CHAPTER XIII._1914

THE BATTLE OF YPRES.

_Fourth and Final Phase, November 11th to the end of the Battle._

Each of the four phases into which I have divided this very brief and

incomplete narrative of the Battle of Ypres is marked by one important

and far-reaching crisis.

In the beginning of the battle came the arrest of the German advance

on the Channel ports, and the brilliant repulse of the enemy back to

the Lys by the cavalry under Allenby and the 3rd Corps under Pulteney.

The second phase is distinguished by the crisis of October 31st, while

in the third phase occurs the memorable stand of the cavalry and other

troops under Allenby on the Wytschaete--Messines ridge.

The great feature of the fourth and last phase was the desperate

assaults made against the Ypres salient on the 11th and 12th November,

in which the flower of the Prussian Guard participated, having

received the Emperor's personal command to make certain of finally

breaking our line.

It was in the same conference room at Cassel in which I had been with

Foch on the 8th, and where, as I have said, we mutually indulged in

day-dreams of imminent victory, that, on the evening of November 10th,

I received the reports which warned me that another great crisis was

at hand.

Foch informed me that an attack on a great scale had just

begun against his line between Ypres and the sea. He had received

reliable reports that the enemy had brought up five fresh corps from

the south. He said that the Germans had already gained possession of

the village of Dixmude, but had not yet crossed the Yser, which French

Marines and Belgians were holding against them. He added that he was

being heavily pressed and was losing ground near Langemarck, and

declared that he must move Conneau's Cavalry Division (holding the

line opposite Messines) north to support him, and he asked me to put

Allenby in to relieve Conneau. I agreed to this, and gave orders

accordingly.

Early on the morning of the 11th, Haig reported that his position was

being heavily shelled, and that he was threatened with a powerful

attack. Two fresh German Army Corps had come up in his front, namely,

the Guard and the XVth.

In short, the Germans were about to deliver their final desperate

blow, which they hoped and believed would at last open up to them the

road to the sea.

The situation was met by Haig with the same grim determination,

steadfast courage and skilful forethought which had characterised his

handling of the operations throughout. A volume might easily be

written of this day's fighting of November 11th, but it is only

possible in these pages to glance at the particular points in the line

of battle where the fighting was fiercest, and where the issues were

most vital at different hours of the day.

Up the Menin road came the first tremendous onslaught at 9.30 a.m. on

the front held by the 1st (Guards), 7th, and 15th Brigades. At the

first clash of arms the Germans pierced our line with a rush. This was

splendidly disputed by the Royal Fusiliers under McMahon,

their devoted and gallant leader, who was killed; while the battalion

was almost annihilated. Reserves, however, quickly came up,

counter-attacks were organised and delivered, and the line was

re-established.

About noon the critical point changed to the right at the canal, where

the French were driven out of their trenches and fell back on

Verbranden Molen. General Vidal called on our 1st Corps for support

and help. The heavy fighting in the neighbourhood of the Menin road

had used up most of his reserves, and the enemy were still clinging to

the woods in that part of the line and threatening renewed attacks;

but, in spite of this, Haig was able to render the French sufficient

help to enable them to make a little headway, though the situation in

this part of the line was in doubt and caused anxiety all day.

About 1.30 p.m. a fresh attack of great violence was delivered further

north against the 5th Brigade. This was thrown back mainly by our

artillery fire.

About 3 p.m. the enemy began to mass in the woods about the Menin

road, near the centre of our line. On attempting to advance, however,

they were caught between two fires, from the north-east and

south-west, the Oxfordshire L.I. and the Northamptons turning them out

of the woods at the point of the bayonet.

Severe fighting went on till nightfall, units becoming much

intermixed. The losses were very heavy indeed, the 1st (Guards)

Brigade mustering at night only four officers and 300 men.

The final result of this magnificent defence was that the attack was

repulsed with terrible loss to the enemy, and the original line

practically held throughout, save for the loss of some few and

unimportant trenches.

Brigadier-General FitzClarence, V.C., to whom reference has

already been made, was killed. His name has justly become famous for

many gallant deeds, but more particularly in connection with the

crisis of October 31st.

The success of this great defence, like those which preceded it, was

due in the first place to the quick grasp of the situation by Sir

Douglas Haig, who so skilfully handled the scanty forces at his

disposal, and economised his few reserves with such soldierlike

foresight. Mutual support at critical moments was ensured by the

wholehearted co-operation of commanders of all units, great and small.

No words can express my sense of the gratitude which the country owes

to the young officers, to the non-commissioned officers, and to the

rank and file of this invincible army. When all has been said, it was

their courage and endurance which spoke the last word.

Whilst we were thus fully occupied about the Menin road, the French

were also being attacked all along their line to the north of Ypres,

but the enemy was held off.

