[Footnote 4: When the Duke of Otranto became minister to

the King, and was appointed to make out lists of

proscription, I was desirous of knowing, what I had to

expect from his resentment; and wrote to him, to sound

his intentions. He sent for me, received me with much

kindness, and assured me of his friendship and

protection. "You did your duty," said he to me, "and I

did mine. I foresaw, that Bonaparte could not maintain

his situation. He was a great man, but had grown mad. It

was my duty, to do what I did, and prefer the good of

France to every other consideration."

The Duke of Otranto behaved with the same generosity

towards most of the persons, of whom he had any reason

to complain; and, if he found himself obliged, to

include some of them in the number of the proscribed, he

had at least the merit of facilitating their escape from

death, or the imprisonment intended for them, by

assisting them with his advice, with passports, and

frequently with the loan of money.]

The rising of the King of Naples became afterwards the subject of our

conversation. "Murat is a lost man," said M. Fouché to me: "he is not

strong enough, to contend with Austria. I had advised him, and I have

written again lately to the Queen, to keep himself quiet, and wait the

course of events: they would not listen to me, and have done wrong:

they might have had it in their power to treat; now they cannot; they

will be sent about their business without pity, and without any

conditions."

The Emperor, who had become uneasy, directed M. de Montron and M.

Bresson to be watched. He was informed, that the latter had just been

sent to England by order of the minister at war.

The Prince of Eckmuhl, being questioned, said, that an English dealer

had forty thousand muskets to sell; and he had commissioned M.

Bresson, to go and examine them, and treat for their purchase. This

mission, which did not at first excite the Emperor's attention,

afterwards recurred to his mind: he first thought it strange, and then

suspicious. "If Davoust," said he, "had not had some motive for

concealing this business from me, he would have mentioned it: it is

not natural: he is acting in concert with Fouché."

This glimpse of light produced no effect. Napoleon contented himself

with severely reprimanding the minister at war; and ordering him,

never again to send any person whatever out of France, without his

consent.

A new incident occurred, to strengthen the Emperor's apprehensions. He

was informed by the prefect of police, that M. Bor..., formerly one of

the principal agents of the police, and one of the habitual confidants

of the minister, had set off for Switzerland with a passport from M.

Fouché. An order for arresting M. Bor... was transmitted by telegraph

to General Barbanegre, who commanded at Huninguen: but it arrived too

late; M. Bor..., as quick as lightning, had already passed the

frontier.

The Emperor no longer had any doubt of M. Fouché's treachery; but he

was afraid the disclosure of it would occasion alarm and

discouragement. In fact, people would not have failed to infer, that

the imperial cause was lost; since this minister, whose perspicacity

was well known, quitted it to join the Bourbons.

Napoleon foresaw too the approaching commencement of hostilities; and,

convinced, that the fate of France would not be decided by the

manoeuvres of the Duke of Otranto, he resolved, to wait for a more

favourable opportunity of getting rid of him. If the victory of

Fleurus had not been followed by the disasters of Waterloo, the first

decree the Emperor would have signed, on his arrival at Brussels,

would probably have been for displacing the Duke of Otranto.

The time of the rendezvous given me by M. Werner being come, I asked

Napoleon for orders. "Fouché," said he to me, "will no doubt have

warned Metternich; and it is probable, that his agent will return no

more: it is even possible, that measures will be taken, to arrest you.

I think, therefore, you may as well remain here."--"I do not think,

sire, that M. de Metternich is capable of such an action. The

patriotism and frankness, which I displayed in my conferences with M.

Werner, appear to have pleased the prince; and M. Werner informed me,

that he was particularly directed, to express to me the good opinion

(permit me to repeat the terms) which he had conceived of my character

and merit. Your Majesty would be wrong, I think, not to allow me to

make this last attempt. As the point in question was not a conspiracy,

but to set on foot a negotiation, it is possible, that M. Werner may

return."--"You have my consent very willingly; but I am afraid, they

will lay hold of you: be prudent."

I was afraid so too. I set off.

It happened as the Emperor foresaw. M. Werner appeared no more.

