THE AMERICAN WAR--1ST STAGE--THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1775–1780.
[Sidenote: 1775.]
It would be beside the purpose to enter upon a relation of the
causes which led to the rupture between England and the thirteen
North American Colonies, and to the war of American Independence.
The immediate ground of dispute was, however, one in which the Army
was specially interested, namely, the question of Imperial defence.
Fifteen years before the outbreak of the American War England had,
by the conquest of Canada, relieved the Colonies from the presence
of a dangerous neighbour on their northern frontier, and for this
good service she felt justified in asking from them some return.
Unfortunately, however, the British Government, instead of leaving it
to the Colonies to determine in what manner their contribution to the
cost of Imperial defence should be raised, took the settlement of the
question into its own hands, as a matter wherein its authority was
paramount. Ultimately by a series of lamentable blunders the British
ministers contrived to create such irritation in America that the
Colonies broke into open revolt.
[Sidenote: 1774.]
It was in the year 1774 that American discontent reached its acutest
stage; and the centre of that discontent was the city of Boston. In
July General Gage, at that time in command of the forces in America,
and later on to be Colonel-in-Chief of the 17th Light Dragoons, feeling
that the security of Boston was now seriously threatened by the
rebellious attitude of the citizens, moved down with some troops and
occupied the neck of the [Sidenote: 1774.] isthmus on which the city
stands. This step increased the irritation of the people so far that in
a month or two he judged it prudent to entrench his position and remove
all military stores from outlying stations into Boston. By November
the temper of the Colonists had become so unmistakably insubordinate
that Gage issued a proclamation warning them against the consequences
of revolt. This manifesto was taken in effect as a final signal for
general and open insurrection. Rhode Island and New Hampshire broke out
at once; and the Americans began their military preparations by seizing
British guns, stores, and ammunition [Sidenote: 1775.] wherever they
could get hold of them. By the opening of 1775 the seizure, purchase,
and collection of arms became so general that Gage took alarm for the
safety of a large magazine at Concord, some twenty miles from Boston,
and detached a force to secure it. This expedition it was that led to
the first shedding of blood. The British troops succeeded in reaching
Concord and destroying the stores; but they had to fight their way back
to Boston through the whole population of the district, and finally
arrived, worn out with fatigue, having lost 240 men, killed, [Sidenote:
19th April.] wounded, and missing, out of 1800. The Americans then
suddenly assembled a force of 20,000 men and closely invested Boston.
It was just about this time that there arrived in Boston Captain Oliver
Delancey, of the 17th Light Dragoons, with despatches announcing that
reinforcements would shortly arrive from England under the command of
Generals Howe and Clinton. Captain Delancey was charged with the duty
of preparing for the reception of his regiment, and in particular of
purchasing horses whereon to mount it. Two days after his arrival,
therefore, he started for New York to buy horses, only to find at his
journey’s end that New York also had risen in insurrection, and that
there was nothing for it but to return to Boston.
And while Delancey was making his arrangements, the Seventeenth was
on its way to join him. The 12th and 18th Regiments had furnished
the drafts required of them, and the Seventeenth, [Sidenote: 1775.]
thus raised to some semblance of war strength, embarked for its first
turn on active service. Here is a digest of their final muster,
dated, Passage, 10th April 1775, and [Sidenote: 10th April.] endorsed
“Embarkation”--
_Lieutenant-Colonel._--Samuel Birch.
_Major._--Henry Bishop.
_Adjutant._--John St. Clair, _Cornet_.
_Surgeon._--Christopher Johnston.
_Surgeon’s mate._--Alexander Acheson.
_Deputy-Chaplain._--W. Oliver.
_Major Bishopp’s Troop._
Robert Archdale, _Captain_.
Frederick Metzer, _Cornet_.
1 Quartermaster, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 1 trumpeter, 29 dragoons,
31 horses.
_Captain Straubenzee’s Troop._
Henry Nettles, _Lieutenant_.
Sam. Baggot, _Cornet_.
