AMMUNITION.
From the beginning of the Battle of the Aisne up to the close of the
Battle of Loos, at the end of 1915, the scanty supply of munitions of
war paralysed all our power of initiative and, at critical times,
menaced our defence with irretrievable disaster. Great anxiety on this
subject overshadowed all my direction of military operations, and deep
concern at the failure of the Government to appreciate and remedy our
difficulties from this cause dominated all my work. In this chapter it
is my object to make known some of the efforts I made to awaken both
the Government and the public from that apathy which meant certain
defeat. I exhausted every effort, by urgent official demands to the
War Office, and personal appeals to Lord Kitchener and such Cabinet
Ministers as I came in contact with. When these efforts got no
response, I gave interviews to the press and authorised public men who
visited me to urge this vital necessity in their addresses. Nothing
less than my deliberate conclusion, after all these measures had
failed and nine months of war had elapsed, that the Empire itself was
in jeopardy, forced me to act in May 1915 as I did. I was conscious
before taking this step, which meant the overthrow of the Government,
that it also meant the end of my career in France, with all the hopes
and ambitions that only a soldier can understand. But the
consciousness of the great results achieved in this upheaval has been
my reward, and I trust that a recital of my difficulties
may, if occasion arise in the future, protect the British Army in the
field from the recurrence of any similar situation.
During my term of office as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, from
March 1912 to April 1914, I had urged these vital necessities upon the
Government, but my demands were steadily opposed by the Finance
Department and the Treasury. All our experiences in the South African
War, and the warnings which the Manchurian campaign plainly gave,
passed altogether unheeded in the years preceding the present war. I
was always a strong advocate for the supply of high-explosive shell to
our horse and field artillery, but I got very little support, and even
such as was given to me was lukewarm in the extreme. I believe the
Ordnance Board was not in favour of it.
As early as the middle of September 1914 the British Army in France
was subjected to heavy bombardment from German 8-in. howitzers, to
which they were quite unable to reply. At the same time the daily
expenditure of artillery ammunition became far in excess of the
receipts from home, and we were unable to maintain the stocks on the
lines of communication up to anything like the proper war
establishment. For example, the 18-pdrs. fired an average of 14 rounds
a day, whilst the receipts were barely seven. The 60-pdr. guns and the
4.5-in. howitzers fired over 40 rounds a day, against a supply of
eight or nine rounds at most. In private letters and telegrams I had
repeatedly brought this to the notice of the Secretary of State, and a
strong official memorandum on the subject was sent to the War Office
on September 28th. A further communication to the same effect was made
on October 10th; and on the 29th of the same month the War
Office were officially told that the state of the ammunition supply
had necessitated the issue of an order restricting expenditure to 20
rounds per gun daily, and that a further restriction to 10 rounds
would be necessary if the supply did not improve. This was during the
most desperate period of the First Battle of Ypres, when the average
daily expenditure of 18-pdr. ammunition had amounted to 81 rounds per
gun.
In some cases the expenditure per gun had reached the enormous total
of 300 rounds daily.
A proportion of at least 25 per cent. of high-explosive shells for 13
and 18 pdrs. was included in the demands to which I have referred
above.
In a communication to the War Office on December 31st, the view was
expressed that considerably more high explosive was necessary, and the
following table was laid down as our minimum requirements to carry on
the war with any prospect of success:--
REQUIRED OUTPUT OF AMMUNITION.
Rounds per gun a day.
13-pdr. 50 (25 H.E.)
18-pdr. 50 (25 H.E.)
4.5-in. howitzer 40 (35 H.E.)
6-in. howitzer 25 (all H.E.)
60-pdr. 25 (15 H.E.)
4.7-in. gun 25 (15 H.E.)
6-in. gun 25 (all H.E.)
9.2-in. howitzer 12 (all H.E.)
It was explained that this output was necessary for a period of active
operations, and should be continued even during a lull, till a reserve
of three or four times the amount laid down in war establishments had
been accumulated. To this request there was no reply until January
19th. The War Office then declined to work up to more than 20 rounds a
day, and refused a request for 50 per cent, of high explosives.
This amazing attitude at a most critical time compelled me to consider
means by which the several members of the Government, and the public
also, might be advised of this deplorable apathy which, if long
continued, meant the destruction of our Army.
In this letter from the War Office, of January 19th, which I have
already mentioned, an estimate was attached of the receipts which we
might rely upon up to and including the month of May. This estimate
was far below our requirements, whilst the actual receipts fell far
short of it. The actual supply in May proved to be less than one half
of the War Office estimate, which was the only one ever furnished for
our guidance. Such failure made it quite impossible to make any
reliable forecast of the condition of the ammunition supply at any
particular date. This state of uncertainty rendered the formulation of
plans for co-operating with the French most difficult, if not
impossible.
During the winter of 1914-15 it was hoped to accumulate some small
reserve of ammunition, but, during this period, all our efforts in
this direction were of no avail, because the number of rounds per
18-pdr. gun throughout this period fell to less than five!
I had serious misgivings that the _morale_ of the Army was becoming
affected by this first long and weary winter of inactivity in the
trenches, and to render the defence effective it was necessary to
undertake an offensive operation.
Early in March a small reserve of ammunition had been
accumulated, and the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was fought and won. Had
proper steps been taken to increase the supply when my first strong
appeals were sent in during September 1914, the offensive operation
commenced so successfully at Neuve Chapelle might have been much
further developed, and, indeed, possibly have led to great and
important results. But the battle had to be broken off after three
days' fighting because we were brought to a standstill through want of
ammunition.
Immediately afterwards I again addressed the strongest representations
I could frame to the War Office. I begged that His Majesty's
Government might be informed that, if their object was to drive the
enemy off French and Belgian territory during 1915, no progress
towards this objective could be obtained unless and until the supply
of artillery ammunition should enable the Army to engage in sustained
operations. The only official reply which I received to this letter
was an injunction to use the utmost economy, but a private letter,
dated March 16th, was addressed by Sir James Wolfe Murray to Sir
William Robertson, who was then my Chief of Staff. This letter was
said to have been dictated by the Secretary of State, and its contents
hinted very strongly that an impression prevailed at the War Office
that we were wasting ammunition.
The operations at Neuve Chapelle used up all our available resources,
and it became necessary to restore them by reverting for a time to a
strictly defensive attitude.
It was, moreover, very clear that the Germans had early realised that
the war was to be one calling for colossal supplies of munitions;
supplies, indeed, upon such a stupendous scale as the world
had never before dreamed of, and they also realised the vital
necessity for heavy artillery. They began with an inferior field gun,
and they never stopped to remedy this defect, but directed all their
energies, from the first, to developing their heavy artillery. Whilst
their total proportion of guns to bayonets was fully maintained, the
proportion of field guns to bayonets was reduced, and all heavy guns
enormously increased. Each month the development of heavy artillery
became more accentuated until, towards the late spring of 1915, the
greater number of projectiles fired by the Germans, whenever
operations of any importance were taking place, were of 5.9 and
upwards. This was in defence as well as in attack, and by this means
the enemy endeavoured to shatter the _morale_ of the attackers, as
well as to inflict very heavy casualties.
The necessity for a great preponderance of heavy artillery was also
recognised by the French long before our War Office could be persuaded
to move in that direction. From early in the war they aimed at
obtaining one heavy gun of 6-in. calibre and upwards for every field
gun they held, without reducing the proportion to bayonets of the
latter which obtains in the French Army. To meet these requirements
the French were taking guns from their old warships and coast defence
ships, and straining every nerve to get guns of heavy calibre into the
field.
In May, 1915, the proportion of field to heavy guns above 6-in.
calibre in the French Army was 2.3 to one. At this time the British
Army had but 71 guns altogether above 5-in. calibre against 1,416
below it, and no adequate steps whatever had yet been taken to bring
the proportion more nearly to the requirements of modern warfare. The
supply of trench guns and mortars, with their ammunition,
hand-grenades, and other most necessary munitions of war, was almost
negligible, nor was there any active attempt to understand and grapple
vitally with the new problems calling for the application of modern
science to the character of warfare that had developed.
I have referred before to the disinclination of the War Office, prior
to the war, to take up seriously the question of high explosives; the
natural consequence was that the true nature of high-explosive shells,
and the correct particulars which govern their construction, were not
properly understood, as they had too little experience of them.
The deadly nature of modern rifle and machine-gun fire had brought
about trench warfare, which enabled the troops opposite to one another
to approach to ranges which were customary in the days of the
Peninsula and Waterloo. The time-honoured grenades, which were so
marked a feature in those days, were thus resuscitated.
Although the War Office received detailed reports from the Front as to
the employment by the enemy of these new and unfamiliar weapons, no
proper attention was ever paid to these reports. It was their duty to
bring these old-time weapons up to date, and to compete with the new
mechanical inventions constantly being devised by the great
organisation of a thoroughly prepared enemy. But reports from the
Front as to these new and unfamiliar weapons were received with a
carelessness which bordered on incredulity. The critical days in the
early part of November, and during the First Battle of Ypres,
compelled me to devise a plan to meet the exigencies of this grave
emergency. As the fighting settled into trench warfare, the inadequacy
of our weapons to enable us to reply to an enemy thoroughly equipped
with every contrivance for this sort of warfare became painfully
apparent; while even our hand-grenades, by reason of their faulty
construction, frequently did not explode. I was therefore compelled to
conduct experiments in the field, and improvise new weapons as well as
possible. For such work the Army had no organisation. In this I
received invaluable assistance from my friend, George Moore. Mr. Moore
is an American who has had wide experience of large construction
developments in the United States. Although a young man, he was deeply
versed in the method of scientific research as applied to mechanical
invention. Add to this that he was a great personal friend of my own
and passionately interested in the success of the Allies, and it will
be seen how naturally I turned to him for help and advice in this
terrible crisis. Under Mr. Moore's advice and direction, experiments
were carried out with the maximum of speed, energy and resource,
covering the field of the proper construction and use of high
explosives, hand-grenades, trench mortars and bombs; and a number of
factories and small plants were set up for the production, for use in
the field, of properly constructed hand-grenades, bombs and trench
mortars.
As a result of this work in the daily trench struggle that had then
developed, we were rapidly enabled to acquire the accurate knowledge
of the proper use of high explosives, and the appliances necessary to
meet the enemy on his own ground under these novel conditions of
warfare. Mr. Moore from time to time brought men in whom he had trust
and confidence to help in the work. Among them I will only
specifically refer to Colonel Lewis, an American, whose machine gun,
bearing his name, proved of such enormous help in this war, and to
Lieutenant Lawrence Breese. This gallant young officer of
the Blues, to which magnificent regiment he belonged, did wonderful
work, and conducted experiments the result of which was of the highest
value; and, after several months of tireless energy, gave his life in
carrying out one of these experiments. This hastily improvised
organisation worked night and day in these trying times, with the
results which enabled us, with success, to meet the enemy in trench
warfare.
During this time I received visits at my Headquarters from prominent
members of both Houses of Parliament, to whom I told, in course of
conversation, the great anxiety I felt on the subject of the shortage
of heavy guns and ammunition.
On March 22nd I gave an interview to the Press, which appeared
generally in the English papers, from which I quote: "It is a rough
war, but the problem it sets is a comparatively simple one--munitions,
more munitions, always more munitions; this is the essential question,
the governing condition of all progress, of every leap forward." On
March 27th I gave an interview to _The Times_, in which I said as
follows: "The protraction of the war depends entirely upon the supply
of men and munitions. Should these be unsatisfactory, the war will be
accordingly prolonged. I dwell emphatically on the need for
munitions."
To the public men who visited me, I appealed that they should make
known this grave necessity to the public in their speeches. I quote a
line from a speech of the Earl of Durham, who, at my request, said:
"What we want and must have is more and more munitions."
At a conference at Chantilly with Lord Kitchener, I reminded him of my
constant representations on the subject of munitions, both officially
and privately, and warned him that the danger would be fatal
if instant action were not taken to supply our needs.
