A REVIEW OF THE ALLIED PLANS IN THE WEST AT THE CLOSE OF THE FIRST
BATTLE OF YPRES.
At this time all our ideas in regard to the framing of plans in the
West were evolved and guided almost entirely by the progress of the
campaign in Poland and Galicia.
After the battle of the Marne, when we were at the Aisne, we were
still hopeful of effecting a great flanking movement which should lead
to more or less decisive results, or at least clear Northern France
and Belgium of the enemy's troops. It has been shown how the
development of events obliged us to modify our hopes and anticipations
until, at the close of the first battle of Ypres, we certainly felt at
our own G.H.Q. that the Allied Forces in Great Britain, France and
Belgium, could effect nothing of importance unless and until one of
two things happened.
Either there must be a considerable augmentation of our forces,
including a vastly increased supply of heavy artillery, machine guns,
trench artillery and ammunition--_or_, the enemy's forces on the
Western front must be so weakened by the necessity of sending troops
to stem the Russian advance in the East, as to enable the Allies with
their available forces to assume the offensive with success.
Now the only resources in regard to _personnel_ upon which the Allies
at that time had to depend for any considerable accession of strength
was the British "New Army," whose entry into the line of
battle must perforce be gradual. It could not be expected to make its
weight felt for a long time to come.
After the fall of Antwerp I realised that, by taking up our position
on the extreme left flank we should find ourselves very near to the
coast, and a good opportunity would be afforded of gaining the
co-operation of the Fleet. In other words, the paramount thought in my
mind was that the British and Belgian forces, co-operating with the
British Fleet, should constitute in themselves the left flank of the
Allied line in the West.
Whilst on the Aisne I had a visit from Mr. Winston Churchill, who was
then First Lord of the Admiralty. He arrived on the night of September
26th and left on the 28th. Winston Churchill had been for several
years one of my most intimate friends. I saw much of him during the
South African War, but it was not until about 1905 or 1906 that I
really got to know him well. His complex character is as difficult to
describe as it is to analyse. To those who do not understand him, the
impetuous disposition, which is one of his strongest characteristics,
is apt to throw into shadow the indomitable courage, tireless energy,
marvellous perspicuity and quick virile brain-power which are the main
features of Winston Churchill's extraordinary personality.
His experience and knowledge of public affairs must be unrivalled;
for, at an age when most men are undergoing the grinding drudgery
which falls to the lot of nearly all successful statesmen, lawyers,
soldiers or ecclesiastics, he was holding the highest offices in the
Government; and not even his most inveterate enemies can say that he
has failed to leave his mark for good on every department he has
supervised.
Possessing a combative nature, he engages constantly in
political strife which is marked by the sharpest controversy, and it
is, therefore, perhaps only his intimate friends who know the real
manly, generous kindliness of his disposition and his perfect loyalty.
The perspective of history will show the part he has played throughout
the Great War to have been consistently constructive and of direct
value to the nation.
His visit to my Headquarters at this time was productive of great
good. The Government were getting nervous of the military situation
and of the arrest of our forward advance. With his characteristic
energy and activity, Churchill visited and examined every part of the
battlefield, and what he saw and heard put him in a position to send
reassuring information to his colleagues.
I discussed with him fully my views as to the desirability of
establishing the British Forces in a theatre where they could
co-operate with the Navy and link up with the troops in Belgium. We
examined the possibility of a failure to effect a decisive turning
movement, and agreed in thinking that, in the last resort, we might
still be able, with the flank support of the Fleet, to snatch from the
enemy's possession the Belgian coast-line as far, at any rate, as
Zeebrugge.
When he left me on September 28th it was with a complete understanding
that he would prepare the Navy to fulfil this _role_, and a few
extracts from letters which I subsequently received from him will show
how well he redeemed his promise.
On October 26th he writes:--
"... But, my dear friend, I do trust you will realise how damnable it
will be if the enemy settles down for the winter along lines
which comprise Calais, Dunkirk, or Ostend. There will be continual
alarms and greatly added difficulties. We must have him off the
Belgian coast even if we cannot recover Antwerp.