5 Non-commissioned officers, 1 trumpeter, 26 dragoons, 31 horses.
_Captain Moxham’s Troop._
Ben. Bunbury, _Lieutenant_.
Thomas Cooke, _Cornet_.
5 Non-commissioned officers, 1 trumpeter, 26 dragoons,
31 horses.
_Captain Delancey’s Troop._
Hamlet Obins, _Lieutenant_.
James Hussey, _Cornet_.
5 Non-commissioned officers, 1 trumpeter, 1 hautboy, 27 dragoons,
31 horses.
_Captain Needham’s Troop._
Mark Kerr, _Lieutenant_.
Will. Loftus, _Cornet_.
5 Non-commissioned officers, 1 trumpeter, 26 dragoons, 31 horses.
_Captain Crewe’s Troop._
Matthew Patteshall, _Lieutenant_.
John St. Clair (Adjutant), _Cornet_.
5 Non-commissioned officers, 1 trumpeter, 1 hautboy, 26 dragoons,
31 horses.
What manner of scenes there may have been at the embarkation that day
at Cork it is impossible to conjecture. We can only bear in mind that
there were a great many Irishmen in the ranks, and that probably all
their relations came to see them off, and draw what mental picture we
may. Meanwhile it is worth while to compare two embarkations of the
regiment on active service, at roughly speaking, a century’s interval.
In 1879 the Seventeenth with its horses sailed to the Cape in two
hired transports--the _England_ and the _France_. In 1776 it filled no
fewer than seven ships, the _Glen_, _Satisfaction_, _John and Jane_,
_Charming Polly_, _John and Rebecca_, _Love and Charity_, _Henry
and Edward_--whereof the very names suffice to show that they were
decidedly small craft.
The voyage across the Atlantic occupied two whole months, but, like all
things, it came to an end; and the regiment [Sidenote: June 15–19.]
disembarked at Boston just in time to volunteer its services for the
first serious action of the war. That action was brought about in this
way. Over against Boston, and divided from it by a river of about
the breadth of the Thames at London Bridge, is a peninsula called
Charlestown. It occurred, rather late in the day, to General Gage that
an eminence thereupon called Bunker’s Hill was a position that ought
to be occupied, inasmuch as it lay within cannon-shot of Boston and
commanded the whole of the town. Unfortunately, precisely the same
idea had occurred to the Americans, who on the 16th June seized the
hill, unobserved by Gage, and proceeded to entrench it. By hard work
and the aid of professional engineers they soon made Bunker’s Hill
into a formidable position; so that Gage, on the following day, found
that his task was not that of marching to an unoccupied height, but of
attacking an enemy 6000 strong in a well-fortified post. None the less
he attacked the 6000 Americans with 2000 English, and drove them out
at the bayonet’s point after the bloodiest engagement thitherto fought
by the British army. Of the 2000 men 1054, including 89 officers, went
down that day; and the British occupied the Charlestown peninsula.
[Sidenote: 1775.]
The acquisition was welcome, for the army was sadly crowded in Boston
and needed more space; but the enemy soon erected new works which
penned it up as closely as ever. Moreover the Americans refused to
supply the British with fresh provisions, so that the latter--what
with salt food, confinement, and the heat of the climate--soon became
sickly. The Seventeenth were driven to their wit’s end to obtain forage
for their horses. It was but a poor exchange alike for animals and
men to forsake the ships for a besieged city. The summer passed away
and the winter came on. The Americans pressed the British garrison
more hardly than ever through the winter months, and finally, on the
[Sidenote: 1776.]2nd March 1776, opened a bombardment which fairly
drove the English out. On the 17th March Boston was evacuated, and the
army, 9000 strong, withdrawn by sea to Halifax.
