All motion hath its beginning; if it were otherwise, we must say the
number of heavenly revolutions of days and nights, which are past to
this instant, is actually infinite, which cannot be in nature.[52] If
it were so, it must needs be granted that a part is equal to the whole;
because infinite being equal to infinite, the number of days past, in
all ages to the beginning of one year being infinite (as they would be,
supposing the world had no beginning) would by consequence be equal
to the number of days which shall pass to the end of the {a45} next;
whereas that number of days past is indeed but a part; and so a part
would be equal to the whole.
2. Generations of men, animals, and plants, could not be from
eternity. If any man say the world was from eternity, then there must
be propagations of living creatures in the same manner as are at this
day; for without this the world could not consist.[53] What we see
now done must have been perpetually done, if it be done by a necessity
of nature; but we see nothing now that doth arise but by a mutual
propagation from another. If the world were eternal, therefore, it
must be so in all eternity. Take any particular species. Suppose a man,
if men were from eternity; then there were perpetual generations――some
were born into the world, and some died. Now the natural condition of
generation is, that a man doth not generate a man, nor a sheep a lamb,
as soon as ever itself is brought into the world; but get strength and
vigor by degrees, and must arrive to a certain stated age before they
can produce the like; for whilst anything is little and below the due
age, it cannot increase its kind. Men, therefore, and other creatures,
did propagate their kind by the same law, not as soon as ever they
were born, but in the interval of some time; and children grew up
by degrees in the mother’s womb till they were fit to be brought
forth. If this be so, then there could not be an eternal succession
of propagating; for there is no eternal continuation of time. Time
is always to be conceived as having one part before another; but
that perpetuity of nativities is always after some time, wherein it
could not be for the weakness of age. If no man, then, can conceive
a propagation from eternity, there must be then a beginning of
generation in time, and, consequently, the creatures were made in time.
“If the world were eternal, it must have been in the same posture as
it is now, in a state of generation and corruption; and so corruption
must have been as eternal as generation, and then things that do
generate and corrupt must have eternally been and eternally not have
been: there must be some first way to set generation on work.”[54] We
must lose ourselves in our conceptions; we cannot conceive a father
before a child, as well as we cannot conceive a child before a father:
and reason is quite bewildered, and cannot return into a right way of
conception, till it conceive one first of every kind: one first man,
one first animal, one first plant, from whence others do proceed. The
argument is unanswerable, and the wisest atheist (if any atheist can
be called wise) cannot unloose the knot. We must come to something
that is first in every kind, and this first must have a cause, not of
the same kind, but infinite and independent; otherwise men run into
inconceivable labyrinths and contradictions.
Man, the noblest creature upon earth, hath a beginning. No man in
the world but was some years ago no man. If every man we see had a
beginning, then the first man had also a beginning, then the world
had a beginning: for the earth, which was made for the use of man, had
wanted that end for which it was made. We must pitch upon some one man
that was unborn; that first man must either be eternal; that cannot be,
for he that hath no beginning hath no end; or must {a46} spring out of
the earth as plants and trees do;[55] that cannot be; why should not
the earth produce men to this day, as it doth plants and trees? He was
therefore made; and whatsoever is made hath some cause that made it,
which is God. If the world were uncreated, it were then immutable,
but every creature upon the earth is in a continual flux, always
changing:[56] if things be mutable, they were created; if created,
they were made by some author: whatsoever hath a beginning must have
a maker; if the world hath a beginning, there was then a time when it
was not; it must have some cause to produce it. That which makes is
before that which is made, and this is God.
II. Which will appear further in this proposition, No creature can
make itself; the world could not make itself.
If every man had a beginning, every man then was once nothing; he
could not then make himself, because nothing cannot be the cause
of something; ‘The Lord he is God; he hath made us, and not we
ourselves.’ (Ps. c. 3.) Whatsoever begun in time was not; and when it
was nothing, it had nothing, and could do nothing; and therefore could
never give to itself, nor to any other, to be, or to be able to do:
for then it gave what it had not, and did what it could not. Since
reason must acknowledge a first of every kind, a first man, &c., it
must acknowledge him created and made, not by himself:[57] why have
not other men since risen up by themselves, not by chance? why hath
not chance produced the like in that long time the world hath stood?