Thus ended this negotiation, which might perhaps have realized many

hopes, had not M. Fouché occasioned its failure.

At the period when it took place, England, in its celebrated Memoir of

the 25th of April, and Austria, in that it published the 9th of May

following, had authentically declared, subsequently to my first

interview at Bâle, that they had not engaged by the treaty of the 29th

of March, to restore Louis XVIII. to the throne; and that their

intentions in pursuing the war were not, to impose on France any

particular government whatever.

These declarations gave great weight to the proposals of M. Werner.

The Emperor thought them sincere; and in one of those moments of

openness, which he was not always sufficiently master of himself to

suppress, he said at his levee: "Well, gentlemen, they offer me the

regency already: it depends only on myself, whether I shall accept

it." These inconsiderate words made some impression; and they who

remembered them have since asserted, that, if the Emperor had not been

enamoured of the crown, he might have placed his son on the throne,

and spared France the carnage of Mont St. Jean. The Emperor descending

from his throne, to place on it his son, and peace, would have added,

no doubt, a noble page to his history: but, ought he to have accepted

the loose proposals of M. Werner, and trusted to the faith of his

enemies? I think not. The first question to be decided, before

treating of a regency, was this: What is to be done with Napoleon? and

it has been seen, that on this point the allies held the profoundest

silence.

I am far from thinking, that the Emperor would have consented in any

case, to lay aside his crown, which he considered as the price of

twenty years toil and victory; I only maintain, that he cannot be

blamed on this occasion, for having retained it.

This confidential avowal to his courtiers is not the only

indiscretion, of which they laid hold, to charge him with imaginary

faults. What will appear surprising is, that, with the character for

negation and dissimulation ascribed to him, he was capable of

indiscretions.

Napoleon conceived in secret, and conducted to their close in mystery,

schemes, that did not call his passions into play, because then he

never ceased to be master of himself: but it was excessively rare for

him, to preserve a continued, and complete dissimulation in affairs,

that strongly agitated his soul. The object, on which he was then

occupied, assailed his mind, and heated his imagination: his head,

continually at work, abounded in ideas, that diffused themselves in

spite of him, and displayed themselves externally by broken words, and

demonstrations of joy or anger, that afforded a clew to his designs,

and entirely destroyed the mystery, in which he would have enveloped

them.

This narration, which I would not interrupt, has made me lose sight of

Napoleon. I left him meditating the constitution he had promised the

French, and now return to him.

Napoleon had at first announced his intention of amalgamating the

ancient constitutions with the charter, and composing from the whole a

new constitution, which should be subjected to the free discussion of

the delegates of the nation. But he thought, that present

circumstances, and the agitation of men's minds, would not permit

subjects of such high importance, to be debated publicly without

danger; and he resolved to confine himself for the moment, to sanction

by a particular act, supplementary to the constitutions of the empire,

the new guarantees, that he had promised the nation.

Napoleon was swayed also by another consideration. He considered the

constitutions of the empire as the title-deeds of his crown; and he

was afraid, if he annulled them, that he should effect a sort of

novation, that would give him the appearance of beginning a new reign.

For Napoleon, such is human weakness, after having devoted to ridicule

the pretensions of "_the King of Hartwell_," was inclined to persuade

himself, that his own reign had not been interrupted by his residence

in the island of Elba.

The Emperor had entrusted to M. Benjamin Constant, and to a committee

composed of ministers of state, the double task of preparing the bases

of a new constitution. After having seen and amalgamated their

labours, he subjected the result to the examination of the council of

state, and of the council of ministers. Toward the end of the

discussion, Napoleon suggested the idea of not submitting this

constitution to public debate, but presenting it only as an additional

act to the preceding constitutions. This idea was combated

unanimously. M. Benjamin Constant, the Duke Decrès, the Duke of

Otranto, the Duke of Vicenza, &c. &c., remonstrated with the Emperor,

that this was not what he had promised France; that a new constitution

was expected from him, purged from the despotic acts of the senate;

and that he must fulfil the expectations of the nation, or prepare to

lose its confidence for ever.

