DISCUSSION OF KINSHIP
I
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THIS CONCEPT
It is undoubtedly one of the most valuable discoveries arrived at by
modern sociological science that each institution varies in accordance
with the social environment in which it is found. A given institution
or social form (like the family, the state, the nation, the church)
appears under various forms in different societies, and among peoples
with a very low culture only rudiments thereof may be expected. This
point of view, applied to marriage and the family, has led some writers
to the assumption of forms as much opposed to those usual in our
societies, as promiscuity and group marriage is opposed to individual
marriage and the family. Nevertheless, although the variability and
multiplicity of forms of marriage and family were acknowledged, the
concepts applied to them were still the old ones, directly borrowed
from our own society and formed upon the facts found amongst ourselves.
In particular the sociologically untrained ethnographers comprehended
the phenomena of kinship only under our own social concepts, judged
them according to our own moral standard, and described them with
words the meaning of which ought to have been defined when applied
to a new case; nevertheless these terms have been nearly always used
by ethnographers in the same sense in which we use them amongst
ourselves, _i. e._ as expressing ideas of community of blood through
procreation.[513] That this is quite erroneous will be shown below.
How far the idea of kinship changes from society to society, what
are its essential invariable features, and what are the variable
elements--these are the problems that must be set forth.
[513] Compare, for instance, Morgan, _Systems_, pp. 108
_sqq._ For other examples see below, pp. 199 _sqq._ Sir
Laurence Gomme writes: "One of our greatest difficulties,
indeed, is the indiscriminate use of kinship terms by our
descriptive authorities."--_Loc. cit._, p. 235.
The inadequacy of our ideas of kinship as applied to lower societies
has been often felt by those ethnographers who wished to enter deeper
into the problems of kinship among a given people. They have found the
greatest difficulty in conveying to a European reader the meaning of
different terms of relationship. While warning the reader to put aside
our (the modern European) ideas of kinship, they have hardly succeeded
in giving any definite and clear concept instead. The reasons for
this failure are simple: our ideas of kinship are defined by certain
facts which are not to be found in the given primitive society. In
order to define kinship so as to fit the latter, the author ought to
bring forward a series of facts, playing a part analogous in the given
society to that played by the essential defining elements amongst us.
But it is by no means easy to know among which facts to look for such
analogous, defining elements. And here again arises the necessity of
a general definition of kinship, one which would afford indications
in what direction to search for social facts giving a right idea of
kinship in any given society. Such a general definition would be like
an algebraic formula, having its constant and its variable terms; if
for the latter special data be inserted (in this instance the special
conditions proper to the given society), the special value for any
given case is obtained (namely the special concept of kinship proper
to the given society). And it should also be indicated within what
range the variables should be taken; in other words, in what facts the
elements which specifically determine kinship in the given society
must be looked for. The practical value of such a general definition of
kinship is obvious. On the one hand it indicates the constant elements
in kinship common to all societies; on the other hand it indicates the
general character of the variable elements, and the way in which they
must be looked for and worked into the general formula.
By the word kinship, roughly speaking, is denoted a series of family
relationships (those of parents to children, brothers to sisters,
etc.), all of which consist of a set of extremely complex phenomena.
They are made up of the most heterogeneous elements: physiological
(birth, procreation, suckling, etc.), social (community of living,
of interests, social norms, etc.), and psychological (different ways
in which these relations are conceived, different moral ideas, and
different types of feelings). Special care must be taken to select in
all these elements the essential ones, as an omission would be just
as fatal for the investigations as an overburdening with secondary
elements. Moreover, it would be specially valuable to look at all these
heterogeneous determining elements from the same point of view, and
view them all under one and the same aspect. Leaving on one side the
purely physiological problem of kinship,[514] it appears necessary
to give a sociological view of kinship, _i. e._ to show the social
bearing of physiological facts as well as of psychological elements.
But it appears also necessary to view the whole of the phenomena of
kinship from the psychological point of view; that is, to show how the
sociological and physiological facts of kinship are reflected in the
"collective mind" of the given society.
[514] This would be the place to point out the biological
meaning of the social aspects of kinship and family;
whether, _e. g._ the different social regulations of sexual
intercourse, which in higher societies afford the basis
to kinship, the different forms of family and kinship are
the expression of biological laws. How far such would be
possible could only be decided on the basis of a biological
knowledge which the present writer does not possess.
Besides for other reasons (adduced below) this appears necessary,
because one of the most important scientific uses that has been made
of the different human systems of kinship is one that presupposes a
certain definite meaning, as given to the terms of kinship in very
low societies. In Morgan's deductions a very important part is played
by the assumption that kinship is always understood in terms of
consanguinity; in particular that it was understood thus by primitive
man; that in all (even the lowest) societies all ideas of kinship were
essentially based upon the community of blood, established in the case
of the mother by her share in bearing, in that of the father by his
part in procreation. Only by assuming that these facts were known to
the lowest, prehistoric savages, could Morgan draw inferences from
systems of kinship terms about the forms of sexual intercourse. If,
on the other hand, the relation between sexual intercourse and birth
escaped the knowledge of primitive men, they could not have based their
idea of kinship upon community of blood between father and offspring;
hence there could be no connection between forms of sexual intercourse
and forms of kinship as conceived by primitive man. Whether there could
be connection between marriage, defined sociologically, and kinship
is another and more complicated problem. In any case Morgan uses
throughout his book the word consanguinity, and he defines it as the
tie of common blood arising from the sexual act. In other words he sets
forth the problem in a simplified and incorrect form. The question how
kinship may be conceived in a given society, especially in a low one,
naturally presents itself as a very important point of investigation.
As in the following pages there will be question more or less
exclusively of the individual relation between parents and children,
the present discussion may be fittingly restricted to the individual
parental kinship in Australia. In the second part of this chapter facts
giving some insight into the aboriginal collective ideas of kinship are
set forth; and in the following chapter other different facts will
be brought forward in order to complete the definition of _individual
parental kinship_. But in accordance with what has been just said, it
is needful to have some guiding principle in collecting this material,
and this will now be looked for. This discussion, being only concerned
with the Australian facts, does not pretend to be complete, but perhaps
if the results are worked out so as to suit our modern European concept
of kinship as well as the Australian one, it might, should it be
correct, be applicable also to other societies.[515] Let us now proceed
to give the general definition of kinship and in the first place to
indicate which are its constant, uniform factors found in all societies.
[515] Of course by result is meant a general formula for
kinship.
Amongst the heterogeneous factors which together make up parental
kinship, the physiological facts appear to be the most constant, for
the natural process of procreation is in all human societies the
same. But the social consequences of this process vary very widely
according to other variable elements, as will appear clearly below
in our discussion of consanguinity. Part of them only, together with
some social elements, may be taken as the uniform, constant basis
of kinship, such as must serve for the first point of departure in
an attempt to discuss more in detail the kinship in any society. It
appears probable that this basis is given by the existence of a group
formed by a woman, her husband, and the children whom she has borne,
suckled and reared. The existence of such a group will be considered
as the necessary and sufficient condition for _individual parental
kinship_. Where such a group exists we are justified in affirming that
individual parental kinship exists, although it is not yet completely
defined thereby; further facts must be adduced in order to complete the
definition. Those further facts are precisely the variable terms in the
general formula of kinship; it remains still to indicate their general
character. But a few words must be first said about the constant
factors of kinship just mentioned.
