THE BATTLE OF YPRES.
_Third Phase, November 1st to November 10th._
The importance attached by the Germans to the fighting of October 31st
and November 1st was emphasised by the presence of the Emperor at
Courtrai. An intercepted wireless message informed us that he was to
go to Hollebeke, no doubt with the intention of heading a "triumphal
entry" into Ypres.
Our airmen endeavoured to give him as warm a reception as possible,
and we had information that his quarters were changed at least once in
consequence of their activity.
I issued an Order of the Day to the troops, announcing the presence of
the august visitor on our front, and urging them to give His Majesty a
good demonstration of what the "contemptible little army" could do.
Right splendidly did they respond.
Throughout the night of the 31-1st, the 2nd Cavalry Division was
heavily attacked all along the Wytschaete-Messines ridge. The enemy
gained a footing in the village of Wytschaete, broke through the line
north of Messines and turned the left flank of the trenches held by
the London Scottish. With devoted gallantry the reserve company of
this battalion made repeated charges with the bayonet, which checked
the enemy's advance and enabled the battalion to hold the position.
This it did until daylight. The Germans were then discovered
to be well round both flanks, and a retirement became inevitable. This
was carried out very steadily under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire
in the direction of Wulverghem.
At 3 a.m. the 12th Lancers, the Northumberland Fusiliers, and the
Lincolns made a counter-attack and re-established the original line.
The cavalry fought on foot with the bayonet in the narrow streets of
the village, and were reported to me as equal to the best infantry in
such work.
By 6.30 a.m. the enemy had been reinforced, and were able to drive
back the 2nd Cavalry Division with the troops attached and reoccupy
Wytschaete. This loss, coupled with the enemy's seizure of the ridge
north of Messines, rendered the latter place untenable by the 1st
Cavalry Division. They retired slowly to an entrenched line north of
Wulverghem.
Somewhat the same kind of situation arose here now as on the day
before at Gheluvelt. Since the night of October 30th the Cavalry Corps
and attached troops had been holding on to the Wytschaete--Messines
ridge against overwhelming numbers of the enemy. They were utterly
exhausted, and the French marching to their succour were still some
way off.
At 5 a.m. two battalions of the 2nd Corps were despatched from
Bailleul to Neuve-Eglise, and further reinforcements were ordered to
follow them an hour later. These troops had only themselves just got
back into reserve, after a most trying and exhausting experience on
the right of our line lasting for nearly three weeks. They also stood
in dire need of rest, but they were the only reserves of any kind at
my disposal.
At 10 a.m. on the 1st, the exhausted 2nd Cavalry Division was
retiring on Mont Kemmel, which they were in no condition to hold if
the enemy pressed on vigorously after them. But once again, as on the
31st, the situation was saved by a desperate effort. Some battalions
of French infantry attacked on the left of the 2nd Cavalry Division
and checked the enemy's advance, which was finally held off until,
some time later, the head of the 16th French Army Corps arrived and
regained the western end of Wytschaete.
The 3rd Corps had reported early in the morning that the position of
its left flank was rendered precarious by the loss of Messines. With
the support furnished by the 2nd Corps, as narrated above, Pulteney
was able to draw back his left towards Neuve-Eglise and form a flank
facing north, covering the important artillery position on Hill 63.
This move had threatened in flank the German advance on the
Wytschaete--Messines ridge, and assisted greatly in securing the
retirement of the cavalry in good order.
At 12.15 p.m. the situation was as follows:--
The 1st Cavalry Division occupied an entrenched position running to
the east and north-east of Wulverghem, in touch on the right with the
reconstructed line of the 3rd Corps and on the left with the 2nd
Cavalry Division.
After the successful advance of the French, the 2nd Cavalry Division
was drawn in to the south of Wytschaete, and its left was in touch
with the 16th French Corps holding the western border of that village.
The 1st Corps was also heavily attacked on November 1st. On the front
held by the 1st Division, part of the 1st Brigade was driven from its
trenches; but the position was retaken by counter-attack, and in the
evening the line held was the same as on October 31st. The
1st Division was much exhausted and weakened by heavy losses. The 7th
Division remained only 2,000 strong. The 3rd Cavalry Division was
given temporarily to the 1st Corps, and assisted to hold the position.
The 9th French Corps on the left of our 1st Corps was unable to make
any progress during the day.
