THE AMERICAN WAR--2ND STAGE--THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1780–1782
[Sidenote: 1780.]
The alliance of France with the revolted provinces having compelled
the British Government to reduce General Clinton’s army by one-half,
this loss was supplemented by the enlistment of volunteers from the
loyal party in America itself, and by the organisation of corps of
irregulars. One such corps, consisting partly of cavalry and partly of
infantry, was commanded by Captain Lord Cathcart of the Seventeenth,
and another, known as the King’s American Dragoons, received an
Adjutant from the regiment. But the corps with which the name of the
Seventeenth was inseparably connected was the so-called “Legion”
commanded by Colonel Banastre Tarleton. To this last a small party of
the Seventeenth seems to have been permanently attached, probably as a
pattern for the guidance of the provincial recruits. But in addition
to these a troop of the regiment under its own officers was frequently
joined to it, which though in contemporary accounts generally included
in the term “Cavalry of the legion,” was distinct from it and careful
to preserve its individuality.
With the change in the composition of the army came simultaneously a
change in the plan of campaign, by a return to the scheme, already
tried once at the outbreak of the war, of an expedition to the
Carolinas; where it was hoped that the loyalists were numerous and
ready to rally round the army. The plan was to scour the country with
flying columns, which would serve at once to hearten good subjects
and overawe the [Sidenote: 1780.] disaffected. For such operations
Charleston was required as a base, and it was to preparations for
the reduction of Charleston that most of Clinton’s energies were
devoted in the summer of 1779. An accession of strength was gained by
the evacuation of Rhode Island in October, and finally, on the 26th
December, Clinton sailed with a portion of his army on this expedition
to the South. One troop of the Seventeenth, sixty strong, accompanied
him.
Bad luck dogged this enterprise from the first. The transports were
overtaken by a storm and dispersed in all directions. All the cavalry
horses perished, and one ship containing siege artillery was lost. It
was not till the end of January that the ships, many of them badly
battered, appeared at the appointed rendezvous, the Island of Tybee,
off the coast of Georgia, having spent five weeks over a voyage
generally reckoned to last ten days. The troop of the Seventeenth was
sent with Tarleton’s legion to Port Royal, a little to the north of
Savannah, where it was landed and quartered at Beaufort, at the head of
the harbour. With great difficulty it procured forty or fifty inferior
horses; and after a time was ordered to join some reinforcements that
were marching up from Savannah, and advance up country with them to
unite with Clinton’s army before Charleston. Meanwhile the people of
the country, knowing that the British had lost their horses, equipped
themselves as cavalry to harass the column on the march. Nothing could
have suited Tarleton better. A charge by the troop of the Seventeenth
sufficed to disperse these irregular horsemen, and ensure the capture
not only of several prisoners, but, better still, of their horses.
After twelve days’ march through a difficult country broken up by
flooded rivers, and in the thick of a hostile population, the legion
arrived at its destination on the Ashley with its strength in horses
multiplied by four or five, and a good supply of forage to boot.
Meanwhile General Clinton with the rest of the army had sailed to the
river Edisto, a little to the south of Charleston, and advanced thence
by slow marches upon the town. Charleston lies on a tongue of land
which runs, roughly speaking, from north [Sidenote: 1780.] to south,
being enclosed between the Cooper River on the east and the Ashley on
the west. The British fleet having moved up to blockade it to the south
or seaward, Clinton on the 30th March threw his army across the Ashley
to the neck of the isthmus on which the town stands, and encamped over
against the American entrenchments. As usual these were formidable
enough, stretching across the isthmus from the Ashley to the Cooper,
and strengthened by a deep canal, two rows of abattis, and other
obstacles. Over and above the garrison of 6000 men within the town, the
Americans kept a force of militia and three regiments of cavalry, under
General Huger, on the upper forks and passes of the Cooper, whereby the
communications between the town and the back country were kept open.
The dislodgment of this corps of Huger’s was therefore indispensable
to the complete investment of Charleston; and the execution of this
task was intrusted to a picked force of 1400 men, including Tarleton’s
legion and the detachment of the Seventeenth.
