Before any answer could be received from Ariaeus, heralds[3] appeared
coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek from
Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was in the
service of the Persian king. Phalinus, an officer of some military
experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, addressed himself to
the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the King, since he
was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their arms and appeal
to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme to a Grecian ear,
Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for victorious men to lay
down their arms. Being then called away to examine the sacrifice[4]
which was going on, he left the interview to the other officers, who met
the summons of Phalinus by an emphatic negative. "If the King thinks
himself strong enough to ask for our arms unconditionally, let him come
and try to seize them."--"The King (rejoined Phalinus) thinks that you
are in his power, being in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by
impassable rivers, and encompassed by his innumerable subjects."--"Our
arms and our valor are all that remain to us (replied a young Athenian);
we shall not be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining
treasures, but shall employ them still to have a fight for _your_
treasure." But though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were
not wanting others disposed to encourage a negotiation; saying that
they had been faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be
faithful to Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere
else. In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested
by Phalinus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first asked
the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common feeling of
Hellenic[5] patriotism, and anticipating, with very little judgment,
that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out. "If (replied
Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your favor, in the
event of a contest with the King, I should advise you to refuse the
surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance of safety for you
against the King's consent, I recommend you to look out for safety in
the only quarter where it presents itself." Sensible of the mistake
which he had made in asking the question, Klearchus rejoined--"That is
_your_ opinion: now report our answer. We think we shall be better
friends to the King, if we are to be his friends,--or more effective
enemies, if we are to be his enemies,--with our arms, than without
them." Phalinus, in retiring, said that the King proclaimed a truce so
long as they remained in their present position--but war, if they moved,
either onward or backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without
declaring which he intended to do.
Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to Ariaeus
returned; communicating his reply that the Persian grandees would never
tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and that he intended
to depart early the next morning on his return; if the Greeks wished to
accompany him, they must join him during the night. In the evening,
Klearchus, convening the generals and the captains, acquainted them that
the morning sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching
against the King--a prohibition, of which he now understood the reason,
from having since learnt that the King was on the other side of the
Tigris, and therefore out of their reach--but that it was favorable for
rejoining Ariaeus. He gave directions accordingly for a night-march back
along the Euphrates, to the station where they had passed the last night
but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian generals, without any
formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly acquiesced in his orders,
from a sense of his superior decision and experience, in an emergency
when no one knew what to propose. The night-march was successfully
accomplished, so that they joined Ariaeus at the preceding station about
midnight; not without the alarming symptom, however, that Miltokythes
the Thracian deserted to the King at the head of 340 of his countrymen,
partly horse, partly foot.
The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn
oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariaeus. According to an
ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a ram, were
all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow of a shield;
in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariaeus, with his chief
companions, a spear. The latter, besides the promise of alliance,
engaged also to guide the Greeks in good faith down to the Asiatic
coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what route he proposed to
take; whether to return by that along which they had come up, or by any
other. To this Ariaeus replied, that the road along which they had
marched was impracticable for retreat, from the utter want of
provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that he intended to
choose another road, which, though longer, would be sufficiently
productive to furnish them with provisions. There was, however, a
necessity (he added), that the first two or three days' marches should
be of extreme length, in order that they might get out of the reach of
the king's forces, who would hardly be able to overtake them afterwards
with any considerable numbers.
They had now come 93 days' march from Ephesus, or 90 from Sardis. The
distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is 1464 miles. There had been at least 96
days of rest, enjoyed at various places, so that the total of time
elapsed must have at least been 189 days, or a little more than half a
year: but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not
specified in number of days.
How to retrace their steps was now the problem, apparently insoluble. As
to the military force of Persia in the field, indeed, not merely the
easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more the undisputed march throughout
so long a space, left them no serious apprehension. In spite of this
great extent, population, and riches, they had been allowed to pass
through the most difficult and defensible country, and to ford the broad
Euphrates, without a blow: nay, the King had shrunk from defending the
long trench which he had specially caused to be dug for the protection
of Babylonia. But the difficulties which stood between them and their
homes were of a very different character. How were they to find their
way back, or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile
cavalry, which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle, would
be most formidable in opposing their retreat? The line of their upward
march had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus:--yet
even under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing,
in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called upon
to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either roads
or distances--without trustworthy guides--without any one to furnish or
even to indicate supplies--and with a territory all hostile, traversed
by rivers which they had no means of crossing. Klearchus himself knew
nothing of the country, nor of any other river except the Euphrates; nor
does he indeed in his heart seem to have conceived retreat as
practicable without the consent of the King. The reader who casts his
eye on a map of Asia, and imagines the situation of this Greek division
on the left bank of the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33 deg.