Information came in towards evening that the enemy was again massing
against Gheluvelt. I went to Vlamertinghe to consult with Foch and
d'Urbal, who told me that nine French battalions and some batteries
would reach Ypres early on the morning of the 2nd. Foch promised me
that he would at once dispatch two battalions of Zouaves to support
Haig's centre.
Reviewing the situation as it presented itself on October 31st and
November 1st, 1914, I believe that the vital interests of the British
Empire were in great danger on both these days. That is to say, the
whole coast-line from Havre to Ostend was within an ace of falling
into the hands of the enemy.
In recalling the fateful hours of those two wonderful days and nights,
I think we were perhaps in the greatest danger between 2 a.m. and 11
a.m. on Sunday, November 1st. Had the French 16th Corps arrived only
an hour later than it did, the German advance from the line
Wytschaete--Messines would have gained such volume, strength, and
impetus, that nothing could have saved Mont Kemmel from falling into
their hands. A vital wedge would have been driven into the very centre
of our line.
The enormous numerical and artillery superiority of the Germans must
be remembered. If they had turned the situation to full account, we
should have seen all the French, British, and Belgian troops lying to
the north of an east and west line through Mont Kemmel, cut
off and hemmed against the coast.
The greatest threat of disaster with which we were faced in 1914 was
staved off by the devoted bravery and endurance displayed by the
Cavalry Corps under a commander, General Allenby, who handled them
throughout with consummate skill. The same high praise must be given
to those two redoubtable divisional leaders, Hubert Gough and de
Lisle.
The cavalry was admirably supported and helped by Shaw and Egerton
with the splendid battalions of infantry which composed the brigades
they commanded, and none of us will ever forget how those French
battalions on the left of the 2nd Cavalry Division checked the enemy
by their gallant and determined advance at the most critical moment.
It is no disparagement, however, to the other troops engaged if I lay
stress on the fact that it was the cavalry alone who, for more than a
fortnight previously, had been disputing foot by foot every yard of
the ground to the River Lys. They had fought day and night with the
utmost tenacity, and the battles of October 31st and November 1st were
but the climax to a long and bitter spell of heroic effort.
For the information of non-military readers, it is necessary for me to
explain that a cavalry division fighting on foot is at a great
disadvantage as compared with an infantry division. When horses cannot
be used in the fighting, they have still to be looked after, and this
takes many men away from the fighting line. A cavalry division
consists ordinarily of three brigades, but when employed in the
trenches they get little more than half that number into the firing
line. They have nothing like the same "gun power" as an
infantry division. But the mobility of the cavalry arm will always be
found to compensate in large degree for these manifest disadvantages.
Taking into account the losses they had suffered, they can hardly have
opposed 2,000 rifles to the onslaught of what has been computed at
more than two German Army Corps.
Of late years our custom has been to train our cavalry to fight on
foot, and in the present war we have reaped the fruit of this wise
policy. But the instinct which must be inculcated in the horse soldier
to regard his horse as his chief reliance, must always disqualify him
to some extent for the _role_ which our cavalry were called upon to
fulfil throughout the momentous issues in the history of the war of
which this chapter treats. I may mention in passing that it was this
same cavalry spirit, or instinct, with which the British cavalry is so
strongly imbued, which enabled them to show to such splendid advantage
in the mounted combats of the earlier phases of the war.
I must add a few words as to the fine part played in the fighting of
November 1st by the Oxfordshire Hussars and the London Scottish. They
were the first Territorial troops who fought in the war.
After disembarking at Dunkirk the Oxfordshire Hussars took part in the
important operations connected with the Belgian retreat from Antwerp, and
rendered most valuable aid in the defence of the Wytschaete--Messines
ridge when that piece of ground was held with such marvellous tenacity
by the Cavalry Division against overwhelming odds.
As for the London Scottish, their services on these two days are well
summarised in a memorandum sent in to me by Allenby.
"The London Scottish," he wrote, "came under my orders on the evening
of October 30th, 1914, and were detailed to the support of
the 2nd Cavalry Division on the following morning. They went into
action at 10 a.m., October 31st, with a strength of 26 officers and
786 men, and occupied trenches in conjunction with the 4th Cavalry
Brigade. They held these trenches throughout the day, being subjected
from time to time to heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. From 9 p.m.
onwards during the night October 31st--November 1st, the Germans
attacked the trenches of the London Scottish continuously, and at 2
a.m. they succeeded in turning the left in large numbers. The
situation was restored at the point of the bayonet by the Reserve
Company. By daylight on November 1st the Germans had, however, turned
both flanks, and it became necessary to retire. The retirement was
directed on Wulverghem, and was carried out steadily under heavy rifle
and machine-gun fire. At 8 a.m. the same morning, the London Scottish
went forward again to take their places in the trenches alongside the
1st Cavalry Division, and there they remained until relieved at dusk
that evening.
