THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).
The Vatican Council--Unusualness of the Occasion--Dr.
Newman's Letter--Jesuit Influence--Dr. Cumming--Symptoms
of Opposition--Opening of the Council--Inequalities of
Representation--Order of Business--Production of the _Schemata_--The
Doctrine of Papal Infallibility--Opposition of France and
Austria--Withdrawal of the French Troops--The Ecclesiastical
Opposition--Withdrawal of the Anti-Protestant Preamble--Adoption
of the Constitution _De Fide_--Discussion on the Constitution _De
Ecclesiâ_--Application of the Closure--The Dogma defined--Secession
of the Minority--Confirmation of the Constitution--Victor Emmanuel
determines on the Occupation of Rome--The Popular Vote--The Papal
Guarantees--The Spanish Throne--The Savoy Candidature--Death of
Prim--Paris after the Revolution of September--Jules Favre's
Circular--Bismarck's Reply--The Negotiations at Ferrières--The
Fortifications of Paris--The Investment completed--Thiers and
Gambetta--Fall of Strasburg--Bazaine in Metz--An abortive
Sortie--Emperor or Country?--Regnier's Intrigue--The Empress
declines to be a Party--A Council of War--Boyer's Mission--Its
Failure--The Army of Metz capitulates--A Riot in Paris--Thiers
negotiates in vain--Abortive Sorties--The Army of the
Loire--D'Aurelle de Paladines reoccupies Orleans--Reasons for
his Inaction--He is ordered to advance--Chanzy's Defeat and
Recapture of Orleans--The Second Army of the Loire--Garibaldi
in the East--The New Year in Paris--Dispositions of the German
Armies--Battle of Amiens--Faídherbe's Campaign--Bapaume--St.
Quentin--An Unpleasant Incident--Le Mans--The Bombardment of
Paris--The Armistice--Termination of the Siege--Bourbaki's
Attempt--Action at Villersexel--The Eastern Army crosses the
Swiss Frontier--The National Assembly at Bordeaux--Prolongation
of the Armistice--Resignation of Gambetta--Preliminaries of
Peace--Occupation of Paris--Acceptance of the Preliminaries--The
Definitive Treaty--German Unity.
The earlier portion of the year, of which the later months ushered in so
much bloodshed and such dire calamities, was rendered memorable by the
sessions of the Vatican Council at Rome, the first General Council of
the Latin Church that Europe had witnessed since the Council of Trent.
To England, indeed, as a Protestant country, the proceedings of a purely
Roman Catholic council could not be of immediate and vital interest. Yet,
besides the necessity and duty of watching keenly transactions tending
to affect the faith and conduct of a large portion of that Christendom
to which England also belonged, the closeness of her connection with
Ireland, whose people zealously participated in the preparatory movements,
brought the subject home to her in various ways; the questions themselves
which it was understood were likely to come before the Council were of
a remarkable nature; and a well-founded apprehension existed that the
settlement of these questions in a particular way was likely to have large
and wide-spreading political results. It will not therefore be out of
place in this History, while keeping clear of anything like theological
discussion, to insert a brief notice of the Vatican Council, showing in
what circumstances and with what intentions it was called together, and
describing how, after great and weighty opposition, a dogma issued from
its deliberations that afterwards acted like a firebrand cast into the
society of all Roman Catholic countries.
The (according to the Roman computation) twenty-second General Council was
convened, by the Bull _Æterni Patris_ dated the 29th of June, 1868, to
meet at the Vatican on the 8th of December, 1869. The principal subjects
for its deliberations were stated to be--the _magisterium_ or supremacy
of the Roman Pontiff, the relations between the State and the Church,
and the deep-seated evils and corruptions of modern society, owing to
the prevalence of revolutionary principles in religion, morals, and
philosophy. Why the Council was summoned at this particular time, it was
not easy to understand. Dissensions on questions of faith, threatening to
terminate in schism, or which already had terminated in schism, appear to
have been, in former ages of the Church, the invariable antecedents of the
convocation of an Œcumenical Council. But in the present case there never
had been a time in which greater unanimity in faith, or a more ardent
spirit of loyal obedience to the Pope, had pervaded the Roman Catholic
world. It had been indeed alleged that the rash speculations of some
German professors at the universities of Munich and Vienna, the drift of
which was to extend the authority of National Churches, and to set limits
to the Papal sovereignty, supplied a natural occasion and a sufficient
justification for the fuller and more exact definition of the Pontifical
and Petrine privileges which the promoters of the Council desired to see
recorded. Yet, at the time, little was heard of these speculations: they
did not aim at popularity; they were not taken up as the watchwords of any
important party in the Church. The non-necessity for, the inopportunity
of, the Council--at any rate with reference to questions of dogma--was an
opinion strongly entertained by many earnest and able Roman Catholics.
"What have we done?" wrote Dr. Newman to Bishop Ullathorne, "to be treated
as the faithful never were treated before? When has a definition _de
fide_ been a luxury of devotion, and not a stern, painful necessity? Why
should an aggressive and insolent faction be allowed to 'make the heart
of the just sad, whom the Lord hath not made sorrowful'? Why cannot we
be let alone when we have pursued peace and thought no evil?... If it is
God's will that the Pope's infallibility is defined, then is it God's
will to throw back 'the times and the moments' of that triumph which
He has destined for His kingdom, and I shall feel I have but to bow my
head to His adorable, inscrutable Providence." Many were of opinion that
the Society of Jesus--the members of which were numerous at Rome, were
supposed to have great influence over the Pope, and were certainly very
active in paving the way for the Council--saw in the extension and more
precise definition of the Papal prerogatives, which the adoption of the
dogma of infallibility would involve, an opportunity for strengthening
that system of centralised and unquestioned power which they have done
so much to establish in the Roman Church. "The dogma," it was said, "is
intended to make the Pope the ruler of the world; but the Jesuits rule the
Pope, therefore the master-influence for the future in that large section
of mankind which is included in the Latin Church will be wielded by the
Jesuits." Nor was this opinion as to the preponderating share assigned to
the Order in the arrangements for the Council confined to Protestants.
Soon after the commencement of the sessions, Bishop Strossmayer, a
Croatian prelate, denounced the Jesuits before the assembled fathers as
manipulating and directing the business of the Council in a manner liable
to be disastrous to the interests of the Church.
Soon after the publication of the Bull convening the Council a Papal
Brief appeared, addressed to all Protestants and non-Roman Catholics,
informing them that a General Council was about to be held, entreating
them not to rest contented with a position in which they could not be sure
of their salvation, and urging them to reconciliation and submission.
Dr. Cumming, of the Scottish Church, London, understood this appeal as
tantamount to an invitation to the Council, and manifested an intention
of attending at the Council at the time appointed and taking part in the
discussion. The Pope, however, writing to Archbishop Manning, desired
that "Dr. Cumming, of Scotland," should be informed that no opinions and
practices that had been condemned by any previous Council could be again
brought under discussion, and that the object of reminding Protestants of
the Council was to induce them to reflect upon the instability of their
religious position. In order that confusion might not characterise the
proceedings of so numerous an assembly, composed of men of every nation,
a large proportion of whom had never set eyes upon each other before,
six commissions were appointed by the Pope, with orders to prepare and
rough-hew the materials for deliberation in council on the several topics
of Religious Dogma, Ecclesiastical Politics, Church Discipline, Monastic
Orders, the East, and Rites and Ceremonies.
In Roman Catholic countries it was believed that the object for which
the Council was convened was to declare the infallibility of the Pope;
and for months before the Council opened great agitation prevailed. In
France, Bishop Maret and Père Gratry, the Oratorian, published pamphlets
impugning, not the opportuneness only, but the truth, of the doctrine
in question. In Germany the celebrated Dr. Döllinger contributed to the
_Allgemeine Zeitung_ a short but weighty essay, "Against the Infallibility
of the Pope." But of all writings of this class none attracted so much
attention as an able work named "The Pope and the Council" that appeared
under the pseudonym of "Janus." The object of the writer was to establish
by reference to history the untenable nature of the claims now made on
behalf of the Roman Pontiffs. The Governments of the Roman Catholic Powers
became uneasy and sought information from Cardinal Antonelli as to the
probable course that the deliberations would take; some of them also spoke
of asserting a claim to send ambassadors to the Council, as in former
times, for the protection of lay interests. But Cardinal Antonelli replied
in smooth and conciliatory terms; he would not admit that the definition
of the dogma of infallibility was probable; and with regard to the
non-admission into the Council of ambassadors from Roman Catholic Powers,
he justified it by the changed circumstances of modern times.
The Council assembled for the first time on the appointed day, the 8th
of December, 1869. Out of 1,044 bishops, mitred abbots, or generals of
orders, who were qualified to sit in the Council, 767 actually attended.
The bishops of Poland alone, among European countries, were absent,
having been forbidden to attend by the Czar. England and Scotland were
represented by twelve or thirteen bishops, the most prominent of whom
were Archbishop Manning and Dr. Ullathorne. Ireland sent twenty-three
representatives, including Cardinal Cullen, Archbishop MacHale, and
the learned and enlightened Bishop of Kerry, Dr. Moriarty. The French
bishops were about eighty in number; those of North Germany only
fourteen. The total number of bishops from all European countries--except
Italy--amounted to 265. The Italian bishops, together with the hundred
and nineteen bishops whose sees were _in partibus infidelium_, formed a
total of 276. The missionary bishops--congregating to Rome from all parts
of the known world, the expenses of their journey and residence in Rome
being borne by the Papal treasury--formed nearly three hundred. It was
objected that the representative character of the Council was impaired
by the inequality of the relations existing between the bishops and the
faithful who composed their flocks. The North German bishops, it was said,
were only as one to 810,000 lay Catholics in North Germany; while the
bishops from the Pontifical State numbered one for every 12,000 of the
laity. Again, it was urged that, whereas in the primitive times one of
the most distinctive characteristics of a bishop sitting in a council was
that he bore testimony concerning the faith of his flock, this could not
be the case with the numerous bishops _in partibus_ now assembled at the
Vatican, whose few and ignorant converts, for the most part just reclaimed
from barbarism, had no traditional Christianity to put in plea. To all
such objections it was replied, on the other side, that a bishop sat in
council in virtue of his consecration only and that the doctrine of equal
numerical representation had never been received in the Church.