They consist in the existence of the individual family group as
determined by individual marriage and by individual motherhood.
Individual motherhood means that the same woman who gave birth to a
child stands to it in a special close relation in its later life also:
she suckles it and rears it, and she is bound to him or her by the
manifold ties resulting from the community of life and community of
interests. This woman is bound on the other hand to a man by individual
marriage; and thereby her children are bound to him also; and the
mother, her husband, and her children form the social unit called the
individual family. The existence of such a unit is to be established by
showing its different social functions, and the different ways in which
its solidarity and individuality are marked in a given society. It is
clear that the position of the father is in this way first established
socially only, as the husband of the children's mother. Nevertheless
it must be borne in mind that thus his relation to the children is
clearly marked; and that this is only a preliminary, so to say formal,
determination of fatherhood, which in all societies appears to be much
more materially defined by other factors, discussed hereafter.
The existence of the individual family as a social unit, based upon the
physiological facts of maternity, the social factor of marriage and
other social factors, are thus chosen as the basis upon which we may
proceed to analyze more in detail the individual parental relation.
Whether this basis exists in all human societies and forms what was
called above the constant, invariable elements of parental kinship,
may remain an open question. This could only be answered correctly
_a posteriori_, on the basis of a series of special researches in
many societies. The existence of individual motherhood, as this word
is defined here, seems to obtain in the majority of human societies
(or even in all of them). Nevertheless, as pointed out above,[516]
even this point cannot be treated as self-evident. This applies in
still higher degree to individual marriage, which has often been
denied as regards many societies.[517] In this place we have mainly
to keep before our eyes the Australian society and our own society,
the latter of which affords, so to say, the heuristic principle,
the clue to the understanding of the former. As far as those two
societies are concerned, our choice appears to be the right one, and
the social-physiological basis mentioned above contains the essential
common elements of kinship in both societies.
[516] In reference to Dr. Rivers' article, compare pp. 6, 7.
[517] In some cases, when the position of the father is
very subordinate in the family and his relation to the
mother and her children is a very loose one--it seems
doubtful whether the existence of the individual family
(in the sense here defined) can be accepted (compare, for
examples of such peoples, Dr. Westermarck, _H.H.M._,
p. 109, and Sir Laurence Gomme, _loc. cit._, pp. 231, 232).
In these cases the necessary condition for individual
_paternal_ kinship according to our theory would be lacking.
The existence of individual marriage and its legal, sexual and
psychological aspects have been discussed and established in the
preceding chapters, as far as Australia is concerned. A discussion
on individual motherhood will be given below. The existence of the
individual family group in Australia, based upon individual marriage
and upon individual motherhood, is the subject of the remaining
chapters of this study. So that the existence of this physiological and
social basis of kinship may be taken as granted.
Bearing now in mind that what will be said hereafter applies in the
first place to Australia, it may be said that in the physiological
and social basis of kinship adopted above, the minimum of conditions
necessary for the application of the idea of individual kinship was
enumerated. But this minimum is not sufficient to determine this idea
completely in any given society. By studying only the social facts
which determine the individuality of family life within the society, we
should not exhaust all the features and essential aspects of parental
kinship in any society. The existence of the individual family merely
indicates unambiguously that individual parental kinship exists
in the given society. For this social unit having a deep analogy
with our own individual family, the relation between the members of
both these social units must also have some deep resemblance. But
to exaggerate this resemblance would be as erroneous as to deny it.
Besides the features common both to our parental kinship and to that
of the Australian, there are also those which differentiate these
two relationships. They must be sought for in the differences in the
_social conditions_, which may even modify the physiological basis of
kinship, as for instance when physical fatherhood is in one society
established beyond doubt by exclusive sexual appropriation, while in
the other there can be no question of it, owing to sexual communism.
The variations in the general social conditions obviously also affect
the purely sociological side of kinship. To point this out clearly, it
is enough to mention that each relation is subject to the normative
influences of the society in the midst of which it exists, and these
norms and their sanction vary with the general social structure.
The variable elements in parental kinship must be also looked for in
the different elements of the _collective mind_, connected with the
parental relationship; in other words, in the different _collective
ideas_ and _feelings_ which have parental kinship for their centre.
Moreover, as mentioned above, there are reasons why the knowledge of
the collective idea of kinship is sociologically important. It may be
emphasized here that we should cripple and curtail our knowledge if
we arbitrarily abstained from inquiring what influence the collective
knowledge as to procreation, consanguinity, affinity, etc., may have
upon the social aspect of the relation in question.
The same thing may be said of another domain of collective mentality:
that is, of the feelings involved in parental kinship. The type of
feelings underlying this relationship may vary with the society, in
the same way as these feelings vary with each individual case in
any given society. And as these feelings essentially determine the
character of parental kinship in any given society, it appears that
the discussion of this point cannot be omitted. Thus into the general
formula of kinship there must enter also the psychological elements:
collective ideas, expressing in a given society what is kinship,
what are its legal, moral and customary aspects; and the collective
feelings prevailing in a given society. From the interaction of these
psychological elements with different variable social elements arise
the more special, peculiar factors which define kinship in any given
society. In other words, the variable elements in the general formula
of kinship are seen to arise chiefly from the collective psychological
interpretation and valuation of some of the physiological and social
facts underlying parental kinship.
To sum up, it may be said that parental kinship is the personal tie
obtaining between members of the _parental group_ or individual
_family_, and like all other personalties it must be further determined
in each society by the characteristic _collective feelings_ and
_collective ideas_ which in the given society give it its specific
meaning.[518] This is that general formula of kinship which will yield
us what we have demanded of it--that is, an indication of the facts for
which to look in any given society. As the facts referred to in the
first part of the above definition (the establishment of the existence
of the family unit) are dealt with in the remaining chapters, it is
necessary to discuss only the second part of the definition.
[518] This definition may appear a commonplace and a
truism, a mere formulation of what is obvious to every
one at first sight. But it is liable to this objection
only when taken formally, _i. e._ when only its _form_ is
considered, because it contains in the words _parental
group_ (individual family) the substance of all that has
been said in the preceding pages about this social unit;
and the other terms of the definition (_collective ideas_
and _collective feelings_) will be determined more in
detail in the following discussion.
The influence upon kinship of the beliefs and ideas as to procreation
appears quite plainly upon an analysis of the concept of consanguinity,
and to this we may devote a few words.