On the 12th April, therefore, Tarleton moved off to Goose Creek on his
way to Monk’s Corner, thirty miles from Charleston, where there lay
the American post that held Biggin’s Bridge over the Cooper. Knowing
that the enemy was superior to him in cavalry, he had determined to
make a night attack, and he had the good fortune on the way to pick
up a negro who acquainted him with the enemy’s dispositions. Learning
from this source that the American force was divided, the cavalry
being on his own side of the river and the infantry on the other, he
pushed on through the night, and at 3 A.M. surprised the main
guard of the cavalry. Galloping hard on the backs of the fugitives he
dashed straight into the camp, dispersed the far superior force that
lay there, and captured 150 prisoners, 400 horses, and 50 ammunition
waggons. The bridge being thus uncovered he at once ordered his
infantry across it against the American post on the other side; and
this having been captured, detached a force to seize Bowman’s Ferry,
which commanded another branch of the Cooper. This was promptly done,
and by the evening [Sidenote: 1780.] the American communications on
the Cooper were cut through and Charleston completely isolated.
The Americans, however, were not so easily to be baulked. Huger himself
and his principal officer, Colonel Washington,[7] had managed to escape
by hiding in a swamp, and before the end of April had begun to collect
another force of cavalry to the north of the Santee, a river which runs
parallel to the Cooper, and at its nearest point is not above twenty
miles from Biggin’s Bridge. On the 6th of May this force crossed the
Santee, snapped up a British foraging party, and prepared to recross
the river, a few miles lower down, at Lanew’s Ferry. Tarleton, who was
patrolling with the detachment of the Seventeenth and some of his own
dragoons, 150 men all told, learned what had happened, and pressed on
with all haste to catch the Americans before they could repass the
Santee. Once again he caught a superior force by surprise. Coming up
at 3 P.M. with the American vedettes he at once drove them in
upon the picquet, and was on the backs of the main body in an instant.
Five officers and 36 men were cut down, 7 officers and 60 men made
prisoners, and the rest, including Colonel Washington, driven into the
river to escape as best they could by swimming. Tarleton, who had lost
but two men and four horses killed, marched back to camp, twenty-six
miles, on the same evening, with the result that twenty horses died of
fatigue. But Tarleton, as we shall see, never spared men or horses.
On the 12th May Charleston surrendered to General Clinton, who
thereupon prepared to return to New York. But first he sent three
expeditions up three different rivers to the interior to pursue the
advantages gained by the surrender. Of these three, one, under Lord
Cornwallis, was ordered to cross the Santee River and pursue a large
train of American stores and ammunition which, under the command of
Colonel Burford, was retreating in all haste by the north-east bank
towards North Carolina. Accordingly, on the 18th May, Cornwallis with
a mixed force [Sidenote: 1780.] of 2500 men, including Tarleton’s
legion and the Seventeenth, marched off and crossed the Santee in
boats at Lanew’s Ferry. The legion and Seventeenth were then at once
detached to Georgetown to clear the left flank of Cornwallis’s line of
march, while the main body pursued its way up the river to Nelson’s
Ferry. Having rejoined Cornwallis at that point on the 27th, Tarleton
was detached once more with 40 men of the Seventeenth, 130 of the
legion dragoons, 100 mounted infantry, and a three-pounder field-gun,
to follow Burford by forced marches. So intense was the heat that
many both of the men and of the horses broke down; but by dint of
impressing fresh horses on the road the little column reached Camden
(sixty miles distant as the crow flies) on the following day. There
Tarleton learned that Burford was still far ahead of him, having left
Rugeley’s Mills (twenty miles as the crow flies beyond Camden) on the
26th. Moreover, American reinforcements were on the march to join
him from North Carolina, and both columns were making all haste to
effect a junction. Seeing that such junction must at all hazards be
prevented, Tarleton started off again at 2 A.M. on the 29th,
reached Rugeley’s Mills at daylight, and there [Sidenote: 29th May.]
obtained information of Burford still in retreat twenty miles ahead of
him. In the hope of delaying him Tarleton sent him a message, wherein
he exaggerated the strength of his force, to summon him to surrender.