"I am getting old ships with heavy guns ready, protected by barges
with nets against submarines, so as to dispute the whole seaboard with
him. On the 31st inst. the "Revenge," with four 13-1/2-in. guns, can
come into action if required, and I have a regular fleet of monitors
now organised, which, they all say, have hit the Germans hard this
week, a fleet which is getting stronger every day.
"If you could gain a passage off to the left, I could give you
overwhelming support from the sea, and there you will have a flank
which certainly they cannot turn...."
In a letter dated November 22nd, again:--
"... If you push your left flank along the sand-dunes of the shore to
Ostend and Zeebrugge, we would give you 100 or 200 heavy guns from the
sea in absolutely devastating support. For four or five miles inshore
we could make you perfectly safe and superior. Here, at least, you
have their flank, if you care to use it; and surely, the coast strip,
held and fed well with troops, would clear the whole line out about
Dixmude and bend it right back, if it did not clear it altogether.
"... We could bring men in at Ostend or Zeebrugge to reinforce you in
a hard south-eastward push. There is no limit to what could be done by
the extreme left-handed push and swoop along the Dutch frontier.... In
a few hours I could have fifty 12-in. guns and seventy 6-in. firing on
the enemy's right and rear. It is difficult for submarines
to attack because of the sandbanks...."
On December 7th the First Lord was again my guest at G.H.Q. We
discussed the situation, and were completely in agreement as to the
advisability of my projected coastal advance and close co-operation
with the Fleet. I told him there was fear of disagreement with the
French, and that political difficulties would certainly arise. He said
he did not think that they were insuperable, and shortly after our
conversation he left for England, promising to arrange everything with
the Prime Minister and Kitchener.
Then came his letter, despatched on December 8th, after he had seen
his colleagues in the Cabinet:
"... Kitchener agrees entirely with your view. We held an immediate
conference with the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey, and, as the
result, the strongest possible telegram is being drafted. The
Admiralty attach the greatest importance to the operation and will aid
in every way. We are already making the necessary preparations on an
extensive scale. Later I will let you have very full and clear
details. The combination must be perfect.
"Kitchener proposes to let you have the 27th Division in time ... I
hope you will continue to press the new plan hard, both here at home
and on the French Generals."
I quote in full Sir Edward Grey's telegram, dated December 9th, to Sir
Francis Bertie at Bordeaux:
"The military situation points to the advisability of shortly taking
steps to prevent the Germans withdrawing their best first-line troops
from the Western theatre for employment against Russia and replacing
them by second-rate troops.
"As some forward movement to achieve this object may be
decided on, I desire to bring to the serious attention of the French
Government the very strong opinion held by His Majesty's Government
that British troops should be so placed in the line as to advance
along the coast in immediate co-operation with our Fleet, and thus
enable us, if necessary, to land further forces at any critical
juncture during the operation.
"To obtain this result a slight change in the present position of Sir
John French's forces in the line would be necessary.
"The British troops would have to be moved to the left of the Allied
line, being replaced in their present position by the French troops
now on the left. They would thus be again taking up the position in
the line they held after moving from Soissons.
"I would point out to the French Government that the people of this
country realise that the Belgian coastal positions are now held by
Germany as a menace to Great Britain. They would, therefore, regard
any losses entailed by an active offensive taken by our troops against
these coastal positions as fully justified. British public opinion
will even demand that the menace should be removed, for the forts on
the coast of Belgium are being prepared as a base of operations by sea
and air against Great Britain especially, and this may in time hamper
the safe transport of fresh troops from England to France.
"Moreover, we feel sure that our co-operation with any contemplated
French effort to drive the Germans back from their present positions
would be rendered much more effective, and lead to more decisive and
far-reaching results, if this preliminary step in the redistribution
of the troops were now taken and our troops subsequently
used in the manner indicated.
"His Majesty's Government consider it most urgent and important that
this step should be taken, and you should ask the French Government to
agree to it and to arrange with Gen. Joffre for carrying it out."