In accordance with the arrangements made with Foch, the Cavalry Corps

took over the line opposite Messines on the morning of the 11th, when

Conneau's cavalry marched north. Allenby was reinforced by two

battalions of the 8th Division, these battalions being replaced by two

Territorial battalions.

In the evening de Lisle's (1st) Cavalry Division was sent to reinforce

Haig, to whom were also dispatched the Hertfordshire Territorial

battalion and two yeomanry regiments from St. Omer.

The situation north of Hollebeke at the canal (which the Germans had

now crossed) was a source of much anxiety to me, and I made strong

representations to Foch as to the necessity of strengthening

his troops at that important point. He promised to reinforce Vidal at

once with three battalions of chasseurs.

On the evening of the 11th, Field-Marshal Lord Roberts arrived at my

Headquarters on a visit, accompanied by his daughter, Lady Aileen (now

Countess) Roberts. It is needless to say with what enthusiasm the

Field-Marshal was welcomed everywhere.

The martial fire, which was the life-long characteristic of this great

soldier, burnt as brightly within him during these last few days of

his life as when he earned his Victoria Cross on the eastern

battlefields over 60 years before. His presence, particularly at this

critical time, in the midst of the army he loved so well--love which

they returned to the full--acted as a timely inspiration and incentive

to our weary and hard-pressed troops.

That the tremendous energy of the great soldier remained unimpaired to

the last was proved to me on the night of his arrival. He dined at my

Headquarters' mess, and after dinner I had a long conversation with

him on the situation. It was getting late, and I suggested that, as he

had a hard day before him on the morrow, he should go to his quarters

and get some rest.

He asked me when I generally got to bed. I told him that I took rest

when I could, but never knew exactly when it would be possible. I

added as an example of this that a conference was fixed for that night

between 12 and 1 o'clock, when we hoped all the reports would be in.

Nothing that I urged could dissuade him from remaining up and

attending that conference, which he followed with his usual clearness

of mind and acute perception, although it lasted into the small hours

of the morning.

The early dawn of the next day saw him perfectly fresh, going

out to visit his beloved Indians.

On the evening of Friday the 13th the Field-Marshal was suddenly taken

very ill on his return home from visiting troops in the front, and he

died on Saturday, the 14th, at about 8 p.m.

On the morning of Tuesday, November 17th, a military funeral service

was held at St. Omer, which was attended by everyone who could get

there. Generals Foch and de Maud'huy represented the French Army. The

Indian Princes attached to the Indian Corps were also present, and the

Maharajah Sir Pertab Singh took his place on the motor hearse and

acted as a personal guard over the remains of the great chief on his

last sad journey to England.

General de Maud'huy paid an impressive tribute to the dead

Field-Marshal in the following General Order which he issued to the

10th Army, dated November 16th, 1914.

"_General Order No 44._

"Lord Roberts, Field-Marshal in the British Army, died yesterday at

General Headquarters of the British Army.

"The illustrious conqueror of Afghanistan and South Africa had come,

in spite of his great age, to visit the battlefields where at the

present time his valiant soldiers are fighting. Up to the moment when

death struck him down, he pursued the object to which he devoted his

whole life, the greatness of England.

"The General Commanding the 10th Army is voicing the feeling of all

ranks under his command, both officers and men alike, when he says to

Marshal French and to the General Officer Commanding the Indian Corps,

that the 10th Army fully shares in the mourning of our Allies

to-day.

"May the example afforded by the famous British Marshal up to the end

be understood and felt by us all. Lord Roberts has died in an hour of

mighty battles, in the midst of the troops which he loved so well. No

end can be more enviable, none more glorious for a soldier.

(Signed) "DE MAUD'HUY."

During the 12th the enemy attempted renewed attacks on either flank of

the 1st Corps, but was repulsed with great loss. Although the troops

holding the Ypres salient were hard pressed and got little rest until

they were relieved by the French, still it may be said that these

attacks were practically the last of the really determined and nearly

successful efforts made by the Germans during the First Battle of

Ypres.

The French were able to retake some of the ground they had lost,

although the enemy still held on to Dixmude.

From November 12th onwards, the chief anxiety I had was to get relief

and rest for the troops which had been fighting so desperately in the

Ypres salient, particularly the 1st Corps. I had long interviews with

Foch, and represented to him the necessity for French troops to take

over the whole of the ground there, at any rate for a time. At first

he said there would be a great difficulty in doing this; but finally

he promised to meet my wishes and agreed to start carrying out the

relief on Sunday, the 15th, at latest.

On this I told Haig that no more troops would be sent to him, but that

he would be gradually withdrawn into reserve as he was relieved by

French troops. The 1st Corps troops were to be withdrawn before any

others, and brought into reserve as quickly as possible.

Foch was as good as his word. On the night of the 15th, the

French 9th Corps took over some of Haig's trenches and released two

brigades of the 1st Division, as well as some artillery. These all

came into reserve on the 16th at Locre and Westoutre.