"Throughout these operations, which lasted for two days, viz., October
31st and November 1st, the losses of the London Scottish amounted to
278, or about 34 per cent, of their strength. Rarely, if ever, have
second line troops sustained unshaken so high a percentage of
casualties.
"E. H. H. ALLENBY, Lieut.-Gen.,
"Commanding Cavalry Corps."
I sent the following message to the Officer Commanding the London
Scottish:--
"I wish you and your splendid regiment to accept my warmest
congratulations and thanks for the fine work you did on Saturday. You
have given a glorious lead and example to all Territorial Corps
fighting in France."
I saw the battalion personally a few days later, and said a
few words to the men on parade. How they had suffered was only too
pathetically apparent. Whilst there was work to be done and an enemy
to be held at bay no other thought filled any of their minds than to
die fighting, if necessary, to the last man. But when these
Territorials returned for a term of well-earned rest to their
cantonments, with the excitement and danger behind them, a severe
reaction came upon them. The heavy losses amongst their friends and
comrades bowed them down with grief; for they necessarily lacked as
yet the professional training and stoicism of men whose real business
is war.
This exhibition of natural feeling only excited in me a deeper
admiration for the splendid courage and endurance they had displayed
when unsustained and unassisted by the influence of that iron
discipline which only a long course of military training can
inculcate. They were urged only by the spirit of _noblesse oblige_,
and the higher ideals which inspire all who have taken up arms against
the Germans in this war.
* * * * *
On November 2nd, the 16th French Corps and Conneau's French Cavalry
Division were holding the Wytschaete--Messines ridge, with a
detachment of our 1st Cavalry Division supporting Conneau.
The troops who had fought so well on the 1st were absolutely tired
out. They had suffered tremendous casualties and could not be counted
on for the moment even as a reserve. They were withdrawn to rest and
refit.
It was with great difficulty that the French troops were able to
maintain themselves on the ridge. The Germans were very active, and
the fight constantly swayed backwards and forwards. The western edge
of the plateau and the outskirts of the villages marked the
extreme limit of the Allied advance line.
For some days I had felt considerable anxiety as to the condition of
the 1st Corps (1st and 2nd Divisions and the 7th Division).
I had constant messages from Haig asking that his tired troops might
be given some rest after all their hard work; but I was driven almost
to my wits' end to find means of giving him the relief he sought. His
Chief of Staff (John Gough) came to my advanced Headquarters at
Bailleul and discussed the subject fully with me.
I thought perhaps Foch might be able to help me; but when I went to
interview him he said that, whilst the present crisis lasted, he could
not spare a single man for this purpose. All I could do was to send
two very tired brigades of the 2nd Corps up to Ypres on the morning of
the 5th to relieve the 7th Division, who then came back into billets
round Locre in a shattered condition.
The next day the remainder of the 2nd Corps (which was resting)
followed to Ypres to afford what further relief was possible to the
1st Corps. The 2nd Corps was now scattered in detachments along the
whole line, and the only reserves available were two or three lately
arrived Territorial Battalions and the worn-out 7th Division, reduced
to less than a brigade in strength.
Willcocks about this time felt anxiety as to the line his Indian
troops were holding, and sent his Chief of Staff to me at Bailleul to
ask if he could be reinforced. Under the conditions then existing, I
was most anxious that the Indian Corps should hold its own without
assistance and, after calling into consultation other officers of
great Indian experience, I refused to do so, pointing out that he had
four battalions of the 2nd Corps in close reserve behind him.
My faith in the Indian troops was justified, and a day or two
later he reported that the Indians were doing well and that he was
full of confidence in them.
On the night of the 3rd, I issued two Special Orders of the Day to the
troops.
They ran as follows:--
"Special Order of the Day.
"By Field-Marshal Sir John French, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.,
Commander-in-Chief, British Army in the Field.
"1. The sphere of operations over which the British Army in France has
been operating is now much contracted and rendered more compact. Since
October 21st it has been possible to keep a considerable force in
general reserve.