The French Government received these proposals very coldly. It was
quite evident that they had no intention of leaving the British Forces
in sole charge of the Allied left, but for the moment they agreed to
regard the question as a military one and to refer it to General
Joffre.
I had several conversations with him on the subject, but there
appeared to be no disposition on his part to acquiesce in my plans.
This attitude on the part of the French was evidently well known in
London, for, on December 13th, I received a letter from Winston
Churchill in which he said: "Of course, we are disappointed here with
the turn events have taken, but we shall do our best to help the
French."
This meant that Joffre had rejected my scheme, but had substituted the
idea of another kind of attack, to be made chiefly by the French, with
fewer troops, in a different direction and with quite another
objective. I will return to this presently, for such an operation
actually took place and proved to be a very feeble substitute for what
I had intended.
Yielding thus to French representations, our Government began to
weaken. Churchill adhered to his views throughout, but was not
supported.
The terms of Sir Edward Grey's communication of December 9th were
unanswerable. Everything which subsequently happened in the course of
the war has proved it. The possession by the Germans of that strip of
Belgian coast-line has been the sharpest of all thorns with
which they have succeeded in pricking us. It has been one of the main
causes of the prolongation of the war. Their vigorous and successful
defence against all our attacks in the autumn of 1917 showed the value
which they attached to the retention of this coast-line.
Lord Kitchener addressed a Memorandum to me in January, 1915, from
which I quote _in extenso_:
"The questions raised in your recent Memorandum of January 3rd,
1915"--he wrote--"and in your appreciation of the situation in the
various theatres of war, were considered by a War Council presided
over by the Prime Minister, on Thursday, January 7th, and Friday,
January 8th.
"The principal questions discussed were--
1. The proposed advance to Zeebrugge.
2. The organisation of the New Armies.
3. The possibility of employing British Forces in a different
theatre to that in which they are now used.
"With regard to the proposed advance to Zeebrugge, the First Lord's
telegram, No. 2623, sent to you on January 2nd, explained the
difficulties imposed on the Admiralty by the development of Zeebrugge
as a base for submarines, and the War Council realised that one of
your principal motives in suggesting an offensive to effect the
capture of Ostend and Zeebrugge was to ease the naval position.
"On a general review, however, of the whole situation, naval and
military, the Council came to the conclusion that the advantages to be
obtained from such an advance at the present moment would not be
commensurate with the heavy losses involved, as well as the extension
that would be thus caused to the lines of the Allies in
Northern Flanders.
"The Council was also influenced in this conclusion by the following
considerations. The first of these was that the reinforcements of 50
battalions of Territorial troops, which you considered indispensable,
could only be supplied at a considerable dislocation of the
organisation of the future reinforcements to be sent to you. It must
be borne in mind that the original organisation of the Territorial
Force included no provision for drafts. Great difficulties have
already been encountered in providing drafts for the 24 battalions
already in your command; and, although arrangements for the necessary
machinery to create a special reserve for the Territorials are in
hand, it would not at present be possible to supply 50 more battalions
with drafts without an entire reorganisation of the forces allotted to
Home Defence, and this would modify the programme for reinforcements
to join our Army in the future.
"The second consideration was that it is impossible at the present
time to maintain a sufficient supply of gun ammunition on the scale
which you considered necessary for offensive operations. Every effort
is being made in all parts of the world to obtain an unlimited supply
of ammunition; but, as you are well aware, the result is still far
from being sufficient to maintain the large number of guns which you
now have under your command adequately supplied with ammunition for
offensive purposes.
"You have pointed out that offensive operations under the new
conditions created by this war require a vast expenditure of artillery
ammunition, which may, for even 10 or 20 days, necessitate the supply
of 50 or 100 rounds per gun per day being available, and that, unless
the reserve can be accumulated to meet expenditure of this
sort, it is unwise to embark on extensive offensive operations against
the enemy in trenches. It is, of course, almost impossible to
calculate with any accuracy how long offensive operations, once
undertaken, may last before the object is attained; but it is evident
that the breaking off of such operations before accomplishment, owing
to the want of artillery ammunition, and not on account of a
successful termination or a convenient pause in the operations having
been reached, might lead to a serious reverse being sustained by our
forces.
