THE SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP.
In our appreciation of the situation at British Headquarters on
October 1st it was considered that the reduction of Antwerp was at
this moment the great objective of the enemy. Personally, I had no
reason to think that Antwerp was in any immediate danger, and
therefore a message which I received from the Secretary of State on
October 2nd came as a most disagreeable surprise.
I was informed that a serious situation had been created at Antwerp,
which was in grave danger of falling in a short time.
Further information reached me at 3 a.m. on the 3rd from London that
the Belgian Government, acting on the advice unanimously given by the
Superior Council of War in the presence of the King, had decided to
leave at once for Ostend. It was further stated that the King, with
the Field Army, would withdraw from Antwerp in the direction of Ghent
to protect the coast-line and in the hope of being able to co-operate
with the Allied Armies. The message added that the town could hold out
for five or six days, and that the decision to evacuate was taken very
seriously as a result of the increasingly critical situation.
It is needless to say that I was perturbed on receipt of this news, It
was difficult to understand why the Belgians, who had fought
so well at Liege, were unable to do more in defence of a fortress
which was much stronger, and situated, moreover, in a position where
it could be supported by the British Fleet.
I fully realised the consequence of the capture and occupation of
Antwerp by the Germans. It was impossible to say how much of the
coast-line the captured _terrain_ would include, but there could be no
doubt that the Channel ports would be gravely imperilled.
Operating from such a base, there would appear to be no insuperable
obstacle to an immediate German advance on Dunkirk, Calais, and
Boulogne. The Belgian Army was in no condition to resist such an
advance. The occupation of these places and the formation of a
defensive line which would include the whole of the Pas-de-Calais,
might become a _fait accompli_ before the troops could arrive from the
main theatres to prevent it.
But here, again, we have an example of the over-confidence which for
ever possessed that army which set out for "world conquest." As on the
Marne, so at Antwerp, they were not prepared to seize the
psychological moment and to play boldly for the great stake.
It is seldom that fortune offers another chance to a military leader
who has once failed to gather the rich harvest which she has put into
his grasp. Yet the German Emperor presents, together with his great
General Staff, one of the few instances in history of a
Commander-in-Chief so soon being given a splendid opportunity to
retrieve such mistakes as those of September 5th and 6th.
With all these tragic possibilities in my mind in these early October
days, I redoubled my endeavours to effect a speedy move of the British
forces to the north. Added to the other cogent reasons to which I
referred in the last chapter was now the most vital of all--the relief
of Antwerp.
Lord Kitchener did not make things easy for me.
Keenly desirous to influence the course of operations, his telegrams
followed one after another each containing "directions" regarding a
local situation of which, in London, he could know very little.
For instance, in one message he told me he was communicating with
General Joffre and the French Government, but, as he did not do so
through me, I was quite unaware of what was passing between them, yet
all the time he was urging me to make what I knew to be impracticable
suggestions to General Joffre. This could only lead to misunderstandings
and confusion of ideas, and I must repudiate any responsibility
whatever for what happened in the north during the first ten days of
October. I was explicitly told by the Secretary of State for War that
the British troops operating there were not under my command, as the
following telegram shows:--
"Have already given Rawlinson temporary rank. I am sending him
instructions regarding his action Antwerp. The troops employed there
will not for the present be considered part of your force."
Rawlinson, I may remark, had been sent for to meet the 7th Division at
Ostend and take command of it.
Had I been left to exercise my full functions as Commander-in-Chief of
the British Army in France, I should certainly have made different
dispositions with regard to the disposal of these troops. I regret
that I must record my deliberate opinion that the best which could
have been done throughout this critical situation was _not_ done,
owing entirely to Lord Kitchener's endeavour to unite in himself the
separate and distinct _roles_ of a Cabinet Minister in London
and a Commander-in-Chief in France. I feel it only right and
in the interest of my country, with a view to any war we may be
engaged in in the future, to make this plain statement of fact. The
calamity at Sedan was due in part to interference from Paris with the
Army in the field, and the American Civil War was more than probably
prolonged by the repeated interference on the part of the Secretary of
State with the Commanders in the field.