But Burford was too cunning either to pause or to surrender; so there
was nothing for Tarleton to do but to leave his three-pounder behind
and press on with his weary men and horses as best he could. At last
at three in the afternoon the British advanced parties came up with
Burford’s rear-guard, captured five men, and forced Burford to turn
and fight. His force was 380 infantry, a detachment of cavalry, and 2
guns. The British had started but 300 strong, had marched a hundred and
five miles in fifty-four hours, and had perforce left some men behind
them on the way. Tarleton divided his little party into three columns,
whereof the men of the Seventeenth, under Captain Talbot, formed the
centre, and attacked at once. [Sidenote: 1780.] The Americans reserved
their fire till the cavalry was within ten yards of them, but failed to
check the charge of the British, who galloped straight into the middle
of them and did fearful execution. Tarleton’s horse was killed under
him; and the men, thinking that their leader was dead, became mad. The
Americans lost 14 officers and 99 men killed; 8 officers and 142 men
wounded, 3 officers and 50 men prisoners, also 3 colours, 2 guns, and
the whole of their baggage train. The British lost but 2 officers and 3
men killed, 1 officer (Lieutenant Patteshall of the Seventeenth) and 11
men wounded, and 40 horses. After this action, known as the engagement
of Waxhaws, the Americans who were advancing from North Carolina
at once retired; and Tarleton rejoined Cornwallis at Camden. South
Carolina was now virtually cleared of American troops; and Cornwallis
having established a few outlying posts to keep order, and left Lord
Rawdon in command at Camden, returned to Charleston to take up the
business of civil administration.
General Washington now detached 2000 men from the North to North
Carolina, which nucleus being reinforced by 4000 more men from
Virginia, entered South Carolina once more on the 27th July, and
advanced along the line of the Upper Santee upon Camden. To the great
disgust and disappointment of the British commander the whole country
welcomed the arrival of the Americans with joy, and Cornwallis in
great anxiety hastened up to Camden in person. General Gates with
6000 men was advancing in his front, General Sumpter with 1000 men
was threatening his communications with Charleston in rear; 800 of
the garrison of Camden were in hospital, and a bare 2000 men fit for
service. Nevertheless Cornwallis decided rather to advance against
Gates than to retreat upon Charleston; and accordingly marched at 10
P.M. on the 15th August, almost exactly at the time when Gates
started down the same road to meet him. [Sidenote: 16th Aug.] At 2
A.M. the advanced parties of the two columns met, fortunately
just at a point where Cornwallis had reached a good position, his
flanks being secured by swampy ground, and the line of [Sidenote:
1780.] Gates’s advance narrowed by the same cause to a point which
prevented deployment of his far superior force. Cornwallis drew up his
little army in two lines, holding Tarleton’s cavalry in reserve in the
rear. Even this small force of mounted men had been weakened by the
recall of part of the Seventeenth to New York; but the regiment was
nevertheless represented. Cornwallis took the initiative, and after an
hour’s hard fighting broke up the Americans completely. Then Tarleton
was let loose with his men of the Seventeenth and dragoons of the
legion, who pursued the defeated army for twenty-two miles, capturing
seven guns, the whole of the baggage, and a great number of prisoners.
Cornwallis lost 345 men killed and wounded, nearly all of them from the
infantry, while the Americans lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners,
not far from 2000 men, a number equal to that of the whole British
force engaged.
There still remained General Sumpter, with 1000 men well armed and
equipped, on the south side of the Wateree (Upper Santee), who was
now preparing to retreat to North Carolina. Tarleton with a mixed
force of 350 men was at once sent across the river after him; but by
noon on the day after the [Sidenote: 17th Aug.] battle his troops
were so exhausted by fatigue and by the heat that he was forced to
pick out 100 cavalry and 60 infantry, and proceed with these alone.