[Illustration: THE VATICAN, ROME.]
For the regulation of the order of business the Bull _Multiplices inter_
was prepared, and communicated to the Council at the commencement of its
proceedings. It was said that under this Bull the liberty of the Council
was abridged to an extent never known in former councils. It lodged in the
hands of the Pope the nomination of the presidents of all congregations
and commissions and enjoined that any proposition that a bishop desired to
bring before the Council should first be laid before a special commission,
which should decide on its admissibility and report accordingly to the
Pope; without whose permission in the last resort it could not be brought
forward. It need hardly be said that Latin was prescribed as the only
language to be used in the public declarations.
The first public session (December 8th, 1869) was devoted to the
formalities of opening. The proceedings of the Council being suddenly
suspended in October, there were but four public sessions altogether. The
second was held on the feast of the Epiphany, January 6th, 1870; when, no
decree being at that time ready for discussion, every bishop attending the
Council, with the Pope at their head, made the formal profession of his
faith by publicly declaring his adhesion to the creed of Pope Pius IV.,
in which were summed up the principal dogmatic definitions and decrees
of the Council of Trent. In the course of January several _Schemata_, or
rough drafts of decrees, were introduced into the Council and referred to
the several examining commissions. The first was the Schema _De Fide:_ it
was headed, in its original form, by a preamble containing language of
a very disparaging nature respecting Protestantism, to the influence of
which it ascribed Rationalism, Pantheism, Atheism, Socialism, etc., which
it proceeded to condemn and anathematise. The second Schema related to
Church discipline, and was brought in on the 14th of January; it dealt
chiefly with the duties of bishops. The third Schema, _De Ecclesiâ_, on
the Church and the Papal primacy, was brought in on the 21st of January;
it originally contained three chapters, but a fourth was added in the
circumstances presently to be related.
The repugnance to the doctrine of Papal Infallibility--or, at any rate,
to the opportuneness of its definition at the present juncture--had been
now so loudly expressed by a number of bishops (chiefly French and German,
but with a sprinkling of English and Americans) that the majority in the
Council began to fear that the advisers of the Pope would recommend the
postponement of the subject to a future occasion. Wherefore a petition,
or _postulatum_, was prepared, soon after the session of the 6th January,
praying the Pope that the doctrine of the infallibility of the Chair
of Peter might be defined; this was signed by five hundred bishops.
The Governments of France and Austria, alarmed at this intelligence,
thought that the time was come for exercising a pressure in a contrary
direction on the Papal Court. Count Daru, then Minister for Foreign
Affairs, instructed the Marquis de Banneville, the French Ambassador at
Rome, to inform Cardinal Antonelli of the desire of the French Cabinet
to be informed beforehand of all proceedings of a political nature that
were taken by the Council, and of the decidedly adverse opinion of the
said Cabinet against any definition of Papal infallibility. The Austrian
Minister held similar language. Cardinal Antonelli replied to Count Daru
in a long despatch written in March, when the prospect of the adoption
of the dogma was increasingly favourable, denying that the Concordat
existing between France and Rome gave the French Government any right to
demand the special information required and claiming it as the privilege
and the duty of the Council to proceed to the doctrinal definition
deprecated by the French Cabinet, which he hoped would be greeted by the
faithful everywhere as "the rainbow of peace and the dawn of a brighter
future." It has been stated that the French Government replied to this
letter from Cardinal Antonelli, stating that, as he determined to pursue
a course that could only end in its ruin, France would for the future
abstain from interference; but that on the day of the declaration of Papal
Infallibility the Concordat would cease to be valid, the State would
separate itself from the Church, and the French troops would be withdrawn
from the Papal territory. It is certain that the resolution to withdraw
the French troops, which was officially communicated by the Marquis de
Banneville to the Holy See on the 27th July, was arrived at before France
had sustained any military reverses, and may therefore have been prompted,
or at least accelerated, by the proclamation of the dogma; but it does not
appear that the menace of treating the Concordat as invalid was ever acted
upon in the smallest degree; it seems probable therefore that the terms of
the despatch were not in reality quite so stringent.
In reply to the petition of the five hundred bishops, a counter-petition
was prepared by the opposition, and received a hundred and thirty-seven
signatures, chiefly those of French, German, and Hungarian bishops.
But the signers of this document--which was drawn up by Cardinal
Rauscher--were careful not to commit themselves to an unconditional
hostility to the dogma. They were content with pointing out the
stumbling-blocks and dangers by which the question was surrounded--the
thorny controversies, supposed to be long since buried, which it would
disinter and quicken into a disastrous activity--and the as yet unresolved
difficulties that passages in the history of the Papacy opposed to the
belief in its infallibility.
The controversy, both in and out of the Council, waxed hotter and
hotter, especially when the Infallibilists, emboldened it would seem by
the hesitating and qualified character of the opposition, as expressed
in the counter-petition--brought in in March, and annexed to the three
chapters of the Schema _De Ecclesiâ_ already submitted, the celebrated
fourth chapter, containing the dogma itself fully formulated. But for
the moment discussion ran upon the Constitution _De Fide_, which was
rapidly approaching maturity. The opposition required, and finally with
success, material alterations in that portion of the preamble which said
so many hard things of Protestantism. In the end, the offensive preamble
was withdrawn and a new one drawn up which the minority could agree to.
The Constitution _De Fide_ was adopted unanimously in the public session
of the 24th of April, all the bishops present voting _placet_, but
eighty-three adding the words "_juxta modum_," by which was meant that
the signer adhered to the constitution in a particular sense attached
by himself to its terms and not in any other sense. Strossmayer alone
absented himself from the voting.
The Constitution _De Fide_ being now out of the way, that of _De
Ecclesiâ_, with its new fourth chapter, was pushed forward with the
greatest ardour. The opposition resorted to the press and several
remarkable pamphlets by men of note appeared. One of these was by
the learned Hefele, lately appointed Bishop of Rottenburg. It was a
discussion of the well-known case of Pope Honorius, condemned for heresy
by Pope Agatho and a council in the year 680. Other _brochures_ on the
same side were written by Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, the Cardinals
Rauscher and Schwarzenberg and Archbishop Kenrick of St. Louis. The first
meeting for the discussion of the Constitution _De Ecclesiâ_ was held
on the 14th of May and the debate was continued during three weeks. The
principal speakers in support of the dogma were Cardinal Patrizi, Cardinal
Cullen, the Archbishop of Malines, and Moreno, the Cardinal Archbishop
of Valladolid. One of the most able and effective speeches was that of
Dr. Cullen, who endeavoured to convict Hefele of self-contradiction, by
contrasting the conclusions of his late pamphlet with the account given of
Pope Honorius in his Church History. Darboy, the Archbishop of Paris, made
an earnest and powerful speech against the decree; and Simor, the Primate
of Hungary, Jussuf, the Patriarch of Antioch, and Dr. MacHale, of Tuam,
spoke on the same side. The discussion dragged on wearily. June arrived,
and with it the burning heat and unwholesome air of a Roman summer; and
still the names of forty-nine bishops were inscribed as desiring to take
part in the discussion. At this point the majority exercised their right
of closing the debate and the general discussion was brought abruptly
to an end on the 3rd of June. Several weeks were then consumed in the
consideration of the chapters, paragraph by paragraph. The voting on the
fourth chapter, that enunciating the dogma, came on on the 13th of July.
As finally settled, the definition was expressed in the following terms:--
"We teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed that the Roman
Pontiff, when he speaks _ex cathedrâ_, that is, when in discharge of the
office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme
apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be
held by the universal Church, through the divine assistance promised to
him in St. Peter, is strong [_pollere_] with that infallibility with which
the divine Redeemer willed His Church to be furnished in defining doctrine
concerning faith or morals, and that therefore such definitions of the
Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves and not from the consent of
the Church."
On this definition the Council voted in the general congregation of the
13th July, and with the following result: 400 _placet_, 88 _non placet_,
and 61 _placet juxta modum_. About seventy others, though in Rome,
abstained from voting. It was now a question with the minority what course
they should take. Cardinal Rauscher proposed that they should all wait for
the public session, which had been fixed for the 25th of July, and then
vote _non placet_ in the presence of the Pope. But more pacific counsels
prevailed. A letter was prepared on the 17th inst., and signed by 110
bishops, in which, after adverting to the particulars of the voting on the
13th, they declared to the Pope that their hostility to the definition
of the dogma remained unchanged, and that by the present writing they
confirmed their previous suffrages, but that nevertheless, out of respect
and affection for his Holiness, they had determined not to stay and vote
openly, "_in facie patris_," on a question so nearly concerning the person
of the Pope. The bishops of the minority accordingly took their departure
from Rome.