Parental kinship is in our society conceived invariably and
exclusively in terms of _consanguinity_,[519] or, speaking more
explicitly, parental kinship is conceived as established by the tie of
common blood, resulting from birth (maternal kinship) or procreation
(paternal kinship). Of course the mere physiological fact does not
establish kinship in its full extent, with all its personal, emotional,
social and legal aspects. It is only when the physiological facts of
procreation or birth are sanctioned by society, in other words when
they are consummated in legal marriage, that the children are full
kinsmen of both their parents. Society takes all facts which are of
vital importance for itself under its own supervision; and consequently
the important facts of propagation are subject to the control of
society, which regulates them by a series of religious, legal,
customary and conventional norms, all of which are also necessary
conditions and essential features of full parental kinship. But this
sanction once granted, the tie of common blood is conceived as the main
source of all mutual duties and moral and legal obligations; and from
this also outflow the feelings of love, attachment, reverence, and so
forth, which are in our society the essential features of parental
kinship. Once a man knows that a child, which he considered his own, is
in reality not begotten by him, undoubtedly all his feelings for this
child are affected, and, under certain conditions, its legal position
may be modified. The two conditions for full parental kinship in our
society are (1) that the child be the real physiological offspring of
both presumed parents; (2) that it be legally begotten or its birth
legalized.
[519] Legal adoption being set apart as a case which only
partly establishes the kinship relations.
In our society the line of distinction between physiological
consanguinity and social consanguinity is quite clear; the one is a
mere physiological fact,[520] the other the social acknowledgment of
this fact and all its consequences, subject to certain norms, laid down
by society.
[520] It seems hardly necessary to emphasize that for
physiological consanguinity _as such_, pure and simple,
there is no room in sociological science.
There are two separate sets of circumstances in which we may speak
of consanguinity: (1) the existence of social institutions, which
allow us to trace the physiological blood ties (_e. g._ monogamy or
harem institutions), in which case we can speak of the existence of
physiological consanguinity as obtaining between the members of the
individual family. (2) The existence of a social acknowledgment of the
facts of procreation as creating ties of individual personal kinship,
in which case we may speak of social consanguinity. If neither of these
conditions are fulfilled, then it would be quite meaningless to speak
of consanguinity.[521]
[521] Keeping to the definition of this word as given
above. It is a question of mere convention whether we
call the general relationship not necessarily based upon
ideas of community of blood _kinship_, as is done here,
or whether we call it _social_ in opposition to _physical
kinship_, as does M. A. van Gennep. What is essential is
to point out that our peculiarly European idea of kinship,
which necessarily involves consanguinity, cannot be applied
to other societies without discussion, but that it is
only a special case of a more general concept of kinship
which may be made up of quite different elements. It would
seem convenient to reserve the word consanguinity for
relationship based upon community of blood, and to use the
word kinship to denote the parental relationship in general.
Now let us see whether these conditions are to be found in all human
societies. That both are found in the majority of the more highly
developed societies appears beyond doubt. But this seems not to be
the case in the lower societies. Even a superficial glance at them is
sufficient to prove it. Whereas, in some of the lowest peoples known
conjugal fidelity seems to be the rule,[522] and consequently the
physiological tie of blood between children and both their parents
is secured, in other societies of low culture the sexual laxity is so
great that there is no possibility at all of tracing the descent of a
child from any individual man.[523] This applies in the first place
to the majority of the Australian tribes, as is shown in the chapter
on sexual matters. In consequence, it may be said that in many low
societies, and especially in some of the Australian tribes, there is no
possibility of speaking of physiological consanguinity as regards the
father.
[522] Dr. Westermarck writes: "There are numerous savage
and barbarous peoples among whom sexual intercourse out
of wedlock is of rare occurrence; unchastity at least on
the part of the woman being looked upon as a disgrace and
even as a crime" (Westermarck, _H.H.M._, p. 61). In support
of his opinion he adduces some forty cases where chastity
is considered a virtue. Besides, the Veddas (according to
Sarrazins and Seligmann) and the Andamanese (according to
Man) may be quoted as peoples by whom absolute marital
fidelity is required.
[523] For various examples of various peoples besides the
Australians, see Westermarck, pp. 71, 81. Compare also
Post, _Ethnologische Jurisprudenz_, i. pp. 17 _sqq._, and
Dargun, _loc. cit._, pp. 9 _sqq._
How does the case stand with the social importance attributed to the
facts of procreation? Here the variation seems to be still greater.
This can be very well exemplified by the Australian material. Over the
greater part of the continent the father's share in procreation is not
known. There cannot be any social acknowledgment of it. Consanguinity
in its social sense does not exist. In some tribes of South-East
Australia, on the other hand, the mother's share in procreation is
under-rated; the father is considered to be the only consanguineous
relative; the child is the father's offspring only, the mother being
merely its nurse. Here the consanguineous relation between mother and
child is considerably reduced in social importance, and consanguinity
as it appears to the social mind is purely paternal. It may be said,
therefore, that paternal kinship in the Centre and the North of the
continent and maternal kinship in the South-Eastern tribes cannot be
called consanguinity (in the social sense of this word), although in
both cases very close kinship exists, as will appear from a detailed
discussion hereafter.
These examples show clearly that it would be incorrect to treat
physiological consanguinity as a constant and indispensable constituent
of parental kinship.
Besides these Australian examples[524] there may be adduced many cases
from other societies in which the ties of blood play no part in the
collective ideas of kinship. The Naudowessies have the curious idea
that their offspring are indebted to their father for their souls, the
invisible part of their essence, and to the mother for their corporeal
and visible part.[525] Here the father's part in procreation was
probably known, but the interpretation thereof was not the correct
physiological one, but one that created, so to say, a spiritual
connection as the bond of paternal kinship, whereas maternal kinship
was conceived in terms of consanguinity. On the other hand, "according
to Kafir ideas a child descends chiefly, though not exclusively,
from the father"[526]--a belief analogous to that of the South-East
Australians. The same belief was held in several higher societies
(Egyptians, Hindoos, Greeks).[527] Dargun has made a list of peoples
among whom the (social) father of the children is quite indifferent as
to whether they are really begotten by him.[528] Among the Todas, where
the determination of paternity is quite out of the question, owing to
their polyandry, fatherhood is determined only by the performance of a
conventional ceremony (the rite of _pursütpimi_, or handing over to the
pregnant woman a miniature bow and arrow). This constitutes fatherhood;
the man who has performed this ceremony is the (social) father of
the child, even if it were certain that he had not begotten it.[529]
Another interesting case was discovered by Dr. Rivers amongst the Banks
Islanders. There fatherhood is determined by the fact of paying the
midwife.
[524] Which are dealt with at length in the second part of
this chapter.
[525] Westermarck, _loc. cit._, p. 105.
[526] _Ibid._, p. 106.
[527] _Ibid._
[528] _Loc. cit._, pp. 9-18.
[529] Rivers, _The Todas_, pp. 517 _sqq._
But the most noteworthy cases in regard to the present subject are
those where fatherhood in its social sense is not consanguineous owing
to the ignorance of the physiological laws of reproduction (a state
of things mentioned already as obtaining in Central Australia). This
ignorance is of general sociological importance, because there are
well-founded reasons for believing that it was once universal amongst
primitive mankind, as may be held to be proved by Mr. E. S. Hartland
in his thorough treatise on _Primitive Paternity_. For the detailed
argument the reader must be referred to this fundamental work.[530] Mr.