The Emperor promised to reflect on it: but, after having weighed in

his sagacity the observations, that had been submitted to him, he

persisted in his scheme; and the next day the additional act appeared

in the Moniteur in the following form:

ADDITIONAL ACT.

Paris, April the 24th.

Napoleon, by the grace of God and the constitutions, Emperor of the

French, to all present and to come, health.

Since we were called, fifteen years ago, by the wishes of France, to

the government of the empire, we have sought to bring to perfection,

at different periods, the forms of the constitution, according to the

wants and desires of the nation, and profiting by the lessons of

experience.

Thus the constitution of the empire has been formed by a series of

acts, which have been invested with the acceptance of the people. We

had then for our object, to organize a grand European federal system,

which we had adopted as conformable to the spirit of the age, and

favourable to the progress of civilization. To effect its completion,

and give it all the extension and stability, of which it is

susceptible, we had adjourned the establishment of several domestic

institutions, more particularly designed to protect the liberty of the

citizens. Our object is nothing more henceforward, than to increase

the prosperity of France by the confirmation of public liberty; whence

results the necessity of several important modifications of the

constitution, the decrees of the senate, and other acts, by which this

empire is governed.

For these reasons, willing, on the one hand, to retain whatever is

good and salutary of the past, and on the other to render the

constitution of our empire conformable in every respect to the wishes

and wants of the nation, as well as to that state of peace, which we

are desirous of maintaining with Europe, we have resolved, to propose

to the people a series of arrangements, tending to modify and improve

its acts, to surround the rights of citizens with all their

guarantees, to give to the representative system its full extent, to

invest the intermediate bodies with the respectability and powers that

are desirable; in a word, to combine the highest degree of political

liberty, and personal security, with the strength and concentration

necessary, to render the independence of the French people, and the

dignity of our crown, respected by foreigners: in consequence, the

following articles, forming an act supplementary to the constitution

of the empire, will be submitted to the free and solemn acceptance of

all the citizens, throughout the whole extent of France[5].

[Footnote 5: This preamble, which gave the death-blow to

the additional act, was, I believe, the work of M.

Benjamin Constant.]

HEAD I.

_General provisions._

ART. 1. The constitution of the empire, consisting of the

constitutional act of the 22d of Frimaire, year 8; of the decrees of

the senate of the 14th and 16th of Thermidor, year 10; and of that of

the 28th of Floreal, year 12; will be modified by the provisions

following: all the rest of their provisions are maintained and

confirmed.

ART. 2. The legislative power is exercised by the Emperor and by two

chambers.

ART. 3. The first chamber, styled the chamber of peers, is hereditary.

ART. 4. The Emperor names its members, who are irremovable, they and

their male descendants, from eldest to eldest, in direct descent. The

number of peers is unlimited. Adoption does not transmit the dignity

of the peerage to the person adopted. The peers take their seats at

the age of twenty-one; but have no deliberative voice before the age

of twenty-five.

ART. 5. The chamber of peers has for its president the archchancellor

of the empire, or, in the case provided for by article 5 of the decree

of the senate of the 28th of Floreal, year 12, by one of the members

of the chamber appointed by the Emperor.

ART. 6. The members of the imperial family, in hereditary succession,

are peers by right. They are seated next to the president. They take

their seats at the age of eighteen, but have no deliberative voice

before the age of twenty-one.

ART. 7. The second chamber, styled the chamber of representatives, is

elected by the people.

ART. 8. The members of this chamber are to the number of six hundred

and twenty-nine: they must be twenty-five years of age at least.

ART. 9. The president of the chamber of representatives is appointed

by the chamber at the opening of the session. He remains in office,

till the chamber is renewed. His appointment is submitted to the

approbation of the Emperor.

ART. 10. The chamber of representatives verifies the powers of its

members, and decides on the validity of contested elections.

ART. 11. The members of the chamber of representatives receive for

travelling expenses, and during the session, the indemnity decreed by

the constituent assembly.

ART. 12. They are re-eligible without limit.

ART. 13. The chamber of representatives is entirely renewed, of right,

every five years.