After marching five miles further his advanced party came upon two
American vedettes, who fired and killed one dragoon. But the shots
caused no alarm in the American camp, for it was assumed that the
American militiamen, according to their usual habit, were merely
shooting at cattle. Tarleton’s men at once captured the vedettes,
and moved on to a neighbouring height, from which on peering over
the crest they discovered the Americans comfortably resting, without
the least suspicion of danger, during the heat of the day. General
Sumpter was not even dressed, so hot was the weather; and altogether
Tarleton’s task, thanks to his own energy, was once more an easy one.
The Americans were promptly attacked and dispersed with the loss of 150
killed and wounded, and 300 prisoners. [Sidenote: 1780.] Two guns, a
great quantity of stores and ammunition, and 250 loyalist prisoners
previously captured by Sumpter, also fell into Tarleton’s hands.
Emboldened by this success, Lord Cornwallis advanced into North
Carolina, but owing to the destruction of one of his detachments
was compelled to fall back once more into South Carolina, and thus,
notwithstanding his victory at Camden, found himself in as bad a
position as ever. In November the indefatigable Sumpter, undismayed
by previous defeats, collected another force and again threatened
the British communications between Camden and Charleston. Once again
Tarleton was ordered to checkmate him; but this time fortune sided with
Sumpter. Tarleton on receiving his instructions moved off with his
usual swiftness, and interposing between Sumpter’s force and the line
of retreat into North Carolina, was on the point of cutting him off
before Sumpter had received the least warning of an enemy’s approach.
Unluckily, however, a deserter betrayed Tarleton’s movements, and thus
enabled Sumpter to get the start of him on his retreat. Tarleton none
the less followed hard after him, and having overtaken his rear-guard,
and cut it to pieces, hurried forward with a handful of 170 of the
Seventeenth and legion cavalry, and 80 mounted infantry, to catch
the main body before it could cross a rapid river, the Tyger, that
barred its line of march. At 5 P.M. on the 20th November he
finally overtook Sumpter at Blackstocks, and with his usual impetuosity
attacked him forthwith. The American force was 1000 strong, skilfully
posted on difficult ground, and sheltered by log huts. Tarleton’s men
were beaten back from all points, and being very heavily punished, were
forced to retire. But by chance Sumpter himself had been badly wounded;
and the Americans, without a leader to hold them together, retreated
and dispersed. Tarleton, therefore, although defeated, was successful
in gaining his point, and received particular commendation for this
action from Lord Cornwallis.
[Sidenote: 1780.]
In December reinforcements from New York were sent to South Carolina,
and among them a troop of the Seventeenth, which was added to
Tarleton’s command for the forthcoming operations. Cornwallis designed
to march once more into North Carolina. The Americans, true to their
habitual tactics, resolved to keep him in the South by harassing
his outlying posts, and to this end sent 1000 men under General
Morgan across the Broad River to attack Lord Rawdon in the district
known as “Ninety-six,” on the western frontier of South Carolina.
Cornwallis replied to this by detaching Tarleton, with a mixed force
of about 1000 men, to the north-west to cut off Morgan’s retreat.
[Sidenote: 1781.] On the night of the 6th January, Tarleton, after
a very fatiguing march, managed to get within six miles of Morgan,
who retreated in a hurry, leaving his provisions half-cooked on the
ground. [Sidenote: 7th Jan.] At three next morning Tarleton resumed
the pursuit, and at 8 A.M. came up with the American force,
disposed for action, at a place called the Cowpens. As usual Tarleton
attacked without hesitation, in fact so quickly that he barely allowed
time for his troops to take up their allotted positions. The 7th Foot
and legion infantry formed his first line, flanked on each side by
a troop of cavalry; the 71st Foot and remainder of the cavalry were
held in reserve. The Americans were drawn up in two lines, whereof
the first was easily broken, but the second stood firm and fought
hard. Seeing that his infantry attack was failing, Tarleton ordered
the troop of cavalry on the right flank to charge, which it duly did
under a very heavy fire, but being unsupported, was driven back by
Morgan’s cavalry with some loss. Tarleton then ordered up the 71st,
which drove back the Americans brilliantly for a time, but being,
like the rest of the British force, fatigued by the previous hours of
hard marching, could not push the attack home. The Americans rallied
and charged in their turn, and the British began to waver. Tarleton
ordered his irregular cavalry to charge, but they would not move; and
then the American cavalry came down upon the infantry, and all was
confusion. [Sidenote: 1781.] “Where is now the boasting Tarleton?”
shouted Colonel Washington, as he galloped down on the broken ranks.