Sidney Hartland has besides drawn sociological conclusions from those
facts in their bearing upon paternal kinship. In Chapter IV of the
first volume he gives numerous examples of peoples among whom there is
no tie of consanguinity between father and son.[531]
[530] Mr. Sidney Hartland has given an exceedingly
exhaustive collection of stories "of birth other than what
we know as the only natural cause"; of customs in which
the "means to which in these stories birth is attributed
are or have been actually adopted for the production of
children"; and he has compared this folkloristic material
with the Australian beliefs. Besides this weight of
facts, the author adduces other important reasons why
it is extremely probable that "such ignorance was once
greater and more widespread than now." The book of Mr.
Sidney Hartland is undoubtedly the most thorough and
most scientific discussion of the present problem. The
strength of his arguments and the mass of evidence strongly
support his conclusions. The contrary opinion, viz. that
the Australian nescience is an accidental result of some
animistic beliefs, an opinion chiefly represented by
Mr. A. Lang, seems to be based more on speculation than
on facts. The view that the ignorance of paternity was
widespread in primitive mankind is shared by Prof. Frazer,
M. A. van Gennep, and Frhr. von Reitzenstein. (For references,
see below, p. 208, footnote 1.)
[531] How far Mr. Hartland's results appear incomplete on
the sociological side will be discussed hereafter.
To ascertain the influence of physiological ties of blood on this
relation in a given society it is needful to know the way in which
they present themselves to the aboriginal mind. That is, we must know
the collective ideas of a given society on the facts of procreation.
Do they know, or do they not know, the father's part in procreation?
But this is not sufficient. Even if they know a certain physiological
fact, they may not acknowledge its bearing upon kinship, they may
attach no importance to its social aspect. So it is with the fact
of physiological maternity in the South-East Australian tribes and
with paternity in the cases quoted by Dargun. And it happens very
often that in peoples where the causal connection between copulation
and pregnancy is well known, fatherhood is by no means determined by
its physiological aspect. Not only the collective knowledge of the
physiological facts, but also the collective attitude towards them,
must therefore be taken into consideration.[532] In short, it may be
said that _physiological_ consanguinity has no direct bearing upon
social facts.
[532] Sir Laurence Gomme writes: "There is a wide
difference between the mere physical fact of having a
mother and father, and the political fact of using this
kinship for social organization. Savages who have not
learned the political significance have but the scantiest
appreciation of the physical fact. The Australians, for
instance, have no term to express the relationship between
mother and child. This is because the physical fact is of
no significance...." (_loc. cit._, p. 232).
To define consanguinity in its social meaning, the collective ideas
held by a given society on the facts of procreation must be considered.
Consanguinity, therefore, is the set of relations involved by the
collective ideas under which the facts of procreation are viewed in a
given society. And it must be borne in mind that these ideas express
not only the purely theoretical views of the social mind on the facts
of procreation; they also involve different emotional elements, and
especially the social importance given to these facts by society.
Consanguinity (as a sociological concept) is therefore not the
physiological bond of common blood; it is the social acknowledgment and
interpretation of it.
It may be said, therefore, that consanguinity is not always considered
as the essence of kinship. If now we wish to determine what are the
common features of the different ideas which in different societies
define kinship, the only answer is that the said ideas affirm in
one way or another a very close, intimate tie between offspring
and parents. These ideas may refer kinship to physiological facts
(consanguinity as found in the major part of human societies); or they
may base kinship on the performance of a quite conventional ceremony
(Todas, Banks Islanders); or they may affirm a very close tie between
parent and child, on the base of some religious or magic belief
(spiritual tie, transmission of soul: the Naudoweissies and some
Australian tribes, as will be seen below). It is evident, therefore,
that the general idea of kinship cannot be construed in terms of any
of these special sets of ideas. The essential features that must be
claimed for these ideas (_i. e._ those ranged in the class of kinship
ideas) are: (1) that they must refer to the relation between child
and father or mother;[533] and (2) that they must affirm an intimate
bond of union of some kind between the parties involved. As may be
easily conceived, it will be difficult in very low societies to get
hold of these ideas, that is, to obtain the exact answer to the
question, "What is kinship?" It is now impossible even to measure
exactly the difficulty of getting a precise answer to this question,
as ethnographers have never paid special attention to this point.
Nevertheless, in Australia we shall be able to get at least some
glimpses, which are of the highest theoretical interest. And even the
negative result--that the idea of consanguinity must be considered
wanting in the majority of Australian tribes--is of considerable
theoretical value.
[533] The terms _child_, _father_ and _mother_ being
defined first broadly as explained above, pp. 172 _sqq._
Besides the general question, "What is considered as the source of
parental (maternal and paternal) kinship?" we may ask questions about
the various other ideas connected with kinship. Here come in the legal,
moral, and customary ideas, by which society exercises its normative
power in reference to the said relation. Some of these are expressed
in different social functions.[534] Others may be reached by the study
of beliefs, traditions, customs and other forms of folk-lore. The
well-known customs of the _couvade_ are one of the typical functions
of the father, in which there is an expression of a deep connection
of a magical kind between the father and his offspring. Whatever
explanation of these customs may be given,[535] it cannot be denied
that they are based upon the idea of a very intimate tie between the
two individuals involved, and that this tie is conceived as being of a
mystical character.
[534] As an example may be quoted the "functions of
kinship" described by Dr. Rivers for the Torres Straits
Islanders. _Cambridge Exp. to Torres Straits_, v. pp. 144
_sqq._, and vi. pp. 100, 101. Also by Dr. Seligmann for the
Melanesians of New Guinea, see passage under this heading
in chap. iii. and chap. xxxvii. _op. cit._
[535] Perhaps the best one is given by Dargun, _loc. cit._,
pp. 22 _sqq._, where many other opinions are also quoted
and criticized.
There is also a series of social rules which regulate the social
position of the offspring according to that of its parents. This group
of rules might appropriately be called _descent_ in the social sense
of this word.[536] In the Australian societies, _e. g._ the membership
of different social groups--as the local group, the totemic clan, the
phratry, the class--is determined by the membership of one of the
parents of the given individual. And many authors speak of tribes with
paternal and maternal descent. It must be borne in mind, nevertheless,
that in order to use the word descent in a definite sense it is always
necessary to add what social group is meant. For it is possible that
membership in the local group is determined by the father, membership
of the phratry by the mother, and membership in the clan by neither of
them. The facts of descent do not seem to play a very important rôle
and are not suitable to be chosen as the most important feature of
kinship. The facts of inheritance also have not very much influence
upon kinship (compare below, pp. 290, 291).
[536] The word descent is often used without any
definition. Mr. E. S. Hartland, _op. cit._, i. p. 258,
uses it in a sense synonymous with kinship. Mr. Thomas,
too, does not define the meaning of this word, but he uses
it more or less in the same way as is done in the text.