"2. For several days past the enemy's activities against our front
have been sensibly slackened, and it is quite possible that we may
have entered upon the last stage of the great battle in which we have
been engaged since October 11th.
"At this moment I am anxious to address a few words to the splendid
troops I have the great honour to command.
"In view of the magnificent way in which the troops of the British
Army have fought, the hardships they have had to endure, and the heavy
losses they have suffered, it is right that all ranks, collectively
and individually, should form a just and reasonable conception of the
general situation and the object which we are endeavouring to attain.
"3. It is necessary for this purpose to realise in the first place the
true limits of the theatre of war as a whole, and then to take a
comprehensive view of the entire course of operations as they have
proceeded up to the present moment, in order to estimate the
value of the results attained.
"4. It must clearly be understood that the operations in which we have
been engaged embrace nearly all the Continent of Central Europe from
East to West. The combined French, Belgian and British Armies in the
West and the Russian Army in the East are opposed to the united forces
of Germany and Austria acting as a combined Army between us.
"Our enemies elected at the outset of the war to throw the weight of
their forces against the Armies in the West, and to detach only a
comparatively weak force, composed of very few first-line troops and
several Corps of the second and third line, to stem the Russian
advance until the Western forces would be completely defeated and
overwhelmed.
"5. The strength of our enemies enabled them from the outset to throw
greatly superior forces against us in the West. This precluded the
possibility of our taking a vigorous offensive, except when the
miscalculations and mistakes made by their Commanders opened up
special opportunities for a successful attack and pursuit.
"The Battle of the Marne was an example of this, as was also our
advance from St. Omer and Hazebrouck to the line of the Lys at the
commencement of this battle. The _role_ which our Armies in the West
have consequently been called upon to fulfil has been to occupy strong
defensive positions, holding the ground gained and inviting the
enemy's attack; to throw these attacks back, causing the enemy heavy
losses in his retreat, and following him up with powerful and
successful counter-attacks to complete his discomfiture.
"6. While we have been thus engaged, the Russian Armies in
the East, numbering some three to four millions of men, have had time
to mobilise and concentrate their immense forces scattered over all
parts of their vast Empire. Our Eastern Allies have already inflicted
a series of crushing defeats on the Austro-German forces, and are now
rapidly advancing on East Prussia and Silesia in great strength.
"7. The value and significance of the splendid _role_ fulfilled since
the commencement of hostilities by the Allied Forces in the West lies
in the fact that at the moment when the Eastern Provinces of Germany
are about to be overrun by the numerous and powerful Armies of Russia,
nearly the whole of the active army of Germany is tied down to a line
of trenches extending from the Fortress of Verdun on the Alsatian
frontier round to the sea at Nieuport, east of Dunkirk (a distance of
260 miles), where they are held, much reduced in numbers and _morale_,
by the successful action of our troops in the West.
"8. What the enemy will now do we cannot tell. Should they attempt to
withdraw their troops to strengthen their weakened forces in the East,
we must follow them up and harass their retreat to the utmost of our
power. If they make further futile attempts to break through our
lines, they must be again thrown back with greater and greater loss.
"The Armies of Russia are at their Eastern gates and will very soon be
devastating their country and overthrowing their Armies.
"The great fight which you have so splendidly maintained against
superior numbers in the Western theatre will be decided and completed
by our brave Allies in the East, and I think that we on this side have
reason to hope that we have completed the most severe and
arduous part of our task.
"We must, however, be prepared for all eventualities, and I feel sure
no effort will be relaxed to meet with the same undaunted front any
situation, however unexpected, which may arise.
"9. I have made many calls upon you, and the answers you have made to
them have covered you, your regiments, and the Army to which you
belong, with honour and glory.
"Your fighting qualities, courage and endurance have been subjected to
the most trying and severe tests, and you have proved yourselves
worthy descendants of the British soldiers of the past who have built
up the magnificent traditions of the regiments to which you belong.
"You have not only maintained those traditions, but you have
materially added to their lustre.
"It is impossible for me to find words to express my appreciation of
the splendid services you have performed.
(Signed) "J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
"Commander-in-Chief, The British Army in the Field.
"November 2nd, 1914."
"Special Order of the Day.
"By Field-Marshal Sir John French, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
"K.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, British Army in the Field.
"General Headquarters,
"November 2nd, 1914.