However mortifying it might be to British sentiment, this evacuation
was decidedly a wise and prudent step; indeed, but for the
determination of King George III. to punish the recalcitrant Boston,
it is probable that it would have taken place long before, for it was
recommended both by Gage, who resigned his command in August 1775, and
by his successor, General Howe. They both saw clearly enough that, as
England held command of the sea, her true policy was to occupy the line
of the Hudson River from New York in the south to Lake Champlain in
the north. Thereby she could isolate from the rest the seven provinces
of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire,
and Maine, and reduce them at her leisure; which process would be the
easier, inasmuch as these provinces depended almost entirely on the
States west of the Hudson for their supplies. The Americans, being
equally well aware of this, and having already possession of New York,
took the bold line of attempting to capture Canada while the English
were frittering their strength away at Boston. And they were within
an ace of success. As early as May 1775 they captured Ticonderoga and
the only King’s ship in Lake Champlain, and in November they obtained
possession of Chambly, St. John’s, and Montreal. Fortunately Quebec
still held out, though reduced to great straits, and saved Canada to
England. On the 31st December the little garrison gallantly repelled an
American assault, and shortly after it was relieved by the arrival of a
British squadron which made its way through the ice with reinforcements
of 3500 men under General Burgoyne. This decided the fate of Canada,
from which the Americans were finally driven out in June 1776.
One other small incident requires notice before we pass to the
operations of Howe’s army (whereof the Seventeenth formed part) in
the campaign of 1776. Very early in the day Governor Martin of North
Carolina had recommended the despatch of a flying column or small force
to the Carolinas, there to rally around it the loyalists, who were
said to be many, and create a powerful diversion in England’s favour.
Accordingly in December 1775, five infantry regiments under Lord
Cornwallis were despatched from England to Cape Fear, whither General
Clinton was sent by Howe to meet them and take command. An attack on
Charleston by this expedition proved to be a total failure; and on the
21st June 1776, Clinton withdrew the force to New York. This episode
deserves mention, because it shows how early the British Government
was bitten with this plan of a Carolina campaign, which was destined
to cost us the possession of the American Colonies. Three times in the
course of this history shall we see English statesmen make the fatal
mistake of sending a weak force to a hostile country in reliance on
the support of a section of disaffected inhabitants, and each time (as
fate ordained it) we shall find the Seventeenth among the regiments
that paid the inevitable penalty. From this brief digression let us now
return to the army under General Howe.
While the bulk of this force was quartered at Halifax, the Seventeenth
lay, for convenience of obtaining forage, at Windsor, some miles away.
In June the 16th light Dragoons arrived at Halifax from England with
remounts for the regiment; but it is questionable whether they had
any horses to spare, for we find that out of 950 horses 412 perished
on the voyage. About the same time arrived orders for the increase of
the Seventeenth by 1 cornet, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 30 privates
per troop; but the necessary recruits had not been received by the
time when the campaign opened. On the 11th June the regiment, with the
rest of Howe’s army, was once more embarked at Halifax and reached
Sandy Hook on the 29th. Howe then landed his force on Staten Island,
and awaited the arrival of his brother, Admiral Lord Howe, who duly
appeared with a squadron and reinforcements on the 1st July. Clinton
with his troops from Charleston arrived on the 1st August, and further
reinforcements from England on the 12th. Howe had now 30,000 men,
12,000 of them Hessians, under his command in America, two-thirds of
whom were actually on the spot around New York.
Active operations were opened on the 22nd August, by the landing of
the whole army in Gravesend Bay at the extreme south-west corner of
Long Island. The American army, 15,000 strong, occupied a position on
the peninsula to the north-west, where Brooklyn now stands--its left
resting on the East River, its right on a stream called Mill Creek,
and its front covered as usual by a strong line of entrenchments.
From this fortified camp, however, they detached General Putnam with
10,000 men to take up a position about a mile distant on a line of
heights that runs obliquely across the island. After a reconnaissance
by Generals Clinton and Erskine, the latter of whom led the brigade to
which the Seventeenth was attached, General Howe decided to turn the
left flank of the Americans with part of his force, leaving the rest
to attack their front as soon as the turning movement was completed.
