CHAPTER IV

RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL WORLD-VIEWS

The world-views of the world-religions

IN the world-religions we can see powerful attempts to establish an

ethical world-view.

The religious thinkers of China, Lao-tse (born 604 B.C.), Kung-tse

(Confucius, 537-479 B.C.), Meng-tse (372-289 B.C.) and Chwang-tse

(fourth century B.C.), all try to ground the ethical in a world- and

life-affirming nature-philosophy. In so doing they arrive at a

world-view which, because it is optimistic-ethical, contains

incentives to inward and outward civilization.

The religious thinkers of India also, the Brahmanic philosophers, the

Buddha (560-480 B.C.), and the Hindus, start, like the Chinese, from

thought about the existing world, _i.e._ from nature-philosophy. They

do not, however, take a world- and life-affirming view of it, but a

world- and life-denying one. Their world-view is pessimistic-ethical,

and contains, therefore, incentives to inward civilization only, not

to outward as well.

Chinese religiousness, and Indian, recognize only a single

world-principle. They are monistic and pantheistic. Their world-view

has to solve the problem of how far we can recognize the original

source of the world as ethical, and how far, correspondingly, we

become ethical by the surrender to it of our will.

In contrast to these monistic-pantheistic world-views we find

dualistic ones in the religion of Zarathustra (sixth century B.C.), in

that of the Jewish prophets (from the eighth century B.C. onwards),

and in those of Jesus and Mohammed, this last, however, showing itself

to be in [pg 028] all points unoriginal and decadent. These religious

thinkers do not start from an investigation of the existence which

manifests itself in the universe, but from a view of the ethical which

is quite independent of it. They put it in opposition to natural

happenings. Accordingly they assume the existence of two

world-principles, the natural and the ethical. The first is in the

world, and has to be overcome; the other is incorporated in an ethical

personality which is outside the world and has been given the final

authority in this sphere.

If among the Chinese and the Hindus the basic principle of morality

was life in harmony with the world-will, so among dualists it is an

attempt to be something different from the world in harmony with an

ethical divine personality which is outside and above the world.

The weakness of dualistic religions is that their world-view, because

it rejects every kind of nature-philosophy, is always naïve. Their

strength lies in the fact that they have the ethical within

themselves, directly present and with undiminished force. They have no

need to strain it and explain it, as monists have to, so as to be able

to conceive it as an effluence from the world-will which reveals

itself in nature.

The world-views of the dualistic world-religions, taken as a whole,

are optimistic. They live in the confident belief that ethical force

will prove superior to natural, and so raise the world and mankind to

true perfection. Zarathustra and the older Jewish prophets represent

this process as a kind of world-reform. The optimistic element in

their world-view asserts itself in a quite natural way. They have the

will, and the hope of being able to transform human society and to

make the races of the world fit for their higher destiny. Progress in

any department of life means for them something gained, for they think

of inward and outward civilization together.

With Jesus the value of the optimistic element in his world-view is

impaired by the fact that he looks forward to the perfected world as a

result of a catastrophic end to the natural one, and while with

Zarathustra and the older [pg 029] Jewish prophets the Divine

intervention is to a certain extent only the completion of the human

activities which have been directed to the perfecting of the world, it

is with Jesus the only thing which has to be taken into account. The

kingdom of God is to appear in a supernatural way; it is in no way

prepared for by any effort made by mankind to attain to civilization.

The world-view of Jesus, because it is fundamentally optimistic,

accepts the ends aimed at by outward civilization. Being, however,

entangled in the expectation of the end of the world, it is

indifferent to all attempts made to improve the temporal, natural

world by a civilization which organizes itself on lines of outward

progress, and it busies itself only with the inward ethical perfecting

of individuals.

Just in proportion, however, as the Christian world-view draws the

consequences of the world’s not coming to an end, and accepts the idea

that the kingdom of God must be established by a process of

development which transforms the natural world, it begins to

understand and be interested in the completing of social organization,

and in all such progress in outward civilization as contributes to it.

Then the optimistic element in the world-view can again work

unhindered side by side with the ethical. Thus we get an explanation

of the fact that Christianity, which in the ancient world showed

itself hostile to civilization, seeks in modern times with more or

less success to conduct itself as the world-view which is for progress

in every sphere of activity.

The world-views of the world-religions and that of Western thought

The questions which press for an answer from the world-religions in

their struggle to reach an ethical and an optimistic-ethical

world-view, are the same as those which present themselves to Western

philosophy also. The great problem is to think out a connexion between

the universe and ethics.

[pg 030]

The three types of world-view which show themselves in the

world-religions, recur also in Western philosophy. The latter, too,

attempts to find an ethical code either in a world- and

life-affirming, or in a world- and life-denying, nature-philosophy, or

it attempts, rejecting more or less completely all nature-philosophy,

to reach a world-view which is in itself ethical. Only, it at the same

time does its best to avoid acknowledging, and indeed to conceal, the

naïve and dualistic element which is inevitably encountered when this

last method of procedure is followed.

The world-views, then, of the world-religions, and that of Western

philosophy, do not belong to different worlds, but stand in close

inward relations to one another. Further, the distinctions between a

religious world-view and a philosophical one is a quite superficial

one. The religious world-view which seeks to comprehend itself in

thought becomes philosophical, as is the case among the Chinese and

the Hindus. On the other hand a philosophical world-view which goes

really deep, assumes a religious character.

Although Western thought does, in principle, approach the problem of

world-view without any presuppositions, it has not been able to keep

itself entirely from being influenced by religious world-views. From

Christianity it has received impulses of a decisive character, and the

attempt to convert the naïve-ethical world-view of Jesus into a

philosophical one has cost it more attention and effort than it admits

to itself. With Schopenhauer and his successors the pessimistic monism

of India finds expression, and it enriches their reflexion upon the

nature of the ethical.

Thus the energies of all the great world-views stream into Western

thought, and through the co-operation of these varied forms of thought

and energy the latter is enabled to exalt into a universal conviction

the optimistic-ethical world-view which hovers before its mind, and

that too in a strength which it has never displayed in any previous

age or in any other part of the world. And that is why Western thought

has advanced farthest both in inward civilization and in outward.

[pg 031]

To give a real foundation to the optimistic-ethical world-view Western

thought is indeed as little able as any of the world-religions were,

and because the West experiences the problem of world-view in its most

universal and most pressing form it is the scene of the greatest

advances made by the civilized mind, but also of its greatest

catastrophes. It experiences portentous changes in its world-view, and

is familiar, too, with terrible periods when it has no world-view at

all.

It is because our Western thought is so sensitive in both these

directions, that it reveals most clearly the questions and

difficulties amid which the search for an optimistic world-view moves.

How far does the history of our thought give to us Westerners the

explanation of our fate? What road does it indicate to us as the best

for our future search after a world-view in which the individual can

find inwardness and strength, and mankind progress and peace?

[pg 032]

Civilization and ethics · 第 4 / 22 章