"The abandonment of the Zeebrugge project does not prevent you from
co-operating to the utmost extent, compatible with your present
resources, with any offensive movement contemplated by Gen. Joffre,
and your previous instructions in this sense are in no way modified.
"The Council further thought that there were certain indications,
which should not be neglected, of German reinforcements reaching their
Armies in the Western theatre in the near future, which may lead
German Commanders to undertake a fresh attempt to force the lines you
and the French Army hold. If this movement should develop, it could
probably be better met and defeated by holding your present lines of
prepared positions than by extending the line to the Dutch frontier
and placing the Belgian Army in probably a more exposed position than
they now occupy. You may rest assured that, as they become available,
fresh troops will be sent to you with the least possible delay to
strengthen your forces as far as is practicable. The 28th Division
have already received orders to leave for France on the 14th inst."
The telegram from the First Lord of the Admiralty, dated January 2nd,
referred to in the above memorandum, ran as follows:--"The
battleship 'Formidable' was sunk this morning by a submarine in the
Channel. Information from all quarters shows that the Germans are
steadily developing an important submarine base at Zeebrugge. Unless
operations can be undertaken to clear the coast, and particularly to
capture this place, it must be recognised that the whole
transportation of troops across the Channel will be seriously and
increasingly compromised. The Admiralty are of the opinion that it
would be possible, under cover of warships, to land a large force at
Zeebrugge in conjunction with any genuine forward movement along the
shore to Ostend. They wish these views, which they have so frequently
put forward, to be placed again before the French Commander, and hope
they may receive the consideration which their urgency and importance
require."
It will be seen from this that Mr. Churchill was not in accord with
the views expressed in Lord Kitchener's memorandum.
The situation was well known to the Cabinet before the despatch of Sir
Edward Grey's telegram of December 9th. It is clear that the points
raised in the memorandum of January 9th were excuses used as a veil to
screen the disinclination of the British Government to taking a firm
stand against the attitude adopted by the French. But there was
something more.
Lord Kitchener's objections can be easily answered. They may be
generally stated thus:--
(1) That the seizure from the Germans of this strip of sea coast
would not be an adequate return for the heavy losses likely to be
incurred in the operation.
(2) That the line then to be held would be unduly extended.
(3) That the reinforcement of the additional troops
demanded "would only be supplied at a considerable dislocation of
the organisation of the future reinforcements to be sent you."
(4) That the supply of gun ammunition on the scale demanded would
be impossible.
(5) That embarking on such an enterprise would prejudice our
power of resisting a possible German counter-offensive in the
immediate future.
My answer to (1) is this: Had we been in possession of the Belgian
coast-line between Nieuport and the Dutch frontier in the early part
of 1915, and had we maintained it to the end of the war, the Germans
would have been deprived in a great measure of the power they have
exercised throughout with such success, to prosecute their submarine
campaign. Any price we might have had to pay in the way of losses
would have been well worth the object attained.
In a lesser degree this may be said of the enemy's aircraft
enterprises. I claim that the naval history of this war clearly bears
out my contention.
As to (2), the extent of the line to be held would depend upon the
degree of success attained by the operations. If we had been able to
make good our advance from the left flank (between Nieuport and
Dixmude) by means of powerful naval support from the sea, the least we
should have effected would have been to clear the Germans out of the
triangle Nieuport--Dixmude--Zeebrugge.
If the operation had then to be suspended, we should have had to hold
the line Dixmude--Zeebrugge instead of Dixmude--Nieuport. In actual
distance the former space is about double the latter. But our position
at Zeebrugge would have afforded a large measure of naval support,
and the country to the south-west of that place lends itself
to inundations. This would have enabled us to occupy the north-eastern
portion of the line in much less strength. Further, it was just in
anticipation of such a necessity that the extra troops were asked for.