At 9 P.M. on the 26th August the turning column, under the
command of Howe himself, marched across the flat ground to seize a pass
on the extreme left of the enemy’s line, the Seventeenth forming the
advanced guard. On reaching the pass it was found that the Americans
had neglected to secure it, being content to visit it with occasional
cavalry [Sidenote: 1776.] patrols. One such patrol was intercepted by
the advanced party of the Seventeenth; and the pass was occupied by the
British without giving alarm to the Americans. At nine next morning,
Howe’s column having completely enveloped Putnam’s left, opened the
attack on that quarter, while the rest of the army advanced upon the
centre and right. The Americans were defeated at all points and driven
in confusion to their entrenchments; but Howe made no effort to pursue
them nor to storm the camp, as he might easily have done. He merely
moved feebly up to the enemy’s entrenchments on the following day,
and began to break ground as if for a regular siege. On the 29th the
Americans evacuated the camp, and retired across the East River to New
York; and this they were allowed to do without hindrance, though the
British army of 20,000 men stood on their front, and a navigable river,
where a British seventy-four could have anchored, lay in their rear.
Thus deliberately were sacrificed the fruits of the battle of Brooklyn.
This was the first action in which the Seventeenth was under fire.
The regiment at its close received the thanks of Generals Erskine and
Clinton.
The possession of Long Island gave the British complete command of New
York by sea; and Howe set himself to transport his army to New York
Island, an operation which was completed on the 15th September. The
Americans then evacuated New York town and retired to the northern
extremity of New York Island, where Washington fortified a position
from Haarlem to Kingsbridge along the Hudson River in order to secure
his retreat across it to the mainland. The English warships now moved
up the Hudson to cut off that retreat; and Howe having left four
brigades to cover New York town, [Sidenote: 12th Oct.] embarked the
rest on flat-bottomed boats to turn Washington’s position. The flotilla
passed through Hell Gate; and Howe [Sidenote: 18th Oct.] having wasted
a deal of time in disembarking the troops first at the wrong place,
landed them finally at Pell’s Point, the corner which divides East
River from Long Island Sound, and [Sidenote: 1776.] forms the extreme
point of the spit of continent that runs down to New York Island. The
advanced parties of the Seventeenth were engaged in a trifling skirmish
at Pelham Manor, a little to the north of Pell’s Point, shortly after
disembarkation; but the British advance was practically unopposed,
and the army was concentrated at New Rochelle, on Long Island Sound,
on the 21st October. Washington now changed front, throwing his left
back, and distributed his army along a line parallel to the march of
the British; his right resting at Kingsbridge on the south, and his
left at Whiteplains on the north. The two armies were separated by a
deep river called the Bronx, which covered the whole of Washington’s
front. Howe continued his march northward, doubtless with the intention
of getting between Washington and the mainland; but Washington had
already sent parties to entrench a new position for him at Whiteplains,
to which he moved on the 26th October. This change of position brought
the Americans from the left flank to the front of the British advance,
and it was plain that an action was imminent. On the 28th, Howe’s
army, advancing in two columns, came up with the Americans, and found
them to be some 18,000 strong. The right of Washington’s main position
rested on the Bronx River; but for some reason a detached force of
4000 men had been posted on a hill on the other side of the river,
which detachment, owing to the depth and difficulty of the stream, was
necessarily cut off from the rest of the line. Howe decided to attack
this isolated body at once. The Seventeenth being detailed as part of
the attacking force, moved off to a practicable ford, the passage of
which was carried in the face of heavy fire; and the infantry then
advancing drove the enemy brilliantly from their entrenchments, from
whence the Seventeenth pursued them towards the main position at
Whiteplains. The regiment lost one man and five horses killed, Cornet
Loftus, four men and eight horses wounded, in this action; which
unfortunately led to no result. On the 30th August a general attack
on the American entrenchments was ordered, but [Sidenote: 1776.] was
countermanded in consequence of a tremendous storm of rain; and on the
1st September the Americans quietly retired northward across the river
Croton, on which they took up a position from which it was hopeless to
attempt to dislodge them.