The turmoil caused by the approach of war led to the anticipation of the
date that had been fixed for the public session. On the 18th of July, the
Pope himself presiding, the Constitution _De Ecclesiâ_, which included
the definition of infallibility, was put to the vote and received 533
_placets_, and 2 _non placets_. The negative votes were given by Riccio,
Bishop of Cajazzo, and Fitzgerald, Bishop of Little Rock, in the State of
Arkansas in the United States. The Pope then read out the constitution
to the assembled fathers, and confirmed it. During the reading a violent
storm of thunder and lightning burst over St. Peter's, and the darkness
became so great that the Pope was obliged to send for a candle. Little
or no excitement was visible among the Romans; the Ambassadors of
France, Prussia, and Austria pointedly stayed away. An analysis of the
eighty-eight negative votes in the general congregation of the 13th of
July, showed that thirty-two were given by German, Austrian, or Hungarian
prelates, twenty-four by French, and seven by Oriental bishops. Two were
Irish (Drs. MacHale and Moriarty, Bishop of Kerry); two English (Vaughan,
Bishop of Plymouth, and Clifford, Bishop of Clifton); one Colonial
(Conolly, Archbishop of Halifax), and five North Americans. Six Italian
bishops, six bishops in _partibus_, and three whose names could not be
ascertained, complete the list.
[Illustration: DR. DÖLLINGER. (_From a Photograph by F. Müller, Munich._)]
The importance of the definition of infallibility was considered by
politicians and lay society in general to consist, not so much in the
assertion and claim that the mere words of the decree contain, as in the
retrospective force that it might be used to impart to Papal decisions
dating from the Middle Ages, at a time when the power and pretensions
of the Holy See were almost unbounded. If such a dogmatic utterance,
for instance, as the Bull _Unam sanctam_ of Boniface VIII., by which
it was declared that, "if the temporal power errs, it is judged by
the spiritual," and that "there are two swords--the spiritual and the
temporal; ... both are in the power of the Church; ... the former that
of priests, the latter that of kings and soldiers, to be wielded at the
good pleasure and by the allowance of the priest,"--if such a Papal
declaration, and others of a similar kind to be found in the Roman
_Bullarium_, were held to be _ex cathedrâ_, and therefore infallibly true,
what a prospect was opened for the non-Roman Catholic Sovereigns of Roman
Catholic subjects, should the new definition come to be generally accepted
by the human conscience throughout the Roman Catholic world. These
fears proved, however, of an alarmist character, and the Roman Catholic
populations were on the whole no less law-abiding than the Protestant.
[Illustration: PALACE OF THE QUIRINAL, ROME.
(_From a Photograph by Alinari, Rome._)]
So far as it was connected with temporal power, the supremacy asserted for
the Pope by the Constitution _De Ecclesiâ_ was about to receive a notable
check and diminution. The declaration of war between France and Prussia
had been speedily followed by an announcement (July 27th), on the part
of the Ollivier Government, that France would withdraw all her troops
from Rome, and this was soon afterwards effected. The Opposition in the
Italian Parliament immediately began to attack the September Convention,
and to urge the occupation of Rome; but Signor Lanzi replied that the
Convention was still binding, and must be adhered to. But in September,
after the fall of the Empire and the Regency, the Italian Government
could not afford to overlook the opportunity which the prostration of
France afforded of extending a kingdom which was itself in so large a
measure the child of revolution. Already, on the 6th of September, the
Chevalier Nigra sounded Jules Favre on the possibility of obtaining the
approval and sanction of the new French Government to the King of Italy
taking possession of Rome. M. Favre, though not personally opposed to the
measure, was too well acquainted with the feeling that prevailed in France
on the subject to give official countenance to the act. On the 8th of
September the King addressed a letter to Pius IX., in which, grounding his
determination on the critical condition of Italy, and also on the presence
of foreigners among the troops composing the Papal army, he announced his
intention to send Italian troops into the Roman territory, who should
occupy those positions which should be "indispensable for the security of
your Holiness," and for the maintenance of order. The Pope flatly declined
to treat, and on the 20th of September the national army, after overcoming
a brief show of resistance on the part of the Papal Zouaves, entered Rome.
The Italian Government, desirous of covering the seizure of Rome under a
show of legality, ordered an appeal to be made to the people of the Papal
territory, who were invited to vote on the question whether or not they
approved of the annexation of Rome to the kingdom of Italy, the spiritual
rights of the Pope being preserved. The voting took place on the 2nd of
October with the following result: Ayes, 133,681; Noes, 1,507. The Italian
Parliament met in December and sanctioned the transfer of the capital from
Florence to Rome. Victor Emmanuel made his public entry into Rome on the
31st of December.
The Pope having refused the terms offered through the Count Ponza di San
Martino, the following arrangements were made by the Italian Government,
with the sanction of the Parliament, without consulting him. He was
confirmed in the possession of his sovereign rights, allowed to retain his
guards, and provided with an income of 3,255,000 francs (which, however,
Pius IX. never consented to accept). He was to keep the Vatican Palace
(the Quirinal Palace being appropriated for the use of the King of Italy),
the Church of Santa Maria Maggiore, his residence at Castel Gandolfo,
and their dependencies. Various provisions were added for the purpose of
securing the freedom and inviolability of the Papal correspondence. The
seminaries and other Roman Catholic institutions were to derive their
authority from the Holy See alone, without any interference from the
Italian educational authorities, and the Pope was left an entire fulness
of authority in the appointment of bishops and the general government of
the Church. In fact, the Guarantees, had Pius IX. chosen to accept them,
would have given him a power such as he possessed in no other European
country.
Spain, the unlucky cause of the deadly war that had broken out between
France and Germany, though striving after repose and a settled government,
failed to obtain it. In May the names of Espartero and Montpensier were
formally before the Cortes as candidates for the Throne. But Espartero
soon afterwards retired on the ground of his advanced age; and Prim,
whose influence was predominant in the Government, would not hear of the
election of the Duke of Montpensier. In June Queen Isabella abdicated
in favour of her son Alfonso, the Prince of Asturias. The next month
witnessed Prim's unsuccessful attempt to secure the elevation to the
Throne of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. Not daunted by so many failures,
Prim now turned his eyes again to the House of Savoy, and prevailed on
the King of Italy to consent to the acceptance of the Spanish Crown
by his second son, the Duke of Aosta. In October this arrangement was
given out as completed, subject to the approval of the Cortes. On the
16th of November a formal vote was taken in the Cortes, and there
appeared--for the Duke of Aosta, 191 votes; for the Federal Republic,
60; for Montpensier, 27; for a Unitarian Republic, 3. Supported by this
decisive majority, Prim proceeded to make the necessary preparations for
the fitting reception of the new Sovereign. The Duke and Duchess of Aosta
embarked at Leghorn and landed at Cartagena on the 30th of December. They
were received by Admiral Topete, and informed by him of a terrible crime
that had just occurred in Madrid. On the 28th of December, Marshal Prim,
while going in his carriage from the Cortes to the Ministry of War, was
fired at by some assassins (supposed to be Republican fanatics, to whom
Prim was odious as the supporter of monarchy) and severely wounded in the
arm and hand. The assassins made their escape. The wounds were at first
not believed to be dangerous, but inflammation set in and Prim expired on
the night of the 30th of December. If he had erred through ambition, the
brave Prim was yet a true lover of his country and a wise, courageous, and
sagacious ruler; at this critical juncture of her affairs, his death was
to Spain an unspeakable and irreparable loss.
It will be remembered that the narrative of the Franco-German War has been
brought down to the capitulation of Sedan and the Revolution of the 4th of
September. Of the gallant struggle made by the French nation after the
fall of the Empire, when the men who had installed themselves in the seats
of power vainly tried to bring back to the standards of the raw Mobiles
that victory which had deserted the eagles of the veterans of the Crimea,
it does not fall within the scope of this work to speak at length.
M. Jules Favre, Gambetta, Crémieux, and the rest (always excepting
Trochu), believing in democracy with an implicit and absolute faith,
seem to have been honestly convinced that what the French, or rather the
Parisian, populace were determined should be or should not be, would in
some way or other be arranged to suit their wishes. How else could the
foolish and presumptuous language--falsified so miserably by the event--of
M. Favre's circular of the 6th of September have escaped from the pen of
any man of common sense or common prudence? The Empire, he said, sought to
divide the nation from the army, but misfortune and duty have brought them
together again; "this alliance renders us invincible." He then proceeded
to misrepresent what the King of Prussia had said in his proclamation
upon entering French territory, as if he had declared that he made war,
"not against France, but against the Imperial dynasty;" whereas the King
merely announced that he was making war against the armies of France, not
against the civil population--a very different thing. But if Prussia was
so ill advised as to continue the war, the new Government would accept the
challenge. "We will not cede either an inch of our territory or a stone of
our fortresses."
Bismarck, upon receiving a copy of Jules Favre's circular, despatched a
counter-manifesto to the Prussian diplomatic agents. "The demand," he
remarked, "that we should conclude an armistice without any guarantee
for our conditions of peace, could be founded only on the erroneous
supposition that we lack military and political judgment, or are
indifferent to the interests of Germany." Germany cared nothing about the
dynasty; but whatever permanent Government might be established in France
must be prepared to give to Germany solid guarantees for the maintenance
of peace. "We are far from any inclination to mix in the internal affairs
of France. It is immaterial to us what kind of government the French
people shall formally establish for themselves. The Government of the
Emperor Napoleon has hitherto been the only one recognised by us; but our
conditions of peace with whatever Government, legitimate for the purpose,
we may have to negotiate are wholly independent of the question how or
by whom France is governed. They are prescribed to us by the nature of
things, and by the law of self-defence against a violent and hostile
neighbour. The unanimous voice of the German Governments and German people
demands that Germany shall be protected by better boundaries than we have
had hitherto against the dangers and violence that we have experienced
from all French Governments for centuries. As long as France remains in
possession of Strasburg and Metz, so long is its offensive strategically
stronger than our defensive power, so far as all South Germany, and North
Germany on the left bank of the Rhine, are concerned. Strasburg, in the
possession of France, is a gate always wide open for attack on South
Germany. In the hands of Germany, Strasburg and Metz obtain a defensive
character." It is now known that Bismarck would have been content with the
acquisition of Strasburg, but the military authorities insisted upon Metz
as well.