ART. 14. No member of either chamber can be arrested, except in case

of being taken in the fact of committing a crime; or prosecuted for a

criminal or correctional cause, during the sessions, except in

consequence of a resolution of the chamber to which he belongs.

ART. 15. No one can be arrested or detained for debt, from the time of

convening the meeting till forty days after the session.

ART. 16. The peers are to be tried by their own chamber in criminal or

correctional cases, according to the forms prescribed by the law.

ART. 17. The quality of peer and of representative is compatible with

all public functions, except those that are responsible

(_comptables_).

All prefects and subprefects are not eligible by the electoral college

of the department or circle (_arrondissement_), for which they are

serving.

ART. 18. The Emperor sends to the chambers the ministers of state, and

counsellors of state, who sit, and take a part in the discussions, but

have no deliberative voice, unless they are members of the chamber,

either as peers or being elected by the people.

ART. 19. The ministers, who are members of the chamber of peers, or of

that of representatives, or who sit in consequence of being sent by

the government, will give the chambers the information deemed

necessary, when making it public does not compromise the interests of

the state.

ART. 20. The sittings of both chambers are public. Nevertheless, they

may resolve themselves into secret committees; the chamber of peers on

the demand of ten members, that of deputies on the demand of

twenty-five. The government also may demand secret committees for any

communications it may have to make. In all cases deliberations and

votes can take place only in a public sitting.

ART. 21. The Emperor may prorogue, adjourn, or dissolve, the chamber

of representatives. The proclamation, that pronounces the dissolution,

convokes the electoral colleges for a new election, and indicates the

re-assembling of representatives in six months at the latest.

ART. 22. During the interval between the sessions of the chamber of

representatives, or in case of the dissolution of this chamber, the

chamber of peers cannot assemble.

ART. 23. The government has the proposal of the law: the chambers may

propose amendments: if these amendments be not adopted by the

government, the chambers are bound to vote for or against the law, in

the form in which it was proposed.

ART. 24. The chambers have the power of inviting the government to

propose a law on a given subject, and to draw up what appears to them

proper to be inserted in the law. This demand may be made by either of

the two chambers.

ART. 25. When a draught of a law is adopted by one of the two

chambers, it is carried to the other; and, if it be approved there,

it is carried to the Emperor.

ART. 26. No written discourse, except the reports of committees, the

reports of ministers on the laws that are presented, and the accounts

that are delivered, can be read in either of the chambers.

HEAD II.

_Of the electoral colleges, and the mode of election._

ART. 27. The electoral colleges of the departments and circles are

retained, conformably to the decree of the senate of the 16th of

Thermidor, year 10, excepting the following modifications.

ART. 28. The district assemblies (_les assemblées de canton_) will

fill up every year, by annual elections, all the vacancies in the

electoral colleges.

ART. 29. From the year 1816, a member of the chamber of peers,

appointed by the Emperor, will be president of the electoral college

of each department for life, and not removable.

ART. 30. Dating from the same period, the electoral college of each

department will appoint, from among the members of the college of

each circle, the president and two vice-presidents: for this purpose

the assembling of the electoral college of the department will precede

that of the college of the circle fifteen days.

ART. 31. The colleges of departments and circles will appoint the

number of representatives established for each by the annexed table

and act, No. 1.[6]

[Footnote 6: This table, and that mentioned in Art. 33,

being of no importance, are not inserted here.]

ART. 32. The representatives may be chosen throughout the whole extent

of France indifferently.

Every college of a department or circle, that shall choose a member

not belonging to the department or circle, shall appoint a substitute

(_suppléant_), who must necessarily be taken from the department or

circle.

ART. 33. Manufacturing and commercial labour and property shall have a

particular representation.

The election of commercial and manufacturing representatives shall be

made by the electoral college of the department from a list of

eligible persons, drawn up by the chambers of commerce and consulting

chambers in conjunction, according to the annexed table and act, No.

2.

HEAD III.