Compare Thomas, _loc. cit._, pp. 11, 12 _sqq._
As it is easy to see, looking at our own ideas on parental kinship,
all the normative ideas, whether religious, moral or legal, are in
close connection with the central, basic idea, _i. e._ in the case
of our society, the idea of consanguinity. And these normative ideas
are brought by the collective mind into causal connection with the
central idea of community of blood.[537] It would be the ideal of
sociological research as regards our present subject if we could
bring in any given society all the normative ideas into such a causal
dependence upon the central idea, and explain how they are conceived
by the collective mind as the outgrowth of this root idea; thus
showing how all the legal, moral and customary aspects converge on
the fundamental concept of kinship. Unhappily, in low societies the
imperfection of ethnographic material would frustrate any attempt at
such an enterprise. In Australia our knowledge of these aspects--moral,
legal and customary--is very scanty. Although they are all undoubtedly
in quite a rudimentary state, careful investigation would possibly
disclose many points of extreme interest.
[537] It is impossible to develop here this thought, which
would require a volume if regard be had to the complexity
of the fact. The references to higher societies are given
by way of illustration only.
One other problem must be discussed here more in detail, owing to
its great theoretical importance, viz. the legal aspect of parental
kinship. We have defined above the meaning of the word _legal_.[538]
In connection with what has been said, we may affirm that the _legal_
is only one of the many aspects of kinship; that legal ideas, as
far as known for any given society, must be taken into account when
defining kinship, but that the latter cannot possibly be reduced
to its legal aspect only. And it is still more incorrect[539] to
represent physiological consanguinity and legal power over the child
as two mutually exclusive sets of facts beyond which there can be no
determination of parental kinship. We find the opinion expressed by
many authors, especially with regard to Australia, that where-ever the
tie binding parent and child was not constituted by the acknowledgment
of consanguinity, that there always it was based on legal principles
such as potestas, authority, _Machtstellung_, or other similar ones.
[538] See above, p. 11.
[539] Comparing what we have said above on consanguinity.
The incorrectness of taking only these two alternatives is shown by the
three following considerations: (1) Such a view overlooks the facts
discussed below, which show that there is actual kinship based on
ideas neither physiological nor legal. (2) This way of interpreting
facts operates with very indeterminate concepts, for we nowhere find
any explanation of how to take the general term _legal_ in connection
with a given aboriginal society, and still less are we told how such
legal concepts as _potestas_, paternal authority, etc., are to be
applied to a given aboriginal society. (3) If a definition of _law_ or
_legal_ be given, it would plainly be seen that it is quite erroneous
to consider any of these concepts as defining parental kinship. This
is quite clear if we use the definition of _legal_ given above, p. 11.
But even allowing a broad margin for the variations which may result
from a varying definition of _legal_, it may be safely stated that in
whatever way we might try to define this word, our definition must
always involve factors of social pressure, stress and authority. In
other words, the relation between two individuals may be considered
_legal only_ when we imply that it is wholly and exclusively determined
by the outward regulating control of the society and by a potential
direct action of it. And in the case we are speaking of--that is,
the relation between parent and child in low societies--there can be
hardly any question of this. As will appear in the Australian case,
this relation is left quite to itself, and it is regulated by the
spontaneous emotional attitude of the father towards his child. No
factor of any outer pressure or constraint enters into it, at least we
are not informed of any such by the ethnographical evidence extant.
The collection and analysis of the statements on this point given
below[540] will show that there cannot be any question of potestas,
authority, proprietorship, or anything of the kind. Neither social
pressure nor economic interest bind the parents to their children, nor
does any motive of this kind enter into this relation.
[540] pp. 238 _sqq._; and pp. 254-256.
As this subject is very important, some examples of the mode of
reasoning just now criticized are set out here. These passages are
quoted from works of very distinguished writers to show that the
mistakes result from serious defects in sociological knowledge, and
not from any accidental causes. And they are taken from passages which
either refer exclusively to the Australian aboriginal society, or are
exemplified by Australian facts.
Mr. Thomas, at the end of a passage in which he discusses the
relation between the concepts of kinship and consanguinity says that
in Australia "some relation will almost certainly be found to exist
between the father and child; but it by no means follows that it
arises from any idea of consanguinity." So far we perfectly agree
with the reasoning of the author. But when Mr. Thomas adds, "In other
communities _potestas_[541] and not _consanguinity_[541] is held to
determine the relations of the husband of a woman to her offspring;
and it is a matter for careful inquiry how far the same holds good in
Australia, when the fact of fatherhood is in some cases asserted to be
unrecognized by the natives,"[542] we see that he falls into the error
of acknowledging only two possibilities: potestas or consanguinity.
It is true that he speaks of consanguinity as being modified by
native ideas, and that thus a social element is introduced into the
physiological concept of consanguinity. But we are still left to guess
how this social element is to be understood. And as pointed out above,
the relation between father and child in the tribes in question cannot
be considered as based upon consanguinity or community of blood,
whatever meaning we give to these words. Erroneous in any case is the
opposition of kinship and potestas, as if these two concepts were of
the same order, and could be considered as two equivalent categories
excluding each other. Whereas, as we saw, these two concepts are of
quite different order and cannot be treated as excluding or replacing
each other. Kinship is a very complicated social fact, very complex
in its sociological and psychological aspects. _Potestas_ is a legal
category, expressing a set of attributes and rights of the father
over his children. Potestas (or any analogous legal factor) may be
a constituent element of kinship in certain societies. It cannot
possibly replace kinship entirely.
[541] The italics are mine.
[542] _Loc. cit._, p. 5.
A similar unsatisfactory reasoning, it appears to me, is to be
found contained in a passage of the small but clearly and deeply
thought out work of the eminent sociologist, the late Prof. Dargun.
He stipulates as the most important postulate of studies in family
organization the discrimination between authority and consanguinity:
"Strenges Auseinanderhalten der Gewaltverhältnisse von den
Verwandtschaftsverhältnissen."[543] And he defines _Verwandtschaft_ as
a purely physiological fact: "die letztere, (Verwandtschaft) ist durch
das natürliche Blutband gegeben."[544] This is obviously an incorrect
definition for sociological use.[545] Equally unsatisfactory is the
definition given of the _Gewalt_ (potestas): Gewalt vom natürlichen
Blutband unabhängig kann "auf sehr verschiedene historische Wurzeln
zurückführen."[546] This definition is both negative and ambiguous,
excluding elements of consanguinity from potestas and assigning to
the latter "various historic roots." We might, therefore, expect to
find everything in this idea, but on the other hand such a definition
lacks precision and does not give either the direction in which to
look for the determining factors, or any criterion for our recognition
of the existence of personal kinship ties. Now our definition of
kinship responds to both these requirements when applied to the
Australian facts. Moreover we find in these phrases of Dargun the
alternative condemned above between authority and consanguinity, the
latter used here in the crude physiological sense. It may be noted
that in some passages of the book in question there are hints pointing
to the fact that the author felt the necessity of a psychological
definition of paternal kinship. So when he says, speaking of the
Australians: "Vollkommenste Vaterherrschaft, ja _selbst ausgesprochene
Vaterliebe_--gehen mit ebenso unbedingter Verwandtschaft--und
Stammeszugehörigkeit in mütterlicher Linie, Hand in Hand,"[547] we see
that here the author speaks of paternal love and states that this is
what determines the relation of father and child in Australia. When he
speaks afterwards of the father as: "Beschützer und Fürsorger"[548] of
his children, we see that he mentions purely personal factors of the
relation of father to child, such as we lay stress upon in speaking
of community of life and of interests. But still the author seems to
be entangled in his alternative between consanguinity and potestas.