With views so divergent, the inutility of a conference between the French
Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prussian Chancellor would seem to be
obvious. Nevertheless, the pressure of circumstances brought about such a
conference, and for this reason--the Government of the 4th of September,
though it probably continued to regard itself as a "heaven-born Ministry,"
had become alive to the fact that its earthly title to legitimacy was
but slender; it therefore desired to bring about the convocation of a
National Constituent Assembly, which might, as it saw fit, either confirm
them in their offices or choose another Government. On the other hand,
it was to the Germans also a matter of prime importance that a regular
Government should be established in France, in order that negotiations
might be opened with it for peace. But in order that the elections from
which such an Assembly was to result might be held, there must be a
temporary cessation of hostilities; and this was a matter that could
only be arranged by means of an interview. Through the exertions of Lord
Lyons, the consent of the King of Prussia to a meeting between Bismarck
and Jules Favre, to settle the terms of an armistice, was obtained.
Several interviews between the two took place at Ferrières, near Meaux
(September 19th and 20th), but no accommodation could be arrived at. As
a military equivalent for the consent to a cessation of hostilities,
Bismarck demanded the surrender of Toul, Phalsburg, and Strasburg; but
to this Jules Favre would not listen, and became violently agitated at
the suggestion that the garrison of Strasburg should give themselves up
as prisoners of war. Again, the subject of an armistice was discussed
in connection with the re-provisioning of Paris. During the three weeks
that would be required for the election and first meeting of a National
Assembly, if an armistice were to prevail, Paris would naturally seek
to augment the stock of provisions within the walls; but, in that case,
Bismarck said, Germany must have a military equivalent to compensate her
for the long delay, and, as such an equivalent, he demanded the surrender
of the fortress of Mont Valérien. Favre was again much excited; he said,
and certainly with reason, that Bismarck might as well ask for Paris at
once. The conferences were broken off without result and Jules Favre
returned to Paris.
[Illustration: SIEGE OF PARIS: MAP OF THE FORTIFICATIONS.]
The remainder of the events of the war to the end of 1870 we propose to
sketch briefly in the following order:--(1) The siege of Paris (noticing
in connection therewith the sieges of Strasburg and Metz); (2) Other
sieges and stormings of fortresses; (3) The operations on the Loire; (4)
The operations in the east of France. Our object will be to keep the chief
current of action before the reader in avoidance of details.
The main defence of Paris consisted in the outer ring of forts, heavily
armed, by which the lines of investment of a besieging army were kept at
such a distance that the bombardment and destruction of the city were
rendered impossible until the forts themselves had been reduced. On the
south side the forts were not sufficiently distant from the city to make
it unattainable by shells, with the modern range of artillery, to an enemy
who had seized the heights of Meudon and Clamart, and the plateau of
Villejuif; secondly, the interval left between the fort of Issy and Mont
Valérien was far too great; and, again, the interval between Mont Valérien
and the forts of St. Denis was dangerously large. To remedy these defects
a system of earthworks was planned and partly executed, after Trochu had
charge of the defence. The disastrous issue of the sortie of the 19th of
September, made by General Ducrot in the direction of Chatîllon, when
the redoubt at that place fell into the hands of the Prussians, and the
14th Corps, yielding to a disgraceful panic, fled in disorder to the city
gates, not only, in General Vinoy's opinion, exercised a baneful influence
over all the subsequent defence, but led to the evacuation by the French
of the whole of the redoubts above described. Two of them, however, one
to the west, the other to the east of Villejuif, were re-taken by General
Vinoy, with little loss, on the 23rd of September; and being immediately
repaired and put in the best condition of defence, were held by the French
during the remainder of the siege, throwing back the Prussian line of
investment at this point considerably and making the bombardment of the
city, on all the eastern half of the southern face, impossible. Had equal
energy been shown in holding, or recovering, the redoubts of Meudon and
Chatîllon, Paris could not have been bombarded to any purpose on this
side. Of this there can be no question.
[Illustration: L. A. THIERS. (_From a Photograph by E. Appert, Paris._)]
After the repulse of Ducrot on the 19th of September, the investment of
Paris, which could not be considered final till the quality of the troops
composing the active army had been ascertained, was regularly completed.
Its salient points were Stains on the north, Chelles on the east, Sceaux
on the south, and Garches on the west. On the 30th of September General
Vinoy headed a grand sortie against the 6th Corps (Tümpling), which
guarded that portion of the Prussian lines which lay south of Villejuif,
with the intention of driving the Germans out of Choisy-le-Roi, and
destroying the bridge over the Seine at that point, so as to make a break
in the German communications. It was hoped that the enemy would have been
surprised; but a delay of twenty-four hours required by Trochu, in order
that a larger force might be got ready to share in the operation, and the
vigilance of the German Intelligence Department, caused that expectation
to fail; and the German troops at Choisy, being reinforced and prepared
for the attack, could not be dislodged. The French loss was considerable,
amounting to nearly 2,000 men; but the troops fought well and the retreat
was effected in good order.
About this time, M. Thiers, at the request of the Government of the
National Defence, visited all the principal Courts of Europe, everywhere
eloquently pleading the cause of his country. Nowhere, not even in Russia,
did his words fail to awaken interest and sympathy; but when M. Thiers
hinted at active intervention, he was met by a general indisposition to
interfere at the present stage of the struggle.
On the 7th of October Gambetta made his escape from Paris in a balloon,
and landed safely in the neighbourhood of Rouen. He at once repaired
to Tours, where a delegation from the Government of Paris had been for
some time established, though it was entirely unequal to its task. He
lost no time in issuing a proclamation, to be circulated through France,
describing in highly coloured language the patriotic exertions which
the Parisians were making, and urging the inhabitants of the unoccupied
provinces to rise and hasten to their succour. He then superseded Crémieux
in the Ministry of War, and appointed himself to the office, in addition
to that of Minister of the Interior. Gambetta evidently thought himself
another Carnot, about to "organise victory." The real nature and scope of
his abilities, which were undoubtedly great, appear to have been seized by
a keen-eyed newspaper correspondent, who said that Gambetta reminded him
of an "energetic traffic-manager" on an English railway. But his activity
and hopefulness were inexhaustible, and he certainly did contrive to
conjure up, as it were out of the earth, armies of some sort or other, and
to find arms and accoutrements for them; though the first were not uniform
and the second miserably insufficient. Nevertheless he did the best he
could with the materials at his hand. Of his military arrangements it is
enough to say that he put an end to the disorders in the great cities that
attempted to rival the central power.
Meanwhile the days crept on and the time came when famine forced the
defenders of Metz to drop their arms. Already Strasburg had fallen
(September 28th) after a gallant defence by General Uhrich, and the
Germans had established a civil government in Alsace. When last we
spoke of Bazaine, it was to mention that after the battle of Gravelotte
he withdrew the Army of the Rhine under cover of the fortifications of
Metz. Nothing of moment occurred for some days; Prince Frederick Charles
was engaged in hutting the German army round Metz and entrenching his
position; while Bazaine was busily preparing for another attempt. A
messenger from MacMahon, passing safely through the German lines, brought
word to Bazaine that the Army of Châlons had commenced its march to his
relief on the 21st of August. In order to co-operate with it, Bazaine
planned a great sortie for the 31st, about which day he calculated that
MacMahon would have arrived in the neighbourhood of the fortress. But
he delayed the attack till the afternoon, for reasons which, even upon
his own showing, appear insufficient; and through the indecision of
subordinate commanders, another delay supervened, so that the advance
was not made till four o'clock. The Germans had time to concentrate a
sufficient mass of troops in the rear of Noisseville and Servigny to repel
the French attack, which was made with no great vigour. Bivouacking on the
ground, the French resumed the action on the next day; but their efforts
were ill planned and ill united; the Germans brought up an overpowering
artillery to crush the French right; and between two and three o'clock,
Bazaine, who had heard nothing of the approach of MacMahon's army, gave
the order for retreat. For the next weeks he confined himself to foraging
for provisions, and even in a sortie on the 7th of October only 40,000 of
his troops were employed.
The Revolution of the 4th of September occurred and the news was received
by Bazaine with unmitigated disgust. The master whom he had served long,
and who had rewarded him well, was the Emperor; if the Emperor was a
prisoner and could give him no orders, then his obedience was due to
the Empress as Regent. He determined not to recognise and to hold no
communications with the men who had supplanted a regular Government under
favour of a street riot and the Republican cry. So far, if Bazaine's
antecedents are considered, it is impossible to blame him; he did not
become culpable till he made the interest of France--which had a more
sacred claim on his allegiance than any form of government--subordinate to
political aims and personal ambition. Count von Moltke, however, in his
"History of the Franco-German War," maintained that he was not a traitor.
In the course of September a strange incident occurred. There was an
individual of the name of Regnier, much attached to the Empire, who was
said to have held some appointment in the household of the Empress. M.