As to the method of employing the 7th Infantry and 3rd Cavalry
Divisions, the following telegram will show that the French
Commander-in-Chief completely concurred in my views:--
"General Commanding-in-Chief to Col. Huguet, October 8th, 8.45 a.m.:--
"The Commander-in-Chief has the honour to inform Marshal French that
he entirely agrees with the ideas on the subject of employing the
whole of the British Forces united.
"He estimates that, in the actual situation of Antwerp, the
reinforcement of the garrison by the 7th English Division will not
have any effect on the fate of the place.
"In these conditions he believes on the contrary that it is very
advantageous that this English Division should unite as early as
possible with the main body of the British Forces in the northern
zone.
"Will the Marshal be kind enough to inform Lord Kitchener of the
Commander-in-Chief's views of the situation?
"He will ask the President of the Republic to confirm these views to
the British War Minister."
As to the confusion of ideas to which I have referred, the following
telegram which I found it necessary to address to the Commander of
the 7th Division, Sir Henry Rawlinson, will show that it existed up
to the 11th instant:--
"Your message No. 19, addressed to Lord Kitchener and repeated to me,
received. I really do not understand whether you regard yourself as
under my orders or not; but if you do, please be good enough to
explain your situation clearly without delay, as I have no knowledge
of any necessity for your re-embarkation or of your intention to do
so.
"Hazebrouck will be in occupation of the 3rd Corps to-morrow morning.
"Be good enough to answer me by some means at once, as my own and
General Joffre's plans are much put out and perhaps compromised by all
this misunderstanding."
To this Rawlinson replied that he was under my orders, and proceeded
to give me the information I requested.
Such, then, was the general atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty in
which I had to work after the fall of Antwerp until towards the 10th
of the month (October), when at length the Secretary of State for War
consented to allow me full liberty of action to direct the movements
of all British Forces in France.
Some 3,000 marines had been landed in Dunkirk towards the end of
September and, when Antwerp was threatened, Lord Kitchener--saying
nothing of it to me--arranged with General Joffre that the latter
should send one or two French Territorial Divisions to join them and
act with them.
The first intimation I had of this was a wire from Lord Kitchener,
received late at night on October 3rd, which ran as follows:--
"I do not know when the two Divisions promised by the French
Government from Havre will be able to start.
"Could you ascertain this and let me know your views on the
situation and how you contemplate acting?"
To this I replied in the early hours of the 4th:--
"I do not know what has passed direct between English and French
Governments, but French General Headquarters told me positively in
answer to repeated enquiry that they are only sending one Territorial
Division from Havre to Ostend, which they say is to start at once by
sea.
"With reference to the last sentence in your message 1315, please
refer to my message F272 dispatched last night at 7.30. I shall get
report from officer I sent yesterday to Bruges and Antwerp directly
and will wire again."
That part of my message F272 (referred to above), which bears on the
subject, runs as follows:--
"French wish us to use Boulogne for 7th Division and Cavalry to
disembark.... I am strongly averse to sending any troops inside the
fortress (of Antwerp) even if they could be got there."
General Joffre's telegram for me of October 8th has already been
quoted, and I had previously been in constant communication with him
on this subject. When I dispatched telegram F272 I knew that Joffre's
views accorded with my own.
That the wishes of the Allied Commanders were ignored in London is
further shown by the following message received by me from the
Secretary of State for War at 2.30 p.m. on October 4th:--
"I am embarking 7th Division and portion of Cavalry Division to-day,
but I cannot get report from Antwerp on the military situation from
which I can decide where they should be disembarked.
"My present opinion is Zeebrugge, where there are good
landing facilities. Can you send Rawlinson by motor to Antwerp to take
charge and study the situation before the troops arrive?"
