entertained by posterity which their ancestors delivered to them, and
that out of a common reverence to their forefathers, and an opinion
that they had a better prospect of things than the increase of the
corruption of succeeding ages would permit them to have. But if this
be a tradition handed from our ancestors, they also must receive it
from theirs; we must then ascend to the first man, we cannot else
escape a confounding ourselves with running into infinite. Was it then
the only tradition he left to them? Is it not probable he acquainted
them with other things in conjunction with this, the nature of God,
the way to worship him, the manner of the world’s existence, his own
state? We may reasonably suppose him to have a good stock of knowledge;
what is become of it? It cannot be supposed, that the first man should
acquaint his posterity with an object of worship, and leave them
ignorant of a mode of worship and of the end of worship. We find in
Scripture his immediate posterity did the first in sacrifices, and
without doubt they were not ignorant of the other: how come men to be
so uncertain in all other things, and so confident of this, if it were
only a tradition? How did debates and irreconcilable questions start
up concerning other things, and this remain untouched, but by a small
number? Whatsoever tradition the first man left besides this, is lost,
and no way recoverable, but by the revelation God hath made in his
Word. How comes it to pass this of a God is longer lived than all the
rest which we may suppose man left to his immediate descendants? How
come men to retain the one and forget the other? What was the reason
this survived the ruin of the rest, and surmounted the uncertainties
into which the other sunk? Was it likely it should be handed down
alone without other attendants on it at first? Why did it not expire
among the Americans, who have lost the account of their own descent,
and the stock from whence they sprung, and cannot reckon above eight
hundred or a thousand years at most? Why was not the manner of the
worship of a God transmitted as well as that of his existence? How
came men to dissent in their opinions concerning his nature, whether
he was corporeal or incorporeal, finite or infinite, omnipresent
or limited? Why were not men as negligent to transmit this of his
existence as that of his nature? No reason can be rendered for
the security of this above the other, but that there is so clear a
tincture of a Deity upon the minds of men, such traces and shadows
of him in the creatures, such indelible {a38} instincts within, and
invincible arguments without to keep up this universal consent. The
characters are so deep that they cannot possibly be rased out, which
would have been one time or other, in one nation or other, had it
depended only upon tradition, since one age shakes off frequently the
sentiments of the former. I cannot think of above one which may be
called a tradition, which indeed was kept up among all nations, viz.
sacrifices, which could not be natural but instituted. What ground
could they have in nature, to imagine that the blood of beasts could
expiate and wash off the guilt and stains of a rational creature? Yet
they had in all places (but among the Jews, and some of them only)
lost the knowledge of the reason and end of the institution, which the
Scripture acquaints us was to typify and signify the redemption by the
Promised Seed. This tradition hath been superannuated and laid aside
in most parts of the world, while this notion of the existence of a
God hath stood firm. But suppose it were a tradition, was it likely
to be a mere intention and figment of the first man? Had there been no
reason for it, this posterity would soon have found out the weakness
of its foundation. What advantage had it been to him to transmit
so great a falsehood to kindle the fears or raise the hopes of his
posterity, if there were no God? It cannot be supposed he should
be so void of that natural affection men in all ages bear to their
descendants, as so grossly to deceive them, and be so contrary to the
simplicity and plainness which appears in all things nearest their
original.
Secondly, Neither was it by any mutual intelligence of governors
among themselves to keep people in subjection to them. If it were a
political design at first, it seems it met with the general nature of
mankind very ready to give it entertainment.
1. It is unaccountable how this should come to pass. It must be either
by a joint assembly of them, or a mutual correspondence. If by an
assembly, who were the persons? Let the name of any one be mentioned.