It must be remembered that all this time, when the British Forces in
France were in absolute jeopardy owing to these deficiencies,
trainloads of all kinds of ammunition were passing along our rear _en
route_ to Marseilles and the Dardanelles.
This was the situation when on April 22nd the Germans made their first
attack with poisoned gas in the Second Battle of Ypres and, in a
gigantic effort, again attempted to break through; and the defence
called for the most desperate kind of fighting, only surpassed in
intensity by the struggle in the First Battle of Ypres. Just about
this time, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, made his famous
Newcastle speech, in which he stated that the Army had all the
ammunition it required. When I read this speech, after all my public
and private appeals, I lost any hope that I had entertained of
receiving help from the Government as then constituted. So that, on
May 9th, 1915, when we commenced the Battle of Festubert, an operation
undertaken to relieve the intense pressure on the troops at Ypres, my
mind was filled with keen anxiety. After all our demands, less than 8
per cent. of our shells were high explosive, and we had only
sufficient supply for about 40 minutes of artillery preparation for
this attack. On the tower of a ruined church I spent several hours in
close observation of the operations. Nothing since the Battle of the
Aisne had ever impressed me so deeply with the terrible shortage of
artillery and ammunition as did the events of that day. As I watched
the Aubers ridge, I clearly saw the great inequality of the artillery
duels, and, as attack after attack failed, I could see that the
absence of sufficient artillery support was doubling and
trebling our losses in men. I therefore determined on taking the most
drastic measures to destroy the apathy of a Government which had
brought the Empire to the brink of disaster. A friend was standing by
my side on the tower, and to him I poured out my doubts and fears and
announced my determination. He warned me that the politicians would
never forgive the action I proposed, and that it meant my certain
recall from the command in France. But my decision was made, and I
immediately started for my Headquarters, fully determined on my future
course of action.
If any additional proof were required of the hopelessness of any
relief coming from the War Office, I found it waiting for me when I
reached Headquarters that afternoon, in the shape of a telegram from
the Secretary of State for War, directing that 20 per cent. of our
scanty reserve supply of ammunition was to be shipped to the
Dardanelles. I immediately gave instructions that evidence should be
furnished to Colonel Repington, military correspondent of _The Times_,
who happened to be then at Headquarters, that the vital need of
high-explosive shells had been a fatal bar to our Army success on that
day. I directed that copies of all the correspondence which had taken
place between myself and the Government on the question of the supply
of ammunition be made at once, and I sent my Secretary, Brinsley
FitzGerald, with Captain Frederick Guest, one of my A.D.C.s, to
England with instructions that these proofs should be laid before Mr.
Lloyd George, who had already shown me, by his special interest in
this subject, that he grasped the deadly nature of our necessities. I
instructed also that they should be laid before Mr. Arthur J. Balfour
and Mr. Bonar Law, whose sympathetic understanding of my
difficulties, when they visited me in France, had led me to expect
that they would take the action that this grave exigency demanded.
Together with the correspondence, I sent the following memorandum:--
(_Secret._)
INFORMATION REGARDING AMMUNITION
1. Large quantities of high-explosive shells for field guns have
become essential owing to the form of warfare in which the Army is
engaged. The enemy is entrenched from the sea to the Swiss frontier.
There is no flank in his position that can be turned. It is necessary,
therefore, for all offensive operations to start by breaking the
enemy's line, which presupposes the attack of formidable field
entrenchments. Shrapnel, being the man-killing projectile which is
used against troops in the open, is primarily used in defence. In
offensive operations it is used for searching communication trenches,
preventing the enemy's reinforcements intervening in the fight,
repelling counter-attacks, and, as an alternative for high-explosive
shell, for cutting wire entanglements. It is, however, ineffective
against the occupants of the trenches, breastworks, or buildings. It
is, therefore, necessary to have high-explosive shell to destroy
parapets, obstacles, buildings, and many forms of fortified localities
that the enemy constructs, more particularly his machine-gun
emplacements. Without an adequate supply the attack is impotent
against the defenders of field fortifications, as the first step
cannot be taken. Guns require 50 per cent. of high-explosive shell.
Howitzers use high-explosive shell almost exclusively.
2. We have found by experience that the field guns actually engaged in
offensive operations, such as Neuve Chapelle, fire about 120 rounds
per gun per day.
Heavy guns and howitzers, according to their calibre, fire
less in proportion. The guns of the whole Army are of course never
equally heavily engaged at the same time, but the number of guns
available and the amount of ammunition are the limiting factors when a
plan of attack is being considered. There is, therefore, scarcely any
limit to the supply of ammunition that could be usefully employed. The
more ammunition, the bigger the scale on which the attack can be
delivered, and the more persistently it can be pressed.
Demands must, however, be reasonable, and our position would be very
greatly improved if our supply reached the figures in the attached
Table "A" within three months. Up to the present it has been below
these figures.
WANTED THREE MONTHS HENCE, SAY, AUGUST 1ST.
_Table "A."_
| Guns |Rounds per Gun | Total Rounds
Nature. |now in | per Day. |required Daily.[3]
|Country. |Shrapnel.| H.E. |Shrapnel.| H.E.
| | | | |
18-pdr. | 700 | 12 | 12 |8,500 | 8,500
13-pdr. | 125 | 12 | 12 |1,500 | 1,500
15-pdr. BLC. | 200 | 12 | 12 |2,500 | 2,500
4.7-in. gun | 80 | 8 | 8 | 650 | 650
60-pdr. | 28 | 8 | 8 | 250 | 250
5-in. howitzer | 50 | -- | 15 | -- | 750
4.5-in. howit- | 130 | 4 | 16 | 500 | 2,000
zer. | | | | |
6-in. howitzer | 40 | -- | 12 | -- | 500
9.2-in. howit- | 12 | -- | 12 | -- | 150
zer. | | | | |
| | | | 13,900 | 16,800
| | Grand Total | 30,700 daily.
| | Grand Total | 921,000 monthly.
[Footnote 3: Round numbers are given. Expansion
must be provided for at a similar rate. We need
more guns and a correspondingly larger amount of
ammunition.]
3. Table "B" shows the percentage of high explosive of
certain natures received since application for increased quantities
was made between September and December last.
PERCENTAGE OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE RECEIVED SINCE FIRST APPLICATION FOR IT
IN INCREASED QUANTITIES.
_Table "B."_
Nature of Gun. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | March.| April.| May.
| Per | Per | Per | Per | Per | Per
| Cent.| Cent.| Cent.| Cent. | Cent. | Cent.
13-pdr. | Nil | Nil | Nil | Nil | Nil | Nil
18-pdr. | 3.8 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 6.1 | 8
4.5-in. howitzer |44.4 | 68.5 | 88 | 75 | 59 | 65
60-pdr. | -- | 66 | 60 | 56 | 53 | 50
7-in. howitzer |55 | 59 | 51 | 77 | 69 | 50
Colonel FitzGerald and Captain Guest reported that on May 12th and
14th they had carried out my instructions and laid the facts before
Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Bonar Law. On May 15th, Colonel
Repington's article appeared in _The Times_. The world knows what then
happened. The Coalition Government was formed, with Mr. Lloyd George
as Minister of Munitions; and, though delays afterwards occurred, the
problem was at last faced with the intelligence and energy that its
gravity demanded, and I feel that for his work on munitions we owe
unmeasured gratitude to Mr. Lloyd George. The successful solution of
the problem came when he applied to it that matchless energy which has
enabled him to come through the great ordeal as England's
most valued leader in her direst hour.
For my unprecedented action I claim that no other course lay open to
me. To organise the nation's industrial resources upon a stupendous
scale was the only way if we were to continue with success the great
struggle which lay before us, and I feel that the result achieved
fully warranted the steps I took.
INDEX
ABBEVILLE, 182, 199, 205;
Railway junction, 200.
Admiralty, _see_ British Admiralty.
Aeltre, 208.
Aeroplane Squadrons, 2, 3, 4, 5;
R.F.C., 25.
Aeroplanes and Aircraft,
effect on warfare, 12;
at Amiens, 33;
potentialities realised by French, 155;
menace of, to London, in event of Germans reaching Calais, 215.
Aerial Reconnaissances, 12, 43-4, 90, 121, 145, 185, 200 _passim_;
Future of, 144.
Air Services (_see also_ Royal Flying Corps),
spirit of, 340.
Aire, 200.
Aire-Bethune line,
2nd Corps directed on, 199, 201, 202.
Aire-La Bassee Canal reached by 2nd Corps, 203.
Aisne,
Battle of the, 13, 16, 142 _sqq._, 193 _sqq._;
day of opening, 146;
British share in, 115, 118 _sqq._, 140-1;
French's dispositions of, how influenced, 157;
French share in, 115, 121, 123, 135, 140 _sqq._, 145, 146,
154, 157, 158-9, 160, 161, 164;
German forces believed to be in position for, 116;
German heavy artillery in, 119, 144, 212;
Germany's lost opportunity in, 216;
Intense artillery fire in, 144, 145-6, 149, 150, 212;
Last days of (Oct. 1 _sqq._), 193 _sqq._;
Last repulse of the enemy at, by the 1st Corps (Oct. 11), 211;
Losses, 152-3, 159, 160;
Operations hampered by,
Lack of artillery and machine guns, 101, 347, 356;
Rain, 157;
Tactical aspect of, 140, 159;
Value in, of British "moral," 55;
Battlefield, Features of,
Strategical, 148;
Topographical, 143, 145, 147-8.
Aisne Canal,
suggested French extension to, 186.
Aisne, Department of, 48.
Aisne-Compiegne-Soissons line,
withdrawal to, 91.
Aisne Front, withdrawal from, object of,
plan first conceived, 155-6, 157, 301;
_pourparlers_ on, with Joffre, 163, 164 _sqq._;
the Northern move begun, 193;
progress of, 235-6;
French views on, 305 _sqq._
Aisne Heights,
a reconnaissance from, 161.
Aisne River:
Bridges (road) over, 147;
All under artillery fire, 148;
Constructed over by British Corps (Sept. 13), 150, 151;
British positions on, 146-7, 158, 160, 165, 182;
Steep banks of, 145;
Reported German troop-transfer to, 223;
Roads and railways in valley of, 147-8;
Wooded country N. of, marches through,
consultations on, with Joffre, 143.
Aizy,
German counter-attack at, 151.
Albert, King of the Belgians,
characteristics of, 344;
French invited to H.Q. of, at Louvain, 42-3;
sortie directed by, 143-4;
and the withdrawal from Antwerp, 175;
and French's scheme for Anglo-Belgian military co-operation
(Dec. 28-30), 343 _sqq._
Albert, French progress near, 325.
Alfrey, Lieut., killed at Moncel, 120.
Allenby, Major-General E. H. H. (now General Sir E. H. H., G.C.M.G.,
K.C.B.), G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Division, later G.O.C. Cavalry
Corps (_q.v._), 16, 24, 323;
At Mons and after,
Instructions to, 47;
support given by, to Fergusson (Aug. 24), 65;
During the Retreat from Mons,
protection given by, to infantry, &c., 60, 64, 65, 71, 72, 75,
84-5, 87;
view of, on Smith-Dorrien's situation on Aug. 25, 76;
help given by, to 2nd Corps at Le Cateau, 78;
During the Marne operations, 109;
Marne bridges seized by, 133;
fine leadership of, 137;
During the Aisne operations, 146, 161;
During the Move North and the Battle of Ypres,
_role_ assigned to, and finely carried out by, 200-1,
202 _sqq._, 233;
the stand on the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 204, 233, 238, 244,
246, 247, 277;
consummate skill shown by, 261;
later work, 278, 280;
On the services of the London Scottish on Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 262-3.
Allied Commanders,
views of, before the Retreat from Mons, 47, 55, 56, 57;
wishes ignored in London (Oct. 4, &c), in reference to Antwerp,
180 _et proevi_.
