A formation of Mitsubishi G3M1 and G3M2 Type 96 bombers (Nell), above,
fly in formation in 1942. The first models flew in 1935, and more than
250 were still serving in the Japanese land-based naval air arm in
December 1941. Nells, instrumental in the reduction of Wake’s defenses,
served alongside the newer, more powerful Mitsubishi G4M1 Type 97
bombers (Betty)--earmarked to replace them in front-line service--in
helping to sink the British capital ships HMS _Prince of Wales_ and HMS
_Repulse_ off Malaya on 10 December 1941.
Two 1,000-horsepower _Kinsei_ 45 engines enabled the Nell to reach a
speed of 238 miles per hour at 9,840 feet. Normally crewed by seven
men, the G3M2 model carried a defensive armament of one 20-mm and two
7.7-mm machine guns, and a payload of either one 1,764-pound torpedo or
2,200 pounds of bombs.
* * * * *
Although Mitsubishi A5M4 Type 96 carrier fighters (Claude), also
equipped the _Chitose Air Group_, none accompanied the group’s Nells
because of the long distances involved. Marine antiaircraft or fighter
aircraft gunfire at Wake destroyed at least four Nells during December
1941. Since the number of G3Ms engaged varied from raid to raid--no
more than 34 or fewer than 17--so, too, did damage figures. On at least
two occasions, though, as many as 12 returned to their base in the
Marshalls damaged.
]
‘_Humbled-by Sizeable Casualties_’
During the night of 10 December 1941, Wake’s lookouts vigilantly
scanned the horizon. Those of her defenders who were not on watch
grabbed what sleep they could. Shortly before midnight, the _Triton_
was south of the atoll, charging her batteries and patrolling on the
surface. At 2315, her bridge lookouts spied “two flashes” and then the
silhouette of what seemed to be a destroyer, dimly visible against the
backdrop of heavy clouds that lay behind her. The _Triton_ submerged
quickly and tracked the unidentifiable ship; ultimately, she fired a
salvo of four torpedoes from her stern tubes at 0017 on 11 December
1941--the first torpedoes fired from a Pacific Fleet submarine in World
War II. Although the submariners heard a dull explosion, indicating
what they thought was at least one probable hit, and propeller noises
appeared to cease shortly thereafter, the _Triton_’s apparent kill had
not been confirmed. She resumed her patrol, submerged.
[Illustration: _The 3,587-ton light cruiser_ Yubari, _seen here at
Shanghai, China, in April 1937, was completed in July 1923. Armed with
5.5-inch guns, she served as Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka’s flagship
for the operations against Wake in December 1941._
Naval Historical Center Photo NH 82098
]
The ship that _Triton_ had encountered off Wake’s south coast was,
most likely, the destroyer deployed as a picket 10 miles ahead of
the invasion convoy steaming up from the south. Under Rear Admiral
Sadamichi Kajioka, it had set out from Kwajalein, in the Marshalls,
on 8 December. It consisted of the light cruiser _Yubari_ (flagship),
six destroyers--_Mutsuki_, _Kisaragi_, _Yayoi_, _Mochizuki_, _Oite_,
and _Hayate_--along with _Patrol Boat No. 32_ and _Patrol Boat No. 33_
(two ex-destroyers, each reconfigured in 1941 to launch a landing craft
over a stern ramp) and two armed merchantmen, _Kongo Maru_ and _Kinryu
Maru_. To provide additional gunfire support, the Commander, _Fourth
Fleet_, had also assigned the light cruisers _Tatsuta_ and _Tenryu_ to
Kajioka’s force.
Admiral Kajioka faced less than favorable weather for the endeavor.
Deeming the northeast coastline unsuitable for that purpose, invasion
planners had called for the converted destroyers to put 150 men ashore
on Wilkes and 300 on Wake. If those numbers proved insufficient,
Kajioka’s supporting destroyers were to provide men to augment the
landing force. If contrary winds threatened the assault, the troops
would land on the northeastern and north coasts. Since the weather had
moderated enough by the 11th, though, the force was standing toward the
atoll’s south, or lee, shore in the pre-dawn hours, confident that two
days of bombings had rendered the islands’ defenses impotent.
Meanwhile, far to the east, at Pearl Harbor, the Pacific Fleet
continued to pick up the pieces after the shattering blow that the
Japanese had delivered on the 7th. The enemy onslaught had forced
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
(CinCPac), to revise his strategy completely. Kimmel wanted to
relieve Wake, but deploying what remained of his fleet to protect sea
communications, defend outlying bases, and protect far-flung territory,
as well as to defend Oahu, would have required a wide dispersal of
the very limited naval forces. By 10 December (11 December on Wake),
the scattered positions of his aircraft carriers, which were at sea
patrolling the Oahu-Johnston-Palmyra triangle, militated against
deploying them to support Wake. Cunningham’s garrison, however, in a
most striking fashion, would soon provide inspiration to the Pacific
Fleet and the nation as well.
Wake’s lookouts, like _Triton_’s, had seen flickering lights in the
distance. Gunner Hamas, on duty in the battalion command post, received
the report of ships offshore from Captain Wesley McC. Platt, commander
of the strongpoint on Wilkes, and notified Major Devereux, who, along
with his executive officer, Major George H. Potter, stepped out into
the moonlight and scanned the southern horizon. Hamas also telephoned
Cunningham, who ordered the guns to hold fire until the ships closed on
the island.