If we never knew anything give being to itself, how can we imagine
anything ever could? If the chiefest part of this lower world cannot,
nor any part of it hath been known to give being to itself, then the
whole cannot be supposed to give any being to itself: man did not form
himself; his body is not from himself; it would then have the power
of moving itself, but that it is not able to live or act without the
presence of the soul. Whilst the soul is present, the body moves;
when that is absent, the body lies as a senseless log, not having
the least action or motion. His soul could not form itself. Can that
which cannot form the least mote, the least grain of dust, form itself
a nobler substance than any upon the earth? This will be evident to
every man’s reason, if we consider,
1. Nothing can act before it be. The first man was not, and therefore
could not make himself to be. For anything to produce itself is to act;
if it acted before it was, it was then something and nothing at the
same time; it then had a being before it had a being; it acted when it
brought itself into being. How could it act without a being, without
it was? So that if it were the cause of itself, it must be before
itself as well as after itself; it was before it was; it was as a
cause before it was as an effect. Action always supposeth a principle
from whence it flows; as nothing hath no existence, so it hath no
operation: there must be, therefore, something of real existence to
give a being to those things that are, and every cause must be an
effect of some other before it be a cause. To be and not to be at the
same time, is a manifest contradiction, which would be, if anything
made itself. That which makes is always before that {a47} which is
made. Who will say the house is before the carpenter, or the picture
before the limner? The world as a creator must be before itself as a
creature.
2. That which doth not understand itself and order itself could not
make itself. If the first man fully understood his own nature, the
excellency of his own soul, the manner of its operations, why was not
that understanding conveyed to his posterity? Are not many of them
found, who understand their own nature, almost as little as a beast
understands itself; or a rose understands its own sweetness; or a
tulip its own colors? The Scripture, indeed, gives us an account how
this came about, viz. by the deplorable rebellion of man, whereby
death was brought upon them (a spiritual death, which includes
ignorance, as well as an inability to spiritual action.[58]) Thus
he fell from his honor, and became like the beasts that perish, and
not retaining God in his knowledge, retained not himself in his own
knowledge.
But what reply can an atheist make to it, who acknowledges no higher
cause than nature? If the soul made itself, how comes it to be so
muddy, so wanting in its knowledge of itself, and of other things?
If the soul made its own understanding, whence did the defect arise?
If some first principle was settled by the first man in himself,
where was the stop that he did not implant all in his own mind, and,
consequently in the minds of all his descendants? Our souls know
little of themselves, little of the world, are every day upon new
inquiries, have little satisfaction in themselves, meet with many
an invincible rub in their way, and when they seem to come to some
resolution in some cases, stagger again, and, like a stone rolled up
to the top of the hill, quickly find themselves again at the foot.
How come they to be so purblind in truth? so short of that which they
judge true goodness? How comes it to pass they cannot order their
own rebellious affections, and suffer the reins they have to hold
over their affections to be taken out of their hands by the unruly
fancy and flesh? This no man that denies the being of a God, and the
revelation in Scripture, can give an account of. Blessed be God that
we have the Scripture, which gives us an account of those things, that
all the wit of men could never inform us of; and that when they are
discovered and known by revelation, they appear not contrary to reason!
3. If the first man made himself, how came he to limit himself? If he
gave himself being, why did he not give himself all the perfections
and ornaments of being? Nothing that made itself could sit down
contented with a little, but would have had as much power to give
itself that which is less, as to give itself being, when it was
nothing. The excellences it wanted had not been more difficult to gain
than the other which it possessed, as belonging to its nature. If the
first man had been independent upon another, and had his perfection
from himself, he might have acquired that perfection he wanted as well
as have bestowed upon himself that perfection he had; and then there
would have been no bounds set to him. He would have been omniscient
and immutable. He might have given {a48} himself what he would; if he
had had the setting his own bounds, he would have set none at all; for
what should restrain him? No man now wants ambition to be what he is
not; and if the first man had not been determined by another, but had
given himself being, he would not have remained in that determinate
being, no more than a toad would remain a toad, if it had power to
make itself a man, and that power it would have had, if it had given
itself a being. Whatsoever gives itself being, would give itself all
degrees of being, and so would have no imperfection, because every
imperfection is a want of some degree of being. He that could give
himself matter and life, might give himself everything.[59] The giving
of life is an act of omnipotence; and what is omnipotent in one thing
may be in all. Besides, if the first man had made himself, he would
have conveyed himself to all his posterity in the same manner;
every man would have had all the perfections of the first man, as
every creature hath the perfections of the same kind, from whence it
naturally issues; all are desirous to communicate what they can to
their posterity. Communicative goodness belongs to every nature. Every
plant propagates its kind in the same perfection it hath itself; and
the nearer anything comes to a rational nature, the greater affection
it hath to that which descends from it; therefore this affection
belongs to a rational nature much more. The first man, therefore,
if he had had power to give himself being, and, consequently, all
perfection, he would have had as much power to convey it down to his
posterity; no impediment could have stopped his way; then all souls
proceeding from that first man would have been equally intellectual.