When was the time? Where was the place of this appearance? By what
authority did they meet together? Who made the first motion, and
first started this great principle of policy? By what means could
they assemble from such distant parts of the world? Human histories
are utterly silent in it, and the Scripture, the ancientest history,
gives an account of the attempt of Babel, but not a word of any design
of this nature. What mutual correspondence could such have, whose
interests are for the most part different, and their designs contrary
to one another? How could they, who were divided by such vast seas,
have this mutual converse? How could those who were different in their
customs and manners, agree so unanimously together in one thing to
gull the people? If there had been such a correspondence between the
governors of all nations, what is the reason some nations should be
unknown to the world till of late times? How could the business be so
secretly managed, as not to take vent, and issue in a discovery to the
world? Can reason suppose so many in a joint conspiracy, and no man’s
conscience in his life under sharp afflictions, or on his death‑bed,
when conscience is most awakened, constrain him to reveal openly the
cheat that beguiled the world? How came they to be so unanimous {a39}
in this notion, and to differ in their rites almost in every country?
why could they not agree in one mode of worship throughout all the
world, as well as in this universal notion? If there were not a
mutual intelligence, it cannot be conceived how in every nation such
a state‑engineer should rise up with the same trick to keep people in
awe. What is the reason we cannot find any law in any one nation to
constrain men to the belief of the existence of a God, since politic
stratagems have been often fortified by laws? Besides, such men make
use of principles received to effect their contrivances, and are
not so impolitic as to build designs upon principles that have no
foundation in nature. Some heathen lawgivers have pretended a converse
with their gods, to make their laws be received by the people with
a greater veneration, and fix with stronger obligation the observance
and perpetuity of them; but this was not the introducing a new
principle, but the supposition of an old received notion, that there
was a God, and an application of that principle to their present
design. The pretence had been vain had not the notion of a God been
ingrafted. Politicians are so little possessed with a reverence of God,
that the first mighty one in the Scripture (which may reasonably gain
with the atheist the credit of the ancientest history in the world),
is represented without any fear of God.[34] An invader and oppressor
of his neighbors, and reputed the introducer of a new worship, and
being the first that built cities after the flood (as Cain was the
first builder of them before the flood), built also idolatry with
them, and erected a new worship, and was so far from strengthening
that notion the people had of God, that he endeavored to corrupt it.
The first idolatry in common histories being noted to proceed from
that part of the world; the ancientest idol being at Babylon, and
supposed to be first invented by this person: whence, by the way,
perhaps Rome is in the Revelations called Babylon, with respect to
that similitude of their saint‑worship, to the idolatry first set up
in that place.[35] ’Tis evident politicians have often changed the
worship of a nation, but it is not upon record that the first thoughts
of an object of worship ever entered into the minds of people by any
trick of theirs.
But to return to the present argument, the being of a God is owned
by some nations that have scarce any form of policy among them. ’Tis
as wonderful how any wit should hit upon such an invention, as it is
absurd to ascribe it to any human device, if there were not prevailing
arguments to constrain the consent. Besides, how is it possible they
should deceive themselves? What is the reason the greatest politicians
have their fears of a Deity upon their unjust practices, as well as
other men they intend to befool? How many of them have had forlorn
consciences upon a death‑bed, upon the consideration of a God to
answer an account to in another world? Is it credible they should
be frighted by that wherewith they knew they beguiled others? No man
satisfying his pleasures would impose {a40} such a deceit upon himself
to render and make himself more miserable than the creatures he hath
dominion over.