Allied Forces (_see also_ Belgian, British, _and_ French);
support of, to Belgium inadequate to prevent retreat, 46;
positions of, on Aug. 29, 91;
offensive planned for, for Sept. 6, 107, 109-10;
and the end of the Great Retreat, 110;
situation of, on Oct. 6, 181-3;
object of, on Oct. 6, 182;
combined eastward advance of, planned for Oct. 13, 203;
condition, if the enemy had driven a wedge between, 225;
position of, and enemy forces opposing, on the night of Oct. 21,
231-2;
enormous enemy superiority to (Oct. 30), 240;
dispositions of, at the 1st Battle of Ypres (Oct. 29 p.m.), 242;
loyalty and fine feeling between, as evidenced in the 1st Battle
of Ypres, 256;
augmentation of, in the West, some resources of, 301-2;
plans for, in the West, at close of 1st Battle of Ypres, bases of,
301;
needs and alternatives, 301-2;
combined attack by (Dec. 14), on the Hollebeke-Wytschaete ridge
line, 322;
ability of, to keep the line inviolate, proven, 345.
Allied Nations, spirit of, at close of 1914, 345.
Alost-Termonde-Lokeren line, German move on (Oct. 11), 203.
Alsace, French offensive in, 48.
Alston, General, G.O.C. Naval Detachments for Antwerp, 181.
Alternatives in Campaigns, the faculty of choice of, 217.
America, entry of, into the War, 346.
American Civil War, lesson of, as to interference by Home
Government with Commanders in the Field, 111, 178.
Amiens,
British concentration point, 6, 14, 32;
aircraft at, 33;
6th French Army forming at, 89;
German forces operating through, 105.
Ammunition
(_see also_ Artillery, Guns, High Explosive, Machine-Guns,
Royal Artillery, _&c._), 44;
British lack of, and the consequences, French's constant
representations on, before and during the war, 162-3, 241;
Kitchener on, 309-10;
French's reply, 313, 316;
results, 332-3, 343, 347, 349, 351;
the upshot of the agitation, 347 _sqq._;
the Memorandum to the War Cabinet, 357-60;
and the results, 360;
Gun-fire, 1st Battle of Ypres, restricted for lack of, 349;
Output of, required for,
Reserve, 349-50;
Use, 349;
Russian (reported) deficiency in; Joffre's information concerning
(Dec. 27), 341.
Ancre River, Bulkeley Johnson killed at, 136.
Anley, Colonel F. G., O.C. (_temp._) 12th Infantry Brigade, 26.
Annequin--Pont Fixe--Festubert--Chapelle--Fosse line, 2nd Corps at
(Oct. 12), 210.
Ansell, Lieut.-Colonel, O.C. 5th Dragoon Guards, killed in action, 76.
Antwerp, 48, 163, 304;
Belgian retirement on, 45, 46;
sortie from, 143;
danger to, not envisaged, 157;
Belgian withdrawal from, planned, 175;
relief of, French's efforts for, 176 _sqq._;
Kitchener's action, 177, 179, 181;
French's views on (Oct. 6), 182-3;
and Joffre's, 178-9;
British Government's anxieties on, 191;
position at, 198;
fall of, 175 _sqq._, 192, 201;
menace of, to the Channel ports, 176;
and effect of, on French's plans of Sept., 164, 302;
French's steps to keep in touch with events at, 184 _sqq._;
German advances from, 208-9.
Appomattox, Lee's surrender at, 231.
Archangel, disadvantages of, 315.
Ardennes, the,
anticipations concerning, 11, 39;
Rivers rising in, 51.
Argyll and Sutherland (Princess Louise's) Highlanders:
2nd Batt., 23, 61; in the Battle of Ypres, 243;
7th Batt. (T.), 296.
Armentieres, 209;
3rd Corps' fighting near, 219, 220;
the town taken, 221;
and shelled, 222;
German forces N. of, 240;
success of the 6th Division near (Oct. 28), 241.
Armentieres--La Bassee, Indian Corps' fighting between, 284.
Armies, Decision to form, communicated to Corps' Commanders, 337.
Arques, 329.
Arras, and the Sea,
German strength between (Oct. 10), Foch's estimate of, 223;
attack N. of, by de Maud'huy (Dec. 16-17), 324-5;
weather difficulties at, 337;
Joffre's plan to break through W. of, 342;
French success near (Dec. 27), 345.
Arras front, the, 234.
Artillery _see_ German, Guns, Heavy Artillery, Royal Artillery.
Artists' Rifles (28th (County of London) Batt. the London Regiment),
arrival in France (Nov.), 27, 271, 295;
converted into an Officers' Training Corps, 272, 295, 297.
Asia Minor, action in, French's view on, 316.
Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., 305, 308, 329, 331;
and the _Entente_, 3;
at the Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914, 3;
French's relations with, and the ammunition shortage, 332;
the Newcastle speech, 356.
Ath, route from, across Haine Valley, 49;
German advance to, 57.
Attack, how best warded off, 313.
"_Attaque_!" General Foch's constant cry, 198, 274.
Aubers Ridge, artillery shortage at, 356.
Augustovo, German disaster at, 230.
Aulnoy, 2nd Corps at (Sept. 8), 123.
Aulnoye, Railway junction at, 52.
Austria-Hungary, War declared by, on Serbia, 2;
French and British declarations of War with, 2.
Austro-German defeats, 268, 274.
Avesnes, 50, 67.
Bailleul, 227, 234, 241, 245, 258;
German defeat at, 207.
Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., and the Munitions question, 357, 360.
Balloon observation and heavy artillery, 12.
Baltic Sea, 315.
Barrow, Lieut.-Col. G. de S., A.D.C. Chief of Staff to Allenby, 243.
Barry, Lieut.-Col. S. L., A.D.C. to French, 255.
Bassevelle, advanced troops at, 126, 127.
Battenberg, H.S.H. Prince Maurice of, death from wounds, 240.
Battles, past and present, names of, and time-limits of, 218.
Bavai, 2nd Army Corps' retreat on (Aug. 24), 63, 64;
French's advanced H.Q. at, 65, 66, 68;
conditions in, and around, 69-70;
strategic importance of, 65.
Bayonets, demand for, by British cavalry (Sept. 21), 161.
Bazaine and Metz, warning from, 71.
Bazoches, 148.
Beale-Browne, Major, 9th Lancers, at Moncel, 119.
Beaumont, French movements near, 38-9.
Becherelle-Maison Neuve road, fighting in woods near, 128.
Bedfordshire Regiment:
1st Batt., 23;
2nd Batt., 29.
Belgian Army (_see also_ Allied Forces);
nearest French force to, 38;
entrenched near Louvain, 41;
retreat on Aug. 21, 45-6;
later position, 48;
in Antwerp, 143, 176;
co-operation of anticipated, 182;
position in combined advance as planned, 203;
retreat of, to Bruges and the Yser, 183, 192, 201, 208, 212;
fatigue of, 217, 224;
stand of, on that stream, 278;
German attack on, at Nieuport (Oct. 19), 227;
in the Battle of Ypres, 232;
active hostilities resumed by (Dec. 2), 336;
French's scheme for co-operation with, by amalgamation, 343-5.
Belgian Coast-line (_see also_ Channel Ports),
Plans for regaining command of, 303;
Commandant of Antwerp, French in communication with, 191;
Defence of Frontier fortresses, 7, 176;
Government, Message from, to French, on the retirement on Antwerp,
45-6;
departure of, from Antwerp (Oct. 3), 175;
Neutrality, British guarantee of, 9, 14;
Pre-war attitude as to conduct in a general war, 9;
Refugees near Le Cateau (Aug. 24), 68-9, 83.
Belgian Luxemburg, German forces in, 41.
Belgium, Central Plains of, 50;
French cavalry operations in, 44, 67, 68;
German turning movement in, 57;
Industrially important districts of, 49, 50, 51;
Inundation of, 242-3;
Further, considered, 313.
Bellot, fighting at, 126.
Beluchi Regiment, 129th (Duke of Connaught's Own), 238.
Bercelaere, the Worcesters at (Oct. 31), 254.
Berinage coalfield, 49, 51, 53.
Berry-au-Bac, French capture of Prussian Guards at (Sept. 17), 157.
Berthelot, General, Chief of Staff to Joffre, first impressions of, 35.
Bertie, Rt. Hon. Sir Francis Leveson, G.C.B. (now Lord Bertie),
British Ambassador to the French Republic, a tribute to, 33;
views of, on Kitchener's functions (Sept. 2), 99;
telegram to, from Grey on the Coastal advance (Dec. 9),
305 _sqq._
Bethune, 209, 235;
2nd corps at, 209, 210.
Bethune--Aire line, 2nd corps approaching, 201, 202.
Bethune-Lille-Tournai road, assigned for French advance (Oct. 13),
203.
Beyers, General, a chivalrous act by, 339.
Bhopal Infantry, 9th Regiment, 238.
Bidon, General, French Territorials under, 233.
Binche, distances from, to Conde and to Le Nouvion, 48;
strategic importance of, 53;
occupied by enemy, 60.
Bingham, Brigadier-General Hon. C. E., G.O.C. 4th Cavalry Brigade,
24, 65, 247.
"Black Country"-like area, 2nd Corps' operations in, 209.
"Black Marias," _see_ "Jack Johnsons".
Black Watch, The (Royal Highlanders),
1st Batt., 17, 126, 250, 328;
5th Batt. (T.), arrival of, in France, 295.
Bleu to Berthen, German positions on, 207.
Bleu to Neuve Eglise line, secured by 3rd Corps, 207.
Boers, the, chivalry shown by, in fight, 339.
Bois l'Eveque, roads and railways, traversing, 52.
Bois Grenier, capture of, by 3rd Corps (Oct. 18), 221.
Boitron, enemy fire from, 127;
Church, artillery action N. of, counter-attack near, and Guards'
action in woods N.W. of, 128.
Bombs, use of, 144.
Bonnet, 1st Army Corps H.Q., 65;
fighting watched from, by French, 66.
Bordeaux, 305, 346.
Border Regiment, the,
2nd Batt., 28;
5th Batt. (T.), 27, 295.
Borodino, Battle of, 217.
Bouchain, Scheldt crossing at, 50.
Boulogne, 173, 176, 180, 183, 188;
French's landing at, 13;
German menace to, 171, 176;
Napoleon's menace from, 215;
a possible execution of in the present century foreseen, 155-6.
Bourg, the Aisne crossed at, by 1st Corps, 151.
Bouvignies, Scheldt crossing at, 50.
Bowes, Brigadier-General, G.O.C. 8th Infantry Brigade, 21, 322.
Bradbury, Captain, killed in action, 101.
Braine and district cleared by Allenby's cavalry, 146.
"Brand, Tom" (Viscount Hampden), O.C. Hertfordshire Territorials,
powers of, with his men, 271.
Brandenburg Corps, and its commander in the Franco-German War of
1870, 285.
Bray, 60.
Braye, French extension to, suggested, 186.
Breese, Lieutenant Lawrence, of the Royal Horse Guards, scientific
experiment of, on new weapons, costing his life, 355.
Breteuil, de Castelnau's H.Q. at, 199.
Bridges, Colonel Thomas, 4th Dragoon Guards, character summary of,
184-5;
sent to Brussels, 185;
report from, on the situation in Antwerp, 198;
French's representative with H.M. the King of the Belgians, the
co-operative scheme discussed with, 343-4.
Bridoux, General, Commanding French Cavalry Corps, _role_
assigned to, 143;
killed, 158.
Brigades, _see_ Infantry Brigades.
Briggs, Brigadier-General C. J., G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Brigade, 24.
British Admiralty, views of, on the Zeebrugge schemes, 311, 320-1.
British Army, _see_ each component part, _and_ Names of
Commanders;
_see also_ British Expeditionary Force, _and_ Indian
Corps;
Disadvantages of (_circa_ 1914), 140;
One of its most sacred Traditions, 330;
Possibility of Employing elsewhere than as on Jan. 9, 1915;
Memorandum of War Council, 313-14;
and French's reply, 315 _sqq._;
Secret of its fighting power, 330.