However, there was still an American garrison of 3000 men, which had
been left by Washington in his entrenchments at Kingsbridge to hold
the passage of the Hudson; and of these Howe determined to make sure.
His attack was delivered by four columns simultaneously. The third of
these crossed the Haarlem Creek in boats under a heavy fire, and by
the capture of a strong post at the other side turned the left of the
American position. The ground was unfavourable for cavalry, however;
and the Seventeenth, which was attached to this column, lost but
one man. The result of the whole operation was the surrender of the
Americans, which was bought with the loss of 800 British killed and
wounded.
Three days later Lord Cornwallis crossed the Hudson with 4000 men, and
marched against the American fort which commanded the passage of the
river from the Jersey side. The Americans promptly evacuated it and
retreated, with Cornwallis at their heels in hot pursuit. He was on the
point of overtaking them and striking a severe blow, when he received
orders from General Howe to halt--orders which he very reluctantly
obeyed. A party of the Seventeenth, probably a sergeant’s party for
orderly duties, seems to have accompanied Cornwallis on this march,
and through the gallant behaviour of one of the men has made itself
remembered.
One day Private M’Mullins, of this detachment, was despatched by Lord
Cornwallis with a letter of some importance to an officer of one of
the outposts, and while passing near a thicket on his way was fired at
by the rebels. He instantly pretended to fell from his horse, hanging
with head down to the ground. The Americans, four in number, supposing
him killed, ran out from their cover to seize their booty, and had
come within a few [Sidenote: 1776.] yards of him, when, to their
great astonishment, Private M’Mullins suddenly recovered his seat in
the saddle and shot the first of them dead with his carbine. He then
drew his pistol and despatched a second, and immediately after fell
with his sword upon the other two, who surrendered as his prisoners.
Whereupon Private M’Mullins drove them triumphantly before him into
camp, where he duly delivered them up. Lord Cornwallis did not fail to
report such bravery to General Howe, who in his turn not only promoted
M’Mullins to be sergeant, but brought the exploit before the notice
of the King. As all Light Dragoons of whatever regiment felt pride in
their comrades, the story of Private M’Mullins found its way into the
standard contemporary work on that branch of the service, and remains
there embalmed to this day. Let it be noted that this feat of leaning
out of the saddle almost to the ground is treated as one which “all
Light Dragoons accomplished with the greatest ease.” We should probably
never have known this but for Private M’Mullins of the Seventeenth.
With the recall of Cornwallis from New Jersey the campaign of 1776 came
to an end. Since the American evacuation of New York, Howe had captured
4500 prisoners and 150 guns; but he had also thrice let slip the
opportunity of capturing the whole American army. One further operation
was insisted upon by the Admiral, namely, the capture of Rhode Island,
which was effected [Sidenote: 8th Dec.] without loss by a small force
under General Clinton. One troop of the Seventeenth accompanied Clinton
on this expedition, and remained at Rhode Island for the next twelve
months.
The rest of the Seventeenth went into winter quarters in New York, the
total strength of the regiment at the close of the campaign being 225
men. Though its casualties had been light, it had done a good deal
of hard work and established for itself a reputation. Howe himself
testifies in his despatches to “the good service they have performed in
this campaign,” and adds that “the dread which the enemy have of the
Dragoons has been experienced on every occasion.” It is a significant
indication of [Sidenote: 1777.]the nature of their work, that Howe
begs for remounts of Irish horses for them, as being “hardier and
better accustomed to get over fences.”
The rest of the army in the winter of 1776–77 was split up into
detachments, and scattered along an extended line from the Delaware
to New York. The Americans fully expected Howe to cross the Delaware
as soon as the ice permitted and attack Philadelphia, but Howe as
usual did nothing. He might have destroyed the American army without
difficulty; but so far from attempting it, he allowed Washington with
an inferior force to cut off two detached posts and do a great deal of
damage.