2. It is unaccountable how it should endure so long a time; that this
policy should be so fortunate as to gain ground in the consciences of
men, and exercise an empire over them, and meet with such an universal
success. If the notion of a God were a state‑engine, and introduced
by some political grandees, for the ease of government, and preserving
people with more facility in order, how comes it to pass the first
broachers of it were never upon record? There is scarce a false
opinion vented in the world, but may, as a stream, be traced to the
first head and fountain. The inventors of particular forms of worship
are known; and the reasons why they prescribed them known; but what
grandee was the author of this? Who can pitch a time and person that
sprung up this notion? If any be so insolent as to impose a cheat,
he can hardly be supposed to be so successful as to deceive the whole
world for many ages: impostures pass not free through the whole world
without examination and discovery: falsities have not been universally
and constantly owned without control and question. If a cheat imposeth
upon some towns and countries, he will be found out by the more
piercing inquiries of other places; and it is not easy to name any
imposture that hath walked so long in its disguise in the world,
without being unmasked and whipped out by some nation or other. If
this had been a mere trick, there would have been as much craft in
some to discern it as there was in others to contrive it. No man can
be imagined so wise in a kingdom, but others may be found as wise as
himself: and it is not conceivable, that so many clear‑sighted men in
all ages should be ignorant of it, and not endeavour to free the world
from so great a falsity. It cannot be found that a trick of state
should always beguile men of the most piercing insights, as well as
the most credulous: that a few crafty men should befool all the wise
men in the world, and the world lie in a belief of it and never like
to be freed from it.[36] What is the reason the succeeding politicians
never knew this stratagem; since their maxims are usually handed to
their successors.[37]
This persuasion of the existence of God, owes not itself to any
imposture or subtility of men: if it had not been agreeable to common
nature and reason, it could not so long have borne sway. The imposed
yoke would have been cast off by multitudes; men would not have
charged themselves with that which was attended with consequences
displeasing to the flesh, and hindered them from a full swing of their
rebellious passions; such a shackle would have mouldered of itself,
or been broke by the extravagances human nature is inclined unto. The
wickedness of men, without question, hath prompted them to endeavour
to unmask it, if it were a cosenage, but could never yet be so
successful as to free the world from a persuasion, or their own
consciences from the tincture of the existence of a Deity. It must
be therefore of an ancienter date than the craft of statesmen, and
descend into the world with the first appearance of human nature.
{a41} Time, which hath rectified many errors, improves this notion,
makes it shock down its roots deeper and spread its branches larger.
It must be a natural truth that shines clear by the detection of those
errors that have befooled the world, and the wit of man is never able
to name any human author that first insinuated it into the beliefs of
men.
Thirdly, Nor was it fear first introduced it. Fear is the consequent
of wickedness. As man was not created with any inherent sin, so he
was not created with any terrifying fears; the one had been against
the holiness of the Creator, the other against his goodness: fear did
not make this opinion, but the opinion of the being of a Deity was
the cause of this fear, after his sense of angering the Deity by his
wickedness. The object of fear is before the act of fear; there could
not be an act of fear exercised about the Deity, till it was believed
to be existent, and not only so, but offended: for God as existent
only, is not the object of fear or love; it is not the existence of a
thing that excites any of those affections, but the relation a thing
bears to us in particular. God is good, and so the object of love, as
well as just, and thereby the object of fear. He was as much called
_Love_,[38] and _Mens_, or _Mind_, in regard of his goodness and
understanding, by the heathens, as much as by any other name. Neither
of those names were proper to insinuate fear; neither was fear the
first principle that made the heathens worship a God; they offered
sacrifices out of gratitude to some, as well as to other, out of fear;
the fear of evils in the world, and the hopes of relief and assistance
from their gods, and not a terrifying fear of God, was the principal
spring of their worship. When calamities from the hands of men, or
judgments by the influences of Heaven were upon them, they implored
that which they thought a deity; it was not their fear of him, but
a hope in his goodness, and persuasion of remedy from him, for the
averting those evils that rendered them adorers of a God: if they had
not had pre‑existing notions of his being and goodness, they would
never have made addresses to him, or so frequently sought to that they
only apprehended as a terrifying object.[39] When you hear men calling
upon God in a time of affrighting thunder, you cannot imagine that the
fear of thunder did first introduce the notion of a God, but implies,
that it was before apprehended by them, or stamped upon them, though
their fear doth at present actuate that belief, and engage them in a
present exercise of piety; and whereas the Scripture saith, “The fear
of God is the beginning of wisdom,”[40] or of all religion; it is not
understood of a distracted and terrifying fear, but a reverential fear
of him, because of his holiness; or a worship of him, a submission to
him, and sincere seeking of him.