British Empire at stake in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 214-16;
two fateful dates for, 237, 252, 260;
saved by the Cavalry Corps, 261;
jeopardised by the shortage of Munitions. French's consequent
action, 347, 356, 357;
practically inviolate throughout the War, 331.
British Expeditionary Force for France, command given to French, 2,
8, 17;
Composition of, 4;
at start and later, with names of Commanders, 16 _sqq._;
Combined action with the Navy considered by French and discussed
with Churchill, 157, 164;
further consideration of, 302 _sqq._;
objections of the French, 305, 307, 342, 343;
the substituted plan in operation, 322 _sqq._;
Concentration on left flank of the French fixed, 5, 6-7, 14;
and effected, 33, 35, 40;
general instructions for action when completed, 42;
order of the day referred to, 212;
_see also_ Move northward, _below_;
Condition of, after Le Cateau, 89, 95, 111;
Co-operation of, with the Belgians, French's scheme for, 302, 303,
343-5;
Belgian promise of, 43-6;
Deficiencies after Le Cateau due to Losses (_q.v._) (Aug. 31),
95;
Despatch of, to France; Instructions to C.-in-C. on his departure,
13-15;
Feeling of, for the Prussian invaders of East Prussia, 194;
French's talks with the men, 88-9, 136;
German estimate of (Sept. 3), 105;
the thing forgotten by them, 107;
H.Q. in London; Locale and Staff, 5-6;
Imperilment of, by the abandonment of the French offensive, 94;
Losses (_see also_ that head) in Officers, how made good, 272;
Marching of, 94;
Message to, from the King, 275;
Moral of, _see_ Spirit Animating, _below_;
Moral sustained through the Great Retreat, 107;
Motive and Task of, 14;
Move of, to the N., to left flank of French forces, envisaged by
French in Sept., 157, 162;
the _pourparlers_ on, 163 _sqq._;
Joffre's views on, 166-9, and dispositions suggested by him,
169 _sqq._;
urged on by French in early October, 176;
further urgent representations on, to Joffre, and the replies,
185 _sqq._;
the march begun (Oct. 1), 193, 195 _sqq._;
its progress, 198 _sqq._;
how thwarted, 341 _sqq._;
combined advance east planned for (Oct. 13), 20;
New base decided on, 93;
Offensive action by, urged by Joffre and others (Aug. 31), and
refused by French, 95;
Orders of the Day issued to, by French;
Sept. 8, 131-2;
Special:
Aug. 22, paragraph 2, quoted, 212;
Oct. 16, 211-12;
Oct. 23, 229;
Nov. 1, 257;
Nov. 3, 260-9;
Nov. 3, 269-70;
Position desired for, for Sept. 6, by Joffre, 107;
Positions held by (_see also_ Concentration, _above_),
and movements of, before and during the:
(_a_) Retreat from Mons, 47 _sqq._;
(_b_) Battle of the Marne, 117 _sqq._;
(_c_) Battle of the Aisne, 145 _sqq._;
(_d_) Movement N., after that Battle, 193 _sqq._;
(_e_) 1st Battle of Ypres, 214 _sqq._;
(_f_) Operations of Dec. 14-19, 1914, 326 _sqq._;
Qualities shown by all ranks in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 238, 239;
Reserves and reinforcements available, 113, 228;
continued lack of both, 265;
War Council's view on (Jan. 7, 1915), 309;
Roads and Supply Railheads allotted to, for the Battle of the
Marne, 132-3;
Services of, acknowledgments of, by,
Joffre, 85, 98;
Poincare, 198;
Spirit animating, 55, 78, 88-9, 98, 110, 111, 113, 238, 239, 266,
269, 270, 271;
Strain endured by, in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 237;
Successive instead of united action by, envisaged by Joffre
(Oct. 4), 189 _sqq._;
Wilson's share in preparation of, 108.
British Force for Relief of Antwerp, 177, 179, 181;
what befell it, and what might have been done with it, 183;
Poincare's view on, 198.
British Forces, _see_ British Army.
British Government, _see also_ War Cabinet;
offensive action urged by, on Aug. 31, 95;
objective unattainable without adequate Munitions, insistence on
by French, 351 _sqq._, 357 _sqq._;
_see also_ 347, 358 _sqq._;
Guarantee of Belgian neutrality, 9, 14.
British Imperial General Staff, French's resignation from, 1;
and French's appointment to Command of B.E.F., 2;
conferences of, with French General Staff, 5, 9.
British Losses at Le Cateau, 78-9, 83-7, 89, 153;
in the Battle of the Aisne, 152-3, 159, 160;
on the Marne, 137, 138;
in the Battle of Ypres, 251, 279, 285-6.
British Naval co-operation arranged for, 226-7;
Detachments for relief of Antwerp, and their Commander, 179, 181;
difficulty of withdrawing, 201;
Transport Service line, efficiency of, 40.
British Navy (_see also_ Naval co-operation)
Combined action with plans for, 157, 164 _sqq._, 302
_sqq._;
French objections to, 305, 307, 342, 343;
Position of in Aug. 1914, 4;
and at the close of the year, 345.
British Reservists, in Aug. 1914, 42.
British Soldiers, military characteristics of, 42;
Moral superiority of, over German, value of, 55;
and Officers, instinctive sympathy between, 88;
Qualities of, saving the Armies from disaster, 94;
Spirit of, at and before the Battle of the Marne, 113, 121;
Troops, mobilisation of, 3.
Brooke, Colonel Lord, and the Warwickshire Battery of Horse
Artillery (_q.v._), 295.
Broome, a pause at, with Kitchener, 333.
Bruges, Belgian retreat on, covered by Rawlinson, 201;
German advance on, 208;
and arrival at, 219;
plan for clearing, 221, 226;
failure of, 235.
Brussels, Belgian evacuation of, 45-6;
German cavalry advance on, 58;
Colonel Bridges despatched to, 185;
Railway to and from, 53;
route from, across Haine valley, 49.
Brussels-Givet line, German menace to, 41.
Bucy-le-Long-Bourg line, held by British, 150, 152.
Bug, the, Russian operations near, 334.
Bulfin, Brigadier-General E. S., G.O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade, 18, 244;
given command of the 1st Division, 251-2.
Bulgaria, Joffre's hopes from, 34.
Bull Run, Battle of, 231.
Bully beef, exchange of, for loan of Guns, by Haig, 159.
"Bunching up" of infantry, 130.
Bussieres, attempt to cut off enemy retreat at, 128.
Bussieres-Boitron-Hondevilliers line, British left on, 131.
Butler, Brigadier-General R. H. K., G.O.C. 3rd Infantry Brigade, 18.
Buzancy, French's view from, of the Aisne combat, 145.
Byng, Major-General Hon. Sir Julian, G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division, 29;
operations by, 201;
during the Battle of Ypres, 227, 239, 243, 244;
Appointed to command Cavalry Division for relief of Antwerp, 181.
Bzura, the, Russian retreat to, and stand on, 230.
Cabinet, The (_see also_ War Cabinet), anxiety of (Dec. 1914),
332.
Cabinet Ministers, French's efforts to rouse to the need for more
Munitions, 347.
Calais, 183;
menace to, and from, of the fall of Antwerp, 176, 214-15, 304.
Calais-Dover, distance well within range of modern heavy artillery,
215.
Cambon, Paul, French Ambassador in London, 3.
Cambrai, 77;
canal by, 49-50;
Scheldt crossing at, 50;
British troops near, 72;
German reinforcements at, 182.
Cambrai to Conde and to Le Nouvion, distances, 48.
Cameron Highlanders, 1st Batt., 27;
at the Petit Morin, 126;
in the Battle of Ypres, 250;
at Givenchy, 328.
Cameronians, The (Scottish Rifles), 5th Batt. (T.), 295.
Campaigns, alternatives offered by preliminary conditions of, 217-18;
Development of, often quite unlike the preconceived plan, 217;
success in, from what resulting, 217-18.
Campbell, Lieut.-Colonel D., 9th Lancers, at Moncel, 119;
and wounded, 120.
Canal Du Centre, junction of, with the Conde Canal, 53.
Capper, Major-General T., G.O.C. 7th Infantry Division, 28, 227;
sent to relief of Antwerp, 181;
at Ghent, 201, 203;
retreat thence, 208.
Carency, French line advanced at, 345.
Carvin and Lens, French Cavalry operating between, 182.
Cassel, French's interviews at, with Foch, 233, 274, 277-8;
on the inundation question, 242-3.
Castelnau, General de, efforts of, to turn the German flank, 13, 145,
159, 160, 162, 197, 216, 325;
Fine leading of, and the results, 158-9;
Seen by French on October 8, personal losses sustained by, and
pressure on troops of, 199.
Catillon, Bridge at, 51.
Cattenieres, German move on, 77.
Cavalry, _see_ British, French, German, Cavalry.
Cavalry, British (_see also_ Indian Cavalry, _and_ each
unit _under_ Brigade, Corps, Division, Regiment, _and_
Names of Commanders) of the Expeditionary Force, 4;
Composition and Commanders of, 16, 17 _sqq._ (_see
also_ Cavalry Brigades, Corps, Divisions),
Demand of, for Bayonets, 161;
Guns saved by, at Le Cateau, 77;
Memorandum on the Employment of, 129-30;
Operations of, before, during, and after the,
(_a_) Retreat from Mons, 44, 47 _sqq._;
(_b_) Battle of the Marne, 119 _sqq._;
(_c_) Battle of the Aisne, 146, 152, 165;
(_d_) Move northwards, 172 _sqq._;
(_e_) 1st Battle of Ypres, 220 _sqq. passim_;
(_f_) Operations of Dec. 14-19, 238;
Reconnaissance work of; shared with Aircraft, 43-4;
Superiority of, to that of the enemy, 94;
Brigades:
1st, 24;
fine work of, at Braine, 146;
2nd, 24, 65, 73;
guns saved by, 77;
at Moncel, 119-20;
3rd, 24, 65;
at St. Quentin, 87;
fighting on the Marne, 129, 132;
filling gap between 3rd and 2nd Corps, 135;
energy of, 137;
at Chassemy, 152;
4th, 24, 25, 63;
at Messines, 247, 263;
5th, 25;
at Binche, 47;
at Cerizy, 87;
near Compiegne, 93;
on the Marne, 132;
following gap between 3rd and 2nd Corps, 135;
in Marne Battle, 135;
French's talk to, after the fight, 136;
energy of, 137;
at Chassemy, 152;
6th, 29;
at Gheluvelt, 250;
7th (_see also_ Kavanagh), 30;
in the Battle of Ypres, 250, 251;
at Messines, 246;
fine work by, 256, 272;
Corps (_see also_ Allenby),
formation of, 24, 200, 202;
fine work by, 203, 204 _sqq._;
operations planned for, in the Battle of Ypres, 219;
and executed by, 220, 221;
victories of, 223;
front held by, 225, 232;
falling back on Messines, 227;
hard pressed at Zonnebeke, 233;
glorious stand by, and by associated troops on the
Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 238, 244 _sqq._;
support sent to, 250;
admirable aid given by, 261;
repulse of the enemy by, back to the Lys, 277;
Divisional, _see_ Divisional Cavalry;
Divisions:
1st, 16, 24, 61;
fine reconnaissance work by, 64, 65, 72, 73, 75, 76, 84, 87,
119, 126;
orders to, before the Battle of the Marne, 132;
at Braine, 152;
and the move N., 169, 171, 173, 188;
the move begun, 193, 193, 198, 200, 202;
fine work by, 204, 205;
fighting on the Lys, 220;
in support at Messines, 244;
fierce fighting by, 245, 246, 247;
withdrawal to Wulverghem, 258, 259;
London Scottish joining in the trenches, 263;
supporting Conneau, 264;
reinforcing Haig, 280;
2nd, 25, 146;
move to the N., 170-1, 172, 174, 193, 195, 200;
capture by, of the Mont des Cats, 204;
and of Mont Noir, 205;
capture by, of Mont Kemmel, 208;
at Warneton, 220;
reinforcing Haig, 243;
and hard pressed, 244;
at Messines, 246;
at Gheluvelt, 250;
heavily attacked on the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 237, 258,
259;
French support of, 261;
London Scottish detached to support, 263;
3rd, 16, 29, 165, 178, 188, 273;
detailed for Relief of Antwerp, 180, 181, 192, 201;
at Thourout, 204;
fighting in Houthulst Forest, 220;
near Menin, 224;
increasing pressure on, 227, 233, 239;
intense fighting near Hollebeke, 243, 244, 246;
value of, 276;
critical situation, 251;
fighting at Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 260;
8th, 169.
