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MEMOIRS
OF THE
PRIVATE LIFE,
RETURN, AND REIGN
OF
NAPOLEON
IN 1815.
_Ingrata patria, ne ossa quidem habes._ SCIPIO.
BY M. FLEURY DE CHABOULON,
Ex-Secretary of the Emperor Napoleon and of his Cabinets,
Master of Requests to the Council of State, Baron, Officer
of the Legion of Honour, and Knight of the Order of Reunion.
VOL. II.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.
1820.
MEMOIRS,
&c. &c.
At the same period (May the 1st) the Emperor received a fresh proof of
the little confidence, that men deserve, and of the horrible facility,
with which they sacrifice their duties and their sentiments, to the
suggestions of their covetousness or their ambition.
Of all the ministers of Napoleon there was not one, who, at the time
of his return, lavished on him so many protestations of fidelity and
devotion to his service, as the Duke of Otranto. "And this fidelity,
if he could have doubted it, would have been guarantied by the
mandate, under which he (M. Fouché) groaned, at the moment when the
return of Napoleon restored him to liberty, and perhaps to life[1]."
[Footnote 1: Fragment of a letter from M. Fouché to the
Emperor, on the 21st of March.]
Yet what was the astonishment of the Emperor, when the Duke of Vicenza
came to inform him, that a secret agent of M. de Metternich had
arrived at Paris from Vienna, and appeared to have had a mysterious
interview with M. Fouché! The Emperor immediately ordered M. Réal,
prefect of the police, to make search after this emissary. He was
arrested, and declared:
That, being employed by a banking-house at Vienna, to settle accounts
of interest with several bankers at Paris, he had been sent for by M.
de Metternich; and that this prince had entrusted him with a letter
for the French minister of police:
That he was ignorant of the contents of this letter; but knew it was
interlined with sympathetic ink: and the prince had delivered to him a
powder for making the hidden characters appear:
That Baron de Werner, diplomatic agent, was to be at Bâle on the 1st
of May, to receive the answer of the Duke of Otranto:
That a fictitious statement of an account had been given him, which
was to serve as a sign, to make known to M. Werner the agent sent by
the French minister:
In fine, that he had delivered the letter and the account to the Duke
of Otranto, who had told him, to attend quickly to his business, and
return to Vienna as soon as possible.
The Emperor immediately sent for M. Fouché, under pretence of
conversing with him on affairs of state.
M. Fouché preserved the most profound silence on what had passed with
the envoy of M. de Metternich, and displayed no marks of embarrassment
or uneasiness.
The first thought of Napoleon was, to seize the papers of his
treacherous minister: but persuaded, that he was too adroit, and too
prudent, to retain any traces of his treason, he deemed it preferable,
in order to come at the truth, to send some one to Bâle, who should
introduce himself to M. Werner as from the Duke. Napoleon attached
great importance to this mission. He condescended to cast his eyes on
me to execute it; and, after having disclosed to me "_the perfidy of
that infamous Fouché,_" he said to me: "You will go immediately to the
Duke of Vicenza: he will give you passports both in the King's name
and in mine: you will learn at the frontier, which will avail you
most. Here is an order under my own hand, to all the generals,
prefects, and lieutenants of police, who may be on the Rhine, to
furnish you with the means of leaving and returning to France, and
with all the assistance you may require, within the kingdom and even
without. I command them, strictly to conform to every thing you may
judge proper to direct. I think you will pass. I have never heard of
this M. Werner, but M. de Metternich is a man of honour: he would not
be concerned in a plot against my life. I do not believe the business
is to renew the attempts of Georges, or the snares of the 3d of
Nivose. However, you will sound M. Werner on this head. I believe,
they are desirous of fomenting disturbances, and forming a conspiracy,
rather against my throne, than against my life. This point it is
essential to ascertain. I give you no farther instructions: you will
act as your own master: I rely entirely on you. If the safety of the
state be threatened, or if you discover any thing of importance,
apprise me of it by the telegraph, and send off a courier with all
speed. If you find there is nothing in it but the commencement of an
intrigue, nothing but a trial; waste no time in useless parleying, but
frankly avail yourself of the opportunity, to make M. de Metternich
acquainted with my situation, and my pacific intentions; and endeavour
to establish a reconciliation between me and Austria. I should also
like to know, what the allies think of Eugene; and whether they would
be disposed to call him to the head of affairs in a regency, if I
should lose my life on the field of battle. Go and see the Duke of
Vicenza, talk with him, and return in half an hour. I will see if I
have any thing more to say to you." Half an hour after, I returned.
The Emperor was in his saloon, surrounded by Marshal Ney and several
persons of consequence. Making a motion with his hand, he said to me:
"I rely upon you: fly."
It was by such expressions, that he knew how to flatter self-love, and
animate zeal. I flew to Bâle. Had it been necessary for me, in order
to justify the expectations of Napoleon, to cross the Rhine under the
mouths of the enemy's cannon, I should have done it.
I began to employ the unlimited powers given me by the Emperor, by
directing provisionally, that no person coming from Paris should be
allowed to quit France. I was not willing to be preceded by the real
agent of the Duke of Otranto.