Inasmuch, however, as such a situation would have forced upon the
enemy the necessity of holding a dangerous and exposed salient which
could be reached on the north side by our guns from the Fleet, it is
more than possible that he would have effected such a retirement as
would have considerably shortened our line.
(3) This contention is disputed; but even if it were true, it is no
sound military argument against embarking on an operation which
promised such valuable results.
(4) There is a complete answer to this objection. Some two or three
months later, large trainloads of ammunition--heavy, medium, and
light--passed by the rear of the Army in France _en route_ to
Marseilles for shipment to the Dardanelles.
(5) The best possible means of warding off an attack is to take a
strong and powerful initiative.
I cannot characterise these reasons for rejecting my plans as other
than illogical, and I feel sure they must really have appeared so to
their authors.
Perhaps the true explanation which underlay all this is to be found in
the following Memorandum of the War Council of January 9th, 1915. It
runs as follows:--
THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPLOYING BRITISH FORCES IN A DIFFERENT THEATRE
THAN THAT IN WHICH THEY ARE NOW USED.
"The Council considered carefully your remarks on this subject in
reply to Lord Kitchener's letter, and came to the conclusion
that, certainly for the present, the main theatre of operations for
British forces should be alongside the French Army, and that this
should continue as long as France was liable to successful invasion
and required armed support. It was also realised that, should the
offensive operations subsequently drive the Germans out of France and
back to Germany, British troops should assist in such operations. It
was thought that, after another failure by Germany to force the lines
of defence held by the French Army and yours, the military situation
in France and Flanders might conceivably develop into one of
stalemate, in which it would be impossible for German forces to break
through into France, while at the same time the German defences would
be impassable for offensive movements of the Allies without great loss
of life and the expenditure of more ammunition than could be provided.
In these circumstances, it was considered desirable to find some other
theatre where such obstructions to advance would be less pronounced,
and from where operations against the enemy might lead to more
decisive results.
"For these reasons, the War Council decided that certain of the
possible projects for pressing the war in other theatres should be
carefully studied during the next few weeks, so that, as soon as the
new forces are fit for action, plans may be ready to meet any
eventuality that may be then deemed expedient, either from a political
point of view, or to enable our forces to act with the best advantage
in concert with the troops of other nations throwing in their lot with
the Allies."
In fact, the idea became fixed in the minds of the War Council that a
condition of stalemate was bound to occur on the Western front, and
therefore other theatres which might afford greater opportunities of
prosecuting a successful offensive must be sought.
I was asked for my views as to this, and I gave them in full. Space
does not allow me to quote my memorandum on the subject _in extenso_,
but my ideas will be gleaned from the concluding paragraphs, which run
as follows:--
"Assuming however, that all the foregoing arguments are brushed aside,
it remains to be seen where any effective action could be taken. The
countries to be considered are the following:--
"(_a_) _Russia._--Impossible, as there is no means of sending an Army
there, the Baltic being closed. Archangel shut in winter and
unsuitable at other seasons, and Vladivostok much too far away.
"(_b_) _Denmark_ and (_c_) _Holland_.--One or other of these countries
would have to declare war on Germany unless her neutrality were
violated, and in both cases the overseas communication would be so
vulnerable to mine or torpedo attack as to be in the highest degree
insecure.
"(_d_) _North German Coast._--Communications would be equally
vulnerable.
"(_e_) _Italy._--Assumes that Italy is a friendly belligerent, in
which case she would probably not require the assistance of British
troops, as her own action should be sufficient to finish Austria. It
is unlikely that Italy would be induced to join in simply by the offer
of troops which her military intelligence must know would be better
employed elsewhere.
"(_f_) _Istria and Dalmatia._--A very dangerous line of communication,
and one which would be impossible in the face of a hostile Italy. The
islands on the Dalmatian seaboard are specially favourable for the
action of defending submarines and torpedo craft, while mines might
render any approach to the coast out of the question. With an
actively friendly Italy an advance through her territory would be more
practicable, but, as stated in preceding paragraph, unnecessary.