Well, then, is it not a folly for an atheist to deny that which is the
reason and common sentiment of the whole world; to strip himself of
humanity, run counter to his own conscience, prefer a private before
an universal judgment, give the lie to his own nature and reason,
assert things impossible to be proved, nay, impossible to be acted,
forge irrationalities for the support of his fancy against the common
{a42} persuasion of the world, and against himself, and so much of God
as is manifest in him and every man?[41]
_Reason II._ It is a folly to deny that which all creatures or all
things in the world manifest.[42] Let us view this in Scripture,
since we acknowledge it, and after consider the arguments from natural
reason.
The apostle resolves it (Rom. i. 19, 20), “The invisible things of him
from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by
the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead, so that
they are without excuse.” They know, or might know, by the things
that were made, the eternity and power of God; their sense might take
a circuit about every object, and their minds collect the being and
something of the perfections of the Deity. The first discourse of
the mind upon the sight of a delicate piece of workmanship, is the
conclusion of the being of an artificer, and the admiration of his
skill and industry. The apostle doth not say, the invisible things
of God are _believed_, or they have an opinion of them, but they are
_seen_, and _clearly seen_. They are like crystal glasses, which give
a clear representation of the existence of a Deity, like that mirror,
reported to be in a temple in Arcadia, which represented to the
spectator, not his own face, but the image of that deity which he
worshipped. The whole world is like a looking‑glass, which, whole
and entire, represents the image of God, and every broken piece of
it, every little shred of a creature doth the like; not only the
great ones, elephants and the leviathan, but ants, flies, worms, whose
bodies rather than names we know: the greater cattle and the creeping
things (Gen. i. 24); not naming there any intermediate creature, to
direct us to view him in the smaller letters, as well as the greater
characters of the world. His name is “glorious,” and his attributes
are excellent “in all the earth;”[43] in every creature, as the glory
of the sun is in every beam and smaller flash; he is seen in every
insect, in every spire of grass. The voice of the Creator is in
the most contemptible creature. The apostle adds, that they are so
clearly seen, that men are inexcusable if they have not some knowledge
of God by them; if they might not certainly know them, they might
have some excuse: so that his existence is not only probably, but
demonstratively proved from the things of the world.[44]
Especially the heavens declare him, which God “stretches out like
a curtain,”[45] or, as some render the word, a “skin,” whereby is
signified, that heaven is as an open book, which was anciently made
of the skins of beasts, that by the knowledge of them we may be taught
the knowledge of God. Where Scripture was not revealed, the world
served for a witness of a God; whatever arguments the Scripture uses
to prove it, are drawn from nature (though, indeed, it doth not so
much prove as suppose the existence of a God); but what arguments it
uses are from the creatures, and particularly the heavens, which are
the public preachers of this doctrine. The breath of God sounds to
all the world through those organ‑pipes. His being is visible in their
existence, his wisdom in their frame, his power in their {a43} motion,
his goodness in their usefulness. They have a voice, and their voice
is as intelligible as any common language.[46] And those are so
plain heralds of a Deity, that the heathen mistook them for deities,
and gave them a particular adoration, which was due to that God they
declared. The first idolatry seems to be of those heavenly bodies,
which began probably in the time of Nimrod. In Job’s time it is
certain they admired the glory of the sun, and the brightness of the
moon, not without kissing their hands, a sign of adoration.[47] It is
evident a man may as well doubt whether there be a sun, when he sees
his beams gilding the earth, as doubt whether there be a God, when he
sees his works spread in the world.
The things in the world declare the existence of a God. 1. In their
production. 2. Harmony. 3. Preservation. 4. Answering their several
ends.