Regnier appears to have been a fanciful and vain personage; and the
notion came into his head that he might become the humble but serviceable
instrument of liberating the Emperor, re-establishing the Imperial
system, and terminating the misfortunes of France. For this, it seemed
to him, three things were necessary: the consent of the Imperial family;
the negotiation of a treaty of peace between them and the Germans; and
the liberation of Bazaine and his army in consequence of that treaty,
who should act as an "Army of Order," put down the Republic and the men
of the 4th of September, and replace the Emperor on the throne. Regnier
first went to Chislehurst and propounded his views to the Empress,
begging that she would furnish him with some kind of credentials. The
Empress, it is plain, put little faith either in the man or in his
project; however, after much importunity, she gave him the credentials
he desired. Having obtained these, Regnier repaired to Ferrières, where
the King and Bismarck were then quartered. He obtained an interview with
the Chancellor and unfolded his plan. Bismarck was at first inclined to
treat him as a dreamer and a meddler, but eventually thought the scheme
of Regnier might be worth a trial. He accordingly gave him a general
pass, which would allow of his passing through the lines of any German
army that he might meet with, in order that he might go to Metz and sound
Bazaine with reference to the project. Passing in this way through the
lines of Prince Frederick Charles, Regnier entered Metz and sought an
interview with Bazaine (September 23rd). The marshal, though he expressed
himself cautiously, did not disguise the feelings of aversion and contempt
with which he regarded the Government of the National Defence; and in
consequence of Regnier's visit he sent Bourbaki, the commander of the
Imperial Guard, that same evening out of Metz on a mission to Chislehurst.
The emissary--Prince Frederick Charles being doubtless cognisant of the
whole intrigue--found no difficulty in passing through the investing
lines. Up to this point Regnier's little plan had apparently prospered,
but now the bubble burst. The Empress was not a woman of that strength and
sternness of character which, in the pursuit of an object of ambition,
would lead her to brave obloquy and play high for a mighty stake. If she
signed a treaty of peace as Regent, providing for the cession of Strasburg
and Metz to Germany, the name of the Napoleonic dynasty, she thought,
would be eternally execrated in France; and, after all, it was not certain
that Bazaine could restore the Empire, or that his army, as a body, would
support him in the attempt. She therefore absolutely declined to be a
party to the scheme and it fell through. Bourbaki returned to France;
but, instead of re-entering Metz, placed his sword at the disposal of the
Government of Tours.
In October, the only description of food that remained abundant in Metz
was horse-flesh and this was obtained at the cost of the efficiency of
the cavalry and artillery. On the day after the sortie of the 7th Bazaine
caused a meeting of divisional generals to be held, to consider the
situation. However distasteful the thought of a capitulation might be,
yet the fast diminishing supplies of food compelled the officers to face
it; they were of opinion that a capitulation should be arranged on terms
that would allow of the army retiring, without laying down its arms, to
the south of France, under a pledge not to serve against Germany during
the continuance of war. If, however, these conditions were not acceded to
by the German leaders, it was the understanding of most of the divisional
generals and of the mass of the officers under them, that a desperate
effort must and would be made to cut a way, sword in hand, through the
investing forces.
At a meeting of the corps commanders, called by Bazaine on the 10th of
October, it was resolved that no new sorties should be attempted, but that
efforts should be made to obtain a military convention by negotiation with
the enemy. The use of the term "military convention" shows that something
different from an ordinary capitulation--something political--was in view.
At all events, General Boyer arrived at Versailles on the 13th of October
to talk over the situation. The course of the negotiation that ensued
was curiously similar to that which the Regnier incident had occasioned.
"You ask," said Bismarck, "that the army in Metz may be allowed to retire
to the south of France, pledged not to bear arms against Germany during
the continuance of the war. But who is to guarantee the convention under
which such an arrangement would be executed? Whom does Bazaine obey?
What is the Government that he serves? If the Government of the National
Defence,--that is an authority that we Germans do not recognise, at any
rate until a Constituent Assembly shall have met and validated their
powers. If the Emperor,--he is a helpless prisoner in Germany. If the
Empress and the Regency,--that may perhaps be satisfactory, but her
sanction must be obtained; she must sign a treaty that will give us what
we want; and the Army of the Rhine, besides the pledge not to bear arms
against Germany, must proclaim the Regency as the legitimate Government
of France, and Bazaine must undertake to play the part of Monk in an
Imperial restoration." Boyer returned to Metz with this answer on the
18th of October, and thence was sent to Chislehurst. The result was the
same as before; the Empress, after much wavering, refused to sign any
treaty of peace by which French territory would be ceded to the invader.
General Boyer communicated to the King on the 23rd the ill-success of his
mission, and Prince Frederick Charles was immediately instructed to inform
Bazaine that all hope of arriving at any result by political negotiation
was abandoned at the royal headquarters. On the 27th the capitulation was
signed and the fortress with an army of 170,000 men passed into the hands
of the Germans.
The confirmation of the news of the capitulation of Bazaine, and the
rumour that an armistice was under consideration, caused a great ferment
in the anarchical or communist element of the Parisian population. Bands
of armed men marched (October 31st) from Belleville to the Hôtel de Ville,
placed Trochu and other members of the Government under arrest, declared
the independence of the Commune of Paris and undertook its government.
The leaders were Flourens, Félix Pyat, Blanqui, etc. Fortunately, Ernest
Picard, the Minister of Finance, contrived to escape, and before the
day closed he brought a Breton battalion of the Gardes Mobiles to the
Hôtel de Ville, who soon rescued their countryman Trochu and dispersed
the revolutionists. The utmost forbearance was shown to the rioters by
the partisans of order. Trochu and his colleagues, after this _émeute_,
thought it desirable to submit the question of their remaining in power to
the suffrages of the people of Paris. The votes were taken accordingly;
nearly 558,000 were favourable to the Government, while 62,638 were
dissentient.
M. Thiers, on his return from his unsuccessful journey to the foreign
Courts, was requested by the Government to re-open negotiations with Count
Bismarck, with a view to a cessation of hostilities and the election of a
Constituent Assembly. But the project again foundered on the question of
re-victualling Paris, to which the military authorities at the Prussian
headquarters would not allow Bismarck to consent, unless on condition of
the surrender of one, if not two, of the forts round Paris--a concession
that Thiers could not make.
Sad and dull was life in Paris during the month of November, cheered
only by one gleam of better fortune, when news came that the Army of the
Loire had gained a victory at Coulmiers. At the end of the month a grand
sortie was resolved upon, in order to facilitate the flanking operations
of General d'Aurelle de Paladines' army, which Gambetta hoped to impel
upon Paris at the same time. Great preparations were made and several
demonstrations against various points of the German lines concerted, in
order to deceive the enemy as to the object of the main attack, which
was the peninsula of Champigny, beyond Charenton. Breaking through the
Prussian lines at this point, Trochu hoped to push forward into the
district of Brie, and march onwards till he fell in with the advancing
army of De Paladines. Ducrot was appointed to the command of the troops
destined for the operation, which numbered about 60,000 men. Bridges were
thrown across the Marne, and on the morning of the 30th the Saxons and
Würtembergers who guarded this part of the line were vigorously attacked
and the villages of Brie and Champigny wrested from them. Still no great
progress was made, and on the night of the 30th it became suddenly cold,
and the French soldiers unused to the hardships of campaigning suffered
terribly from exposure. The 1st of December was employed by Trochu and
Ducrot in strengthening the line, Brie-Champigny, which they had seized.
On the 2nd the Germans brought up fresh forces, and severe fighting took
place, at the end of which the French retained all their positions, except
the eastern end of the village of Champigny. On the 3rd Trochu resolved
to retreat, moved to do so by the absence of any news of De Paladines and
the increasing severity of the weather. The retreat was covered by the
guns of the forts and was effected with little loss. Another great sortie
was made on the 21st of December, with some vague hope of co-operating
with a northern army, supposed to be at that time advancing towards
Paris. The attack was directed against the Prussian Guard at Stains and
the Saxons more to the east. It was repelled with little difficulty, the
French losing considerably and showing in this sortie a lack of spirit and
endurance, naturally to be accounted for by want of food, severe cold, and
the depressing circumstances of the siege.
Besides Metz and Strasburg, eight other fortified places were compelled to
surrender before the close of the year. In the case of Laon, the surrender
on the 9th of September of a citadel and a position remarkably strong by
nature, was rendered necessary by the weakness of the garrison. Toul,
after a savage bombardment for several days, by which the town was set on
fire in several places, surrendered to the Duke of Mecklenburg on the 23rd
of September. Soissons, Verdun, La Fère, and Thionville were reduced in
the course of October and November. Phalsburg (the fortress at which is
laid the scene of Erckmann-Chatrian's famous novel, "Le Blocus"), after
its brave commandant, General Talhouet, and its no less brave inhabitants,
had endured a bombardment and blockade--the first intermittent, the second
continuous--during four months, was compelled to surrender, by failure of
provisions, on the 12th of December.
[Illustration: EVACUATION OF METZ. (_See p._ 584.)]
The narrative of the formation of the Army of the Loire, of its successes
and its reverses, is one of the most striking and instructive chapters
in the history of the war. All that will be here attempted is to give an
outline of the course of events, as it may be clearly traced in the works
of the two French generals who had most share in them, General d'Aurelle
de Paladines and General Chanzy. Soon after the Revolution of the 4th of
September, it being apparent that France must either raise fresh armies or
submit to whatever terms the victors of Sedan might impose, the formation
of a new army corps, the 15th, was commenced at Bourges, under the command
of General Motterouge. By the beginning of October its organisation was
nearly complete. Then came the advance of Von der Tann towards Orleans,
the defeat of Motterouge at Artenay and the first German occupation of
Orleans; the 15th Corps being driven over the Loire, and falling back
as far as Ferte St. Aubin. On the 11th of October General d'Aurelle de
Paladines, an officer on the retired list, who had offered his services
and his experience to the new Government, was appointed to supersede
General Motterouge. By the end of October came the disastrous news of the
fall of Metz. Prince Frederick Charles was now free to march southward
with 100,000 victorious troops and break up the nascent organisation of
the Army of the Loire. Several weeks, however, must elapse before he could
reach the Loire, and in that time the force which d'Aurelle's energy had
rendered formidable might still be able to strike a blow. On the 25th of
October the general concerted with the Minister of War, Gambetta, and his
delegate, M. de Freycinet, the plan of an advance of the 15th and 16th
Corps on Orleans. Crossing the Loire at Blois and other places, the 15th
and 16th Corps, preceded by numerous bodies of Franc-tireurs, forming
altogether an army of between 60,000 and 70,000 men, were ranged, at the
end of October, on a line facing the north-east, and extending from the
forest of Marchenoir to the Loire, near Beaugency. Von der Tann, who
commanded in Orleans and whose force was considerably weaker in point of
numbers, was alarmed at the movement and prepared to march out and attack
the enemy, intending, should he be unsuccessful, to evacuate Orleans.