So we read: "Wo zwischen dem Vater und seinen Kindern ein wirkliches
Verwandtschaftsverhältniss bestehet, dort muss auf die faktische
Zeugung durch den Hausvater entscheidendes Gewicht gelegt werden, und
umgekehrt überall wo Gleichgültigkeit gegen dieses Zeugungsverhältniss
an den Tag tritt, ist das Gewaltverhältniss des Vaters, noch nicht
zur Blutsverwandtschaft herangereift."[549] In this phrase there is
a complete oversight of the various actual ways in which an intimate
relation between father and child may be established, and which have
nothing to do either with consanguinity or with _patria potestas_.
[543] _Loc. cit._, p. 2.
[544] _Ibid._
[545] See above, p. 182.
[546] _Loc. cit._, p. 2.
[547] _Loc. cit._, p. 7.
[548] _Ibid._
[549] _Loc. cit._, p. 8.
In the new work of Prof. Frazer there are also some pages touching on
this point. Although he distinguishes well between the _physiological_
and _social consanguinity_,[550] still in another place he says,
speaking of the Central Tribes: "Denying as they do explicitly that
the child is begotten by the father, they can only regard him as the
consort, and in a sense as the owner of the mother, and, therefore,
as the owner of her progeny, just as a man who owns a cow owns also
the calf she brings forth. In short, it seems probable that a man's
children were viewed as his property long before they were recognized
as his offspring." It is impossible to agree with this opinion. The
word "property" can in no strict sense be applied to the relation
between father and child in Australia. Besides the author does not even
clearly indicate in what sense he uses the word; and this word appears
here only as a metaphor. Moreover, it is obvious that this opinion
implies opposition between consanguinity and the legal category of
"proprietorship," and contrasts the words "property" and "offspring."
[550] "Fatherhood to a Central Australian savage is a very
different thing from fatherhood to a civilized European. To
the European father it means that he has begotten a child
on a woman; to the Central Australian father it means that
the child is the offspring of a woman with whom he has a
right to cohabit, whether he has actually had intercourse
with her or not. To the European mind the tie between a
father and his child is physical; to the Central Australian
it is social."--_Loc. cit._, i. p. 236.
In fact, as we hinted above, and as we shall have opportunity of
discussing below[551] in connection with the evidence, there is little
ground for speaking of _authority_, _patria potestas_, "_ownership_"
or any similar attributes of the father as regards his children in
Australia. It must not be forgotten that these words are nearly
meaningless as long as they have not a legal sense. According to the
definition of _legal_ we should say that two people stand to each
other in a purely legal relation when certain norms are laid down
and actively sanctioned by society, which requires a definite mutual
behaviour and attitude on the part of each. It was pointed out above
that in Australia we have data allowing us to speak of the legal aspect
of social institutions and relations;[552] it appears improbable,
though, that there could be found any _purely_ legal relation. At any
rate, nothing of that sort determines or forms the substance of the
relation between father and child in Australia. If a father should
kill or abandon his child, he would, for all we know, be left quite
undisturbed. Nobody compels him to provide for its subsistence, to
protect it and care for it.[553] There are spontaneous elements that
bind him to it. And these spontaneous elements (to discover them will
be our task) determine his relation to his child. Undoubtedly this
kinship relation presents _some_ legal features, such as, for instance,
his right to dispose of his daughter in marriage (a right which in some
tribes is reported to belong to the mother or mother's brother). But
we know very little about it.[554] At any rate, there are only a few
occasions on which the relation in question involves any possibility of
social intervention.[555]
[551] pp. 186, 254.
[552] pp. 11 _sqq._
[553] In our society, if parents wish to abandon their
progeny while still dependent, they would be prevented by
the law from doing it, and compelled to perform a series
of duties and services, which usually spring from the
natural parental love. Thus we see that in our society
the relation between parents and children has much more
of a legal character than in Australia. Nevertheless it
would seem quite absurd to style this relation in our
society as essentially a legal one. It has only its legal
sides, which, comparatively, are seldom put into action,
especially while the children are not yet grown up, _i. e._
just during the period when the relationship in question is
the most important.
[554] Compare pp. 254 _sqq._
[555] The legal norms are an essential object of study
also from the standpoint that they may be the expression
of some important ideas held about kinship. Especially the
motivation of these norms, as given by the aborigines, may
be of high value in this respect. But obviously this does
not mean that kinship is a legal category.
Nobody ever doubts, as far as I can see, the fact that all personal
ties between two individuals consist not only of ideas, but also of
feelings, and that they are influenced no less by the feelings the two
individuals mutually inspire than by the ideas they form of each other.
To ascertain, _e. g._, if there be friendship between two people, one
seeks to know their feelings towards each other, as well as what they
think about each other. The relation between a parent and a child is
in our society chiefly determined by their mutual feelings. And in a
case where these feelings are absent, this relationship--in spite of
all legal, moral, and other factors which tend to maintain its form--is
deeply affected. It may be taken for granted that the sentimental side
most essentially determines in a given society any kind of personal
relationship. And in the same society the character of a given personal
relation--be it parental kinship or anything else--varies with the
intensity of the feeling and is essentially defined by the latter. It
may be accepted also, that in different societies the types of feelings
corresponding to given personal relations may vary according to the
society, and may define in each one this given relation in its most
essential character. In other words, the concept of collective feelings
can be applied as well as the concept of collective ideas.[556] By this
is to be understood certain types of feeling, which being dependent on
corresponding collective ideas possess the same essential character as
the latter: they exist in a certain society, and are transmitted from
generation to generation; they impose themselves on the individual
mind, and possess the character of necessity; they are deeply connected
with certain social institutions; in fact they stand to them in the
relation of functional dependence (in the mathematical sense). So, for
instance, it is clear that in the hypothetical primitive promiscuous
society, in which _ex hypothesi_ there would be no individual
relationship, the feelings of affection for the individual offspring
could not exist. We could only speak of the "collective feeling" of
_group affection_. So it seems to me that the relation of parents to
children cannot be treated with any approach to completeness without
seriously taking into account its emotional character.
[556] As is well known, we are indebted for the concept of
_collective ideas_ to the French school of Prof. Durkheim
and his associates. Throughout this study, and especially
in this chapter, I have done my best to avail myself of
this valuable methodological standpoint.
But even if the foremost importance of emotional elements and the
possibility of treating them as collective feelings were granted,
there is another objection to be met. Granted that these elements are
actually quite essential in determining family relations, it might be
objected that they are too shapeless and indeterminate in themselves
to be of any practical use in scientific research, especially if our
theories have to be based upon ethnographic observations in which the
more tangible and the more unambiguous the facts chosen, the less the
risk of being misled. Now, are not feelings of the most indeterminate
character, the most misleading, and the most difficult to ascertain?