30'--will hardly be surprised at any measure of despair, on the part
either of general or soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not
even the advantage of such a map, or probably of any map at all, to
enable him to shape his course.
In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult
Ariaeus; who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good reason,
that return by the same road was impracticable; and promised to conduct
them home by another road--longer indeed, yet better supplied.
Sec. 2. Commencement of the Retreat.
At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march in an
easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should reach
some villages of the Babylonian territory, as in fact they did; yet not
before they had been alarmed in the afternoon by the supposed approach
of some of the enemy's horse, and by evidences that the enemy were not
far off, which induced them to slacken their march for the purpose of
more cautious array.[6] Hence they did not reach the first villages
before dark; these too had been pillaged by the enemy while retreating
before them, so that only the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain
accommodation, while the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark,
pitched as they could without any order. The whole camp was a scene of
clamor, dispute, and even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions
could be obtained. Early the next morning Klearchus ordered them under
arms; and desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused
the herald[7] to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who
had let the ass[8] into the camp on the preceding night, should be
rewarded with a talent[9] of silver.
What was the project of route entertained by Ariaeus, we cannot
ascertain; since it was not farther pursued. For the effect of the
unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy--and even the
clamor and shouting of the camp during the night--so intimidated the
Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next morning to treat
about a truce. The contrast between this message, and the haughty
summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms, was sensibly felt
by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the proper way of dealing
with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive demeanor. When Klearchus
was apprised of the arrival of the heralds, he desired them at first to
wait at the outposts until he was at leisure: then, having put his
troops into the best possible order, with a phalanx[10] compact on every
side to the eye, and the unarmed persons out of sight, he desired the
heralds to be admitted. He marched out to meet them with the most showy
and best-armed soldiers immediately around him, and when they informed
him that they had come from the King with instructions to propose a
truce, and to report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it,
Klearchus replied abruptly--"Well then--go and tell the King, that our
first business must be to fight; for we have nothing to eat, nor will
any man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, without first providing
dinner for them." With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned
very speedily; thus making it plain that the King, or the commanding
officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the King thought their
answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a place where
they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be concluded.
After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon the
Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that the guides
should conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could be had.
He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during the march,
himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led them over many
ditches and channels, full of water, and cut for the purpose of
irrigation[11]; some so broad and deep that they could not be crossed
without bridges. The army had to put together bridges for the occasion,
from palm-trees either already fallen, or expressly cut down. This was a
troublesome business, which Klearchus himself superintended with
peculiar strictness. He carried his spear in the left hand, his stick in
the right; employing the latter to chastise any soldier who seemed
remiss--and even plunging into the mud and lending his own hands in aid
wherever it was necessary. As it was not the usual season of irrigation
for crops he suspected that the canals had been filled on this occasion
expressly to intimidate the Greeks, by impressing them with the
difficulties of their prospective march; and he was anxious to
demonstrate to the Persians that these difficulties were no more than
Grecian energy could easily surmount.
At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides for
quarters and provisions; and here for the first time they had a sample
of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory, which
Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision. Large
quantities of corn,[12]--dates not only in great numbers, but of such
beauty, freshness, size, and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen or
tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece, was
disregarded and left for the slaves--wine and vinegar, both also made
from the date-palm; these are the luxuries which Xenophon is eloquent in
describing, after his recent period of scanty fare and anxious
apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches which such new and
luscious food, in unlimited quantity, brought upon himself and others.
Sec. 3. Negotiations with Tissaphernes.
