The circumstances surrounding the use of the 164° 48' E figures were in
issue before the Royal Commission. It was suggested against the airline
they had not been introduced accidentally: that the movement of the
position 25 miles to the west had been deliberate. If that were so it
would seem that a re-calculation of track and distance would have been
needed and made both for the fuel plan and also as a check for purposes
of navigation. However, no re-calculation of track and distance was made
and entered with the 164° 48' co-ordinate. The figures which actually
appear for track and distance to that point remain precisely the track
and distance figures which were shown in the flight plan to the 166° 48'
point for the first flight in February 1977. For purposes of comparison
a calculation to the "false" waypoint was prepared and put before the
Royal Commission. It showed that a direct track from Cape Hallett to
that point is actually 191° and the distance 343 miles. The point is
referred to in paragraph 230 of the Report within a section headed "The
creation of the false McMurdo waypoint and how it came to be changed
without the knowledge of Captain Collins".
In paragraph 229 it is said that submissions had been put to the
Commissioner that "the shifting of the McMurdo waypoint was done
deliberately so as to conform" with a track used by military aircraft
proceeding to Williams Field. Then in paragraph 230 there is a summary
of contrary arguments advanced by members of the navigation section to
support their claim of accident. They include--
"(c) It was pointed out that if the McMurdo waypoint had been
intentionally moved 25 miles to the west, then the flight plan
would have a corresponding change to the track and distance
information which it previously contained. Instead of a true
heading from Cape Hallett to the NDB of 188.9° and a distance of
337 nautical miles, there would have been required, in respect of
the changed McMurdo waypoint, a true heading of 191° and 343
nautical miles. Similar alterations would have had to be made in
respect of a return journey to the true north."
That is the matter already outlined. Concerning it the Commissioner said
in paragraph 234 that there was "considerable validity in this point"
although then he added:
"... the Navigation Section may have thought it not necessary to
alter the track and distance criteria from Cape Hallett to McMurdo
for the reason that the pilots were accustomed to flying on Heading
Select down this sector and not by reference to the fixed heading
programmed into the AINS."
There is a further argument of the navigation section which is
summarized in paragraph 230 (e)--
"It was submitted that an alteration to the McMurdo waypoint to
facilitate better sightseeing was not valid because flight captains
had a discretion to deviate horizontally from the flight plan
track."
The Commissioner accepted that point as "a valid objection" in answer to
the suggestion that the move had been deliberate (paragraph 236).
However when he came in paragraph 255 (a) to express his final
conclusion upon this general question he initially said this--
"The first question is whether the programming of the McMurdo
waypoint into the 'false' position before the commencement of the
1978 flights was the result of accident or design. On balance, it
seems likely that this transposition of the McMurdo waypoint was
deliberate."
There is reference at that point to a track and distance diagram
indicating a track down McMurdo Sound, and the sub-paragraph then
continues--
"So as I say, I think it likely that the change of the McMurdo
destination point was intended and was designed by the Navigation
Section to give aircraft a nav track for the final leg of the
journey which would keep the aircraft well clear of high ground."
Then the final portion of paragraph 255 (a) leaves the matter in the
following half-way situation--
"However, I propose to make no positive finding on this point. I
must pay regard to the circumstance strongly urged upon me by
counsel for the airline in their closing submissions, namely, that
if the alteration was intentional then it was not accompanied by
the normal realignment of the aircraft's heading so as to join up
with the new waypoint. As I say, I think this latter omission is
capable of explanation but it is a material fact in favour of the
Navigation Section which I cannot disregard, and it is the single
reason why I refrain from making a positive finding that the
alteration of the waypoint was intentional."
It may be that in speaking of a single reason in the last sentence of
the extract the Commissioner put aside his earlier unqualified
conclusion that the matter set out in paragraph 230 (e) was also "a
valid objection" to the suggestion that the waypoint had been moved
deliberately. In any event the eventual and significant finding
concerning the matter is contained in the following sub-paragraph 255
(b):
"I believe, however, that the error made by Mr Hewitt was
ascertained long before Captain Simpson reported the cross-track
distance of 27 miles between the TACAN and the McMurdo waypoint,
and I am satisfied that because of the operational utility and
logic of the altered waypoint it was thereafter maintained by the
Navigation Section as an approved position."
At this point it is necessary to explain the reference in that
sub-paragraph to Captain Simpson; and then, if it be assumed that "the
altered waypoint ... was thereafter maintained ... as an approved
position", it is necessary to understand the reasons given by the
Commissioner for the change back to Williams Field. If the altered
waypoint had been adopted as a better position why was it then thought
that it had to be discarded?