Howe’s operations in the campaign of 1777 were little more
satisfactory. After making every preparation to cross the Delaware and
advance into Pennsylvania he brought back the army to New York, and
embarked for the Chesapeake in order to approach Philadelphia from that
side. In September he won the battle of Brandywine, and took possession
of Philadelphia on the 26th. This occupation of Philadelphia was the
sole result of the campaign; and it was, in fact, a political rather
than a military enterprise, the object being to overawe the American
Congress. It was a fatal mistake, for while Howe was wasting his time
in Pennsylvania, Burgoyne was moving down from Canada to open the line
of the Hudson from the north, in the hope of co-operation from Howe’s
army in the south. No such co-operation was forthcoming. Howe’s army
was engaged elsewhere; Clinton, though, as will be seen, he did make on
his own responsibility a slight diversion on the Hudson, yet dared not
weaken the garrison of New York. The result was that [Sidenote: 16th
Oct.] Burgoyne with his whole force of 7000 men was overpowered and
compelled to surrender at Saratoga.
The Seventeenth being left in garrison at New York, of course took
no share in Howe’s operations. The fact was that in November 1776
it received some 200 recruits and 100 fresh horses from England, so
that its time must have been fully occupied in the task of knocking
these into shape. Nevertheless small detachments of the regiment were
employed in two little affairs which must be related here.
The Americans, after retreating across the Croton in 1776, had formed
large magazines on the borders of Connecticut, at the town of Danbury
and elsewhere. These magazines General Clinton judged that it would
be well to destroy. Accordingly, on the 25th April, 2000 men, drafted
from different regiments, including twelve from the Seventeenth for
the needful reconnaissance and patrol duties, embarked on transports
and sailed up Long Island Sound to Camp’s Point, where they landed. At
ten that night they marched, and at eight next morning they reached
Danbury, to the great surprise of the Americans, who evacuated the
town with all speed. The British, having destroyed the whole of the
stores, prepared to return to their ships, but found that the Americans
had assembled at a place called Ridgefield, and had there entrenched
themselves to bar the British line of march. Weary as they were after
twenty-four hours’ work, the English soldiers attacked and carried the
entrenchments; and then, as night came on, they lay on their arms,
prepared to fight at any moment. At daybreak they continued their
march, and were again attacked by the Americans, who had received
reinforcements during the night. Still they fought their way on till
within half a mile of their ships, when General Erskine, losing all
patience, collected 400 men, and taking the offensive at last beat the
enemy off. The men had had no rest for three days and three nights,
and were fairly worn out; but we may guess that the little detachment
of the Seventeenth was not the last to answer to the call of its
Brigadier. This expedition cost the British 15 officers and 153 men!
The second of the two affairs to which we have alluded was an
expedition made by Clinton as a diversion to help Burgoyne, and was
directed against two American forts on the right bank of the Hudson,
which barred the passage of the British warships to Albany; Albany
being the point to which Burgoyne hoped to penetrate. A force of
3000 men, including one troop of the [Sidenote: 1777.] Seventeenth,
embarked on the 5th October and sailed up the [Sidenote: 5th Oct.]
Hudson to Verplanks Point, forty miles from New York, on the east bank
of the river. Here Clinton landed a portion of his force under the
fire of a small American field-work, drove out the enemy, and pursued
them for some little way. This feint produced the desired effect.
The American general of the district at once concluded that Clinton
meant to advance to meet Burgoyne on the east bank of the Hudson, and
hurried away with most of the garrison of the river ports to occupy
the passes on the roads. Clinton meanwhile quietly embarked [Sidenote:
6th Oct.] two-thirds of his force on the following morning, leaving
the remainder to hold Verplanks, and landed them on the opposite bank.
Thence he advanced over a very steep mountain, along very bad roads,
to attack two important posts, Forts Clinton and Montgomery, from the
rear. Though Fort Clinton, the lower of the two, was but twelve miles
distant, it was not reached before sunset, owing to the difficulties of
the march. Opposite Fort Clinton the force divided into two columns,
one of them standing fast, while the other made a detour to reach Fort
Montgomery unobserved--the design being to attack both posts, which
were only three-quarters of a mile apart, simultaneously. The upper
post, Fort Montgomery, was easily captured, being at once abandoned by
its garrison of 800 men. Fort Clinton, however, was a more difficult
matter, the only possible approach to it being over a plain covered
with four hundred yards of abattis, and commanded by ten guns. The
British, though they had not a single gun, advanced under a heavy fire,
pushed each other through the embrasures, and, in spite of a gallant
resistance on the part of the Americans, drove them out of the fort.