Cavalry Commanders, French's discussions with, before Mons, 43.
Cavalry on Foot, disadvantages of, 261-2.
Cavalry spirit, advantages of, 262.
Cavan, Brigadier-General the Earl of, G.O.C. 4th (Guards Brigade),
19, 244, 271;
later command of, 252, 271;
fine work by, 272;
marvellous influence over his men, 271.
Celles, spurs near, 150.
Cerizy, German cavalry repulse at, 87.
Cerseuil, 7th Brigade at, 195.
Chailly and Jouy-sur-Morin, 1st Corps at, 123.
Chalons, rail to, from Maubeuge, 53.
Chamigny, Marne crossed at, by part of 3rd Corps, 138.
Champagne, Plain of, 117;
German forces giving way in, 142.
Changis, Marne crossings near, 124, 129;
French difficulties at, 133-4.
Changis-Coulommiers line, British position on, before the Marne
Battle, 115.
Channel Ports, German menace to, 341;
constantly in French's mind, 11, 155-7;
increased by the fall of Antwerp, 176;
possibility of averting, 183;
gravity of, in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 214-16, 224;
the advance checked by that battle, 235-6, 277;
moment of greatest danger to (Oct. 31), 252, 260;
saved by the Territorials, 294;
rendered grave by German hold on Belgian coast, Grey on, 306-7;
French's plan for extinguishing this menace, 302 _sqq._;
Joffre's views and alternative plan, 307, 310-11;
and memorandum on, 317-18.
Channel Tunnel, 214;
views on, of French, 156.
Chantilly, meetings at, with Joffre, 336, 340;
conference at, with Kitchener, the Munitions question urged at,
355-6.
Charleroi, country near, 50;
German advance on, 58.
Charleroi Canal, canals connected with, 53.
Charly-sur-Marne, bridge at, seized by Allenby, 133.
Chassemy, Gough's cavalry at, 152.
Chateau-Thierry, French forces falling back on, 104;
taken by the enemy, 105;
French advance directed on, 115;
German concentration near, 151.
Chatillon, the French G.H.Q. at, 142.
Chemin des Dames, position maintained by the French, 157;
plateau S. of, 161.
Cheshire Regiment:
1st Batt., 22;
6th Batt. (T.), 296.
Chetwode, Brigadier-General Sir Philip P. W., G.O.C. 5th Cavalry
Brigade, 25, 47;
German cavalry repulsed by, at Cerizy, 87;
1st Corps' retirement covered by, 93;
French's visit with, to the tired troops, 136.
Chichester, Brigadier-General, O.C. Territorial Training Camp,
St. Omer, 294.
Chivalry in war, importance of maintaining, instances of, in the
Boer War, 339.
Chivres Plateau, German artillery concentration on, 151-2.
Chivres Plateau-Missy line held by 5th Division, 152.
Chivres Spur, Aisne Valley, 147.
Christmas Day, 1900, a Boer Christmas present after, 339.
Christmas Day, 1914, how spent by French, 337;
an armistice believed to have been suggested for, by the Pope, 337;
German fraternisation on, 338.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, and the _Entente_, 3;
on the situation of the British Navy on August 5, 1914, 4;
attacks on, repudiated by French, and valuable help acknowledged,
164;
character-summary of, 302-3;
visits of, to French, and plans for naval co-operation sketched
out during, 163-4;
and letters after, 302 _sqq._;
later visit to French (Dec. 17), the difficulties of British
coastal advance discussed, 305;
French dislike of the plan, 305;
and substitute for it, 307;
on the French attitude to the Zeebrugge plan, 307;
telegram from (Jan. 2), on the development of Zeebrugge as a
submarine base, 308;
text, 311.
Clive, Major, Grenadier Guards, liaison officer at French H.Q.,
news from, 72;
a tribute to, 274.
Cloth Hall, and other glories at Ypres, 248.
Coast-line, menace to, _see_ Channel ports.
Coldstream Guards, The,
1st Batt., 17, 250;
at Givenchy, 328;
2nd Batt., 19, 125, 128, 244;
3rd Batt., 19, 125, 127, 128, 244.
Command of Ground, chief value of, 149.
Commander-in-Chief, demands on the brain of, 80;
functions of, as exercised by Kitchener in South Africa, 333;
responsibility of, for all blame always maintained by French,
329-30.
Commanders of Armies in the Field, and Interference by Home
Government, _see_ Divided Command.
Committee of Imperial Defence, 1, 8;
warning to, by French, on the command of the Channel ports, 155-6,
214;
suggestion to, on sectional construction of submarines made by
French, 216;
French a member of, 8.
Compiegne, French's G.H.Q. at, 86, 89, 90, 93;
conference at, with Joffre, 92;
pivot of French cavalry operations, 146.
Compiegne-Clermont line, French forces falling back to, 93.
Compiegne-La Fere line, gap in, Joffre's desire for the British to
fill, and French's replies, 92, 94, 95.
Compiegne-Longueil-Pont Ste. Maxence area, 3rd Corps directed on,
187.
Conde, the Scheldt at, 48, 50;
military value of, 53, 54;
roads from, route of, 54;
2nd Corps' difficulties S.E. of, 65;
Aisne crossing at, 150.
Conde Bridge, British cavalry (entrenched) covering, 195.
Conde-Cambrai-Le Nouvion-Binche area,
Features of,
Strategical, 52 _sqq._;
Topographical, 48 _sqq._
Conde Canal line, British forces on, 47, 50;
junction of, with Canal Du Centre, 53;
bridges gained by German cavalry, 62.
Conde Fort, Missy, cleared of enemy, 149.
Conde-Manette line, British forces on, 60.
Conde-Mons-Erquelinnes line, British on, 59;
heavy pressure on, 61.
Conde-Valenciennes-Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies road, 54.
Congreve, Brigadier-General W. N., V.C., G.O.C. 18th Infantry
Brigade, 28.
Connaught Rangers,
1st Batt., 19, 128, 238;
2nd Batt., 19, 160.
Conneau, General, French cavalry under, operations of, 204, 227, 235;
at Messines, 264, 278;
relieved, 280.
Cormicy-Rheims-Verzy line, held by 5th French Army, 146.
Corps Commander, discussions with before Mons, 43.
Coulommiers, French at, with Haig, 106;
French's G.H.Q. at, 131.
Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914,
Members and Military Officers present at, 3-4;
topics discussed and conclusions arrived at, 4-5.
County of London (London Regiment):
9th Batt. (Queen Victoria's Rifles), 295;
12th Batt. (The Rangers), 296;
13th Batt. (Princess Louise's Kensington Batt.), 295.
Courcelles, 1st Corps H.Q., 152.
Courtacon-Esternay-La Villeneuve-les-Charleville line reached by
5th French Army, 121.
Courtacon-Esternay-Sezanne line, 5th French Army directed on, before
the Marne battle, 115.
Courtrai, Rawlinson's operations towards, 201, 219;
German advance to, 208;
and reinforcements at, 240.
Couvrelles-Ciry-Nampteuil-sous-Muret area, British troops in, 196.
Cracow, anticipated fall of, 194;
Russian tactics concerning, 230.
Craonne, French forces near, 152;
loss of, 157.
Crawford, and the Light Division, 215.
Cressy, Allenby's H.Q. at, 87.
Crouy and Crouy Ridge, Allied forces at, 152.
Cuiry-Housse-Oulchy-le-Chateau area, 2nd Corps directed to assemble
in, 193.
Cuisy-Iverny-Neufmontiers-Meaux, French advance by, across the
Marne, 115.
Cunard, Lady, 2.
Cunliffe-Owen, Colonel, G.O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade (_temp._),
18.
Cuthbert, Brigadier-General G. J., G.O.C. 13th Infantry Brigade, 22.
Cyclist Companies attached to Divisional Cavalry and R.E.,
1st, 18;
2nd, 20;
3rd, 21;
4th, 26;
5th, 23;
6th, 28;
7th, 29.
Dagny, Cavalry action near, 119.
D'Amade, General, troops under, 61;
help given by, to 2nd Brigade at Le Cateau, 78, 80;
attack by, on the Germans about Peronne, 87.
Dammartin, G.H.Q. moved to, 95, 100, 101, 104.
Dardanelles Expedition, repercussion of, on the W. front, 316, 318,
343, 356;
the climax and its results, 357 _sqq._
Davies, Brigadier-General R. H., G.O.C. 6th Infantry Brigade, 19.
Davies, Brigadier-General, G.O.C. 8th Infantry Brigade, 66.
Dawnay, Major Hugh, 2nd Life Guards, services and death in action,
84, 273-4;
on the 1st Corps' doings (Oct. 24), 235.
Defence, strengthened by Modern Weapons, 12, 144.
Delays, danger of, 7.
de la Panouse, Vicomte, and British support of France, 3.
de Lisle, Brigadier-General (later, Major-General) H. de B.,
G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 24;
later G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Division, 24, 65;
_role_ assigned to, 200, 202-3;
and finely executed by, 204-5;
at Messines, 247;
high praise due to, 261;
in the Battle of Ypres, 280.
Denain, Scheldt crossing at, 50.
Denmark, Neutrality of, and Vulnerability of Sea-communications, 315.
Derby, Earl of, on Kitchener's love for Broome, 333.
Devonshire Regiment, 1st Batt., 21, 22, 27, 327.
Dhuisy, British troops directed to, to ease pressure on 8th French
Division, 134.
Dhuizel, 146;
1st Corps H.Q. at, 152.
Dieppe, German opportunity at, lost, 214, 215-16.
Dinant, French forces at (Aug. 18), 41.
Dinant-Trelon line, 5th French Army on, 58, 59.
Dispatches, difficulty of writing, 80.
Divided Command and Divided Counsels, evils of, 99 _sqq._;
177 _sqq._, 222, 319;
Poincare's views on, 198-9;
French's efforts to minimise, 232-3;
a concrete instance (Dec. 18), 325.
Divisional Cavalry:
1st Division, 18;
2nd, 20;
3rd, 21;
4th, 26;
5th, 23;
6th, 28, 203;
7th, 29.
Divisions, British (_see also_ Cavalry Division), Commanders
and Composition of, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 25, 27, 28;
Regular Forces,
1st, 16, 17, 252;
in the Retreat from Mons, 66, 106;
in the Battles of the Marne, 125, 126, 129;
and of the Aisne (at Vendresse), 151;
in the Battle of Ypres, 223, 232;
at Gheluvelt, 241-2, 250, 253-4, 265;
at Messines, 260, 265;
moved into reserve, 284;
2nd, 16, 19;
in the Retreat from Mons, 66, 81, 106;
in the Battle of the Marne, 119, 127;
at the Petit Morin, 128;
in the Battle of the Aisne, 151;
in the Battle of Ypres, 223, 235, 251, 253-4, 265;
Territorials incorporated with, 297;
3rd, 16, 20;
in the Retreat from Mons, 60, 62, 71;
at Solesmes, 73, 75;
in the Battle of the Marne, at Nanteuil, 133, 160, 193;
in the Battle of the Aisne, at Aizy, 151;
and Vuilly, 152;
position on Oct. 2, 195;
Commander killed, 211;
in the Battle of Ypres, at Messines, 247;
and after, 323;
4th, 16, 25, 68, 72, 105;
at Le Cateau, 77, 210;
and after, 85;
bridging feat, of, in the Marne Battle, 134;
in the Battle of the Aisne, 145, 152, 161;
moving North, 205;
at Bailleul, 207;
in the Battle of Ypres, Le Gheer retaken by, 233;
at Messines, fine work of, 245;
5th, 16, 22;
in the Retreat from Mons, 62, 71, 76;
heavy pressure on, 66, 70;
in the Battle of the Marne, 133, 134;
in the Battle of the Aisne and after, 150-2, 195, 196;
heavy fighting by, 210;
in the Battle of Ypres, at La Bassee, 221;
in the December operations, 323;
6th, 16, 27, 94, 150, 203;
in the Marne Battle, 153, 160;
in the Battle of Ypres, 205;
Bailleul and Meteren taken by, 207;
success of, at Armentieres, 241;
constant fighting of, 275;
7th, 16, 28, 165, 167, 169, 173;
not under French, 177, 178, 179;
detailed for relief of Antwerp, 180-1;
French's reiteration of request for, 188;
placed under French's orders, 192, 208;
orders to, 208;
in the Battle of Ypres, 224, 239, 251, 253-4, 256, 327;
defence by, of the Ypres salient, 239;
at Gheluvelt, 241-2;
heavily shelled, 251;
heavy losses, 260, 265;
8th, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173, 201, 239;
in the Battle of Ypres, 327;
12th, at the Battle of Loos, O.C. killed, 150;
27th, 239, 305;
28th, 310;
Territorial:
46th (North Midland), 300;
47th (London), 300;
48th (South Midland), 300;
49th (West Riding), 300;
50th (Northumbrian), 300;
51st (Highland), 300.