What should hinder them from inheriting the same perfections?
Whence should they have divers qualifications and differences in
their understandings? No man then would have been subject to those
weaknesses, doubtings, and unsatisfied desires of knowledge and
perfection. But being all souls are not alike, it is certain they
depend upon some other cause for the communication of that excellency
they have. If the perfections of man be so contracted and kept within
certain bounds, it is certain that they were not in his own power,
and so were not from himself. Whatsoever hath a determinate being must
be limited by some superior cause. There is, therefore, some superior
power, that hath thus determined the creature by set bounds and
distinct measures, and hath assigned to every one its proper nature,
that it should not be greater or less than it is; who hath said of
every one as of the waves of the sea, “Hitherto shalt thou come, but
no further;”[60] and this is God. Man could not have reserved any
perfection from his posterity; for since he doth propagate not by
choice, but nature, he could no more have kept back any perfection
from them, than he could, as he pleased, have given any perfection
belonging to his nature to them.
4. That which hath power to give itself being, cannot want power to
preserve that being. Preservation is not more difficult than creation.
If the first man made himself, why did he not preserve himself? He
is not now among the living in the world. How came he {a49} to be so
feeble as to sink into the grave? Why did he not inspire himself with
new heat and moisture, and fill his languishing limbs and declining
body with new strength? Why did he not chase away diseases and death
at the first approach? What creature can find the dust of the first
man? All his posterity traverse the stage and retire again; in a short
space their age departs, and is removed from them ‘as a shepherd’s
tent,’ and is ‘cut off with pining sickness.’[61] ‘The life of man is
as a wind, and like a cloud that is consumed and vanishes away. The
eye that sees him shall see him no more; he returns not to his house,
neither doth his place know him any more.’[62] The Scripture gives us
the reason of this, and lays it upon the score of sin against his
Creator, which no man without revelation can give any satisfactory
account of. Had the first man made himself, he had been sufficient
for himself, able to support himself without the assistance of any
creature. He would not have needed animals and plants, and other helps
to nourish and refresh him, nor medicines to cure him. He could not be
beholden to other things for his support, which he is certain he never
made for himself. His own nature would have continued that vigor,
which once he had conferred upon himself. He would not have needed
the heat and light of the sun; he would have wanted nothing sufficient
for himself in himself; he needed not have sought without himself for
his own preservation and comfort. What depends upon another is not
of itself; and what depends upon things inferior to itself is less of
itself. Since nothing can subsist of itself, since we see those things
upon which man depends for his nourishment and subsistence, growing
and decaying, starting into the world and retiring from it, as well as
man himself; some preserving cause must be concluded, upon which all
depends.
5. If the first man did produce himself, why did he not produce
himself before?
It hath been already proved, that he had a beginning, and could not
be from eternity. Why then did he not make himself before? Not because
he would not. For having no being, he could have no will; he could
neither be willing nor not willing. If he could not then, how could
he afterwards? If it were in his own power, he could have done it,
he would have done it; if it were not in his own power, then it was
in the power of some other cause, and that is God. How came he by
that power to produce himself? If the power of producing himself were
communicated by another, then man could not be the cause of himself.
That is the cause of it which communicated that power to it. But
if the power of being was in and from himself and in no other, nor
communicated to him, man would always have been in act, and always
have existed; no hindrance can be conceived. For that which had the
power of being in itself was invincible by anything that should stand
in the way of its own being.
We may conclude from hence, the excellency of the Scripture; that
it is a word not to be refused credit. It gives us the most rational
account of things in the 1st and 2d of Genesis, which nothing in the
world else is able to do.
III. No creature could make the world. No creature can create {a50}
another. If it creates of nothing, it is then omnipotent and so not
a creature. If it makes something of matter unfit for that which is
produced out of it, then the inquiry will be, Who was the cause of the
matter? and so we must arrive to some uncreated being, the cause of
all. Whatsoever gives being to any other must be the highest being,
and must possess all the perfections of that which it gives being to.