This message was amplified by the following message which was sent
later in the day:--
"I am arranging following Expeditionary Force for relief Antwerp:--
British Force:
"7th Division, under Gen. Capper, 18,000 men, 63 guns; Cavalry
Division, under Gen. Byng, 4,000 men, 12 guns. To arrive at Zeebrugge
October 6th and October 7th.
"Naval detachments under Gen. Alston, 8,000 men, already there; also
naval and military heavy guns and detachments already sent.
Headquarters Staff will be subsequently notified.
French Force:
"Territorial Division, Gen. Roy, 15,000 men, proper complement guns
and two squadrons to arrive Ostend October 6th to October 9th;
Fusiliers Marins Brigade under Rear-Admiral Ronarch, 8,000 men; grand
total, 53,000 men. Numbers are approximately correct."
In order to summarise the situation as it was reflected in my mind at
this time, I will quote two more telegrams.
Lord Kitchener wired on the early morning of the 6th:--
"Please let me have a telegraphic appreciation of the situation of the
Allied Forces for information of the Government."
To which the following reply was sent:--
"Allied line extends from La Bassee, about 14 miles south-west of
Lille on the left, through Arras, east of Albert, Bray-sur-Somme, west
of Roye, Ribecourt, Nampcelle, Nouvron, Soissons, north of
Braye-en-Laonnois, Craonnelle, Berry-au-Bac, then south of Rheims,
then east to Verdun, then south to St. Mihiel, then east to
Thiaucourt.
"On the extreme left is the 21st French Corps, with two Cavalry Corps
operating between Carvin and Lens.
"Hard fighting north of the Oise, where strength of French Force
equivalent to 12 Corps and six Cavalry Divisions. Comparative quiet on
the Aisne; British forces in progress of evacuating positions and
moving north of the Somme near Abbeville; move should be completed by
the 20th instant.
"The German line extends from about Lille, roughly parallel to the
Allies, west of Bapaume, Chaulnes, Roye, south of Noyon, thence along
the hills north of the Aisne to Craonne, Brimont, Nogent-l'Abbesse,
Somme Py, north-east of Verdun, where it turns south to
Fresnes-en-Woevre, then to near St. Mihiel, Thiaucourt, and east of
Thiaucourt.
"The strength of the Germans north of the Oise is probably 11 Corps
and nine Cavalry Divisions in position. In addition to the above
forces, one Brigade was detraining at Cambrai yesterday, and reserve
troops are holding entrenched positions about Mons and Valenciennes,
numbers variously reported from 50,000 to 70,000.
"The object of the Allies is to bring about a retirement of the
Germans from their present line by turning their north flank, and at
the same time to hold in this theatre of operations as many German
Corps as possible. French General Headquarters anticipated that the
northern turning movement would have been facilitated by the close
co-operation of the Belgian Field Army.
"So far as I am able to have an object apart from the general French
view of the situation, I place the relief of Antwerp as of
first importance as regards forces under my command."
Lord Kitchener had dispatched these troops _en route_ to Antwerp
itself before he even asked me for an appreciation of the general
situation.
The history of the rapid investment and fall of Antwerp, the
evacuation of Ostend and Zeebrugge and the retreat of the Belgians to
the Yser, is very well known now, and it is not my intention to go
over the ground again here; but I feel sure that, had the views of the
Commanders in the field (Joffre and myself) been accepted, a much
better and easier situation would have been created.
It is perfectly clear that the operations for the relief of Antwerp
should never have been directed from London.
It should have been left entirely in the hands of the French
Commander-in-Chief (or in mine acting with him) to decide upon the
dispositions and destination of the troops immediately they left
British shores. We alone were in a position to judge as to the best
methods by which to co-ordinate the objectives and distribute the
troops between the northern and southern theatres.