Dixmude, French Naval Division at, 208;
German forces between it and Nieuport, 240;
taken by them, 278;
and held, 283;
possibility of clearing line to, 304;
Belgian forces active near, 337.
Domptin, reached by 1st Army Corps, 133.
Doran, Brigadier-General B. J. C., G.O.C. 8th Infantry Brigade, 21.
Doran, Brigadier-General W. R. B., G.O.C. 17th Infantry Brigade, 28.
Dorset Regiment, 1st Batt., 23.
Douai-St. Quentin Railway, junction of, at Cambrai, 54.
Doue, H.Q. of Smith-Dorrien, 128;
German evacuation of, 131.
Douglas, General Sir Charles, G.C.B., at the Council of
War of Aug. 5, 1914, 3.
Doullens, H.Q. of Foch at, French's visit to and conference at,
199-200.
Douve River, 324;
Valley of, German attack in, 245;
and continuous activity in, later, 275.
Dover, War time aspect of, 31, 34;
Straits of, and the Command of the Channel Ports, 155-7.
Dragoon Guards:
1st (King's), 29, 250;
2nd (Queen's Bays), 24, 146;
3rd, 29, 250;
4th (Royal Irish), 24, 65, 73, 184;
at Messines, 245;
5th (Pss. Charlotte of Wales), 24, 76;
at Messines, 245;
6th (Carabiniers), 24;
at Messines, 247.
Dragoons:
1st (Royals), 29, 250;
at Hollebeke, 243;
2nd (Scots Greys), 25, 47;
after the crossing of the Marne, 130.
Dranoutre-Messines area, reached by 1st Cavalry Division, 205.
Drummond, Brigadier-General L. G., G.O.C. 19th Infantry Brigade, 23;
at Valenciennes, placed under orders of Allenby, 61, 65.
Du Cane, Colonel (_temp._ Brigadier-General) J. P.,
C.B., Chief of Staff, 3rd Corps, 323.
Duff, Lieut.-Colonel Grant, C.B., and his men, in the Battle
of the Marne, 126.
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 1st Batt., 22.
Dunkirk, 169, 179, 183, 188, 228, 243;
importance of and risks to, 155, 176, 214, 304.
Dunkirk-Cambrai-La Capelle-Hirson line, French Reserves on, 21, 41,
47-8, 73.
Durham, Earl of, demand by, at French's request, for more Munitions,
355.
Durham Light Infantry, 2nd Batt., 28.
Dyle, the Belgian retreat on (Aug. 18), 46.
Eastern War Front, British official fears concerning (Dec. 27),
laid before Joffre, and his views on the matter, 340-1.
East Prussia, Russian operations in, 194, 229, 268.
Ecaillon stream, affluent of the Scheldt, 50.
Edward, Prince of Wales, arrival of, in France, 287.
Egerton, ----, of Egerton's Brigade, 261.
Egyptian Campaign of 1882, volunteers in, 292.
Eighteenth (British) Corps, 186.
Eleventh (British) Corps, 169.
England, Immunity of, during the War, 330-1;
Invasion of, possibilities of, 155-6.
_Entente_ Powers, British Cabinet's loyalty to, 3.
Epernay, Forest near, French attempt to turn, 143.
Epernay-Rheims, French movement towards, 143.
Ereclin, the, and other affluents of the Scheldt, 50.
Esperey, General Franchet d', _see_ Franchet d'Esperey.
Essex Regiment, 2nd Batt., 26.
Estaires, Germans driven back near, 204;
Lahore Division sent to, 234.
Estaires to Menin, cavalry reconnaissance in strength along the
Lys from, directed for Oct. 15, 205.
Etreux, Munster Fusiliers cut up at, 17.
European War, French's anticipations of, 1, 2.
Falloden, Viscount Grey of, _see_ Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward.
Fanshawe, Brigadier-General, G.O.C. 6th Infantry Brigade, 19.
Faujus, Cavalry action at, 120-1.
Fere-en-Tardenois, French's H.Q. moved to, 145;
visit at, from President Poincare, 198-9.
Fergusson, Major-General Sir Charles, G.O.C. 5th Division, 22;
hard pressed (Aug. 24), 65;
and the Aisne crossing at Missy, 149, 150.
Ferozepore Brigade, _see under_ Indian troops.
Festubert, Battle of (1915), 344;
British artillery supplies for, 356;
drastic measures taken by French after, on the Munition question,
357;
Indian troops engaged at, 327, 328.
Field Guns (_see also_ Guns), actually on the Offensive,
number of rounds fired per gun per day, 358.
Finance Department's opposition to provision of Munitions, 348.
Fifth Corps, part of 2nd Army under Smith-Dorrien, 337.
First Army Corps (1st B.E.F.), Commander, and composition, 16, 17-20;
during the Mons Battle, and the Retreat, 60, 64, 65, 66, 93, 110;
the fight at Landrecies, 74-5, 77-8;
gap between and the 2nd Corps (Aug. 26), 74-5, 81;
French assistance to, 81-2;
the retreat resumed, 82;
fatigued but ready, 100;
retirement of, engagements during, 110, 116;
on the Marne, 122, 125, 132, 137;
at Chilly and Jouy-sur-Morin (Sept. 8), 123;
roads and supply railheads for (Sept. 9), 132;
crossing the Marne, 133;
appearance and attitude of, 135-6;
fatigue of;
French's talk to, 136;
positions of, before and during the Battle of the Aisne, 146;
in the Battle of the Aisne, 150-1;
points at which Aisne crossing was effected by (Sept. 14), 151;
successful operation of, 151;
positions of (Sept. 14), 152;
reinforcement sent to, and plan for, 153;
counter-attack repulsed with heavy losses, 153;
heavy attack on, repulsed (Sept. 17), 157;
reinforcements sent to (Sept. 18), 158;
losses, 159;
heavy fighting, 159-61;
disposition of, in the move N., 171;
relief of, French's efforts to effect, 185-6;
relief of, Notes on, of the Allied Chiefs, 185 _sqq._, 191;
movements ordered (Oct. 1), 193;
position of (Oct. 2), 195;
relief of, delay in, Joffre's assurance as to (Oct. 10), 201-2;
final repulse by, of the Germans on the Aisne (Oct. 11), 211;
arrival of last detachment of, at St. Omer, 211;
French's intended use of, against Bruges and Roulers, 219, 226;
sent N., 228;
actions by and positions of, in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 232, 235,
242;
defence of the Ypres salient, 239; _sqq. passim_;
actions by, _sqq._;
action, 1st Defence of Ypres salient, 239;
report from (Oct. 30), 243;
French effective support for, promised by Foch (Oct. 31), 243;
Orders to (Oct. 30), 244-5;
position serious (Oct. 31), 249;
the retirement, 252;
the rally, 253;
H.Q. guard, 248;
line broken, 251;
line re-established (Oct. 31), 255-6;
heavily attacked (Nov. 1), 259, 260;
rest essential for, 264, 265;
heavily engaged (Nov. 11), the line pierced, with heavy losses
and re-established, 278-9;
help given by, to Vidal, 279;
part played by, in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 283;
parallels to, 285;
losses sustained, 285-6;
Reserve, Territorials in, 297;
relief sent by, to the Indian Corps (Dec. 20), 328;
as part of the 1st Army under Haig (Dec. 25), 337.
"First Seven Divisions, The," at the Battle of Ypres, 237-8.
FitzClarence, Brigadier-General, V.C., G.O.C. 1st Infantry
Brigade, 17;
the situation at Gheluvelt saved by, 254-5;
killed in action, 17, 255, 280.
FitzGerald, Lieut.-Colonel Brinsley, French's Secretary, 34, 255,
357, 360.
Fitzgerald, Sir Maurice, 31.
Flag of Truce, practically unknown in the Great War, 339.
Flanking Movement, de Castelnau's efforts to effect,
_see_ Castelnau;
planned by French, 13, 157 _sqq._ _passim_, 197,
235-6, 301;
Foch's view on, 199;
_see also_ Aisne Front, withdrawal from.
Foch, General (now Marshal), 13, 321;
Appearance, 197-8;
Characteristics:
Military genius, 197-8;
optimism, 199, 223, 242-3, 274;
spirit of, and audacious strategy of, 198, 274;
Effort of, to turn the German flank, 13, 145, 199;
French's friendship with, and tribute to, 197-8;
relations with French, conferences, plans, &c. concerted
together (in order of date), 199-200, 203, 216, 218, 220,
224, 235, 255, 260, 274;
on inundation (Oct. 29), 242-3;
promise of support by, 221, 226, 245, 260, 281;
no reserves to spare, 265;
but help given to 1st Corps, 283-4;
Representing the French Army at Lord Roberts's funeral service
in France, 282;
On the enemy attack on his line between Ypres and the sea, support
asked and given, 278;
On the Operations of Dec. 16-17, 324-5;
On the "Russian bluff," 337.
Fontaine Fauvel, high ground about, reached by Allenby, 133.
Fontaine-Ors road, 52.
Fontenelle, Sambre source near, 50.
Foret de Crecy, 117.
Foret de Mormal, roads and railways traversing, 52;
enemy advance through, 75, 81.
Foret de Nieppe, cleared by British cavalry, 203.
Foret de St. Gobain, 143.
"Formidable," H.M.S., sunk by submarine in Channel, 311.
"Fosse Position," 10th French Corps at, 57.
Fosse-Charleroi-Thuin line, French forces on, 58.
Fourth Corps, British Army, Commander and composition of, 201;
in the march north, 203;
covering Belgian retreat, 208;
directed eastward, danger to left of, 219, 221, 224; 220, 223,
226, 227;
in the Battle of Ypres, 232, 327;
temporarily broken up, 239;
part of 1st Army under Haig, 337.
Fowke, Brigadier-General, O.C. Royal Engineers, 6.
France and Belgium, the line in (Oct. 14-June 15), held, thanks to
the Territorials, 294;
British Expeditionary Force for (_q.v._), Command of, 2, 8;
Victory of, share in, of the Women and Children, 36.
Franchet d'Esperey, General, G.O.C. 5th Army, _vice_ Lanrezac
superseded (Sept. 4), 107;
at the Marne, 115, 123, 125.
Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, murder of, 1.
Franco-Belgian frontier, _terrain_ near, 49.
Franco-British consultations in Aug. 1914, 6, 9;
Military relations during 1914, 108, 112 _passim_;
Understanding as to Co-operation in event of German attack on
France, 5, 6, 9.
Franco-German war of 1870, fame in, of the Brandenburg Corps, 285.
Franiere, German advance near, 57.
Frederick Charles of Prussia, Prince, and the Brandenburg Corps, 285.