Cunningham then turned to Commander Keene and Lieutenant Commander
Elmer B. Greey, resident officer-in-charge of the construction
programs at Wake, with whom he shared a cottage, and told them that
lookouts had spotted ships, undoubtedly hostile ones, standing toward
the atoll. He then directed the two officers to order an alert and
immediately headed for the island’s communications center in his pickup
truck.
As the Japanese ships neared Wake, the Army radio unit on the atoll
sent a message from Cunningham to Pearl Harbor at 0200 on the 11th,
telling of the contractors’ casualties, and, because of the danger that
lay at Wake’s doorstep, suggesting early evacuation of the civilians.
Army communicators on Oahu who received the message noted that the
Japanese had tried to jam the transmission.
At 0400, Major Putnam put VMF-211 on the alert, and soon thereafter he
and Captains Elrod, Tharin, and Freuler manned the four operational
F4Fs. The Wildcats, a 100-pound bomb under each wing, then taxied into
position for take-off. Shortly before 0500, Kajioka’s ships began
their final run. At 0515, three Wildcats took off, followed after five
minutes by the fourth. They rendezvoused at 12,000 feet above Toki
Point. At 0522, the Japanese began shelling Wake.
The Marines’ guns, however, remained silent as Kajioka’s ships “crept
in, firing as they came.” The first enemy projectiles set the oil
tanks on the southwest portion of Wake ablaze while the two converted
destroyers prepared to land their _Special Naval Landing Force_ troops.
The column of warships advanced westward, still unchallenged. Nearing
the western tip of Wake 20 minutes later, Kajioka’s flagship, the
_Yubari_, closed to within 4,500 yards, seemingly “scouring the beach”
with her 5.5-inch fire. At 0600, the light cruiser reversed course yet
again, and closed the range still further.
The _Yubari_’s maneuvering prompted the careful removal of the brush
camouflage, and the Marines began to track the Japanese ships. As the
distance decreased, and the reports came into Devereux’s command post
with that information, the major again told Gunner Hamas to relay the
word to Commander Cunningham, who, by that point, had reached his
command post. Cunningham upon receiving Hamas’ report, responded, “What
are we waiting for, open fire. Must be Jap ships all right.” Devereux
quickly relayed the order to his anxious artillerymen. At 0610, they
commenced firing.
Barninger’s 5-inchers at Peacock Point, Wake’s “high ground” behind
them, boomed and sent the first 50-pound projectiles beyond their
target. Adjusting the range quickly, the gunners soon scored what
seemed to be hits on the _Yubari_. Although Barninger’s guns had
unavoidably revealed their location, the ships’ counterfire proved
woefully inaccurate. Kajioka’s flagship managed to land only one shell
in Battery B’s vicinity, a projectile that burst some 150 feet from
Barninger’s command post. “The fire ... continued to be over and then
short throughout her firing,” Barninger later reported. “She straddled
continually, but none of the salvoes came into the position.” It
was fortunate that the Japanese fire proved as poor as it was, for
Barninger’s guns lay completely unprotected, open save for camouflage.
No sandbag protection existed!
Captain Platt, meanwhile, told Major Potter via phone that, since
Battery L’s rangefinder had been damaged in the bombing the previous
day, First Lieutenant McAlister was having trouble obtaining the range.
After Platt passed along Potter’s order to McAlister to estimate
it, Battery L opened fire and scored hits on one of the transports,
prompting the escorting destroyers to stand toward the troublesome guns.
Platt carefully scrutinized the Japanese ship movements offshore, and
noted with satisfaction that McAlister’s 5-inchers sent three salvoes
slamming into the _Hayate_. She exploded immediately, killing all of
her 167-man crew. McAlister’s gunners cheered and then turned their
attention to the _Oite_ and the _Mochizuki_, which soon suffered hits
from the same guns. The _Oite_ sustained 14 wounded; the _Mochizuki_
sustained an undetermined number of casualties.
[Illustration: _A portable coincidence range-finder is like those
used at Wake Island in conjunction with the 5-inch/51 caliber guns of
Batteries A, B, and L. It was believed that they had been removed from
decommissioned and deactivated battleships in the 1920s._
Charles A. Holmes Collection, MCHC
]
First Lieutenant Kessler’s Battery B, at the tip of Peale, meanwhile,
dueled with the destroyers _Yayoi_, _Mutsuki_, and _Kisaragi_, as well
as the _Tenryu_ and the _Tatsuta_, and drew heavy counterfire that
disabled one gun. The crew of the inoperable mount shifted to that
of a serviceable one, serving as ammunition passers, and after 10
rounds, Kessler’s remaining gun scored a hit on the _Yayoi_’s stern,
killing one man, wounding 17, and starting a fire. His gunners then
shifted their attention to the next destroyer in column. The enemy’s
counterfire severed communications between Kessler’s command post
and the gun, but Battery B--the muzzle blast temporarily disabling
the rangefinder--continued with local fire control. As the Japanese
warships stood to the south, Kessler’s gun hurled two parting shots
toward a transport, which proved to have been out of range.
[Illustration: MAP 2