But the boasting Tarleton, who had driven Washington once to hide for
his life in a swamp, and once to swim for his life across the Santee,
was not quite done with yet. Amid all the confusion the troop of the
Seventeenth rallied by itself, and with these, a mere 40 men, and 14
mounted officers who had formed on them, Tarleton made a desperate
charge against the whole of Washington’s cavalry, hurled it back, and
pressing on through them, cut to pieces the guard stationed over the
captured English baggage. Cornet Patterson of the Seventeenth, maddened
by Colonel Washington’s taunt, singled him out, and was shot dead by
Washington’s orderly trumpeter. Lieutenant Nettles of the Seventeenth
was wounded, and many troopers of the regiment likewise fell that day.
The survivors of that charge were the only men that left the field
with Tarleton that evening. The irregular cavalry was collected in the
course of the following days; but the infantry men were cut down where
they stood. Both the 7th and the 71st had done admirably throughout
their previous engagements in the war, and felt that their detachments
had not received fair treatment at Cowpens. The 71st, it is on record,
never forgave Tarleton to the last.
In spite of his victory Morgan continued his retreat into North
Carolina, Lord Cornwallis following hard at his heels, but sadly
embarrassed by the loss of his light troops. Having been misled by
false reports as to the difficulty of passing the rivers of North
Carolina, Cornwallis marched into the extreme back country of the
province so as to cross the waters at their head, and on the 1st
February fought a brilliant little action to force the passage of the
Catawba. At the close of the day Tarleton’s cavalry had an opportunity
of taking revenge for Cowpens, and this time did not leave the
Seventeenth to do all the work alone. From the Catawba Cornwallis
pressed the pursuit of Morgan with increased energy, but failed,
though only by a hair’s breadth, to overtake him. [Sidenote: 1781.]
Nevertheless, by the time he had reached Hillsborough, the American
troops had fairly evacuated North Carolina; and Cornwallis seized
the opportunity to issue a proclamation summoning the loyalists of
the province to the royal standard. The Americans replied by sending
General Greene with a greatly augmented force back into Carolina.
Thereupon the supposed loyalists at once joined Greene, who was thus
able to press Cornwallis back to a position on the Deep River. On the
14th March, Cornwallis, always ready with bold measures, marched out
with 2000 British to attack Greene with 7000 Americans, met him at a
place called Guildford, and defeated him with heavy loss. The cavalry
had no chance, though the Seventeenth was present at the action; but
the British infantry was terribly punished: 542 men were killed and
wounded in the fight; and Cornwallis thus weakened was obliged to
retire slowly down the river to Wilmington, which he reached on the 7th
April.
The memory of Cornwallis’s campaigns in the Carolinas has utterly
perished. But although they issued ultimately in failure, they remain
among the finest performances of the British rank and file. The march
in pursuit of Morgan, which culminated in the action of Guildford
and the retreat to Wilmington, alone covered 600 miles over a most
difficult country. The men had no tents nor other protection against
the climate, and very often no provisions. Day after day they had to
ford large rivers and numberless creeks, which (to use Cornwallis’s
own words), in any other country in the world would be reckoned large
rivers. When, for instance, the Guards forced the passage of the
Catawba, they had to ford a rapid stream waist-deep for five hundred
yards under a heavy fire to which they were unable to reply. The
cavalry on their part came in for some of the hardest of the work,
being continually urged on and on to the front in pursuit of an
enemy which they could sometimes overtake, but never force to fight;
constantly engaged in petty skirmishes, losing a man here and a man
there, but gaining little for their pains, and at each day’s close
driven to their wits’ end to procure food for themselves and forage
for their horses. [Sidenote: 1782.] By the time Cornwallis reached
Wilmington the cavalry were about worn out with their work on the
rear-guard, and, in Cornwallis’s words, were in want of everything.