The communication with Bâle was not yet interrupted: but it was
necessary, to have a permit to enter the city, another to go out of
it, and, on the slightest suspicion, you were carried before the
director of the police, who, without taking his pipe out of his mouth,
gave orders, according to his own good pleasure, either to turn you
out at the gate, or to throw you into prison, I had provided myself
with a commission of inspector general of provision, and presented
myself at Bâle under the pretence of making large purchases there.
Money will always secure a good reception in Switzerland.
I repaired without meeting any obstacle to the Three Kings inn, where
M. Werner had alighted. He was already arrived. I announced to him,
that I had been commissioned by a person at Paris, to confer with him.
He showed me the account he had as a token; and I showed him _at a
distance_ that I had, for I knew it was good for nothing. It had been
written out from memory by our prisoner, the token having remained in
the hands of M. Fouché.
M. Werner began by expressing to me with all the pomp of diplomatic
politeness the pleasure, which he felt at seeing me; that he had
expected me ever since the 1st of May (this was the 3d); and that he
began to fear, that M. Fouché was indifferent about entering into a
conference with the prince. This conjecture led me to suppose, that
nothing had yet been agreed upon or proposed. I answered M. Werner,
that in fact the Duke of Otranto had shown a little hesitation,
because the letter of M. de Metternich left _some uncertainty_; but
that, still filled with esteem and deference for this prince, he would
be eager to offer him every proof of his zeal, that should be in his
power; that he had chosen me for his interpreter, and that I should
take a pleasure in answering with unbounded confidence the _new_
overtures, which M. Werner was no doubt commissioned to make to me. I
added, that the Duke of Otranto had recommended to me, to lay aside
diplomatic forms, and to explain myself with that complete _absence of
restraint_, which M. de Metternich must inspire. That in consequence,
I intreated him, to follow my example, and to tell me without
circumlocution, _what he expected of us_.
He answered me, that M. de Metternich had retained the highest opinion
of M. Fouché's merit: that he imagined, a man like him could not
suppose, that Napoleon would maintain himself on the throne: that he
was persuaded, he had accepted the ministry of police, only to spare
France the calamities of a civil and a foreign war: and that, under
this persuasion, he hoped M. Fouché would not hesitate, to second the
efforts the allies were about to make, to get rid of Bonaparte, and
re-establish the Bourbons in France.
I replied, that M. Fouché, whose patriotism was well known, had not
been able to contemplate without pain the misfortunes, with which
France was threatened; but that hitherto he had not perceived the
possibility of remedying them. "Frequently," I said, "people at a
distance see more clearly, than those who are nigh: what are the views
of M. de Metternich and the allies on this point? _what means do they
conceive may be employed, to get rid of Napoleon?_"
"M. de Metternich," said he, "has not fully communicated to me his
views in this respect. I have even reason to believe, that nothing has
yet been determined; and that it is in order to arrive at some certain
result, that he is desirous of concerting matters with M. Fouché, who
must be better acquainted with the true state of affairs than he is.
As to the means of getting rid of Bonaparte, there is one, the issue
of which cannot be doubtful: this is force: but the allies are
unwilling to have recourse to it, unless in the last extremity; and
they would have wished, _that M. Fouché could have found means of
delivering France from Bonaparte_, without shedding fresh torrents of
blood."
This ambiguous answer giving me some uneasiness, I replied: "I know but
two ways of overturning the throne of Napoleon: the first is, to
assassinate him!" As I pronounced these words, I turned my eyes a little
aside, that I might not embarrass M. Werner, and might observe him at my
ease. "Assassinate him!" exclaimed he with indignation: "such a step
never entered into the thoughts of M. de Metternich."--"So I presume;
and accordingly I began with expressing to you the high veneration,
which I feel for M. de Metternich. The second way," I continued, "is of
secretly uniting, or, to speak plainly, of conspiring against Napoleon;
and I do not see very clearly at present, _on whom we can reckon_: have
M. de Metternich and the allies _any connexions yet formed_?"
"They have none," he answered: "scarcely have they had time to come to
any mutual understanding at Vienna. It is for M. Fouché to prepare and
arrange his plans: it is to him, that the allies are desirous of
confiding the care and honour of saving France from the calamities of
a new war, and from the tyranny prepared for her by the Emperor."
Convinced by the turn the conversation had taken, that there had been
no previous connexion between the Duke of Otranto and M. de
Metternich; convinced, that the life of the Emperor, and the safety of
the state, were not threatened; I changed my style, and proceeded
straight to the end, which I had principally in view; that of
endeavouring to establish, if not a reconciliation, at least
conferences between France and Austria.
"Do the allies then imagine," resumed I, "that it would be easy for M.
Fouché to stir France against Napoleon? There was a time, it is true,
when the Emperor was not liked; but the Bourbons have treated the
nation so ill, that they succeeded in rendering him regretted, so that
his enemies are become his partisans."
"What you tell me," answered M. Werner with astonishment, "is
completely the reverse of the reports, that reach us from Paris."