"(_g_) Through Greece to Servia, presumably _via_, Salonika, presumes
Greece to be a friendly belligerent. Probably the least objectionable
of any possible proposal, but necessitating the strict neutrality of
Bulgaria, as otherwise the land communications would be very open to
attack. A hostile Italy would also jeopardise the whole force.
"(_h_) _Gallipoli_, _Asia Minor_, _Syria_.--Any attack on Turkey would
be devoid of decisive result. In the most favourable circumstances it
could only cause the relaxation of the pressure against Russia in the
Caucasus and enable her to transfer two or three Corps to the West--a
result quite incommensurate with the effort involved. To attack Turkey
would be to play the German game and to bring about the end which
Germany had in mind when she induced Turkey to join in the war,
namely, to draw off troops from the decisive spot, which is Germany
itself.
"To sum up, my opinions are--
"(1) That the impossibility of breaking through the German line in
Flanders has not been proved, and that that operation is feasible
provided a sufficiency of high-explosive shells and of guns is
provided.
"(2) That, even if it were proved impossible to break the German line,
so large a margin of safety is needed that troops could not be
withdrawn from this theatre. It is to be remembered that the Allies
are in a much better position to await the outcome of events. Time is
against Germany; she will not sit for ever behind her entrenchments,
and the Allies must be prepared with an adequate force to
strike her whenever she may attempt to break out or withdraw.
"(3) That there are no theatres, other than those in which operations
are now in progress, in which decisive results could be attained.
"I have not gone into details in considering the question of the
employment of forces in other theatres, as such operations were
considered by the M.O. Directorate of the War Office when I was
C.I.G.S., and I have no doubt that a full record of the conclusions
which were reached are filed there."
General Joffre's final opinion is expressed in a memorandum, dated
January 19th, 1915, of which the following is a summary:--
"1. I wish to call your particular attention to the following
points:--
"2. The French General Staff consider a German offensive
possible--even probable--in the near future. The Germans are certainly
making new formations; the 38th Corps has been identified in Bavaria.
"3. Our front must therefore be made absolutely secure. If broken, for
example, about Roye and Montdidier, the consequences for the Allies
would be of the most serious description.
"4. In addition to (3) we must place ourselves in the position of
being able to assume the offensive.
"5. Because of (3) and (4), reserves are absolutely necessary.
"6. For these reasons, I am anxious for a rapid release of the Corps
north of the British line.
"7. We must never lose sight of the decisive result, and all secondary
operations must give way.
"8. Operations towards Ostend--Zeebrugge, though important,
are, for the moment, secondary, and in my opinion should follow rather
than precede the principal action, viz., the Collection of Reserves.
"To resume:--
(_a_) To beat the enemy it is necessary to have Reserves.
(_b_) These Reserves can only come from the north, as British
reinforcements set them free.
(_c_) The German menace, not a vain thing, makes it necessary to
collect these Reserves in the shortest possible time.
(_d_) The main object, viz., the defeat of the enemy, makes it
necessary to delay the offensive towards Ostend--Zeebrugge."
I always disagreed with these views, and remain convinced that my
plans should have been accepted and tried. I will only add, as a
further argument against embarking upon operations in other theatres
of war, that our military forces at that time, and for at least
fifteen months afterwards, were not sufficient to enable us to carry
on great operations in more than one theatre with the necessary power
and energy required for success. They could only have resulted in what
actually happened in 1915, viz., the series of feeble and on the whole
unsuccessful attempts to break through the German line in France, and
an absolute failure, compelling ultimate withdrawal of our troops, in
the Dardanelles.
I have dealt at perhaps wearisome length with the strategic
alternatives and the problems which presented themselves for solution
after the close of the First Battle of Ypres. It has been necessary to
do so in order that my countrymen may understand the situation as it
actually existed at the time, and that they may appreciate what seemed
to me conclusive reasons why greater progress was not made in 1915.
Divided counsels lead to half measures and indecisive action. Such
counsels have always had, and always will have, the most deterrent and
disadvantageous effect on any vigorous prosecution of a war, great or
small.