Frederick the Great, German military following of, 346.
French, Field Marshal Sir J. P., G.C.B., &c. (now Viscount
French of Ypres), and the Great War;
Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Aug. 1914,
2, 3, 8, 17;
the command "entirely independent," 15 (_cf._ 94 _sqq._,
177, and 329-30,
_see also_ Ammunition, Channel Ports, Move Northward,
Offensive);
anticipation by, of European War, 1, 8;
the first idea received of the coming in 1914, 2;
the violation of Belgian neutrality expected, 10-11;
at the Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914, 3;
views of, on landing of B.E.F., 6-7;
advance studies of, on problems of a B.E.F., 8-9;
all plans concentrated on a war of movement and manoeuvre, 11;
at German manoeuvres of 1911, and the Kaiser's remarks on his
forces, 9-10;
instructions to, before leaving for France, 13-5, 94;
arrival in France, official visits, 33;
first meeting with Joffre and his staff, 34 _sqq._;
visits of, to Corps Commanders, &c., and conferences with them,
40, 43, 47, 60, 62, 130, 154, 159, 202, 209, 210, 219, 243-4,
246, 249, 255, 337 _et alibi_;
visit of, to Lanrezac, 56;
and message sent to, later, 57;
interviews with Commander of French Reserve Divisions, 37;
letter to Kitchener on French dispositions W. of the Meuse,
request in, for Plumer to succeed Grierson, 38-40;
appreciation of the situation on Aug. 18, 40-2;
observations on the physique of the British troops, 42;
invitation to Louvain from the King of the Belgians, 42-3;
message from Belgian Government on evacuating Brussels, 45-6;
no idea of retreat then entertained by, 47;
visit to Lanrezac's G.H.Q., and the beginning of his retreat, 56-7;
Lanrezac's request to, 58;
and the reply, 59;
anxiety for the Mons salient, 61;
meeting with Sordet, 67-8;
the temptation of Maubeuge, 70;
orders issued for the retreat to continue, 71;
the vital problem before, as to a stand on Aug. 25, 73;
retreat decided on, 74;
account of the fighting at Landrecies sent by, to Kitchener, 75;
Dispatch by, on the Battle of Le Cateau, 79-80;
interviews with Joffre and with Lanrezac, 81, 82-3, 85-6;
Joffre's, telegram to, of appreciation of the services of the
British Army, 85;
possible stand on the Oise considered by, and personal
reconnaissance by, of the _terrain_, 85;
roadside talks with the British troops, 88-9;
idea of, for a stand between the Marne and the Seine, 92;
conference of, with Joffre, inability to make a stand insisted on,
92;
and reiterated, 93;
opinion of, on von Kluck's movement, 106;
pressure put upon to change his plans successfully resisted, 92,
93 _sqq._, 111-12;
independence of action, necessity for, felt and urged by, in
letter to Lord Kitchener, 94;
interview in Paris with Kitchener, 95 _sqq._;
results, 95-8;
letters to, from Joffre on French's proposed disposition of
forces, 96-7, 97-8;
and the reply, 98;
letter to, from Gallieni (Sept. 2), on co-operation of the
British, in the defence of Paris, and the reply (Sept. 3), 102-4;
Joffre's plans communicated to, 107;
and conference with him at Melun, 110, 114 _sqq._;
object of, in writing this record, 111, 114 _sqq._;
basis of orders issued by, on the Battle of the Marne, 114, 116-17,
122-3;
view of, on the enemy situation and intentions before the Battle
of the Marne, 116-17;
visits by, to the British Corps, 118-19, 122;
problem before, on Sept. 7-8, 123-5;
memorandum issued by, on lessons of the Marne Battle, 129 _sqq._;
the Marne crossed by, and a talk with the 5th Cavalry Brigade,
135-6;
despatch of, on the Battle of the Marne, 137;
estimate by, of the British contribution to the success of the
Battle of the Marne, 140-1;
optimism of, after the Battle of the Marne, 142 _sqq._;
further conferences with Joffre, 143;
principle of modern warfare brought home to, 145;
observations by, 145, 148, 149, 159-60, 161, 206-7, 222, 237, 243,
323 _et alibi_;
appreciation by, of the situation on Sept. 14-15, 153;
reviving hopes of enemy retreat, 153;
modified on Sept. 16, 154, 155;
grave anxiety beginning to possess, as to the safety of the
Channel ports (_q.v._), 155-7, 176;
the move N. from the Aisne for their defence with naval
co-operation first conceived, 157, 162, 164;
letter to, from Maunoury, on his intended advance, and asking for
British support, 161-2;
official correspondence of, on heavy artillery (_q.v._), and
Munitions (_q.v._) begun, 163;
visit to, of Winston Churchill (Sept.), 163-4;
plans for co-operation with the Navy discussed, 164;
letters exchanged by, with Joffre, on the move N. of the British
forces, 164 _sqq._;
hampered by the smallness of his army, 165;
difficulties of, due to the siege and fall of Antwerp, 175 _sqq._;
exchange of messages on, between French and Kitchener, 179 _sqq._;
strongly averse to sending troops inside Antwerp, 180;
steps taken by, to keep in touch with events at Antwerp, 184-5;
efforts of, to expedite the British move N., urgent note from, to
Joffre, and the reply, 185 _sqq._;
conclusions of, on the German situation on Oct. 1, hopes of, and
orders issued by, 193-4;
basis of, 194;
visit to, from President Poincare, 198;
visits by, to de Castelnau, and to Foch, plans detailed to, and
concerted with the latter, 199-200;
instructions given by, to Allenby, 200-1, 202, 205;
and to Rawlinson, 201;
plans arranged by, with Foch, 203, 216, 218, 220;
and direction based thereon given to Corps Commanders, 219;
these plans modified by reports and observations, 218, 220, 222,
223 _sqq._;
apprehension of, as to offensive advance conveyed to Foch, and his
reply, 220-1;
all hope of an offensive abandoned (Oct. 21), 228;
reinforcements obtainable, 228;
visit of, to Pulteney at Hazebrouck, the fighting witnessed there,
205-7;
mistaken anticipations before the 1st Battle of Ypres, basis of,
216, 223,
the one reservation, 216-17;
grave decision taken by, on Oct. 19, workings of his mind, and
manner in which the problem presented itself, 223 _sqq._;
conclusions arrived at, a balance of certain against uncertain
disaster, 225;
action taken on decision, 225 _sqq._;
instructions given by, to Haig on Oct. 19, 225-6;
reserves lacking to, 225;
hopes of, in Oct., 1914, 231;
basis of, 229, 231 _sqq._;
efforts of, to minimise the evils of divided command, 232-3;
estimate held by, of British operations during the second phase
of the 1st Battle of Ypres, 237;
anxiety of, concerning the 2nd Corps, 240, 241;
apprehension of, on supply of Ammunition, 241;
visit to, of Foch, promising effective support to 1st Corps, 245;
blow to, of the falling back of the 1st Corps, 252-3;
the dramatic climax, 253 _sqq._;
message sent by, to the O.C. London Scottish on their work of
Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 263;
their aspect on parade noted by, 264;
hopes of, still constantly disappointed, 270-1;
consultations of, with Foch on the need of relieving the 1st
Corps, 283-4;
the infection of his hopefulness, 274;
news of the great enemy attack received during, 277-8;
view of, on the true position for the British Army, 302,
(_see also_ 154 _sqq._ _and_ Channel Ports);
visit to, while on the Aisne, from Winston Churchill (then at
the Admiralty), agreement with on Naval co-operation, 302-3
_sqq._;
letters to, from Churchill on the same subject, 303-5;
replies by, to memoranda from Kitchener on the Zeebrugge scheme,
311-13;
and to that of the War Council on possible different theatres
of war, 315-17;
visit to, from Admiral Hood (Dec. 13), on Naval co-operation in
the advance from Nieuport, 321;
ordered home for consultation with the Cabinet, 329;
the meeting at Walmer Castle, 329;
discussions with Kitchener on the situation;
insistence by French on his personal responsibility for all
blame, 329-30;
sympathy shown to, by Asquith, 332;
feelings of, for Kitchener as soldier and as politician, their
differences, a last and happy memory of a former chief, 333;
continued discussion with the War Cabinet, 334;
its alarmist views not shared by, 336;
nor by Foch, 337;
decision of, to form Armies, communicated to designated
Commanders, 337;
the Christmas fraternisation stopped by, 338;
interview of, with Joffre by desire of the War Cabinet, 335, 336,
340;
on future plans, as to coastal advance, with Naval co-operation,
342;
plan of, to work the N. section with the Belgian and British
Armies, 343;
why it failed, 343, 345;
state of mind of, at close of 1914;
the results of the year justifying, 345;
experiments conducted by, in the field, on new weapons for trench
warfare, 354-5;
constant efforts of, to secure adequate supplies of Munitions of
War and considered action by, of May 1915, with full knowledge
of all entailed thereby, 347 _sqq._;
earlier urgency, when chief of I.G.S., on the Munitions question;
financial opposition met by, 348;
visits to, of Members of both Houses of Parliament on whom the
need of Guns and Munitions was urged, 355;
interviews given by, to the Press, on the question of
Munitions, 355;
ordered to surrender part of his Munition reserves for the
Dardanelles, 357;
Secretary and A.D.C. sent by, to lay proofs of the urgent need
of Munitions before Lloyd George, as well as before Balfour
and Bonar Law, 357;
text of the Memorandum sent at the same time, 357 _sqq._;
the results, 360-1;
unprecedented action taken by, on the Munition question
(May 9, 1915), and the results, 357 _sqq._;
Offices held by, at various times,
Chief of Imperial General Staff, 1, 2;
I.G. of Forces, 8, 296;
I.Y., experiences as, fully borne out in the War, 295;
On his alleged call on Maunoury for assistance on Sept. 8, 135;
On the effect on the campaign of the shortage of Ammunition
(_q.v._), 350-1;
on his lack of reserves, 265;
on the lesson learnt from the failure at the Lys River, 145;
On his position as C.-in-C. in France, 94, 99-100, 329-30;
On the possibility of "bending" but not of "breaking" the enemy's
trench line, 145;
Orders of the Day, issued by, _see under_ British
Expeditionary Force;
Submarine construction in sections suggested by (May 1914), 214.