"I can assure you," continued I, "that they have deceived you. The
acclamations and good wishes, that accompanied Napoleon from the gulf
of Juan to Paris, ought however to have informed you, that he had in
his favour the unanimous suffrages of the army, and of the
nation."--"Say of the army."--"No: I persist in saying of the nation,
and of the army. From the moment when Napoleon re-appeared on French
ground, he was received with enthusiasm, not only by his soldiers,
but by the citizens also. If he had the suffrages of only a few
regiments in a state of insubordination, would he have traversed
France without any obstacle? Would he have received on his journey
that unanimous testimony of love and devotion, which the whole
population of Dauphiny, the Lyonese, and Burgundy, emulated each other
in displaying?"--"It is possible, that Bonaparte may have been well
received in some places; but a few solitary acclamations do not
express the wishes of a whole nation; and, had it not been for the
army, he would never have re-entered the Tuileries."--"It is certain,
that, if Napoleon had had the army against him, he could never have
dethroned Louis XVIII. with eight hundred men: but we must not
conclude, that, because the army declared for him, it was the army
alone, that re-established him on the throne. When he took Lyons, he
had with him only two thousand men; he had but eight thousand, when he
marched for Paris; and he had only eight hundred with him, when he
entered the capital. Had not the nation entertained the same
sentiments as the army, could he, with such a contemptible force, have
given the law to two millions of individuals scattered on his road;
and to the fifty thousand soldiers, national guards and volunteers,
who were assembled under the walls of Paris? If indeed the nation had
opposed the proceedings and wishes of the army, and the army had
overcome the nation, it might have been asserted with reason, that the
restoration of Napoleon was the work of the soldiers exclusively: but
you know, as well as I, that not a single act of violence was
committed, not a single musket was fired, and that they were every
where welcomed and feasted as friends and deliverers. I ask you, now,
what ought we to conclude from this union, this unanimity of
sentiments and actions?"--
"We may infer, that the people, naturally weak and timid, were afraid
of the army; and gave it a good reception, that they might not be
exposed to its violence: but this does not prove, that in the bottom
of their hearts they shared the sentiments of the army for Napoleon."
"God alone knows what passes in the bottom of the heart: we mortals
can judge only by appearances, by men's words and actions. Now
actions, words, and appearances combine to prove evidently, that the
nation approved and shared the enthusiasm of the army. Besides, you
are wrong in thinking, that in France the people can entertain
sentiments different from those of the army. Under the ancient
monarchy, when the army was composed of the dissolute reduced to want,
of malefactors pursued by the hand of justice, there did not, and
could not, exist any affinity between the army and the nation: but now
that the army is a national body, composed of the sons and brothers of
our best citizens; and that these sons, these brothers, though
separated from their families, remain united with them in heart, mind,
and interests; the nation and the army are one. If the allies have
founded their hopes solely on a disagreement of opinions and wishes
between the nation and the army, they have calculated erroneously: the
approach of their troops, far from dividing the French, will only draw
their union closer. They will not fight for Napoleon, they will fight
for the honour and independence of the nation."--"From what you tell
me it would seem, that France is determined to run the hazard of war;
and that it is ready, if Napoleon require it, to second as heretofore
his schemes of conquest."--"No, sir: the glory of Napoleon has cost us
too dear; we desire no more laurels at such a price. Napoleon has the
wishes of the nation on his side, less from affection to his person,
than because he is a man of the revolution, and his government will
secure us pledges, which we have demanded in vain from the Bourbons;
but if the Emperor were to suffer himself to be led away by the thirst
of conquest, France would abandon him; and then you might reckon on M.