But not a man of the army complained, and all, by Cornwallis’s own
testimony, showed exemplary patience and spirit. Meanwhile the
Americans gave him no rest. No sooner was his back turned on South
Carolina than they attacked his posts right and left, making particular
efforts against Lord Rawdon at Camden. In fact, in spite of all the
hard work done and the hardships endured with invincible patience by
the British troops, the state of the country was worse than ever--armed
parties of Americans everywhere and all communications cut. Cornwallis
was painfully embarrassed by his situation. To re-enter South Carolina
would be to admit that the operations of the past eighteen months had
been fruitless. He decided that the best course for him was to continue
his advance into Virginia, at the same time despatching messengers to
warn Lord Rawdon that he must prepare to be hard beset.
Not one of these messengers ever reached Lord Rawdon. The perils of
bearers of despatches at this time were such that they could only
be conquered by more than ordinary devotion to duty. Fortunately an
instance of such devotion has been preserved for us from the ranks of
the Seventeenth. The case is that of a corporal, O’Lavery by name,
who was especially selected to accompany a bearer of despatches on a
dangerous and important mission. The two had not gone far before they
were attacked, and both of them severely wounded. The man in charge of
the despatch died on the road; the corporal took the packet from the
dead man’s hand and rode on. Then he too dropped on the road from loss
of blood, but sooner than suffer the papers to fall into the hands of
the enemy, he concealed it by thrusting it into his wound. All night
he lay where he fell, and on the following morning was found alive,
but unable to do more than point to the ghastly hiding-place of the
despatch. The wound thus maltreated proved to be mortal, and Corporal
O’Lavery was soon past all human reward. But Lord Rawdon, unwilling
that such gallant service should be forgotten, erected a monument to
O’Lavery’s memory in his native County Down.
On the 25th of April Cornwallis, having refreshed his army, quitted
Wilmington and marched northward to Petersburg, [Sidenote: 20th May.]
where he effected a junction with two bodies, amounting together to
3600 men, which had been despatched to reinforce him from England
and New York. With these he crossed the Appomattox in search of
Lafayette, and pursued him for some way north, destroying all the
enemy’s stores as he went. The Americans were now, in spite of their
continued resistance in South Carolina, in a distressed and desponding
position; but just at this critical moment their hopes were revived by
intelligence of coming aid from France. Clinton having discovered this
by interception of despatches, and learned further that an attack on
New York was intended, recalled half of Cornwallis’s troops to his own
command, and thus put an end to further operations in the South. It
is significant that Clinton begs in particular for the return of the
detachment of the Seventeenth; evidently he counted upon this regiment
above others in critical times. Thus for the moment operations in the
South came to a standstill and Cornwallis retired to Yorktown.
Meanwhile Washington had raised an army in Connecticut and marched
down with it to his old position at Whiteplains, where he was joined
by a French force of 6000 men which had occupied Rhode Island since
June of the previous year. For more than a month Washington kept
Clinton in perpetual fear of an attack, until at last he received
intelligence that the expected French fleet under the Comte de Grasse
was on its way to the Chesapeake. Then he suddenly marched with the
whole army, French and American, to Philadelphia, and thence down the
Elk River to the Chesapeake. De Grasse had been there with 24 ships
and 3500 troops since the 30th, and had managed to keep his position
against the British fleet of 19 ships under Admiral Graves. This brief
command of the sea by the French virtually decided the war. [Sidenote:
1782.] Yorktown was invested on the 28th September, and on the 19th
October Cornwallis was compelled to surrender. From that moment the
war was practically over, though it was not until the 16th April 1783
that Washington received, from the hand of Captain Stapleton of the
Seventeenth, the despatch that announced to him the final cessation of
hostilities.