First, In their production. The declaration of the existence of God
was the chief end for which they were created, that the notion of
a supreme and independent Eternal Being might easier incur into the
active understanding of man from the objects of sense, dispersed in
every corner of the world, that he might pay a homage and devotion
to the Lord of all (Isai. xl. 12, 13, 18, 19, &c.), “Have you not
understood from the foundation of the earth, it is he that sits upon
the circle of the heaven,” &c. How could this great heap be brought
into being, unless a God had framed it? Every plant, every atom, as
well as every star, at the first meeting, whispers this in our ears,
“I have a Creator; I am witness to a Deity.” Who ever saw statues or
pictures but presently thinks of a statuary and limner? Who beholds
garments, ships, or houses, but understands there was a weaver, a
carpenter, an architect?[48] Who can cast his eyes about the world,
but must think of that power that formed it, and that the goodness
which appears in the formation of it hath a perfect residence in some
being? “Those things that are good must flow from something perfectly
good: that which is chief in any kind is the cause of all of that
kind. Fire, which is most hot, is the cause of all things which are
hot. There is some being, therefore, which is the cause of all that
perfection which is in the creature; and this is God.” (_Aquin. 1
qu. 2. Artic. 3._) All things that are demonstrate something from
whence they are. All things have a contracted perfection, and what
they have is communicated to them. Perfections are parcelled out among
several creatures. Anything that is imperfect cannot exist of itself.
We are led, therefore, by them to consider a fountain which bubbles up
in all perfection; a hand which distributes those several degrees of
being and perfection to what we see. We see that which is imperfect;
our minds conclude something perfect to exist before it. Our eye sees
the streams, but our understanding riseth to the head; as the eye sees
the shadow, but the understanding informs us whether it be the shadow
of a man or of a beast.
God hath given us sense to behold the objects in the world, and
understanding to reason his existence from them. The understanding
cannot conceive a thing to have made itself; that is against all {a44}
reason. As they are made, they speak out a Maker,[49] and cannot be a
trick of chance, since they are made with such an immense wisdom, that
is too big for the grasp of all human understanding. Those that doubt
whether the existence of God be an implanted principle, yet agree that
the effects in the world lead to a supreme and universal cause; and
that if we have not the knowledge of it rooted in our natures, yet we
have it by discourse; since, by all masters of reason, a _processus
in infinitum_ must be accounted impossible in subordinate causes. This
will appear in several things.
I. The world and every creature had a beginning. The Scripture
ascertains this to us.[50] David, who was not the first man, gives
the praise to God of his being “curiously wrought,” &c. (Ps. cxxxix.
14, 15). God gave being to men, and plants, and beasts, before they
gave being to one another. He gives being to them now as the Fountain
of all being, though the several modes of being are from the several
natures of second causes.
It is true, indeed, we are ascertained that they were made by the true
God; that they were made by his word; that they were made of nothing;
and not only this lower world wherein we live, but, according to the
Jewish division, the world of men, the world of stars, and the world
of spirits and souls. We do not waver in it, or doubt of it, as the
heathen did in their disputes; we know they are the workmanship of
the true God, of that God we adore, not of false gods; “by his word,”
without any instrument or engine, as in earthly structures; “of
things which do not appear,” without any pre‑existent matter, as all
artificial works of men are framed. Yet the proof of the beginning of
the world is affirmed with good reason; and if it had a beginning, it
had also some higher cause than itself: every effect hath a cause.
The world was not eternal, or from eternity.[51] The matter of the
world cannot be eternal. Matter cannot subsist without form, nor put
on any form without the action of some cause. This cause must be in
being before it acted; that which is not cannot act. The cause of the
world must necessarily exist before any matter was endued with any
form; that, therefore, cannot be eternal before which another did
subsist; if it were from eternity, it would not be subject to mutation.
If the whole was from eternity, why not also the parts; what makes the
changes so visible, then, if eternity would exempt it from mutability?