Fouché and all true patriots uniting, to get rid of Napoleon for
ever."--
"You do not think, then, it appears to me, that M. Fouché is disposed
at the present moment, to second the views of the allied sovereigns
and M. Metternich?"--"I do not; M. Fouché is convinced, that the
Bourbons cannot reign: that the nation has an antipathy to them, which
nothing can remove."--"The allies are not so much bent on restoring
the crown to Louis XVIII., as on taking it from Napoleon, whose
remaining on the throne is incompatible with the safety and repose of
Europe: I am even authorized to think, that they would leave the
French free to choose whatever sovereign, and whatever government,
they might think proper. The Duke of Orleans, for instance, would not
he suit the nation? He served formerly in the republican armies; he
has been a partisan of the revolution; his father voted for the death
of Louis XVI."--"The Duke of Orleans, no doubt, would offer the
nation most of the pledges it requires: but his elevation to the
throne, far from annihilating our troubles, would increase them; he
would have against him the partisans of Louis XVIII., of Napoleon, and
of the regency; that is to say, almost the whole nation."--"Well,
then, the allies might consent to give you the young prince Napoleon
and the regency, or perhaps a federal government."--"At the time of
the invasion in 1814, we had several times occasion to debate the
question of the regency with M. Fouché. He thought, that, with a
regency, France would experience the renovation of those discords, to
which minorities commonly give birth. A people, that has been at war
with itself, and with its neighbours, has need of being swayed by a
man, who knows how to hold the reins of government with a firm hand,
and to make himself respected at home and abroad."--"But you have no
want of firm and able men; and a council of regency might be composed
for you, that would answer the wishes both of the allies and of
France."--"I know well, that we have in the archchancellor, in the
Duke of Vicenza, and in several of our principal functionaries,
statesmen abounding in talents, wisdom, and moderation: but the
difficulty would be, to make a choice among the military men. Most of
these have equal rights, and their pretensions, their jealousies,
their rivalries, could not but be fatal to our tranquillity."--"We
should know how to keep them in order; and I do not see one among them
whose ambition could prove formidable."--"Their ambition has not
displayed itself for want of opportunity. I know but one military man,
who could be placed at the head of the government with safety; this is
Eugene, the prince who said, in 1814, in his memorable proclamations,
that 'they alone are immortal, who know how to live and die faithful
to their duty, faithful to gratitude and honour:' this prince, I say,
far from aspiring to the throne, would be on the contrary its glory
and support: but his family ties, and the duties they impose on him,
perhaps would not permit him to quit Bavaria. Perhaps too the allies
would not allow the direction of affairs in France, to be entrusted to
him: do you think they would?"--"I am perfectly ignorant of what might
be the determination of the prince and his family."--"But cannot you
guess, what would be that of the allies?"--"Not in the least."--"What
men," said I to him jocularly, "you diplomatists are! why are not you
as open with me, as I am with you? have I left one of your desires
unsatisfied? have I avoided answering one of your questions?"--"I am
not endeavouring to dissemble, I assure you: but, as the question you
have put to me was not foreseen, I cannot, and ought not, to allow
myself to answer it."--"Well, we will say no more of it. As to a
federal government, this would too much resemble our republic, and we
have paid so dear for the honour of being republicans, that we have no
farther inclination for it. A federal government may suit a country
with a scanty population, like Switzerland; or a new nation, like
America; but it would be a calamity to our old France: we are too
volatile, too impassioned; we want a ruler, a master who knows how to
make himself obeyed. Hark you, M. Werner, I must continue to speak to
you frankly: the only chief, that suits us, is Napoleon: no longer
Napoleon the ambitious and the conqueror, but Napoleon corrected by
adversity. The desire of reigning will render him docile to the will
of France, and of Europe. He will give them both such pledges, as they
may require: and I believe the Duke of Otranto will then esteem
himself very happy, to be able to concur with M. de Metternich in
pacifying Europe, re-establishing harmony between Austria and France,
and so restricting the power of the Emperor, that it shall no longer
be possible for him, to disturb a second time the general
tranquillity. This, I believe, must be the object of the allies; it
depends on themselves alone to attain it: but if they reckon upon
subjugating us by means of our intestine divisions, they will be
deceived; of this you may assure M. de Metternich.
"For the rest, I shall give the Duke of Otranto an account of the
overtures you have made me, and particularly of those relating to a
regency: but, suppose we should consent to accept either one or the
other of your proposals, what is to be done with Napoleon? for, as it
is neither your intention, nor ours, to kill him, he must live; and
where shall he live? Have the allies come to any determination on this
point?"--"I do not know: M. de Metternich did not explain himself on
this point: I will submit the question to him. I will acquaint him
with your opinion of the state of France, and the situation of
Napoleon, and of the possibility of a general arrangement: but I
foresee, that the present sentiments of M. Fouché will astonish him
greatly. He thought, that he detested Bonaparte."--"Men change with
circumstances: M. Fouché may have detested the Emperor, when he
tyrannized over France; yet be reconciled to him, since he has been
willing to render it free and happy."
We parted, after having exchanged a few supplementary questions, and
agreed to return with all speed, he to Vienna, and I to Paris; and to
meet again at Bâle in the course of a week.
As soon as I arrived at Paris, I presented myself before the Emperor.
I had spent only four days in going and returning; and he imagined, on
seeing me so quickly, that I had not been able to pass. He was
surprised and delighted to learn, that I had seen and conversed with
M. Werner; led me into the garden (it was at the Élysée), and there we
talked together, if I may use the term, for near two hours. Our
conversation was so desultory, that it almost entirely escaped my
memory: I could retain only a few fragments of it. "I was fully
persuaded," said Napoleon to me, "that M. de Metternich had plotted
nothing against my life: he does not like me, but he is a man of
honour. If Austria chose it, every thing might be arranged: but she
has an expectant policy, that loses every thing: she never knew how to
take a decided part at the proper moment. The Emperor is ill advised:
he does not know Alexander; and is not aware, how crafty and ambitious
the Russians are: if once they get the upper hand, all Germany will
be subverted. Alexander will set the good-natured Francis, and all the
little kings, to whom I gave crowns, playing at catch-corners. The
Russians will become masters of the world when I have nothing to do in
it. Europe will not be sensible of my value, till she has lost me.