The American loss was 300 killed, wounded, and prisoners; the British
loss, 140 killed and wounded. Having destroyed the American shipping
and some other batteries farther up the river, Clinton’s little
expedition returned to New York. The troop of the Seventeenth formed
part of the column that stormed Fort Clinton--a service which, if the
original plan of campaign had been [Sidenote: 1777.] adhered to, would
have been one of the most valuable in the war.
With this the campaign of 1777 came to an end, decidedly to the
disadvantage of the British, who had lost the whole of Burgoyne’s
division and gained nothing but Philadelphia. The winter of 1777–78
the British army spent in the city of Philadelphia, where it was kept
inactive, and allowed to grow slack in discipline and efficiency;
and this although Washington lay for five whole months but 26 miles
distant, at Valley Forge--his position weak, his guns frozen into the
entrenchments, his army worn to a shadow by sickness and desertion,
and absolutely destitute of clothing, stores, and equipment. Howe had
14,000 men, and Washington a bare 4000, yet for the fourth time Howe
allowed him to escape; and this time inaction was fatal, for the new
year was to bring with it an event which changed the whole aspect and
conduct of operations.
[Sidenote: 1778.]
In February 1778 the French Government, still smarting under the loss
of Canada, concluded a treaty of defensive alliance with the young
American Republic, and despatched a fleet under D’Estaing to operate
on the American coast. The British Government no sooner heard the
news than it sent instructions for the army to evacuate Philadelphia
and retire to New York, from whence half of it was to be forthwith
despatched to attack the French possessions in the West Indies. The
burden of this duty fell, not upon Howe, to whom it would have been a
just retribution, but upon Clinton, who succeeded to the command on
Howe’s resignation in the spring of 1778.
During the winter the Seventeenth had been moved down from New York to
join the main army at Philadelphia, where, in March 1778, we find them
reduced to a nominal total of 363 men, of whom no fewer than 67 were in
hospital, and 162 horses. Fortunately for its own sake the regiment was
busily employed during the spring in the duty of opening communications
and bringing in supplies, by which it was prepared for the heavy work
that lay before it. On the 3rd of May a strong detachment of the
[Sidenote: 1778.] Seventeenth formed part of a mixed force of 1000
men which was sent out to reduce a hostile post at Crooked Billet,
seventeen miles from Philadelphia. The business was neatly managed, for
the British, with trifling loss, killed, wounded, or captured 150 of
the Americans, and, thanks to the Seventeenth, took the whole of their
baggage. Three weeks later the regiment was again employed in a small
expedition against 3000 Americans, who had been posted by Washington
in an advanced and isolated position at Barren Hill under the command
of Marquis Lafayette. This time the affair was sadly bungled, and the
Americans, who should have been captured in a body, would have got off
scot free but for a dash made on the rear-guard by the light Dragoons,
wherein 40 or 50 American prisoners were taken.
By constant excursions of this kind, on a larger or smaller scale, the
regiment was prepared for the very arduous duty that lay before it.
On the 18th June, at 3 A.M., the evacuation of Philadelphia
was begun, and by 10 A.M. the whole British army had crossed
the Delaware at the point of its junction with the Schuylkill. It then
advanced up the left bank, on a road running parallel to the river,
as far as Cornell’s Ferry, where it left the line of the Delaware
and turned off on the road to Sandy Hook. Up to the 27th June the
British, though constantly watched by small parties of the enemy, were
allowed to pursue their march through this difficult country without
molestation; but on that day an advanced corps of 5000 Americans
appeared close in rear, with the main army of Washington but three
miles behind it, while other smaller bodies came up on each flank. On
[Sidenote: 28th June.] the 28th, Clinton, expecting an attack, divided
his army into two parts, the first of which he sent off at daybreak in
charge of the baggage (which was so abundant that the column was twelve
miles long), leading off the second, under his personal command, at
8 A.M. The Seventeenth was attached to the baggage column,
and must have marched with it for some eight or nine hours, when it
was hurriedly sent for to join the rear-guard under General Clinton.