_Of the law of taxation._

ART. 34. Direct general taxes, whether on land or personal property,

are voted only for one year: indirect taxes may be voted for several

years. In case of a dissolution of the chamber of representatives, the

taxes voted in the preceding session are continued, till the chamber

meets anew.

ART. 35. No tax, direct or indirect, in money or in kind, can be

levied; no loan can take place; no entry of credit in the great book

of the public debt can be made; no domain can be alienated or

exchanged; no raising of men for the army can be ordered; no portion

of territory can be exchanged; except by virtue of a law.

ART. 36. No proposal of a tax, of a loan, or of a levy of men, can be

made, except in the chamber of representatives.

ART. 37. It is in the chamber of representatives also, that, 1st, the

general budget of the state, containing an estimate of the receipts,

and the proposal of the funds assigned for the year to each

department of the ministry; and, 2dly, an account of the receipts and

expenses of the year, or years, preceding; are to be introduced in the

first instance.

HEAD IV.

_Of ministers and their responsibility._

ART. 38. All the acts of the government must be countersigned by a

minister having some department.

ART. 39. The ministers are responsible for the acts of government

signed by them, as well as for the execution of the laws.

ART. 40. They may be accused by the chamber of representatives, and

are to be tried by that of peers.

ART. 41. Every minister, every commander of an army by land or sea,

may be accused by the chamber of representatives, and tried by the

chamber of peers, for having compromised the safety or honour of the

nation.

ART. 42. In this case the chamber of peers exercises a discretionary

power, both in assigning the character of the crime, and in the

punishment to be inflicted.

ART. 43. Before it is decided, that a minister shall be put upon his

trial, the chamber of representatives must declare, that there are

grounds for examining into the charge brought against him.

ART. 44. This declaration can be made only on the report of a

committee of sixty members drawn by lot. This committee cannot make

its report till at least ten days after its nomination.

ART. 45. When the chamber has declared, that there are grounds for

examination, it may summon the minister before it, to demand an

explanation of him. This summons cannot take place, till ten days

after the committee has made its report.

ART. 46. In all other cases, ministers having departments cannot be

summoned or sent for by the chambers.

ART. 47. When the chamber of representatives has declared, that there

are grounds for examination against a minister, a new committee is to

be formed, of sixty members, drawn by lot as the former; and this

committee makes a fresh report on the subject of bringing him to

trial. This committee does not make its report till ten days after its

nomination.

ART. 48. The bringing to trial cannot be decided upon, till ten days

after the report has been read, and distributed among the members.

ART. 49. The accusation being resolved upon, the chamber of

representatives names five commissioners, chosen from among its own

members, to conduct the charge before the chamber of peers.

ART. 50. Article 75 of head 8 of the constitutional act of the 22d of

Frimaire, year 8, declaring, that the agents of the government can be

prosecuted only in consequence of a decision of the council of state,

shall be modified by a law.

HEAD V.

_Of the judicial power._

ART. 51. The Emperor appoints all the judges. They are for life, and

irremovable, from the instant of their appointment; the nomination of

judges of the peace, and of commerce, excepted, which will take place

as heretofore.

The present judges, appointed by the Emperor agreeably to the decree

of the senate of the 12th of October, 1807, and whom he may think

proper to retain, will receive appointments for life before the 1st of

January next.

ART. 52. The institution of juries is retained.

ART. 53. The debating of criminal causes is to be public.

ART. 54. Military crimes alone are amenable to military tribunals.

ART. 55. All other crimes, even if committed by military men, are

under the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.

ART. 56. All crimes and offences, that were amenable to the high

imperial court, and the trial of which is not reserved by the present

act for the chamber of peers, are to be carried before the ordinary

tribunals.

ART. 57. The Emperor has the right of pardoning, even in correctional

cases, and of granting amnesties.

ART. 58. The interpretations of laws demanded by the court of

cassation shall be given in the form of a law.

HEAD VI.

_Rights of citizens._

ART. 59. Frenchmen are equal in the eye of the law, both in

contributing to the taxes and public expenses, and in regard to

admission to employments civil or military.

ART. 60. No one can be taken out of the hands of the judges assigned

him by the law, on any pretence.

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