There was no one but myself strong enough, to tame England with one
hand, and restrain Russia with the other. I will spare them the
trouble of deliberating where they shall put me: if they dared, they
would cram me into an iron cage, and show me to their cockneys as a
wild beast: but they shall not have me; they shall find, that the lion
is still alive, and will not suffer himself to be chained. They do not
know my strength: _if I were to put on the red cap, it would be all
over with them._ Did you inquire of M. Werner after the Empress and my
son?"--"Yes, Sire: he told me, that the Empress was well, and the
young prince a charming boy."--The Emperor, with fire: "Did you
complain, that the law of nations, and the first rights of nature, had
been violated in respect to me? Did you tell him how detestable it is,
to deprive a husband of his wife, a father of his son? that such an
action is unworthy a civilized people?"--"Sire, I was only the
ambassador of M. Fouché."
After a few moments' silence, the Emperor continued: "Fouché, during
your absence, has come and told me the whole affair[2]: he has
explained the whole to my satisfaction. It is his interest not to
deceive me. He has always been fond of intriguing; we must let him do
it. Go and see him, tell him all that has passed with M. Werner; show
confidence in him; and, if he question you about me, tell him, that I
am perfectly easy, and that I have no doubt of his attachment and
fidelity."
[Footnote 2: I have since been assured, that M. Réal had
warned him, by means of Madame Lacuée, his daughter,
that the Emperor knew the whole affair.]
Already the Emperor had had reason to complain of M. Fouché on several
important occasions; but, subjugated by I know not what charm, he had
always placed more confidence in him than he wished.
Few men, it is true, possess the gift of pleasing and persuading in a
higher degree than the Duke of Otranto: equally profound and witty,
equally endowed with foresight and ability, his mind embraces at once
the past, present, and future: he alternately seduces and astonishes
by the boldness of his thoughts, the acuteness of his perception, and
the solidity of his judgment.
Unhappily his mind, overstrained by the revolution, has contracted a
habit and taste for strong emotions: quiet is tiresome to him: he
wants agitation, danger, convulsions: hence that desire of stirring,
intriguing, I had almost said of conspiring, which has driven M.
Fouché into errors so deplorable, and so fatal to his reputation.
Conformably to the orders of Napoleon, I repaired immediately to the
Duke of Otranto's, and told him laughing, that I was come to give him
an account of the mission which he had confided to me. "A fine
mission, indeed!" said he to me. "It is just like the Emperor; he is
always suspicious of those who serve him best. Do you think, for
example, that you are sure of him? You deceive yourself. If you should
involuntarily be guilty of the slightest inconsistency, and he knew it
(these words he pronounced in such a way, as to give me to understand,
that it was through him the Emperor might be informed of it), nothing
more would be wanting to ruin you. But let us have done with princes,
and talk together." Leading me to his sofa, he said: "Do you know,
that you gave me some uneasiness? if you had been betrayed, you would
probably have been sent to some fortress, and kept there till a peace
took place."--"Very true; I certainly ran that risk; but when an
affair of such importance is at stake, a man should not think of
himself."
I gave him a faithful account of what M. Werner said; but took care,
not to let him know the time of our next interview; for I was afraid,
that he would play me some trick with the Swiss, or would hasten to
undeceive M. de Metternich.
When I had finished my tale, he resumed: "I first thought the whole of
this a hum, but I find I was mistaken. Your conference with M. Werner
may lead to a reconciliation between us and Austria; what you said
must open the eyes of M. Metternich. To convince him completely, I
will write to him; and depict with so much clearness and truth the
real situation of France, as will make him sensible, that the best
thing that can be done is, to abandon the Bourbons to their unlucky
fate, and leave us to arrange matters with Bonaparte in our own way.
When you are ready to set off, come to me, and I will give you my
letter."
He then said, "I did not speak to Napoleon about the letter of M. de
Metternich immediately, because his agent had not delivered to me the
powder, necessary to make the writing appear; I was obliged to have
recourse to chemical experiments, which required time. Here is the
letter (he made me read it): you see it says nothing: however, if I
could have deciphered it immediately, Napoleon should have known
nothing of it; I would have served him, without saying any thing to
him. In affairs of this kind secrecy is necessary; and Napoleon is
incapable of it: he would have been so much agitated, and have set so
many men and so many pens in motion, that the whole would have taken
wind. He ought to know my sentiments and opinions; and no person, but
himself, could have taken it into his head for a moment, that I could
betray him for the Bourbons: I despise and detest them at least as
much as he."
The indirect threats of M. Fouché, and the whole of his discourse,
persuaded me, that he was not sincere. I imparted my suspicions to the
Emperor, who did not agree in them: he told me, that M. Fouché's
insinuation of his having it in his power to ruin me was only meant,
to give himself an air of importance. That, however, I had nothing to
fear from him, or from any other person. In fact, I did not fear; for,
when the Emperor had conceived a liking for any one, he took him
under his own protection, and no person whatever was allowed to hurt
him.
The next day but one I went to the Duke of Otranto's, to receive the
letters he had promised me. He appeared surprised, to see me so soon.