The rear column had just come down from the [Sidenote: 1778.] high
ground into a plain about three miles long by one mile wide, when the
Americans appeared in force in the rear and on both flanks. Their
first attempt was made on the right flank, and was likely to have
been serious, had it not been checked, to use Clinton’s words, by the
resolute bearing and firm front of the Seventeenth. The Americans had
not lost their respect for the Light Dragoons. From that point the
regiment was swiftly moved to others; and the general impression left
on the mind by Clinton’s rather confused description is, that the
Seventeenth were kept manœuvring round the column, frequently under
Clinton’s immediate direction, wherever the Americans threatened most
danger. The 16th Light Dragoons, more fortunate than the Seventeenth,
had a chance of charging the American cavalry, and made admirable use
of it; but they lost a great number of horses, which was a serious
matter considering the weakness of the British mounted force. Finally
Clinton made his dispositions for a pitched battle in the plain; but
the Americans knew better than to accept it, and retired to the hills
from which they had originally come down. Clinton thereupon attacked
them with the infantry and drove them back. They retreated to a second
position. Again Clinton attacked, and after hard fighting forced them
out. They then fell back on a third position, where, Clinton feeling
by this time assured of the safety of his baggage, thought best to
leave them. And so ended the very hard day’s work which takes its
name from the heights of Freehold, at the foot whereof the combat was
fought. So terrible was the heat in the confinement of the valley that
fifty-nine of the infantry dropped dead while advancing to the attack.
The total loss on the English side was 358 men. The Seventeenth had no
casualties, though Clinton’s testimony shows that they did good work.
The Americans lost 361 men, and from that day abandoned the pursuit,
having had for the present enough of it. Clinton, therefore, made the
rest of his way untroubled to Sandy Hook, and on the 5th July embarked
his army for New York. A flying expedition to Rhode Island, which
arrived too late to catch [Sidenote: 1778.] the French force that
had threatened it, and a successful inroad into Georgia in the south,
brought the campaign of 1778 to a close.
In November, Clinton, in obedience to his orders, sent away half of his
army to England and the West Indies. He was so sensible of the injury
inflicted on his forces by the loss of some of his best troops, that he
begged to be allowed to resign his command, and required some pressure
to induce him to retain it. His difficulties were great enough, for
everything was going wrong in New York. In December there was not a
fortnight’s flour in store, and not a penny in the military chest. The
clothing provided for the men proved to be bad, and was condemned right
and left by their officers. “The linen is coarse and thin, and unfit
for soldiers’ shirts, the stockings of so flimsy a texture as to be
of little service, and the shoes of the worst kind.” One consignment
of shoes was found to consist of “thin dancing pumps,” and even these
too small for the men to wear. Moreover the Government in England,
which had always given Howe a free hand, thought it right to tie down
Clinton, who was far the better man, with every kind of order. “For
God’s sake, my Lord,” the General wrote at last, “if you wish me to do
anything leave me to myself.”
Such was the state of things when the Seventeenth went into their
winter quarters at Hampstead, Long Island, in 1778. It was now the
only British cavalry corps on the American Continent, the 16th having
gone home, leaving all its horses and a certain number of men with the
sister regiment. Though its numbers were thus raised to 414 men, we
shall not again find it in the field entire during the remainder of
the war. From this winter onward the scene of the main contest shifts
from the north to the south, and we shall find the Seventeenth divided
between these two points of the compass.
[Illustration:
Field-day Order. Review Order.
OFFICERS, 1810–1813.]
[Illustration:
Watering Order. Review Order. Marching Order.
PRIVATES, 1810–1813.]