After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were visited
by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees and a suite of
slaves. The satrap[13] began to open a negotiation with Klearchus and
the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter, he stated to them
that the vicinity of his province to Greece impressed him with a strong
interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks,[14] and made him anxious to
rescue them out of their present desperate situation; that he had
solicited the King's permission to save them, as a personal recompense
to himself for having been the first to forewarn him of the schemes of
Cyrus, and for having been the only Persian who had not fled before the
Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King had promised to consider this point, and
had sent him in the mean time to ask the Greeks what their purpose was
in coming up to attack him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give
him a conciliatory answer to carry back, in order that he might have
less difficulty in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this
Klearchus, after first deliberating apart with the other officers,
replied, that the army had come together, and had even commenced their
march, without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had
brought them up the country under false pretences, but that they had
been ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always
treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had no
purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious to return
home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from all quarters, but
would be not less prompt in requiting favor or assistance. With this
answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned on the next day but one,
informing them that he had obtained the King's permission to save the
Grecian army--though not without great opposition, since many Persian
counsellors contended that it was unworthy of the King's dignity to
suffer those who had assailed him to escape. "I am now ready (said he)
to conclude a covenant[15] and exchange oaths with you; engaging to
conduct you safely back into Greece, with the country friendly, and with
a regular market for you to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on
your part always to pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the
country: if I do not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at
liberty to take them where you can find them." Well were the Greeks
content to enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given
upon it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the captains on their
side--and by Tissaphernes with the King's brother-in-law on the other.
Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would go back to the King,
make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home; going
himself to his own province.
The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly, and not
to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that Queen
Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his contest for
the throne--that the first report conveyed to her of the battle of
Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with joy, which was
exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of his death,--that
she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all those, who, though
acting in the Persian army and for the defence of Artaxerxes, had any
participation in the death of Cyrus--and that she showed favorable
dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks. It may seem probable, farther,
that her influence may have been exerted to procure for them an
unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the use afterwards made by
Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the present convention.[16] And in
one point of view the Persian king had an interest in facilitating their
retreat. For the very circumstance which rendered retreat difficult,
also rendered the Greeks dangerous to him in their actual position. They
were in the heart of the Persian Empire, within seventy miles of
Babylon; in a country not only teeming with fertility, but also
extremely defensible; especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity
of canals, as Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt. And Klearchus
might say to his Grecian soldiers--what Xenophon was afterwards
preparing to say to them at Kalpe on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias
also affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he afterwards conducted
away from Syracuse[17]--that wherever they sat down, they were
sufficiently numerous and well-organized to become at once a city. A
body of such troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps
encourage, the Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and
to relieve themselves from the prodigious tribute[18] which they now
paid to the satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of Artaxerxes
thought it advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of
Babylonia, beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any
rate the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary
to conciliate the goodwill of the Greeks, because there seems to have
been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge could only be reached
by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the interior of
Babylonia.
Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when
Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. For
twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him any
communication; the Cyreian Persians[19] under Ariaeus being encamped near
them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few days, the
source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so, as Ariaeus received
during this interval several visits from his Persian kinsmen, and
friendly messages from the King, promising amnesty[20] for his recent
services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were painfully felt,
in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his Persian troops
towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the Greek soldiers
impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the King had concluded the
recent convention only to arrest their movements, until he should have
assembled a larger army and blocked up more effectually the roads
against their return. To this Klearchus replied--"I am aware of all that
you say. Yet if we now strike our tents,[21] it will be a breach of the
convention, and a declaration of war. No one will furnish us with
provisions: we shall have no guides: Ariaeus will desert us forthwith, so
that we shall have his troops as enemies instead of friends. Whether
there be any other river for us to cross, I know not; but we know that
the Euphrates itself can never be crossed, if there be an enemy to
resist us. Nor have we any cavalry,--while cavalry is the best and most
numerous force of our enemies. If the King, having all these advantages,
really wishes to destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely
exchange all these oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word
worthless in the eyes both of Greeks and barbarians."[22]
Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his own
complete despair of the situation--certainly a very natural
despair--except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and also his
ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling
helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes.
That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with his
army prepared to return to Ionia[23]--with the King's daughter, whom he
had just received in marriage--and with another grandee named Orontas.
Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march, providing supplies for the
Greek troops to purchase; while Ariaeus and his division now separated
themselves altogether from the Greeks, and became intermingled with the
other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks followed them, at the distance
of about three miles in the rear, with a separate guide for themselves;
not without jealousy and mistrust, sometimes shown in individual
conflicts, while collecting wood or forage, between them and the
Persians of Ariaeus. After three days' march (that is, apparently, three
days, calculated from the moment when they began their retreat with
Ariaeus) they came to the Wall of Media,[24] and passed through it,
prosecuting their march onward through the country on its other or
interior side. It was of bricks cemented with bitumen,[25] 100 feet
high, and 20 feet broad; it was said to extend a length of about 70
miles, and to be not far distant from Babylon. Two days of farther
march, computed at 28 miles, brought them to the Tigris. During these
two days they crossed two great ship-canals, one of them over a
permanent bridge, the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats.