In fact I had made him believe, that I was not to return to Bâle till
the 1st of June. To give a colour to this hasty departure, I informed
him, that M. Werner, whom I had requested to write to me, in case of
any unforeseen occurrence, under cover to M. **** the banker, had just
desired me, to repair to Bâle immediately. He let me see, that he was
not the dupe of this falsehood yet nevertheless delivered me with a
good grace two letters for M. de Metternich.
One of these, which has been published in the English newspapers,
tended to show, that the throne of Napoleon, supported by the love and
confidence of the French, had nothing to fear from the attacks of the
coalition.
In the other he went over the proposals of M. Werner: he discussed
with admirable sagacity the advantages and inconveniences, that might
result from them to the interests of France and of Europe; and he
finished, by declaring, after having successively rejected a republic,
a regency, and the Duke of Orleans, that Napoleon, whom he loaded
with extravagant praises, was evidently the chief best suited to the
French, and to the interests of the allied monarchs rightly
understood. Nevertheless, he had contrived to turn his expressions
with so much art and address, that it was impossible not to perceive,
that he thought in the bottom of his heart the Duke of Orleans the
only prince, capable of ensuring the happiness of France, and the
tranquillity of foreign nations.
I laid this letter before the Emperor, and endeavoured in vain to make
him sensible of the treachery. He could see nothing but the eulogiums
of his genius: the rest he overlooked.
M. Werner had been punctual to his rendezvous and I hastened to his
residence. "I was afraid," said he to me obligingly, "that you had
been refused admission into Bâle: I have spoken about it to the
authorities, and, if you wish it, I will cause to be delivered to you
the necessary passport, to enable you to enter Switzerland, depart, or
reside in it, without obstacle, and without danger."
I thanked him for this offer, which convinced me, that the Swiss were
as well disposed towards our enemies, as they were the reverse to us.
We afterwards entered on business. "I related to M. de Metternich,"
said he to me, "the frank and loyal conversation, which I had the
honour of holding with you. He hastened to give an account of it to
the allied sovereigns: and the sovereigns have thought, that it ought
to produce no alteration in the resolution they have formed, never to
acknowledge Napoleon as sovereign of France, or to enter into any
negotiation with him individually: _but at the same time, I am
authorized formally to declare to you, that they renounce the idea of
re-establishing the Bourbons on the throne, and that they consent to
grant you the young Prince Napoleon._ They know, that in 1814 a
regency was the wish of France; and they would think themselves happy,
to be able to accomplish it now."
"This is direct," answered I: "but what is to be done with the
Emperor?"--"Begin you with deposing him: the allies will afterwards
come to a suitable determination, according to circumstances. They are
great, generous, and humane; and you may depend on it, they will treat
Napoleon with the respect due to his rank, his alliance, and his
misfortunes."--"This answer does not explain, whether Napoleon will be
free, to choose a place of retreat for himself; or remain a prisoner
to France and the allies."--"This is all I know."--"I perceive, that
the allies want Napoleon to be delivered up to them bound hand and
foot: never will the French be guilty of such a cowardly act. Since
our interview, the public opinion in his favour has been expressed
with fresh strength; and I protest to you, that he never possessed the
love of the French to so high a degree. The electors convoked for the
_Champ de Mai_, and the new representatives of France[3], are arriving
at Paris from all quarters. Do you think, that these electors, and
these deputies, who are the choice of the nation, would have embraced
the perilous cause of Napoleon, were it not the common cause of all
France? Do you think, that, if they were not resolved to defend it
against all the world, they would be so stupid, or so imprudent, as to
come forward in the face of that world, to swear fealty to the
Emperor, and proscription and hatred to the Bourbons? The allies
subdued us in 1814, because we were then without union, without will,
without the means of resistance. But a great nation is not to be
subdued two years following; and every thing indicates, that, if a
contest take place, it will turn out to the advantage of the French
this time."--"If you knew the force, that will be opposed to you, you
would hold a different language: you will have twelve hundred thousand
men to fight against, twelve hundred thousand men accustomed to
conquer, and who already know the road to Paris."--"They know it,
because they were taught it by treachery."--"Consider, too, that you
are without artillery, without an army, without cavalry."--"The
Spaniards resisted all the force of Bonaparte, though they had fewer
resources than we have."--"You have no money."--"We shall procure it
at the expense of the nobles and royalists, or do without it. The
armies of the republic were paid with garlands of oak, yet were they
the less able, to overcome the armies of the coalition?"--"You are
wrong, I assure you, in viewing your situation under such fine
colours. This new war will be more cruel, and more obstinate, than the
others. The allies are determined, never to lay down their arms, while
Napoleon remains on the throne."--"I by no means look with
tranquillity on the war that is preparing. I cannot think of it
without alarm. If Napoleon prove victorious, it is possible, that
success may turn our brains, and inspire us anew with the desire of
revisiting Vienna and Berlin. If he be unsuccessful, it is to be
feared, that our defeats will animate the people with rage and
despair, and that the nobles and royalists will be massacred."--"The
prospect is no doubt extremely distressing; but I have already told
you, and I repeat it, nothing will alter the determination of the
allied monarchs: they have learned to know the Emperor, and will not
leave him the means of disturbing the world. Even would the sovereigns
consent, to lay down their arms, their people would oppose it: they
consider Bonaparte as the scourge of the human race, and would all
shed their blood to the last drop, to tear from him the sceptre, and
perhaps his life."--
[Footnote 3: The greater part of the deputies were not
yet named; but there was no harm in anticipating
events.]