D'Aurelle continued to press forward, handling his troops warily and
deliberately, as well knowing how disastrous, with such inexperienced
soldiers, the consequences of any mistake might easily be. The two armies
met on the 9th of November, on the plain around the village of Coulmiers,
ten miles west of Orleans, and for the first time in the war the Germans
were defeated.
On the following day (November 10th) General d'Aurelle entered Orleans
and was welcomed enthusiastically by the inhabitants. He fixed his
headquarters at Villeneuve d'Ingre, about three miles outside the city.
He has been repeatedly censured for not leading his army, after the
victory of Coulmiers, directly upon Paris, so as to raise the siege.
Had Prince Frederick Charles been still detained at Metz, this is what
d'Aurelle undoubtedly ought to have done. But the Prince, in his southward
march, was already almost as near Paris as the Army of the Loire; his
headquarters on the 10th of November were at Troyes. D'Aurelle with good
reason shrank from the enterprise of attacking the Duke of Mecklenburg
(whose army, swelled by the remains of Von der Tann's corps, amounted to
about 50,000 men and was posted near Chartres), with the certainty that
Prince Frederick Charles, a man not likely to miss an opportunity, was,
with 100,000 victorious Prussians, within striking distance of his right
flank. D'Aurelle's plan, therefore, was this--to form a large entrenched
camp in front of Orleans and fortify it with great care, mounting on
the works a number of heavy marine guns of long range; behind these
entrenchments to continue the organisation of the army and the instruction
of the soldiers, in both of which respects much improvement was still to
be desired; and to receive here, with his forces united and well in hand,
the attack which Prince Frederick Charles was marching to deliver. Had
that attack been successfully resisted, had the Prussian legions been
beaten back from before the walls of Orleans, then, General D'Aurelle
thought, there might be a chance of marching effectually to the relief of
Paris. But Gambetta interfered with his plans, and the result was that a
French advance was defeated on the 28th of November at Beaune la Rolande.
A council of war was held on the 30th of November, at St. Jean de la
Ruelle, near Orleans, at which d'Aurelle, Chanzy, and Freycinet were
present. Against the wishes and ideas of d'Aurelle, Freycinet communicated
the formal order of Gambetta to advance with the whole army on Pithiviers,
with a view to the relief of Paris. There was no choice but to obey. Next
day, Chanzy, with the 16th and 17th Corps, forming the left of the army,
advanced by Patay against the army of the Duke of Mecklenburg, and drove
it back a considerable distance. But Prince Frederick Charles, observing
the fatal error into which the French had fallen, through the interference
of Gambetta and Freycinet, of dispersing their troops too widely, executed
on the 2nd of December a masterly manœuvre, which in its results changed
the whole aspect of the campaign. Concentrating the heavy masses of the
German infantry on a narrow front, on each side of the great road which
joins Artenay and Chevilly, he advanced, engaging Chanzy with his right,
but directing the heaviest attack against the 15th Corps, which lay
between him and Orleans. The strongest division of that corps (Paillères)
had been sent away some days before, towards Pithiviers, by Gambetta's
orders, and had not yet rejoined the main body. Pressing steadily forward,
the Germans overpowered the resistance of the two remaining divisions
of the 15th Corps, and drove them back beyond Chevilly. Chanzy's troops
in this day's battle held their ground on most points, but the division
Barry, of the 16th Corps, gave way, and Chanzy lost his hold of the road
to Châteaudun. On the 3rd the fighting continued, the Germans slowly
pressing onward, step by step. D'Aurelle, fearful of a block at Orleans,
if the retreat of the whole French army should be directed thither,
sent orders to Chanzy to retire on Beaugency. He was not prepared for
the immense force which the enemy had developed in his front, and he
seems to have abandoned the hope that his beaten troops, even behind the
entrenchments he had prepared, could make an effectual stand. On the
4th, the arrival of Paillères with his division at headquarters inspired
d'Aurelle with a momentary hope that the entrenchments might yet be held,
and he telegraphed to Chanzy, directing him to march on Orleans. But it
was now too late; the enemy held the Châteaudun road, and was interposed
between Chanzy's army and Orleans. Moreover, the troops of Paillères'
division, and of the 15th Corps generally, weary and dispirited, exhausted
by want of sleep and food, could not be induced to man the entrenchments.
They pressed on into Orleans, many even of the officers forgetting their
duty, and repairing, without permission, to inns and private houses in
the town. D'Aurelle entreated, expostulated, and threatened, but all in
vain. Then he saw that Orleans must be evacuated and made arrangements
accordingly. The immense supplies that had been accumulated there were
removed, and on the night of the 4th of December the 15th Corps defiled
over the Loire bridge, leaving about a thousand prisoners in the hands of
the enemy. Thus was Orleans re-occupied by the Germans, and d'Aurelle de
Paladines was promptly superseded by Chanzy.
The new Second Army of the Loire, under Chanzy, had an eventful history,
which must here be summed up in a few words. Chanzy struggled gallantly;
but so far from advancing nearer to Paris, he was ever driven farther away
from it; he was continually fighting and falling back. He fought a battle
at Villorceau, on the 8th of December, against the Duke of Mecklenburg,
and maintained all his positions, except on the right, at Beaugency, which
the Prussians obtained possession of in the night. This disaster was owing
to another interference by Gambetta with the movements of the troops.
Admiral Jauréguiberry had given positive orders to General Camo, who
commanded the movable column of Tours, to hold firmly a strong position
which he assigned to him in front of Beaugency. But during the day a
direct order was received by Camo, from the Minister of War, to retire
behind Beaugency; this order he obeyed and the result was tantamount to a
defeat. After two more days' fighting, Chanzy fell back to the line of the
Loire, hoping to protect Vendôme. Prince Frederick Charles followed, and
a general engagement took place near Vendôme on the 15th of December, in
which, as before, the French fought well; but at its conclusion, his line
being forced back at one point, Chanzy resolved to evacuate Vendôme and
fall back on Le Mans. He arrived at Le Mans on the 21st of December, and
here for the present we will leave him.
In the east the military operations were not at first of such importance
as to have much effect on the issue of the war. Since France had declared
herself a Republic, the sympathies of Garibaldi were enlisted on her
behalf; he came to Tours on the 9th of October. Garibaldi was warmly
received by Gambetta and appointed to a special command in the east of
France; a brigade of Franc-tireurs, of miscellaneous composition, being
placed under his orders. Garibaldi's health was too infirm to allow of his
exhibiting any great activity in the field. His headquarters were fixed
at Autun, where he turned the fine old cathedral into a barrack for his
Franc-tireurs. General Werder, who commanded the German troops employed
in this part of France, was little hampered in his movements, either
by the efforts of Garibaldi, or by those of his more regular opponent
General Cambriels. On the 29th of October the important town of Dijon,
the ancient capital of Burgundy, had fallen into the hands of Werder. The
strong fortress of Besançon defied the German arms. It was of the highest
importance for them to take Belfort, a fortress of the first class,
situated in the southern corner of Alsace, in the gap between the Vosges
mountains and the Jura. General Treskow appeared before the place on the
3rd of November, and commenced to invest it; but the investment was for
a long time very incomplete, and communication with the country outside
was scarcely interrupted. Garibaldi marched towards Dijon, on the 27th
of November, at the head of a column of Mobiles and Franc-tireurs 10,000
strong. At a place called Pasques he fell in with Werder's outposts, who
held his force in check till the arrival of a brigade from Dijon, by which
the Garibaldians were easily routed, with the loss of many prisoners. On
the whole, the employment of Garibaldi did more harm by causing disunion
among the French, than it did good by any loss that it inflicted on the
Germans.
The opening of 1871 found the besieged population of Paris enduring with
exemplary patience the manifold hardships and gathering perils by which
they were beset. An additional source of danger and distress was about to
be disclosed, in the bombardment of the forts and city; but this also they
sustained with the greatest fortitude and resignation. From the beginning
of the year the bread distributed by the Government consisted of a
detestable compound of flour mixed with all kinds of foreign ingredients.
On the 3rd of January some Franc-tireurs brought some newspapers through
the investing lines, which gave no cheering account of the state of
affairs in the provinces. On that very day a battle was fought at Bapaume,
the issue of which ought to have contributed to amend the state of things,
but through some strange mismanagement it produced no good effect.
We will take this opportunity to give a brief sketch of the military
operations in the northern district since the fall of Metz. When that
event happened, the First and the Second German Armies, which had been
united before Metz while the siege lasted, were again separated. The bulk
of the Second Army marched with Prince Frederick Charles upon the Loire;
the First Army, placed now under the command of General Manteuffel, was
detached towards Amiens and Rouen, in order to disperse or press back any
new French armies which might threaten to attain to such a consistence
as to interfere with the secure prosecution of the siege of Paris.