Canals of such magnitude must probably have been two among the four
stated by Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them about
three miles and a half distant from the other. They were 100 feet broad,
and deep enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by means
of numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of the soil;
and they were said to fall into the Euphrates; or rather perhaps they
terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the Euphrates to
the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at a different point
of its course. Within less than two miles of the Tigris was a large and
populous city named Sittake, near which the Greeks pitched their camp,
on the verge of a beautiful park or thick grove full of all kinds of
trees; while the Persians all crossed the Tigris, at the neighboring
bridge.
As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp after
supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at the
advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions from
Ariaeus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there were troops
concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of attacking them
during the night--and also to send and occupy the bridge over the
Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it down, in order that the
Greeks might be caught without possibility of escape between the river
and the canal. On discussing this information with Klearchus, who was
much alarmed by it, a young Greek present remarked that the two matters
stated by the informant contradicted each other; for that if
Tissaphernes intended to attack the Greeks during the night, he would
not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his own troops on the
other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive those on this side of
all retreat if they were beaten,--while, if the Greeks were beaten,
there was no escape open to them, whether the bridge continued or not.
This remark induced Klearchus to ask the messenger, what was the extent
of ground between the Tigris and the canal. The messenger replied that
it was a great extent of country, comprising many large cities and
villages. Reflecting on this communication, the Greek officers came to
the conclusion that the message was a stratagem on the part of
Tissaphernes to frighten them and hasten their passage across the
Tigris; under the apprehension that they might conceive the plan of
seizing or breaking the bridge and occupying a permanent position in the
spot where they were; which was an island, fortified on one side by the
Tigris,--on the other sides, by intersecting canals between the
Euphrates and the Tigris. Such an island was a defensible position,
having a most productive territory with numerous cultivators, so as to
furnish shelter and means of hostility for all the King's enemies:
Tissaphernes calculated that the message now delivered would induce the
Greeks to become alarmed with their actual position, and to cross the
Tigris with as little delay as possible. At least this was the
interpretation which the Greek officers put upon his proceeding; an
interpretation highly plausible, since, in order to reach the bridge
over the Tigris, he had been obliged to conduct the Greek troops into a
position sufficiently tempting for them to hold--and since he knew that
his own purposes were purely treacherous. But the Greeks, officers as
well as soldiers, were animated only by the wish of reaching home. They
trusted, though not without misgivings, in the promise of Tissaphernes
to conduct them; and never for a moment thought of taking permanent post
in this fertile island. They did not however neglect the precaution of
sending a guard during the night to the bridge over the Tigris, which no
enemy came to assail. On the next morning they passed over it in a body,
in cautious and mistrustful array, and found themselves on the eastern
bank of the Tigris,--not only without attack, but even without sight of
a single Persian, except Glus the interpreter and a few others watching
their motions.
After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons,[26]
the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern side
of the Tigris, for four days to the river Physkus; said to be seventy
miles. The Physkus was 100 feet wide, with a bridge, and the large city
of Opis near it. Here, at the frontier of Assyria and Media, the road
from the eastern regions to Babylon joined the road northerly on which
the Greeks were marching. An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen
at the head of a numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and
Ekbatana as a reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to
see the Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of two
abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent array, and
halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long a time in passing
by the Persian host that their numbers appeared greater than the
reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon the Persian
spectators was very imposing. Here Assyria ended and Media began. They
marched, still in a northerly direction, for six days through a portion
of Media almost unpeopled, until they came to some flourishing villages
which formed a portion of the domain of Queen Parysatis; probably these
villages, forming so marked an exception to the desert character of the
remaining march, were situated on the Lesser Zab, which flows into the
Tigris, and which Xenophon must have crossed, though he makes no mention
of it. According to the order of march stipulated between the Greeks and
Tissaphernes, the latter only provided a supply of provisions for the
former to purchase; but on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to
plunder the villages, which were rich and full of all sorts of
subsistence--yet without carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap
to put an insult on Cyrus, as his personal enemy, through Parysatis,
thus proved a sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five more
days' march, called seventy miles, brought them to the banks of the
river Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows into the Tigris near a
town now called Senn. During the first of these five days, they saw on
the opposite side of the Tigris a large town called Kaenae, from whence
they received supplies of provisions, brought across by the inhabitants
upon rafts supported by inflated skins.[27]
Sec. 4. Treachery of Tissaphernes.