"I know, that the Prussians have sworn him implacable animosity: but
the Russians and Austrians surely are not so exasperated as the
Prussians."--
"On the contrary, the Emperor Alexander was the first, to declare
against Napoleon."--
"Be it so: but the Emperor of Austria is too virtuous, and too
politic, to sacrifice his son-in-law, and his natural ally, a second
time to vain considerations."--
"The Emperor is not guided by vain considerations: he had to choose
between his affections as a father, and his duties as a sovereign; he
had to decide between the fate of a wife and child, and the fate of
Europe: the choice he would make could not be doubted, and the
magnanimous resolution taken by the Emperor is incontestably a noble
title to the gratitude of his contemporaries, and the admiration of
posterity."--
"I am fully aware, how much it must have cost him, to overturn the
throne of his daughter, and of his grandson; and condemn them to lead
a painful life on the face of the earth, without father, without
husband, without a country. Though a Frenchman, I do justice to the
strength of mind, that the Emperor has shown on this memorable
occasion: but if the part he then took were proper, it appears to me,
that the path he now seems inclined to pursue will be as dangerous, as
it is impolitic. Austria, in the critical situation in which it is
placed by the vicinity, ambition, and alliance of Prussia and Russia,
has need of being protected and supported by a powerful ally; and no
prince is more capable of succouring and defending it than
Napoleon."--
"Austria has nothing to fear from its neighbours: such harmony reigns
between them, as nothing can disturb: their sentiments and principles
are the same. M. de Metternich has charged me, to declare to you
positively, that he acted only in concert with the allies; and that
he would enter into no negotiation without their consent."--
This word, negotiation, struck me. "Since we must not think, M.
Werner," answered I, "of re-establishing that union and friendship
between Austria and France separately, which their interests, and
their family connexion, demand; at least let us not renounce the hope
of a general accommodation. Never perhaps was humanity threatened with
a war so terrible: it will be a conflict to the death, not between
army and army, but between nation and nation. The idea makes me
tremble. The name of M. de Metternich is already celebrated; but with
what glory would it be surrounded, if M. de Metternich, in becoming
the mediator of Europe, should accomplish its pacification! And we,
too, M. Werner, do you think we should not obtain a share in the
blessings of the people? Let us lay aside our character of
negotiators, and examine the situation of the belligerent powers, not
as their agents, but as disinterested persons, as friends of humanity.
You say, you have twelve hundred thousand fighting men; but we had a
million in 1794, and shall have still. The love of honour and
independence is not extinct in France; it will fire every heart, when
the business is to repel the humiliating and unjust yoke, that you
would impose on us.
"If the picture I have drawn you of the state of France, and the
patriotism with which she is animated, appear to you unfaithful, or
exaggerated, come with me; I offer you a passport, and all the pledges
you can require; we will travel together incognito; we will go
wherever you please; we will hear, we will interrogate, the peasants,
the townspeople, the soldiers, the rich, and the poor; and when you
have seen, seen every thing with your own eyes, you may aver to M. de
Metternich, that he has been deceived; and that the efforts of the
allies, to impose upon us the law, can have no other result, than that
of watering the ground in vain with blood."
The emotion, that I could not restrain, had transfused itself into M.
Werner: "I wish," said he to me with tenderness, "it was in my power
to second your wishes, and to concur with you in stopping the effusion
of human blood: but I dare not indulge this hope. However, I will give
M. de Metternich an account of the energy, with which you have pleaded
the cause of humanity: and, if he can accept the office of a mediator,
I know so well the loftiness of his soul, to pledge myself to you,
that he will not refuse it."
Thus far, in order to accustom M. de Metternich to treat directly with
me, I had avoided bringing forward M. Fouché. However, as he had
directed me to make use of his letters, I took an opportunity of
mentioning them to M. Werner. I read them to him; and took care to
comment on them in such a way, as to destroy the unpleasant
impression, which I foresaw the partiality of the praises lavished on
Napoleon would make upon him. When we came to the passage, where M.
Fouché discussed the inconveniences of a republic, M. Werner stopped
me, and said, that I certainly had not conceived him rightly; that he
had spoken to me merely indirectly of a republic, as it never entered
into the thoughts of the allied monarchs, to give way to its
re-establishment; for their endeavours would rather be exerted, to
crush the seeds of a republican spirit, than to favour their dangerous
germination. I reminded him of the conversation we had had on the
subject; but, as it was of little importance to me, to prove myself in
the right, I readily admitted myself to be in the wrong.
"At any rate," said he, taking the letters, "the language of M.