French,
Armies or Corps, _see also_ Allied Forces, Names of
Commanders, _and_ French Forces _infra_,
Artillery, prevision and provision, 352-3;
the 75's, 341;
activity along the Ourcq (Sept.), 106;
Cavalry Divisions, 182;
French's request concerning, on Aug. 16, 35;
dispositions of, 38 _sqq._;
operations of, in Belgium, 44;
Staff of, characteristics of, 67;
in the Marne Battle, 113 _sqq._, 126 _sqq._,
131 _sqq._;
Bridoux's, operations assigned to, on Sept. 10, 143;
raid by, and death of commander, 157-8;
Conneau's, in the Battle of Ypres, 204, 227, 231, 278;
Maunoury's (1st Corps), dispositions for and during the Marne
Battle, 115, 125, 146;
de Mitry's, success of, on Oct. 11, 204;
pushed back (Oct. 19), 227;
positions and movements in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 232
_sqq._;
Sordet's, co-operation of (Aug. 26-7), 84;
Chasseurs, 281;
Infantry,
1st, at Dinant, 41;
2nd, Progress of, up to end of September, 162;
and in Dec., 325;
3rd, Line of (Aug. 18-21), 41, 47;
defeat and retreat of, 70;
German artillery captured by, 145;
4th, Line of, on Aug. 21, 47;
disposition of, on and after Aug. 30, 93, 116, 133-4;
progress of, 146;
5th, Dispositions of, Aug. 16, and after, 35-7, 39;
advance by, intended, 47;
fighting by, 57 _sqq._, 60;
retirement begun, 64;
and continued, 68, 70, 72, 81;
effect on 1st Division, 81-2;
Joffre's promise as to, 86;
the retreat still continued, 88;
brilliant success of, at Guise, 91;
gap between and the 6th Army, filled by French at Joffre's
request, 92-3;
but widened by the further retreat, 95;
situation saved by British cavalry, 94;
position of, on Sept. 2, Joffre on, 96-7;
retreat continued, 104-5;
fighting on the Marne, 106;
dispositions of, on Sept. 4-5, 107, 109-10;
its new commander, 107;
Joffre's intention for it to advance, 115;
fighting on the Marne, 121-3;
British connection to be maintained with, 124-5;
position of, Sept. 9, 131;
across the Marne, 137-8;
value to, of British co-operation, 141;
in the Aisne Battle, 143, 146;
6th, Formation of, 86;
and Commander, 89;
quality of, and glory won by, in the Marne Battle, 88;
enemy unaware of, 90;
and consequent miscalculations, 105;
objective of, on Aug. 30, 93;
dispositions of, and support of, to British forces, Joffre
on, 96;
retreat of, on Paris, 104;
Joffre's plans for, for Sept. 6, 107, 109, 114-15;
in the Battle of the Marne, German forces opposing, 121, 123;
French's efforts to help, 124;
success of, 129, 135, 141;
position assigned to (Sept. 10), 143;
heavily engaged (Sept. 12) on the Aisne, 145-6, 152;
attack by, on Nouvron, 154;
efforts by, to turn German flank, 154, 158-9, 162;
defensive line assigned to, on Sept. 18, and Army placed
under de Castelnau, 158;
blow struck by changing line of battle, 159;
Northward operation of, 160, 162;
with other forces placed under Foch, 197;
7th, 89;
8th, 116;
British aid given to, 133-4;
9th, Position assigned to, before the Marne Battle, 116;
10th Corps to secure connection between, and the 5th, 143;
entrenched at Ypres, 233;
in the Battle of Ypres, 284;
defenders of the salient, 239;
at Zonnebeke, 242, 255, 260;
Joffre's need of, 345;
10th, Action, losses and position of, in August, 41, 57, 58;
position assigned to, on Sept. 10, 143;
forming part of the "group" under Foch, 197;
forced back, 202;
positions of, in 1st Battle of Ypres, 241;
13th, checked at Noyon, 134;
16th, in the Battle of Ypres, 259;
co-operation of, on Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 260, 261, 264;
and later, 323, 324;
an instance of divided command (Dec. 18), 325;
20th, 345;
21st, 128, 324;
32nd, attack by, and successes of, Klein Zillebeke-Zillebeke
line, 322;
61st, at Nouvron, 154;
62nd, at Nouvron, 154;
Naval, at Dixmude and Nieuport, 202, 208, 221, 232, 278;
New, formed, objective of (Sept. 30), 162;
Northern, d'Urbal in command of, 234;
reinforced, 235;
advance of, delayed by enemy machine guns, results as to the
British forces engaged, 322 _sqq._;
Reserves, 35, 39, 44, 72, 81;
6th and 7th, 39, 47-8, 57, 81-2;
Territorials for Dunkirk, asked for by Kitchener, 179-80;
and sent by Joffre, 188;
strength of, 181;
moved to Ypres, 208;
on the Yser, 221.
French Army:
Actions of (1915), important but indecisive, 343;
and British, in Aug. 1914, relative positions of, 35;
Compared with German Army up to 1914, 140;
Good British relations with, how established, 108;
General order issued to, by de Maud'huy on the death of Lord
Roberts, 282-3.
French Decorations sent to British Troops (Sept. 3), 99.
French Forces, _see also_ French Armies or Corps, French Army,
_and_ French Divisions;
disposition of, on Aug. 17 and after, 38-9, 41, 47-8;
early successes, 55;
losses, 58;
in the retreat from Mons, 72, 73, 92, 93;
Joffre's instructions to, 97, 98;
of Sept. 10, 142-3;
changes of Commanders in, and spirit animating, 113;
positions in the Aisne Battle, 152;
operating in the Northern area, under Foch's general control
(Oct. 3), 197, 201;
relief by, of 2nd Corps, 211;
support by, in the N. sought by French, 221;
and given, 245, 246, 250, 258-9;
on the Yser, and elsewhere, 224;
landing at Dunkirk, 243;
at Arras, progress hampered by weather, 337;
Moroccan troops in a crater-hole, 161;
Zouaves, 260;
Fortresses of the second class, object of, 52;
General Staff, British consultations with before, and on outbreak
of, war, 5, 6, 9;
efforts of, to provide heavy artillery, 352;
impressions of, 40;
attitude of, to proposed British combined Coastal operations
(Dec.), 305;
plans of, for meeting a possible W. offensive by the enemy, 341;
Military Mission on eve of war, consultation (Aug. 10), 6;
Misgivings as to British military support, 3;
Nation, attitude of, in August, 1914, 3, 33, 34;
Railways, strain of, in relation to the move N. of the British
Army, 104, 166, 167, 171, 172, 173, 187;
Relations with Austria broken off, 2;
"75" gun newest ammunition for, wonderful results with, Joffre
on, 341;
Supplies of Munitions for Russia, Joffre on, 341-2;
Territory, German violation of, 2;
Women, agricultural services of, 36.
Frezenberg-Westhoek-Klein-Zillebeke line, importance of, 251.
Fromelles, _terrain_ near, 209.
Frost bite of the Feet, a misnomer, 288.
Galicia, Russian operations in, 194, 230, 337;
influence of, on the Western Campaign, 301.
Gallieni, General, Military Governor of Paris, 33;
letter from, to French, on co-operation of Allied Forces in
defence of Paris, and the reply, 102-4;
visit of, to Melun with Joffre's plans, 107.
Gallipoli Campaign, French's view on, 316.
Garatin, Allenby's cavalry at, 109.
Garde Dragoner (German) and the Moncel fight, 119.
Garhwal Brigade, _see under_ Indian Corps.
Gastins, Allied advance to, 115, 119.
Gembloux, German cavalry repulsed from (Aug. 18), 41.
George V., Message from, to the British Expeditionary Force, and
the reply (Nov. 9), 275;
an audience with (Dec.), 336.
George, Rt. Hon. David Lloyd, a tribute to, 163;
French's proofs of his dangerous lack of Ammunition laid
before (May 9, 1915), 356;
and the result, 360-1.
German advance, preliminary operations 2, 7;
anticipations on, 11, 42;
line of 43;
and aims of, 44;
continuance of, 46-7;
the Meuse crossed, 72;
further direction of, 77, 80-1;
last days of, 109;
Aerial observation apparently faulty at Abbeville, 200;
Army, _see also_ German Artillery, Cavalry, First Army
Higher Command, Offensive, &c.,
Grierson's knowledge, of 37;
Positions, operations, forces employed (in sequence), 40-1;
crushing superiority of, at Mons, 43, 46, 57;
turning movement, 57, 58, 65, 70, 73, 75, 78;
investment of Paris aimed at by, 89, 90-1;
troops sent to Eastern frontier (Aug.), 92;
drawing on of, urged by French, 92;
French plans for, 103;
offensive abandoned by von Kluck, 114, 116, 121, 122;
risky situation of, 115; 116;
at the Battle of the Marne, 118 _sqq._, 131, 137;
retreat of, from the Marne, summary on, 138-9;
advantages held by, when defeated on the Marne, 139-40;
effect on, of the sortie from Antwerp, 144;
French efforts to turn right flank of, 145, 189;
in the Aisne Battle, 145, 149 _sqq._;
ideas entertained as to movements of, 152-3, 161, 193;
capture by, of Antwerp, possibilities opened up by, but
missed, 176;
line held by, and strength of, on Oct. 6, 182, 186;
forces gathering near Lille, 198;
surprised by British cavalry and 3rd Corps, 200;
de Maud'huy forced back by, 202;
divisions moving on Alost-Termonde-Lokeren, 203;
forces opposing at Bailleul, 207;
westward concentration of, from Antwerp, 208-9;
detachments at Bruges and Roulers, 219;
outposts of, 4th Division in touch with, 220;
increasing strength, and its effects, 222, 224, 226, 227-8;
forces engaged, and actual positions of, on night of Oct. 21,
231-2;
later positions, 232 _sqq. passim_;
attacks by, in massed formation, 235;
losses during 1st Battle of Ypres, 232-3, 235, 241, 242, 279;
continual reinforcements of, during the 1st Battle of Ypres,
238, 240, 243;
onslaught of (Oct. 31-Nov. 1), glorious resistance of Allied
forces, and points of major importance, 238-9, 260;
at Gheluvelt, 250;
enormous superiority of, in numbers and artillery
(Oct. 31-Nov. 1), 260;
and before, 267;
failure to turn the situation to full account, 260-1;
forces opposing Cavalry Corps at Messines (Oct. 31-Nov. 1),
262;
pressure on W. Front increasing, 270;
forces employed in the great attack on the Ypres salient
(Nov. 11-12), 277, 278;
reduced to War of Position on its whole W. Front, 345;
Advance to the sea checked by the first phase of the 1st Battle
of Ypres, 235-6;
First use of poisoned gas by, 356;
_Morale_ of, effect on, of the W. fighting, 268;
Results to, of successive phases of the 1st Battle of Ypres
summarised, 277;
Right flank of (_see also_ Flanking Movement), efforts to
turn first phase of the 1st Battle of Ypres, the conclusion
of (Oct. 26), 235-6;
Tied down on the W. to a line of trenches;
French on, to his troops, 268;
Artillery, 45, 66, 78, 101, 119, 123, 126-7, 131, 133, 145-6,
152-3, 240;
Rheims Cathedral destroyed by, 159;
3rd French Army's capture of (Sept. 11), 145;
Heavy, 144, 222, 240, 348;
development of, 352;
range of, 215;
8-in. howitzers 144, 198, 212, 348;
Machine guns of, 124, 321-2, 324 _passim, et alibi_;
Preparation of, before the war, scale of, 351, 352;
Tactics, 129;
Cavalry, _passim_, tactics of, in Belgium, 44-5;
artillery and jaeger battalions with, 42, 124, 126, 207;
operations of, and repulses, &c., 83-4, 198, 204, 230;
French's knowledge of, utilised on the Marne, 9, 10, 123-4;
Defiance of chivalry in war, 338;
Designs at Landrecies and at Le Cateau, 76, 78;
Difficulties in September, 105-6;
Emperor, _see_ William II;
First Army of the Meuse, operations of, 46 _sqq._;
offensive abandoned by, 114, 115, 116, 121, 122;
Troops composing, at the Battle of the Marne, 118 _sqq._;
Higher Command (Great General Staff), plans of, changes in, errors
made by, 91, 104-6, 107, 176, 345-6;
Instructions on treatment of Indian prisoners, 196;
Invasion, possibilities of, 215;
rumour on, 329;
Line in Flanders, possibility of breaking through, French on
(Jan. 1917) essentials to, 316;
Points at which a break-through was planned by Joffre (Dec. 27),
this idea the basis of the general strategic idea for 1915,
342;
its results, 342-3;
Mobilisation proceedings, 2, 7;
Naval flag driven from the sea (Dec. 1914), 345;
Northern flanks, efforts to turn, 145, 155, 158-9, 182, 198, 198,
214 _sqq._;
Offensive on W. Front, French anticipations of (Jan. 19, 1915),
as affecting the Zeebrugge scheme, 317-18;
Home anxieties over (Dec. 17), 329 _sqq._;
French's view on, 336;
Proclamation of "Kriegsgefahrszustand," 2;
Strategic scheme for invasion of France crushed at the Battle of
the Marne, 138-9;
Submarine Base, developing at Zeebrugge, 308, 311;
Campaign, how it might have been frustrated, 304, 308, 311, 312;
Tactics, flanking and outflanking manoeuvres, 154;
Violation of,
Belgian neutrality, 45, 46, 47;
Franco-British prevision on, 9, 10-11;
French territory, 2;
War menace, 1, 2, 5, 9, 10-11.
Germany, Declarations of War by, 2, 3;
and previous preparations, 2, 140;
Paris railways to, route of, 53;
_The_ decisive spot in the war in French's view (Jan. 1915),
316.