In fact, the theory of feelings and emotions seems to be the least
developed in individual as well as in social psychology. Especially it
might be suggested that to pursue the investigation on double lines is
useless; feelings always find adequate expression in ideas, in fact
crystallize in them.[557] Without trying to give a general answer to
these objections, they may be met as regards the special case under
discussion. In Australia, as a matter of fact, they do not hold good.
For our knowledge of the sentimental side of parental kinship is much
better and much more determinate than our knowledge of any other aspect
of this relation.
[557] It seems needless to add that the deep connection and
mutual dependence of both feelings and ideas is perfectly
acknowledged. This is not the place, of course, to pursue
any detailed psychological investigations. I would like
to remind the reader that all that is said here must be
judged by its application to the Australian facts given
below. In higher societies where art, poetry and thought
lend themselves much more to the expression of feelings,
the former afford objective documents of the latter. In
low societies we must look for such objective documents
elsewhere, in different sets of facts.
It may be here indicated why our knowledge on this point may be
considered as a well-founded one. As stated below (pp. 249, 250) the
agreement between the statements as to parental feelings is quite an
exceptional one. Comparing it with the usual discrepancy between the
reports of different observers on many other points, which would appear
much less liable to any subjectivity, this complete agreement and
the relative exactness of our information is highly remarkable.[558]
It should be noted that on this point there is no extrinsic reason,
or secondary motive, that would make us suspect an artificial cause
of agreement. The point in question forms no part of any theory; it
affects no moral or racial susceptibilities. And there was no special
reason why so many observers should pay attention to it, and why they
all should state the same thing: viz. extreme love and fondness towards
the children on the part of the parents. This agreement shows that the
facts which the ethnographers had under observation were so expressive
of the underlying psychology, and they struck the writers so strongly
that they simply felt compelled to notice them. And observing closely
the facts through which those feelings of paternal affection found
their expression, it becomes evident that these feelings are not so
indeterminate as might _a priori_ be supposed; that, on the contrary,
they find quite an unequivocal expression in a series of facts. Let us
look more closely at these facts.
[558] Compare below, p. 250.
In the first place consider the facts of daily life[559]--the behaviour
of parents towards children in all the cases where the latter want help
or merit punishment. We read that on all such occasions both parents
exhibit great kindness and extreme leniency. The children are carefully
looked after by the father as well as by the mother; and they are very
seldom punished. In one place it is even stated that the father is
more lenient than the mother. Now is it not in agreement with all our
every-day experiences that in such facts and features of daily life
prominent and characteristic feelings find their adequate expression?
And is the accordance of opinion among all our Australian informants
on this point not a proof that they were able to judge with great
certainty from these facts concerning the underlying feelings?--that
these outer signs were unmistakable expressions of the inner facts?
Undoubtedly our information is too little detailed, and particulars
referring to treatment of children and other features of the aboriginal
daily life in this connection would be of the highest value. But
considering that the attention of the observers was never specially
drawn to these questions by any theoretical writer, and comparing our
information on this point with other parts of our evidence, it must
be acknowledged that it is exceptionally good. And this reliability
is doubtless in the first place due to the fact that the subject of
observation was clear, unambiguous and well determined.
[559] Conys. _Statements_, pp. 238 _sqq._
We are, moreover, in possession of a few reports of actual occurrences
in which the great love displayed by the parents for their children
is shown in its full strength and under the stress of special
circumstances. In a battle that took place between some aborigines and
settlers, the former were put to flight. They had to cross a river,
but in doing so they left a child behind them. It was seized by a
Maori who was at the station, and it was shown to the blacks standing
on the other bank of the river. The father of the child recognized it
at once. He seemed almost frantic, held out his arms eagerly towards
the child, making at the same time signs for it to be given to him.
The Maori pretended to be willing to give it and made signs to the
black to cross the river again. And the black swam across the river to
rescue his child. Thus he did not hesitate to risk his life in order
to save his child; in the end he was treacherously murdered by the
Maori.[560] Another touching story is told by Rob. Dawson concerning
a mother's grief after the loss of her son. He says that the woman
was utterly transformed by the blow. "Before the catastrophe she was
a remarkably fine woman, being tall and athletic beyond any other in
the settlement; _now_, she was a truly wretched and forlorn spectacle,
apparently wasted down by watching and sorrow. I have seen this poor
creature often since our first meeting, at their different camps near
us, and she has still the same wretched appearance."[561] These tales
show that parental feelings could be as deep and pathetic among the
Australian blacks as in any cultured society. We read another story in
Howitt,[562] who tells us that when he was living one day in his camp
in the Dieri country the father of a lad, who was visiting Howitt's
camp the day before, came in a state of utmost alarm and terror. The
lad, his son, was missing, and they could not find him. The father was
terrified and, suspecting that the white men had concealed the lad
and might carry him away, he looked through Howitt's luggage. It may
be noted that this occurred among the Dieri, where it is said that
individual paternity does not obtain. Nevertheless it was not a group
of fathers that came worrying and striving to find the boy; neither
was it a group of fathers that risked their lives for the child, nor
a group of mothers that was grieving to death for their child. In the
few anecdotes reported below with the other statements we see also how
strongly paternal affection is marked. So in the story of the old man
quite infatuated with his son and disconsolate after his death, and in
the story of another man eager to rescue his boy, and the old man in
Curr's story, who allowed his boy to do anything he liked.[563]
[560] Br. Smyth, ii. p. 311.
[561] _Loc. cit._, pp. 92, 93.
[562] _Kam. and Kurn._, p. 189.
[563] Compare pp. 248, 249; and 269 _sqq._
Such stories and anecdotes could be easily multiplied from the
ethnographical material extant. They all corroborate our proposition,
viz. that the sentimental side of the parental relation expresses
itself quite clearly and tangibly in ever so many facts of different
order, and that it would be easy for a well-informed observer to give a
fairly exact account of the feelings in terms of facts. These facts, as
said above, are in the first place the facts of daily life, which are
quite unmistakable in their meaning and easily expressed in an accurate
manner. The proof of it is that we have now relatively abundant data,
although no methodical research was devoted to these facts. Then there
are different occasions on which the limit of affection, the maximum
and minimum of their range in a given society, is established. Such
are the foregoing stories. I think we can safely conclude that the
emotional side is on the one hand quite essential, and important enough
to take the first place in our considerations.[564] On the other hand
it can be accurately described in terms of objective data for the
purpose of being chosen as the chief characteristic of the parental
relation. It must be added that not a single other side or aspect of
this relation appears to fulfil these conditions in the same degree. As
will subsequently appear, our knowledge about the aboriginal _ideas_ on
parental relationship are not so ample by far as our knowledge about
their _feelings_ in that connection.
[564] The importance of the emotional character of parental
kinship has already been theoretically studied. Prof. K. Buecher
(_loc. cit._, p. 19) represents the primitive parents as
selfish, heartless, with no love or attachment for the
child, and draws important conclusions from this. Dr.