As things actually turned out, the troops which were landed at Ostend
and Zeebrugge had (to quote from General Joffre's wire to Huguet on
October 8th) no influence on the fate of the fortress, and what help
they were in protecting the retreat of the Belgians and saving that
Army from destruction might have been equally well rendered from a
safer and more effective direction. This would not have necessitated
that dangerous and exhausting flank march, costing such terrible loss,
by which alone they were able eventually to unite with the main
British forces.
Dispatched from England on October 5th or 6th, and disembarking at
Calais or Boulogne (Dunkirk could have been used if the
Belgian Army had required more help), they would have deployed six or
seven days later in the valley of the Lys south of the 3rd Corps, and
Lille might have been saved.
It is quite possible also to conceive a situation starting from these
preliminary dispositions, which would have resulted in saving Ostend,
even Zeebrugge and that line of coast, the possession of which by the
enemy, dating from October, 1914, was a source of such infinite
trouble to us.
Although I was given no voice in these Antwerp dispositions, and was
left in partial ignorance of what was going on, which, in my position
as Commander-in-Chief, was deplorable--I took what steps I could to
keep in close touch with the progress of events.
Colonel Bridges of the 4th Dragoon Guards was with his regiment in the
Cavalry Division. He had formerly been Military Attache in Brussels
and understood the Belgians well. He had already greatly distinguished
himself in earlier battles, and I sent for him.
Bridges commenced the War as a squadron commander, and it will always
be a matter of deep gratification to me that I was enabled to see him
in command of a Division before I gave up the Army in France.
Of tall and spare figure, his face has always struck me as that of an
ideal leader of men. He has an absolute contempt of any personal
danger, and was constantly putting himself in the most exposed
positions, so that I was often in dread of losing him. I know he was
hit slightly once or twice and said nothing about it, but on another
occasion he was so severely wounded that for a day or two his life was
in danger. He was calm, quiet and very deliberate in all situations,
and his reports were of the utmost value. He never appeared
to want anything in the way of personal comfort, was quite indifferent
in any weather as to whether he slept on a bed or on the ground, and
had a happy knack of seeming delighted to start on any mission however
difficult and dangerous, or for any place however distant, with
nothing but the clothes he stood up in.
I wish I could describe Tom Bridges better. He is a typical fighting
soldier and leader, and I have entertained the deepest regard for him
ever since we first met many years ago. I certainly had hoped ere this
to have seen him in command of an Army Corps.
In accordance with my instructions he arrived at my Headquarters
during the night of October 3rd-4th. I dispatched him at 5 a.m. on the
4th by motor to Brussels, instructing him to get into immediate
communication with the Belgian General Staff and endeavour to persuade
them to hang on to Antwerp, promising support from us so soon as we
could possibly get to them.
Colonel Sykes was at that time second to Sir David Henderson in
command of the Royal Flying Corps. I sent him by aeroplane in the same
direction, telling him to find out all he could and bring me back a
report from Bridges.
I directed Sir David Henderson to establish air reconnaissances
towards Antwerp, which he did.
Finally, I did my utmost to expedite the move of all the British
Forces to the northern theatre. It appeared likely that there might be
considerable delay in relieving the 1st Corps. I therefore dispatched
Henry Wilson to General Joffre with the following note, dated October
4th, 1914:--
"With reference to Sir John French's note and the importance,
therein dwelt upon, of the earliest possible relief of the
1st Corps from its present position, he suggests to His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief the possibility of an extension by the 18th Corps
of its line to the left, as far as the point where the Aisne Canal
passes through the line of entrenchment occupied by the 1st Corps in
the neighbourhood of Braye.
"In this connection Sir John French would particularly bring to the
notice of His Excellency the greatly increased strength of the
entrenchment by reason of the work which has been carried out during
the long time it has been under occupation by the 1st Corps. He would
also point out that the enemy is now much weaker than before, and that
such feeble attempts as he makes on the line of entrenchment are
entirely in the nature of reconnaissances, with a view to discover
whether the entrenchment is still held or not. Another consideration
of importance is that the line now held by the 18th Corps and French
troops attached to it is much less in extent than that occupied by the
British 1st Corps.