What visible creature is there which possesses the perfections of the
whole world? If therefore an invisible creature made the world, the
same inquiries will return whence that creature had its being? for he
could not make himself. If any creature did create the world, he must
do it by the strength and virtue of another, which first gave him
being, and this is God. For whatsoever hath its existence and virtue
of acting from another, is not God. If it hath its virtue from another,
it is then a second cause, and so supposeth a first cause. It must
have some cause of itself, or be eternally existent. If eternally
existent, it is not a second cause, but God; if not eternally existent,
we must come to something at length which was the cause of it, or else
be bewildered without being able to give an account of anything. We
must come at last to an infinite, eternal, independent Being, that
was the first cause of this structure and fabric wherein we and all
creatures dwell. The Scripture proclaims this aloud, “I am the Lord
and there is none else: I form the light, and I create darkness.”[63]
Man, the noblest creature, cannot of himself make a man, the chiefest
part of the world. If our parents only, without a superior power, made
our bodies or souls, they would know the frame of them; as he that
makes a lock knows the wards of it; he that makes any curious piece
of arras, knows how he sets the various colors together, and how many
threads went to each division in the web; he that makes a watch,
having the idea of the whole work in his mind, knows the motions of
it, and the reason of those motions. But both parents and children
are equally ignorant of the nature of their souls and bodies, and
of the reason of their motions. God only, that had the supreme hand
in forming us, in whose “book all our members are written, which in
continuance were fashioned,”[64] knows what we all are ignorant of. If
man hath in an ordinary course of generation his being chiefly from a
higher cause than his parents, the world then certainly had its being
from some infinitely wise intelligent Being, which is God. If it
were, as some fancy, made by an assembly of atoms, there must be some
infinite intelligent cause that made them, some cause that separated
them, some cause that mingled them together for the piling up so
comely a structure as the world. It is the most absurd thing to think
they should meet together by hazard, and rank themselves in that order
we see, without a higher and a wise agent. So that no creature could
make the world. For supposing any creature was formed before this
visible world, and might have a hand in disposing things, yet he must
have a cause of himself, and must act by the virtue and strength of
another, and this is God.
IV. From hence it follows, that there is a first cause of things,
which we call God. There must be something supreme in the order {a51}
of nature, something which is greater than all, which hath nothing
beyond it or above it, otherwise we must run _in infinitum_. We see
not a river, but we conclude a fountain; a watch, but we conclude an
artificer. As all number begins from unity, so all the multitude of
things in the world begins from some unity, oneness as the principle
of it. It is natural to arise from a view of those things, to the
conception of a nature more perfect than any. As from heat mixed
with cold, and light mixed with darkness, men conceive and arise in
their understandings to an intense heat and a pure light; and from a
corporeal or bodily substance joined with an incorporeal, (as man is
an earthly body and a spiritual soul), we ascend to a conception of
a substance purely incorporeal and spiritual: so from a multitude of
things in the world, reason leads us to one choice being above all.
And since in all natures in the world, we still find a superior nature;
the nature of one beast, above the nature of another; the nature of
man above the nature of beasts; and some invisible nature, the worker
of strange effects in the air and earth, which cannot be ascribed to
any visible cause, we must suppose some nature above all those, of
unconceivable perfection.
Every skeptic, one that doubts whether there be anything real or no
in the world, that counts everything an appearance, must necessarily
own a first cause.[65] They cannot reasonably doubt, but that there
is some first cause which makes the things appear so to them. They
cannot be the cause of their own appearance. For as nothing can have
a being from itself, so nothing can appear by itself and its own force.
Nothing can be and not be at the same time. But that which is not and
yet seems to be; if it be the cause why it seems to be what it is not,
it may be said to be and not to be. But certainly such persons must
think themselves to exist. If they do not, they cannot think; and if
they do exist, they must have some cause of that existence. So that
which way soever we turn ourselves, we must in reason own a first
cause of the world. Well then might the Psalmist term an atheist
a fool, that disowns a God against his own reason. Without owning a
God as the first cause of the world, no man can give any tolerable or
satisfactory account of the world to his own reason. And this first
cause,
1. Must necessarily exist. It is necessary that He by whom all things
are, should be before all things, and nothing before him.[66] And if
nothing be before him, he comes not from any other; and then he always
was, and without beginning. He is from himself; not that he once was
not, but because he hath not his existence from another, and therefore
of necessity he did exist from all eternity. Nothing can make itself,
or bring itself into being; therefore there must be some being which
hath no cause, that depends upon no other, never was produced by any
other, but was what he is from eternity, and cannot be otherwise;
and is not what he is by will, but nature, necessarily existing, and
always existing without any capacity or possibility ever not to be.
2. Must be infinitely perfect. Since man knows he is an imperfect
being, he must suppose the perfections he wants are seated in some
{a52} other being which hath limited him, and upon which he depends.
Whatsoever we conceive of excellency or perfection, must be in God.
For we can conceive no perfection but what God hath given us a power
to conceive. And he that gave us a power to conceive a transcendent
perfection above whatever we saw or heard of, hath much more in
himself; else he could not give us such a conception.