Steinmetz has subjected this assumption to a thorough
criticism; taking his stand on a rich collection of
ethnological data, he shows that this assumption is
without any ground; he fully acknowledges the importance
in sociological researches of behaviour, treatment and
emotional attitude in the parental relation. Compare his
important article in _Zeitschr. f. Soziologie_, i. pp. 608
_sqq._, and _Ethnologische Studien_, ii. pp. 186 _sqq._
The foregoing discussion has been mainly concerned with the collective
ideas which define parental kinship, and the different sets of social
facts in which these ideas find their expression have been enumerated.
It also dealt with collective feelings, and the different facts in
which these are to be looked for were surveyed. We must now emphasize
the fact that just as we may say that the different ideas determining
kinship converge towards one central concept, or rather flow out of one
common central idea of kinship, so there is also an intimate connection
between the ideas determining kinship and the feelings bound up with
it. This becomes obvious if our own social conditions be considered.
As mentioned above, a father in our society loves his child in a great
measure because he knows that it is his own offspring. In societies in
which the idea of consanguinity (in the social sense) does not exist,
such a connection between feelings of paternal love and knowledge of
a physiological procreation would be impossible. And it would be of
the highest sociological interest to trace what form such connections
assume. An attempt at such a study would be possible in our own society
and in other higher societies, although there would be serious
difficulties enough. But there would hardly be sufficient material to
attempt it in any lower society, and there is absolutely no possibility
of doing this for Australia.
A brief summary of the foregoing argument may now be given. It was
stated at the beginning that parental kinship corresponds to a very
complex and manifold set of phenomena; moreover in various societies
this relationship is determined by various elements. The problem is
to find in all this complexity the structural features, the really
essential facts, the knowledge of which in any given society would
enable us to give a scientifically valid description of kinship. In
other words, the problem is to give a general formula defining kinship,
which would state its constant elements and give heed to the essential
varying elements therein; that formula being on the one hand not too
narrow for application to the various human societies, it would be on
the other hand not too vague to afford quite definite results when
applied to any special case. A final solution of this problem cannot be
arrived at _a priori_, but only by way of induction, after the facts
in the different human societies have been studied. And in order to
attempt such a preliminary study of the Australian facts, the foregoing
remarks have been given; they aim at a general definition of the kind
just described in the form of a tentative or preliminary sketch.
Consequently in the first place the attempt was made to ascertain what
could be taken as the constant elements in individual parental kinship.
What appeared to be nearly universal in this connection is the fact
that infants and small children are always specially attached, and
stand in a specific close relation to a man and a woman.[565] The woman
is invariably their own mother, who gave them birth; the man is the
woman's husband. The existence of this group, which may be called the
individual family, is the basis upon which kinship may be determined;
it is the condition under which it is possible to speak of individual
parental kinship in any given society.
[565] Compare the footnote above, p. 174.
But it was shown that the knowledge of these facts is not sufficient
to yield a precise idea of maternal and paternal kinship, and that
many of its manifold aspects of foremost sociological interest would
remain unknown if the inquiry were broken off at this point. These
latter aspects depend upon factors which are by no means constant in
all societies, but have a very wide range of variation depending on the
general social conditions. A discussion of the concept of consanguinity
has shown that the variations go so far as to affect the main question
of paternal kinship: "Who is the father (in the social sense) of a
child, and how is he determined?"
In order to indicate in which direction the varying general conditions
of society must be investigated so as to yield all that is essential
for the sociological knowledge of kinship, it was found most convenient
to range the facts in two main lines of inquiry: (1) The different sets
of facts which express the central collective idea of what fatherhood
is; and the various other collective ideas--legal, customary, moral--of
a normative character referring to the relation in question. The
social facts in which these ideas must be looked for are: Beliefs,
traditions, customs referring to the relation in question (as for
instance the couvade type), and functions of kindred such as legal
duties and obligations between parent and child. (2) The facts in
which the expression of the collective feelings characteristic of the
relation in question is to be found. The facts of daily life, as well
as the dramatic expression of feelings, come in here. The emotional
character of the parental kinship relation is of the highest importance
in determining the social feature of this relation, and for the
comprehension of its social working.
These points of view will be applied hereafter to the discussion of
the Australian parental kinship. But in order to illustrate here their
theoretical bearing, a short discussion will be given of some of the
ways in which the concept of kinship has been applied to low societies
by sociologists. Morgan's way of dealing with the meaning of kinship
must be first mentioned.[566] He assumes without further discussion
that kinship was conceived always and in all societies, even the lowest
ones, in terms of consanguinity.[567] Our discussion of consanguinity
shows how great a mistake it was on the part of Morgan to impute to the
primitive mind a whole series of ideas which absolutely and necessarily
must have been foreign to it. As was said above, primitive mankind
was certainly wholly ignorant of the process of procreation, and the
relation of the sexes cannot possibly have been the source of kinship
ideas. How great a part this assumption plays in Morgan's deductions it
is easy to perceive.[568] And he was led to it by omitting to discuss
and analyze the concept of kinship, and by applying to low societies
our own social concept of it.
[566] Compare also above, p. 171.
[567] Compare especially _Systems, etc._, chap. ii.
pp. 10 _sqq._ "The family relationships are as ancient
as the _family_. They exist in virtue of the law of
derivation, which is expressed by the perpetuation of
the species through the marriage relations. A system of
_consanguinity_, which is _founded upon a community of
blood_, is but the formal expression and recognition of
these relationships." (The italics are mine.) This is
in other words the assumption that kinship was always
conceived as consanguinity, or community of blood through
procreation. Compare also _Ancient Society_, pp. 393, 395.
[568] _Systems, etc._, pp. 474 _sqq._, where the only
source of the classificatory system is attributed to
different "customs" referring to the sexual aspect of
marriage. As we saw, precisely this aspect is quite
irrelevant to the formation of primitive kinship ideas,
consequently also of primitive kinship terms.
J. F. MacLennan uses also the kinship concept as identical with that
of blood relationship.[569] But it must be emphatically stated that
MacLennan recognizes both the importance of feelings in relation to
kinship[570] and the fact that consanguinity was not known to primitive
man,[571] although he unfortunately does not develop these two
important ideas.
[569] See _loc. cit._, pp. 83 _sqq._ It is difficult to
pick out any one clear statement to show that the author
identifies kinship with consanguinity. But a glance at the
pages quoted is enough to prove this. I quote a phrase from
the table of contents: "The most ancient system in which
the _idea of blood relationship_ was embodied was a system
of kinship through females only." (The italics are mine.)
[570] Men are always "bound together by a feeling of
kindred. The filial and paternal affections may be
instinctive. They are obviously independent of any theory
of kinship, its origin and consequences ... they may have
existed long before kinship became an object of thought,"
_op. cit._, p. 83. From these remarks it is only one step
to say that feelings ought to be considered as determining
elements, and that even if ideas corresponding to them did
not exist, kinship could not be denied.
[571] "No advocate of innate ideas will maintain their
existence on relationship by blood," _op. cit._, p. 83.
The same use of the concept of kinship (Verwandtschaft) was pointed out
above as a mistake of Dargun's. The ideas on kinship of Prof. Frazer
and Mr. Thomas were also dealt with above, where it was found that they
were not adapted to the complexity of the facts.