"In these circumstances Sir John French trusts that His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief will be able to give such orders as will ensure the
troops occupying the portion of the line extending from the right of
the British entrenchment to the canal being relieved by troops from
the 18th Corps, the change to be carried out on the night of 6th-7th
October."
To this General Joffre replied as follows:--
"General Wilson has been good enough to convey the desire expressed by
His Excellency Marshal French to see the whole of the British Army
follow the move of the 2nd Army Corps to the left wing of the Allies
line.
"The Commander-in-Chief has the honour to state that he will
endeavour to satisfy this request, but as already stated in Note No.
159 of October 1st the movement of the British troops can only be
carried out in succession.
"The heavy task with which the railway service is at present burdened,
and the difficulty of immediately replacing on the front all the
British units employed there, render it impossible to contemplate the
simultaneous withdrawal of all the British forces.
"A French Division will arrive to-morrow in the area of Soissons. Its
billeting area is fixed by the G.O.C. 6th Army and it is intended to
relieve the 3rd Army Corps. When this Corps has been withdrawn from
the front it will march to the area Compiegne--Longueil--Pont Ste.
Maxence, where it will entrain in its turn. The route to be followed
can be decided upon by agreement with the G.O.C. 6th Army. Admitting
that the relief can be carried out on the night, October 5th-6th, the
3rd Corps, taking three days to march to the neighbourhood of Pont
Ste. Maxence, will be ready to entrain on October 9th.
"With regard to the movement of the 1st Army Corps it is impossible at
present to decide the date at which its withdrawal can be carried out.
Indeed, its withdrawal will depend on the general situation, the
difficulty of bringing up other troops to be taken from the front to
replace the 1st Army Corps, and finally on the tasks imposed on the
railway service, but the Commander-in-Chief begs once more to assure
Marshal French that he will make the greatest efforts to concentrate
the whole of the British Army in the north. He takes note that the
Commander of the British troops wishes to see his forces concentrated
with all speed.
"The 1st Cavalry Division will move by march route as has
already been done by Gen. Gough's Division.
"Regarding the detrainment area, Lille was first of all regarded as
the centre, but in view of existing circumstances it appears difficult
to determine as yet in what area the 2nd Corps now in course of
transport can be detrained. This Corps will have finished detraining
on the 8th and will be ready to act on the 9th. The most favourable
area for detraining appears to be that of St. Omer-Hazebrouck.
"The 3rd Corps, having been withdrawn from the front on the 6th and
entraining on the 9th, will be detrained on the 12th in the same area.
It will be ready to act on the 13th.
"Lastly, the Commander-in-Chief reiterates the request already made in
the note of October 1st that the 7th British Division may be
disembarked at Boulogne with the least possible delay. As soon as this
Division has been assembled, it will move by march route to join the
2nd and 3rd Corps. No precise indications can be given as to the date
on which this junction will be effected, as it will depend on the date
of arrival in France of the 7th Division, which date the
Commander-in-Chief is not in a position to decide.
"The Indian Divisions will join the British Army as soon as desired by
Marshal French.
"In order to strengthen the forces in this part of the theatre of
operations the request made to the French Government by His Excellency
Lord Kitchener has been responded to by sending to Dunkirk two
Territorial Divisions, one going from Havre by sea and the other
railed from Paris without in any way retarding the movement of the
British Army.
"These are the dispositions that have been made with regard
to the movements to be carried out in the immediate future. The
Commander-in-Chief, however, wishes to lay particular stress on the
following considerations. The operations in progress necessitate the
constant reinforcement of our left wing by troops taken away from
different portions of the front. The movements carried out at Marshal
French's request, which can only be effected in succession will
result--
"_Firstly._--In temporarily dividing the British Army in two.
"_Secondly._--In preventing for nearly ten days all movement of
French troops to the north and, in consequence, creating a
serious delay in the realisation of the operations contemplated.