So ended the first war service of the 17th Light Dragoons. It will have
been remarked that since 1779 little has been said of the headquarters
of the regiment stationed at New York. The answer is that there is
little or nothing to say, no operations of any importance having been
undertaken in the North after the capture of Charleston. Yet it is
certain that the duties of foraging, patrolling, and reconnaissance
must have kept the men in New York perpetually engaged in trifling
skirmishes and petty actions, whereof all record has naturally
perished. A single anecdote of one such little affair has survived,
and is worth insertion, as exemplifying from early days a distinctive
trait of the regiment, viz. the decided ability of its non-commissioned
officers when left in independent command. We shall find instances
thereof all through the regiment’s history. Our present business is
with Sergeant Thomas Tucker, who, when out patrolling one day with
twelve men, came upon a small American post, promptly attacked it,
and made the garrison, which, though not large, was larger than his
own party, his prisoners. Tucker had accompanied the regiment from
England as a volunteer; he went back with it to England as a cornet.
Incidents of this kind must have been frequent round New York; and as
seventeen men of the Seventeenth, exclusive of those taken at Yorktown,
were prisoners in the hands of the Americans at the close of the war,
there can be no doubt that the garrison duty in that city was not mere
ordinary routine.
A few odd facts remain to be noted respecting the officers. The first
of these, gleaned from General Clinton’s letter-book of 1780, is rather
pathetic. It consists of a memorial to the King from the 17th Light
Dragoons, setting forth “that they look upon themselves as particularly
distinguished, by having been employed in the actual service of their
country ever since the rebellion began in America. [Sidenote: 1782.]
But its being the only regiment of Dragoons in this service, and their
promotion being entirely confined to that line, they cannot but feel
sensibly when they see every day promotion made over them of officers
of inferior rank.” I cannot discover that the least notice was taken of
this petition, hard though the case undoubtedly was; for many of these
officers held high staff appointments in New York. Lieutenant-Colonel
Birch was a local Brigadier-General, and towards the end of the war
was actually in command at New York; but he seems to have gained
little by it. On the other hand Captain Oliver Delancey made his
fortune, professionally speaking, through his success as Clinton’s
Adjutant-General from August 1781.
As to the detachments employed in the South enough has already been
said. But it is worth while to correct the error into which other
writers have fallen, that the men of the Seventeenth were not with
Cornwallis in the campaign of North Carolina. The fact is rendered
certain by the mention of twenty-five men in the melancholy roll of the
capitulation of Yorktown, which twenty-five I take to be the remnant
of the small body that was permanently attached to Tarleton’s legion.
Moreover, it was not likely that Cornwallis, who was badly in want of
light troops, would have left them to do garrison work with Rawdon. The
loose expression “legion-cavalry” is so often used to cover the whole
of the mounted force under Tarleton’s command, that it is frequently
difficult to distinguish the detachment of the Seventeenth from the
irregulars. But the men of that detachment were not willing to sink
their individuality in the general body of legion dragoons. When their
old regimental uniform was worn out they were offered the green uniform
of the legion, but they would have none of it. They preferred to patch
their own ragged and faded scarlet, and be men of the Seventeenth. Nor
can we be surprised at it when we remember how the legion retired and
left a handful of the Seventeenth to face the victorious Americans
alone at Cowpens. This action gives a fair clue to the real seat of
strength in Tarleton’s cavalry.
[Sidenote: 1782.]
Lastly, it must be noted that, although the history of the American War
is usually slurred over in consequence of its disastrous conclusion,
yet to the rank and file of the British army there is far more ground
therein for pride than for shame. British troops have never known
harder times, harder work, nor harder fighting, than in the fifteen
hundred miles of the march through the Carolinas. They were continually
matched against heavy odds under disadvantageous conditions, yet they
were almost uniformly victorious. The Americans fought and kept on
fighting with indomitable courage and determination, but it was not the
Americans but the French, and not so much the French army as the French
fleet, that caused Cornwallis to capitulate at Yorktown.
[Illustration:
_G. Salisbury._ OFFICER, Review Order.
PRIVATE, Field-day Order. CORPORAL, Marching Order.
1814.]