Fouché will greatly surprise M. de Metternich. He repeated to me
again, the evening before I set out, that the Duke of Otranto had on
all occasions expressed to him an inveterate hatred of Bonaparte; and
that even in 1814 he blamed him, for not having caused him to be
confined in some strong fortress; predicting to him, that he would
return from the island of Elba, to ravage Europe anew. M. Fouché must
be totally ignorant of what passes at Vienna, to believe in the
Emperor's security: what he will learn from M. de Montron and M.
Bresson will no doubt lead him to adopt a different opinion; and will
make him sensible, that it will be for his own interest, as well as
that of France, to second the efforts of the allies."
"I know the connexions of the Duke of Otranto with those gentlemen,"
answered I: "he will not pay much credit to what they tell him. I
regret that you were not commissioned to say so much to me on our
first interview, it would unquestionably have made a very different
impression on him; but what has not yet been done may be done; and, if
you wish it, I will readily be your interpreter."
"M. de Metternich," replied M. Werner, "did not positively inform me
what he had commissioned those gentlemen to say to the Duke of
Otranto; but I presume it could only be a repetition of what he
directed me to say to you."
"If this be the case," rejoined I, "you would be wrong, to flatter
yourself with the least success. If the question related to Napoleon
alone, we should not hesitate to sacrifice the cause of one man to
that of a whole people: Napoleon, personally, is nothing to us; but
his continuance on the throne is so connected with the happiness and
independence of the nation, that we cannot betray him, without
betraying our country at the same time; and this is a crime, of which
M. Fouché and his friends will never render themselves guilty.
"In short, M. Werner, I hope you will succeed in convincing our
enemies, that they would attempt in vain to dethrone Napoleon by force
of arms; and that the most prudent part that can be taken is, to be
contented with tying his hands in such a manner, as to prevent him
from oppressing France and Europe anew.
"If M. de Metternich approve this step, he will find us disposed,
secretly or openly to second his salutary views; and to join with him
in rendering it morally and physically impossible for Napoleon, to
recommence his tyranny. I will then return to Bâle, and I will go to
Vienna, if you desire it: and in a word I will do every thing, that
can be done, to arrive promptly at a secure result.
"But if M. de Metternich will not enter frankly into a conference, and
his sole intention be, to instigate treachery, his endeavours will
prove fruitless; and M. Fouché requests, that M. de Metternich and the
allies will spare him the trouble of convincing them of it."
M. Werner assured me, that he would faithfully report to M. de
Metternich all he had heard; and we parted, after promising to meet at
Bâle again on the 1st of June.
I gave the Emperor an account of this new conference. He appeared, to
conceive some hopes from it. "These gentlemen," said he, "begin to
soften, since they offer me the regency: my attitude imposes on them.
Let them allow me another month, and I shall no longer have any fear
of them."
I did not forget to remark to him, that M. M. de Montron and Bresson
had been charged with fresh communications for M. Fouché. "He has
never opened his mouth to me on the subject," said Napoleon. "I am now
persuaded, that he is betraying me. I am almost certain, that he is
intriguing both at London and at Ghent: I regret, that I did not
dismiss him, before he came to disclose to me the intrigues of
Metternich: at present, the opportunity is gone by; and he would every
where proclaim me for a suspicious tyrant, who had sacrificed him
without any cause. Go to him: say nothing to him of Montron or
Bresson; let him prate at his ease, and bring me a full account of all
he says."
The Emperor imparted this second interview to the Duke of Vicenza; and
directed him, to send for M. de Montron, and M. Bresson, and endeavour
to set them talking. The Duke de Vicenza having been able to get
nothing out of them, the Emperor, as I have been informed, would see
them himself; and, after having questioned and sounded them for four
hours, he dismissed them both, without having heard any thing but
accounts of the hostile dispositions of the allies, and the
conversations they had had at Vienna with M. de Talleyrand and M. de
Metternich, the substance of which was the same as that of my
conferences with M. Werner.
As the Emperor had rejected my first suspicions with so much
indifference, I was flattered to see him sharing my distrust: but
this gratification of self-love gave way to the most painful
reflexions.
I had conceived the highest opinion of the character and patriotism of
the Duke of Otranto; I considered him as one of the first statesmen in
France; and I bitterly regretted, that such qualities, and such
talents, instead of being devoted to the good of his country, should
be employed in favouring the designs of our enemies, and in coolly
contriving with them the means of subjugating us.
These reflexions, which ought to have inspired me with horror for M.
Fouché, had on me an opposite effect: I was staggered by the enormity
of the crime I ascribed to him. No, said I to myself, M. Fouché cannot
be guilty of such baseness: he has received too many benefits from the
Emperor, to be capable of betraying him, and has given too many proofs
of attachment and affection to his country, to conspire its dishonour
and ruin. His propensity to intrigue may have led him astray; but his
intrigues, if reprehensible, are at least not criminal.
Thus I repaired to the Duke of Otranto's in the persuasion, that I had
judged him too severely. But his air of constraint, and his captious
endeavours, to penetrate what M. Werner might have said to me,
convinced me, that his conscience was not at ease; and I felt my just
prejudices revived and increased[4]. The time I staid with him was
spent in idle questions and dissertations on the probabilities of
peace or war. It would be useless and tiresome, to recite them here.