"The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief has watched with the deepest
admiration and solicitude the splendid stand made by the soldiers of
His Majesty the King in their successful effort to maintain the
forward position which they have won by their gallantry and
steadfastness.
"He believes that no other Army in the world would show such
tenacity, especially under the tremendous artillery fire directed
against it.
"Its courage and endurance are beyond all praise. It is an honour to
belong to such an Army.
"The Field-Marshal has to make one more call upon the troops. It is
certainly only a question of a few days, and it may be of only a few
hours, before, if they only stand firm, strong support will come, the
enemy will be driven back, and in his retirement will suffer at their
hands losses even greater than those which have befallen him under the
terrific blows by which, especially during the last few days, he has
been repulsed.
"The Commander-in-Chief feels sure that he does not make his call in
vain.
(Signed) "J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
"Commander-in-Chief,
"The British Army in the Field."
During the early days of November, strong French reinforcements began
to reach Ypres. The 20th French Corps detrained in that area on the
4th and 5th.
It was about this time that both our Intelligence Departments and that
of the French became very optimistic on the subject of a great
withdrawal of the Germans from the Western Front. The Russians were
going on from one success to another, and large entrainments of German
troops were reported at Roulers, Thourout, Tourcoing, and other
places.
Whatever may have been really going on, our hopes were, as usual,
doomed to disappointment, for the pressure on our front became greater
and greater. But our eyes were always turned towards the East, and, as
I have explained in a former chapter, the Russian "Will-o'-the Wisp"
continued to uphold us and keep our eyes centred upon it.
Several Territorial units now began to be landed in France, amongst
others the Artists' Rifles, the Honourable Artillery Company, the
Queen's Westminsters and Hertfordshire Territorials, and the
Warwickshire Battery of Horse Artillery. I spent a morning riding
about amongst them, and was deeply impressed by the wonderful spirit
which pervaded them. The only thought they had was to prepare
themselves in the shortest possible time to take their part in the
fighting at the front.
The Hertfordshire Battalion was commanded by an old friend of mine,
whom I can never think of as other than "Tom Brand," under which
patronymic I had served with him for a long time both in peace and
war, and learnt his great soldierlike qualities. By this time,
however, he had succeeded his father, the famous Speaker of the House
of Commons, and had become Viscount Hampden. I watched him at the time
of which I am writing exercising to the full the power, which he
possessed in an extraordinary degree, of instilling the real fighting
spirit in the men he commanded and afterwards led with such great
skill and gallantry.
It was a power which he possessed in common with his intimate friend,
Lord Cavan, who fought for a long time side by side with him in
France. These two men bore a strong resemblance to one another in the
marvellous influence they seemed to exercise over those under them.
Both men struck me very much. Lord Cavan, like Hampden, was "a
dug-out" and commanded first a brigade and then a division of the
Guards, until he was selected for the command of an Army Corps, with
the utmost gallantry and success.
Closely associated with my early recollections of the
Territorials in France is the Artists' Rifles. They were, before the
war, classified, with some few others, as an Officers' Training Corps.
Our losses in officers in the campaign up to then had been prodigious,
and I was trying to devise some means to fill up their ranks. What I
saw of the Artists' Rifles and the men of which the Corps was
composed, induced me to think of turning them to this purpose.
They were commanded by a most valuable and efficient officer, Colonel
May. Him I consulted about it, and with his help an Officers' Training
School was established, which was the first of many which have since
sprung into existence. The Artists' Rifles were instrumental in
quickly meeting some of our pressing needs in this important respect,
and may be said to have laid the foundation of that Officers' School
of War whose ramifications were soon to extend not only behind all the
fighting lines, but throughout the United Kingdom. It is interesting
to recall the fact that the conversion of certain picked Territorial
battalions into Officers' Training Corps before the war was another of
Lord Haldane's brilliant conceptions.
* * * * *
Some fine work was done on the evening of the 6th by Kavanagh's 7th
Cavalry Brigade, Cavan's 4th Guards Brigade and Lawford's 22nd Brigade
of the 7th Division. Moncey's detachment of French troops, posted on
the right of the 1st Corps, had been driven back over the canal, and a
serious position was created.
Our troops counter-attacked with great effect, Lawford's Brigade (2nd
Batt. The Queen's, 2nd Batt. R. Warwickshire Regt., 1st Batt. R. Welsh
Fusiliers, and 1st Batt. S. Staffs Regt.) capturing a good many
prisoners and machine guns. The counter-attack was successful, and the
situation was restored.