Manteuffel had the whole of the 8th Corps, one brigade of the 1st Corps,
and a division of cavalry, under his immediate command, when he received
intelligence that a considerable French force under General Farre had been
concentrated in front of Amiens. The Prussians attacked on the morning of
the 27th of November. On their left they were in overpowering strength,
and quickly pushed back the French right for a considerable distance;
on the right, however, they could make no progress, and even, on the
appearance of a column advancing towards their right flank from Corbie,
gave ground decidedly. But in the evening the cavalry division came into
action on this wing and enabled the infantry again to advance. As the
final result of the engagement, the French were defeated at all points
and fell back to and behind Amiens. That important manufacturing city
was immediately occupied by General Manteuffel. A far richer prize fell
into his hands a few days later. The army defeated before Amiens retired
towards Arras and Lille, and Rouen thus found itself open to attack while
the military preparations for its defence were still very incomplete.
General von Göben, at the head of the 8th Corps, encountering only
trifling opposition, occupied Rouen on the 6th December, and immediately
made a heavy requisition on the city for stores and clothing.
General Faidherbe, formerly the governor of the French colony of the
Senegal, an officer of great talents and experience, reached Lille on the
4th of December, and took over the command of the Army of the North. After
reorganising the troops as well as he could, he advanced in the direction
of Amiens, and took up a strong position on the left bank of the little
river Hallue, somewhat to the north-east of the site of the late battle
on the south side of the city. Manteuffel resolved to attack Faidherbe,
and falling upon him on the morning of the 23rd of December, he drove
in the French outposts, and, in the course of the day, carried all the
villages along the Hallue, as far as the foot of the hills rising from
its left bank. This was the main French position, and it was held firmly
against all attacks. It was clearly a drawn battle. On the next day the
armies remained facing each other; it was a question which would browbeat
the other into retiring first. Unfortunately for France, Faidherbe, on
account of defects in his commissariat, found himself compelled to retreat
on the night of the 24th of December, and fell back, first to Albert and
ultimately beyond Bapaume.
On the 27th of December Manteuffel sent Von Göben to lay siege to Péronne.
This little fortress on the Somme, the name of which is familiar to the
readers of "Quentin Durward," it was a main object of German strategy to
reduce, because the whole line of the Somme would then be in their power,
and the passage of the river by a hostile force, especially considering
the season of the year, would be attended with great difficulty. Of
course, for the same reasons, it was important for the French to raise
the siege. General von Göben posted a covering force of ten or twelve
thousand men at Bapaume, while the siege, or rather bombardment, was being
carried on with the greatest vigour. The covering force was attacked by
Faidherbe on the 3rd of January, 1871, and driven, with heavy loss, into
the town of Bapaume. The battle was over; already Von Göben had given
orders for a retreat during the night, and his baggage trains had begun
to move off, when the welcome news reached him that the French had fallen
back. With a little more firmness General Faidherbe would have forced
the Germans to retire, and Péronne would have been saved. Defective
commissariat arrangements were again alleged by him, in a letter written
shortly afterwards, and also a reluctance to destroy the town of Bapaume.
Unrelieved, Péronne was obliged to surrender on the 10th of January, after
many of its inhabitants had been killed by the bombardment, its ancient
and beautiful church irreparably damaged, and great part of the town laid
in ruins.
[Illustration: LÉON GAMBETTA. (_From a Photograph by Carjat, Paris._)]
On the 19th of January, hearing that a strong French force was
approaching, the Prussians occupying St. Quentin evacuated the town.
Faidherbe then took possession of it, and concentrated its army outside
the walls, on the west and south sides. Von Göben, who was now in command
of the First Army, Manteuffel having been sent to assist Werder to defeat
Bourbaki, at the head of what was called the Army of the South, resolved
to strike a decisive blow. Calling in his detachments from all parts and
skilfully combining their movements so as to result in a concentric attack
on the French position, having also obtained the promise of Moltke to send
him a reinforcement by rail from Paris, so as to arrive at what was likely
to be the critical part of the battle, he advanced against Faidherbe at
St. Quentin on the 19th of January. The result could not be doubtful;
after a resistance bravely kept up by the 22nd, less tenaciously by the
23rd Corps, the French army was broken, and driven into and beyond St.
Quentin. This was the last regular battle of the war. Von Göben advanced
northwards and summoned Cambray to surrender, but the Governor refused.
Nothing else of moment happened in this part of the country till the
surrender of Paris brought about the cessation of hostilities.
An incident occurred on the Seine, towards the end of 1870, between
Rouen and Havre, which caused some irritation in Britain until proper
explanation and satisfaction had been made. The Prussians at Rouen,
fearing that steam gunboats would be sent up the river to attack them,
seized without ceremony six British colliers that were lying in the
Seine off Duclair, and scuttled them in order that they might form an
obstruction in the stream. Much stress was laid on this affair at the
time, the tension of men's spirits on account of the continued misery
of France being considerable, and the high-handed ways of Prussian
officials not having been pleasant to put up with on the part of neutrals
peaceably plying their vocations. But when Lord Granville wrote to
Count Bismarck, nothing could be more frank, explicit, or satisfactory
than the Chancellor's reply. He authorised Count Bernstorff to say to
Lord Granville that the Prussian Government sincerely regretted that
its troops, in order to avert immediate danger, had been obliged to
seize ships that belonged to British subjects; that their claim to
indemnification was admitted, and that the owners should receive the
value of their ships, according to equitable estimation, without being
kept waiting for the decision of the legal question, who was finally to
indemnify them.
No gleam of hope came from the west after the beginning of the year.
Chanzy, as we have seen, reached Le Mans with the Second Army of the
Loire on the 21st of December, and being left in peace there for two or
three weeks was able to do much towards the better organisation of his
forces. A succession of small combats, between the line of the Sarthe and
that of the Loire, took place between the 27th of December and the 10th
of January, in some of which the French obtained the advantage; while
others, particularly the later ones, marked a continual pressing back of
the French outposts and small detachments by the army of Prince Frederick
Charles, who had now made the necessary preparations to attack Chanzy,
and drive him, if possible, still farther west. The decisive battle took
place on the 11th of January. In numbers the French were probably much
superior to the army that was about to attack them. But their _moral_ was
fearfully shaken by the continued ill success that had attended their
arms. The battle raged all day along the whole line and at six o'clock in
the evening the French still held their ground. But an hour or two after
dark, a strange incident occurred. Shrewdly counting, it would seem,
on the nervousness and unsteadiness of young troops at night, Prince
Frederick Charles ordered a strong force of all arms to attack, about 8
P.M., the division of mobilised Bretons who were holding the
strong position of La Tuilerie. The Bretons, hearing rather than seeing
the enemy coming upon them, when the first shots fell in their ranks,
broke and fled. Quickly the contagion ran through the rest of the army;
by the morning it seemed hardly to have more cohesion than a rope of sand;
thousands of prisoners fell into the hands of the Germans; and a retreat
beyond the Sarthe became indispensable. Chanzy fell back to Laval on the
Mayenne, fifty miles west of Le Mans, and began again his Sisyphean task.
Thus Chanzy, with a beaten and demoralised army, was driven back to a
greater distance from Paris than ever; nor could any reasonable man now
entertain the hope that whatever exertions he, or Gambetta on his behalf,
might make, his army could again become formidable before the lapse of
many weeks. But with the Parisians starvation was become an affair of a
few days.
The bombardment began on the morning of the 5th of January. There were
three attacks--that directed against St. Denis and its forts; that against
Fort Rosny and other eastern forts; and, lastly, that against the three
southern forts, Issy, Vanves, and Montrouge. Two hundred guns concentrated
their fire against these southern forts. The unimportant attack on the
east was maintained by sixty guns, while a hundred and fifty thundered
on St. Denis from the north. Issy, on account of the too great distance
between it and Mont Valérien, was the fort against which, more than any
other, the Germans could bring to bear a concentric fire, and it was
accordingly more knocked about than any of the rest. The most formidable
of the German batteries, containing twenty-four pieces, was on the terrace
of Meudon. From the whole of them an average shower of ten thousand
projectiles per diem was rained during the continuance of the bombardment
on the forts and on Paris. In the daytime the fire was chiefly directed
at the forts, in the night it was turned against the city. The promise of
Count Bismarck, expressed with brutal cynicism, that the Parisians should
"stew in their own juice," was now fulfilled. Thanks to the distance, and
to the number and extent of the open spaces within the _enceinte_, the
mortality caused by the bombardment was far less than might have been
expected; absolutely, however, its victims were not few. Ninety-seven
persons (including thirty-one children and twenty-three women) not
employed in the defence were killed by the bombardment and two hundred
and seventy-eight (including thirty-six children and ninety women) were
wounded. Among the public buildings and institutions injured by it were,
the Jardin des Plantes, the Panthéon, the Val de Grâce, the Observatory,
the Church of St. Sulpice, and the Hôtel des Invalides. Nothing, says
General Vinoy, could be more admirable than the behaviour of the people
while the bombardment was going on. The effect of it was to harden rather
than to weaken the spirit of resistance; and Trochu, forced as it were by
the enthusiasm of those by whom he was surrounded, declared (January 6th)
that he would never capitulate. The effect of the fire upon the forts was
far less than the Germans had expected. Even of Fort Issy the defences
were far from being ruined; it could still have held out a long time after
the capitulation was settled. On the other hand the last sortie from Paris
on the 19th of January was a disastrous failure and it was followed by
grave signs of disaffection among the National Guard.