On the 13th our front on the Ypres salient was heavily shelled from 10

a.m., and infantry attacks commenced at 1 p.m. up the Menin road and

against the 6th and 7th Brigades (1st Batt. The King's (Liverpool)

Regt., 2nd Batt. S. Staffs Regt., 1st Batt. R. Berks Regt., 1st Batt.

K.R.R. and 3rd Batt. Worcester Regt.; 2nd Batt. S. Lancs, 1st Batt.

Wilts Regt., and 2nd Batt. R. Irish Rifles). The latter had their line

broken, but it was restored by a counter-attack. The enemy lost

heavily.

Heavy attacks were made early on the 14th against the 9th Brigade (1st

Batt. Northumberland Fusiliers, 4th Batt. Royal Fusiliers, 1st Batt.

Lincs Regt. and 1st Batt. R. Scots Fusiliers) in the same area, and

later these developed along the whole front, but the Germans were

everywhere driven back.

On the 15th the Indian Corps became heavily engaged between

Armentieres and La Bassee. Some trenches were lost and regained during

the day, and the enemy made no progress.

On the early morning of this day a very gallant piece of work was

carried out on our Ypres front by a storming party which was led by

Co.-Sergt.-Major Gibbon of the 5th Battn. Northumberland Fusiliers. On

the previous evening the enemy had gained possession of some buildings

within our line. A gun was brought up by a cleverly-concealed route to

the closest range, the buildings were battered down and our position

restored at the point of the bayonet.

On the 17th the Ypres salient was again the scene of heavy

encounters. There was severe fighting, but we had a very

successful day, inflicting great loss on the enemy south of the Menin

road.

The 21st marked the end of the Battle of Ypres, and I had the

satisfaction of seeing our troops completely evacuate the Ypres

salient. The whole of the 1st Corps and the cavalry were in reserve.

The fourteen battalions of the 2nd Corps, which had been moved up to

support the 1st Corps in the north, marched to rejoin their Corps

north of Bailleul.

* * * * *

I cannot close the narrative of this great battle without particularly

emphasising the part which was played by the 1st Corps. They were

thrown in suddenly to fill up the gap through which the Germans were

preparing to pour in troops in order to seize the Channel seaboard.

They were called upon to advance and make good their ground in the

teeth of numbers three or four times their own strength and against a

much more powerful artillery. For five weeks they fought day and night

continuously against vastly superior forces, and against artillery

always far above their own in strength and numbers.

In the great campaigns of the past we find special units singled out

and handed down to fame, such as "The Light Division" under Crawford

in the Peninsular War or "The Brandenburg Corps" under Prince

Frederick Charles of Prussia in the Franco-German War of 1870. I think

we may rest assured that history will label the 1st British Corps in

this war with some such distinguished sobriquet. Well and truly did

they earn it.

I append the record of the losses of the 1st Corps in the battle up

to November 21st, when they were relieved. It speaks more eloquently

than any words of mine of the great _role_ it played in this

tremendous struggle.

FRANCE.

Casualties of the First Battle of Ypres.

FIRST CORPS' LOSSES

|Killed (including Died of Wounds and

| Died other causes)

| |--------------------------------

| | Wounded

| | |---------------------

| | | Missing (including

| | |Prisoners)|----------

| | | | Total

| | | |

|Off.| O.R. |Off| O.R. |Off | O.R.|Off| O.R.

| | | | | | | |

1st Corps (1st and 2nd | 127| 1,666|316| 7,669| 74|3,663|517| 12,998

7th Division (Oct 27th | 49| 425|114| 1,328| 83|1,644|246| 3,397

to Nov 7th, 1914), | | | | | | | |+(a) 731

inclusive. | | | | | | | |+(b) 765

7th Brigade (less 3rd | 8| 91| 12| 315| --| 94| 20| 500

Worcesters, but | | | | | | | |+(c) 327

9th Brigade (less 1st | 3| 110| 16| 358| 4| 393| 23| 861

Scots Fusiliers, but | | | | | | | |+(d) 310

including 2nd | | | | | | | |+(e) 131

15th Brigade (viz., 1st| 10| 128| 18| 420| 5| 275| 33| 823

56th Field Coy Divi- | -- | 4| --| 27| --| -- | --| 31

Total | 197| 2,424|476|10,117| 166|6,069|839| 18,610

| | | | | | | + 2,264

[Footnote a: 2nd Scots Fusiliers, unclassified,

27/10 to 4/11/14.]

[Footnote b: 1st S. Staffs, unclassified, 20/10 to

7/11.]

[Footnote c: 2nd S. Lancs, unclassified, 20/10 to

24/10.]

[Footnote d: 4th Royal Fusiliers, unclassified,

11/11/14.]

[Footnote e: 1st Scots Fusiliers, unclassified, 10

to 12/11.]

C2 Cas--6/11/17.