We paid dearly for this success, however, in the loss of some very
valuable lives. Amongst others Gordon Wilson, commanding the Blues,
and Hugh Dawnay, commanding the 2nd Life Guards, were killed. Wilson
was an excellent cavalry leader. He had done splendid work with the
3rd Cavalry Division ever since they landed, and his death left a big
gap.
Up to three or four days before his death, Hugh Dawnay had been my
liaison officer with the 1st Corps. The occasion of his going back to
his regiment arose in this way. The 2nd Life Guards were getting very
weak in officers, and he had an idea that he ought to be with them. He
felt this very deeply, and told me so in a conversation we had
together on the subject. The first time he spoke to me about it I told
him that, whilst I sympathised with all he said, yet I considered it
was his duty to remain where he was. I reminded him of the highly
important work he was doing so well, and told him that it would be
most difficult to replace him in that work, whereas it would be
comparatively easy to put his regiment right as regards officers.
The next day he came back to me and repeated his request with great
earnestness. He told me he could never be happy or contented in his
mind if at this juncture he did not take his place beside his brother
officers in his old regiment. It would indeed have been difficult for
any soldier to refuse such a request, or fail to understand and enter
into Dawnay's feelings.
I felt that it was weak of me to give way to him, but I did so on the
understanding that his absence was only to be temporary. Of course, he
might easily have been killed in the performance of his
Staff duties, nevertheless when I heard he had fallen I felt that, in
the interests of the service, I had done wrong in allowing him to go.
It is necessary to steel one's heart against any kind of sentiment
when conducting a great war, and in the loss of one of the finest and
most valuable young Staff Officers I have ever come across, I learnt a
lesson never to be forgotten.
On several subsequent occasions similar requests were made to me
without avail, notably in the case of my friend Clive of the
Grenadiers, whose services and help I can never recall without
admiration and gratitude.
On the night of the 6th came the information that the Austrians had
been badly routed and driven across the San river by the Russians. Up
went our hopes again like quick-silver; another week gone and we
expected to see the Germans on our front weakened and reduced by the
necessity of sending troops to save Silesia.
Our hopes and plans were fully discussed at a meeting held on Sunday,
November 8th, at Foch's Headquarters at Cassel. Foch was in one of his
most sanguine moods, and I must confess to having strongly felt the
infection of his hopeful disposition. Our military barometer, however,
went up and down as swiftly and suddenly as that of a ship in a
typhoon.
What filled my immediate thoughts was the dire necessity of relieving
the tired-out troops in the Ypres salient, and this was the point I
impressed most strongly upon Foch who, it seemed to me, found it
difficult to talk of anything but "_Attaque! Attaque! Attaque!_"
He gave me some help in this matter; indeed, as much as he could, I
feel sure, but not before most of those gallant troops were called
upon to withstand the new and terrible onslaught which I
shall describe in the next chapter.
On the 9th we received the following gracious message from His Majesty
the King:--
"To Sir John French,
"Expeditionary Force. November 9th, 1914.
"The splendid pluck, spirit and endurance shown by my troops in the
desperate fighting which has continued for so many days against vastly
superior forces fills me with admiration. I am confident in the final
results of their noble efforts under your able command.
"GEORGE, R.I."
The following reply was sent:--
"To His Majesty the King,
"Buckingham Palace,
"London. November 9th, 1914.
"Your Majesty's most gracious message has been received by the
officers and men of Your Majesty's Army in France with feelings of the
deepest gratitude and pride. We beg to be allowed to express to Your
Majesty our most faithful devotion and unalterable determination to
uphold the highest traditions of Your Majesty's Army and carry the
campaign through to a victorious end.
"FRENCH."
Throughout the phase of the battle narrated in this chapter, fighting
went on with varying success all along the line from La Bassee to the
sea. Ploegsteert Wood was the scene of many violent engagements. The
6th Division and 19th Brigade to the south were constantly at grips
with the enemy. All along the valley of the Douve and the
Wytschaete--Messines ridge the enemy was continuously active. But the
point in the line which caused me the greatest anxiety was
the dent between the 1st (British) and the 16th (French) Corps at the
canal to the north of Hollebeke. It is not too much to say that only
by the display of the greatest gallantry and endurance on the part of
the 3rd Cavalry Division and the other troops engaged at that point
was the enemy prevented from getting dangerously near our
communications.