"Now it is of capital importance for the success of the operations
that all movements made to the north, either English or French, should
immediately contribute to the same object, viz., to arrest and
outflank the German right wing. The result will certainly not be
achieved should His Excellency Marshal French propose to defer his
action until all his forces are concentrated. It would be advantageous
to have time enough to complete the English movement so that the
British Army could be engaged all at once, but it appears certain that
events will decide otherwise.
"The Commander-in-Chief may be forced to ask Marshal French to
co-operate with British Divisions as they detrain and without waiting
for the whole of the detrainment to be carried out. He would be
obliged to consider the case of the retreat of the left wing, the
extent of which he would not be in a position to limit, if with the
object of carrying out a concentration which, though certainly
advantageous, is not indispensable, some Divisions remained inactive
at the time when the fate of the campaign was being decided; moreover,
it is to be noted that the enemy on his side engages as he detrains;
we cannot act differently.
"The Commander-in-Chief feels sure that His Excellency Marshal French
will be good enough to examine this question of capital importance
with all the attention it deserves, and will take the necessary action
without which the gravest consequences must be faced.
"To sum up, the Commander-in-Chief has the honour to submit to His
Excellency Marshal French the following points on which he begs His
Excellency may be good enough to give a prompt reply:--
"1. Transport of the 2nd Army Corps to the same area, Hazebrouck,
completed the 9th.
"2. Transport of the 3rd Corps to the same area, completed the
13th.
"3. Lastly, and this is the essential point, without which the
fate of the campaign may be compromised, the possibility of
engaging the British Divisions in the north as they arrive,
without waiting for the British Army to be concentrated.
"The task of the British Army now in the general operations should,
therefore, be constantly to prolong the general line as it detrains,
in order to outflank the enemy and thus to join hands with the Belgian
Army.
"The support of our Cavalry Corps operating in the northern area will
always be given."
I answered thus:--
"Sir John French has duly received His Excellency's note 791 for which
he begs to offer him his best thanks.
"The arrangements therein proposed are perfectly
satisfactory, and the _role_ which the British Army can fulfil on the
left flank of the Allied Force will, Sir John French hopes and
believes, tend best to the efficient progress of the campaign.
"He can assure His Excellency of the very best support of the British
Army at all times; and, should necessity arise, the various units, as
they arrive in the new area, will on no account be held back to await
a general concentration, if and when their immediate action is
demanded by the exigencies of the campaign.
"Sir John French would like to point out particularly to His
Excellency that the possibility of his having to engage his forces,
unit by unit, before the entire force is concentrated, offers another
great reason why it is most essential that the relief of the 1st Army
Corps from its present position should be effected with the least
possible delay.
"Whilst feeling quite assured that His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief will do his utmost to effect this, Sir John French
feels that it is most necessary to insist upon the vast importance of
the presence of all the British Forces on the left flank at the
earliest possible moment.
"His Majesty's Government feel great anxiety as to the condition of
the Fortress of Antwerp, the fall of which stronghold would have
far-reaching consequences, political, material and moral.
"Sir John French is now in close daily communication with the Belgian
Commandant of the Fortress, and if he can daily assure him that there
is no delay in a movement which must have the ultimate effect of
relieving the situation at Antwerp, so long as that place is able to
hold out, it should prove a great encouragement to the garrison.
"Sir John French will address another note later on to His Excellency
on the subject of the Indian Divisions.
"Sir John French wishes to call His Excellency's attention to the fact
that the 2nd Corps will not complete its detrainment until the evening
of the 9th instant, and therefore will not be ready to act until the
10th instant. In his memorandum His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief
states as follows, referring to the 2nd Corps: This Corps will have
finished detraining on the 8th and will be ready to act on the 9th."
Antwerp fell on the 9th October and was followed by the retirement of
the Belgian Army to the line of the Yser.
The 7th Infantry and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were not placed under my
orders until October 10th. From that date, however, I will commence to
chronicle their doings.