Paris was at the end of her resources. She could not wait to know the
result of the great combination--Gambetta's masterpiece--by which
Bourbaki, at the head of 130,000 unhappy conscripts, had been impelled
against Werder and the German communications. Of that expedition we
shall speak presently; but whether it succeeded or not, not a day was
to be lost in coming to any terms whereby a fresh supply of food might
be obtained for the 1,800,000 persons cooped up in Paris. Jules Favre
visited the German headquarters on the 24th of January, and on several
days afterwards, to arrange for a capitulation and an armistice. At seven
o'clock in the evening of the 26th General Vinoy received the order to
cause all the forts and field works to cease firing by midnight on the
same day. The order was obeyed, and the siege of Paris was at an end.
The convention establishing both a capitulation and an armistice for the
masses of the belligerent armies was signed by Bismarck and Favre, at
Versailles, on the 28th of January. The armistice was to last twenty-one
days, and was to be established wherever military operations were being
actually carried on, except in the departments of Doubs, Jura, and Côte
d'Or; the siege of Belfort also was to continue. Bismarck would have
readily consented to extend the armistice to these departments also; but
unfortunately Jules Favre fancied that Bourbaki had achieved, or was about
to achieve, great things, of which the relief of Belfort was the least;
he would not therefore include his army in the armistice. The object of
the cessation of hostilities was declared to be the convocation by the
Government of a freely elected National Assembly, which was to meet at
Bordeaux to decide whether the war should be continued or not. The forts
of Paris, with all guns and war material contained in them, were at once
to be surrendered to the German army, which during the continuance of
the armistice was not to enter the city. The guns forming the armament
of the _enceinte_ were also to be surrendered. The entire garrison of
Paris were to become prisoners of war and to lay down their arms, except
a division of 12,000 men, which the military authorities would retain for
the maintenance of internal order. After the surrender of the forts, the
reprovisioning of Paris would proceed without let or hindrance by all the
ordinary channels of traffic, except that no supplies were to be drawn
from the territory occupied by the German troops. A war contribution
amounting to £8,000,000 sterling was imposed on the city. The terms of
the armistice were punctually carried out, and on the 29th of January the
German troops were put in possession of the forts.
All along the line, except in the three departments and before Belfort,
the combatants dropped their arms. In that region a crowning disaster had
already overtaken the last convulsive efforts of France. The three corps
that had been placed under the command of Bourbaki, together with the
24th Corps (Bressolle), which was to be moved up from Lyons to co-operate
in the movement, formed an army of about 130,000 men. With this force
Bourbaki was expected to fall upon Werder and overpower him, raise the
siege of Belfort, and, crossing the Rhine, carry the war into Germany;
while Garibaldi and Cremer, after the defeat of Werder, were to fall
on the German line of communications by the Strasburg-Paris railway.
Entering Dijon on the 2nd of January, 1871, Bourbaki directed the main
body of his army to concentrate round the fortress of Besançon, whence
in two or three days he led it to the relief of Belfort. Werder, who had
fallen back from Dijon on Vesoul, attacked Bourbaki's left flank on the
9th of January, at Villersexel, on the Oignon, his object being to gain
time for the main body of his troops to fall back on the line of the
Lisaine, in front of Belfort, and fortify a position there. The action at
Villersexel was indecisive, but the march of the French was delayed by
it, and Werder gained the time he so greatly needed. On the 15th, 16th,
and 17th of January Bourbaki made successive attempts to force Werder's
position behind the Lisaine, but always without success. With his immense
preponderance in numbers, the boldest flank movements would have been
permissible, and could hardly have failed to dislodge the Germans; but
Bourbaki simply attacked them in front, and as they were strongly posted,
and had a solidity which his own troops had not, his efforts failed. On
the 18th Bourbaki resolved to retreat; and by the 22nd instant he had
again concentrated his army in the neighbourhood of Besançon.
By the failure of the French to force Werder's position the fall of
Belfort was made a certainty; but a greater disaster was behind. An
Army of the South had been formed by Moltke, and placed under the
command of Manteuffel, who took charge of it, on the 13th of January,
at Châtillon-sur-Seine. Marching southwards to the assistance of
Werder, Manteuffel seized Dôle, to the south-west of Besançon, and sent
detachments to occupy various points near the Swiss frontier, so as to
intercept the retreat of Bourbaki's army in that direction. After reaching
Besançon, Bourbaki remained for some days irresolute what to do; the
desperate situation of his army and the consciousness, perhaps, of his own
incapacity to command, overset his reason; and on the 24th he attempted to
commit suicide by shooting himself through the head. The want of supplies
sufficient both for the fortress and for the support of so large an army
was probably the cause why Clinchamp, upon whom the command devolved,
instead of keeping the army under the shelter of the mountain forts and
lofty citadel of Besançon, resolved on continuing the march southward,
in order either to elude the Germans by escaping along roads close to
the Swiss frontier, or, if the worst came to the worst, to cross the
border and surrender to the Swiss authorities. Eventually the 24th Corps,
under General Bressolle, succeeded in making its escape and reaching
Lyons. The rest of the army, overtaken and attacked by Manteuffel in and
around Pontarlier, after losing thousands of prisoners, was driven into
Switzerland and there interned.
In pursuance of the terms of the armistice elections were held throughout
France in order to the convocation of a National Assembly. By the 12th of
February about three hundred members only, out of the seven hundred and
fifty who were to compose the new Legislature, had arrived at Bordeaux;
but so urgent was the case that the Assembly proceeded to constitute
itself on that day. On the 16th of February M. Grévy was chosen President
of the Assembly, and on the following day M. Thiers was appointed, by a
large majority, Chief of the Executive Power. Some days before this, it
being evident that the armistice which was only to last till the 19th of
February, would expire before the Assembly could come to a decision upon
the momentous question before it, Jules Favre hurried up to Versailles
in order to obtain a prolongation of the time. It was granted, but at
the same time the fate of Belfort, the governor of which had hitherto
repelled all attacks, was sealed; the fortress was to be surrendered
to the Germans, but the garrison, with their arms and stores, and the
military archives, was to march out with the honours of war and be allowed
to retire to the south of France. Accordingly the garrison, still 12,000
strong, marched out and proceeded to Grenoble; and the fortress was
occupied by the Germans on the 18th of February. This may be regarded as
the closing scene of the Franco-German War.
Gambetta fell from power as suddenly as he had risen to it. He appealed
to the nation to use the interval for the collection of new forces,
and caused the Delegation of the Government at Bordeaux to publish an
electoral decree on the 31st of January, excluding from the possibility of
being elected to the Assembly all persons who had stood in any official
relation to the Second Empire. Against this outrageous decree Count
Bismarck could not refrain from protesting, and fortunately he could
appeal to the phrase in the article of the capitulation bearing on the
question, which spoke of a "freely elected" National Assembly. It was
a critical moment, for had M. Gambetta found a large body of Frenchmen
unwise enough to back him in this course, great delays must inevitably
have arisen, the legality and plenary authority of the Assembly might
have been disputed, and perhaps the Germans might have been called in, or
might themselves have stepped in, to arbitrate in a question of French
internal politics. This consummation was happily avoided. The Government
at Paris undertook to cancel the decree of the Delegation, and sent one
of their number, Jules Simon, to Bordeaux, with instructions to publish
and enforce their decision. Gambetta, finding his proceedings disavowed,
resigned office on the 6th of February. In his stead Thiers was chosen to
be Chief of the Executive. He appointed a Ministry, persuaded the Assembly
to postpone all discussion as to the future Government of France, and
proceeded to Versailles to agree with Count Bismarck upon the terms of
peace.
[Illustration: GERMAN TROOPS PASSING UNDER THE ARC DE TRIOMPHE, PARIS.
(_See p._ 594.)]
On the 19th of February the National Assembly elected a diplomatic
commission of fifteen members, who were to accompany MM. Thiers and
Jules Favre to Paris, and assist them in negotiating a peace. No serious
intention of continuing the war was entertained by any considerable
party or faction in the Assembly. On the 21st of February the French
negotiators met Count Bismarck at Versailles. Thiers knew that the Germans
meant to have, substantially, the terms which they demanded, and he did
not waste time by idle reclamations or counter-proposals. On two points,
however, his efforts achieved a certain success. Count Bismarck desired
to retain Belfort, a fortress which in German hands would make France as
vulnerable to attack on the upper Rhine, as the loss of Metz left her
weak and vulnerable on the lower. Thiers, however, succeeded in retaining
Belfort for France, purchasing the concession by consenting to the march
of the German army through Paris. Again, whereas Bismarck had originally
demanded six milliards (£240,000,000) as the war indemnity, Thiers with
infinite exertion succeeded in reducing it to five milliards. On this
second point the assistance of British diplomacy was specially invoked
by the French Government. Lord Granville, at the urgent request of the
Duc de Broglie, the new French Ambassador, wrote to Berlin (February
24th) the mildest, faintest, weakest representation--remonstrance it was
not--that could have been made, if any was made at all, on the subject of
the excessive indemnity. Before, however, the duplicate of this despatch
reached Mr. Odo Russell at Versailles, Count Bismarck had already given
way. The preliminaries of peace were signed on the 26th of February. By
them France agreed to cede Alsace and German Lorraine, including Metz, to
Germany, and to pay a war indemnity of five milliards within three years,
the German army to evacuate France as the instalments were paid.
In the preliminaries of peace a convention was inserted, authorising the
occupation of a definite portion of Paris by a body of German troops not
exceeding 30,000 men. Accordingly, on the morning of the 1st of March,
portions of the 11th, 2nd Bavarian, and 6th Army Corps, crossing the
Seine by the bridge of Neuilly, defiled along the avenue of the same
name, passed under the Arc de Triomphe, and marched through the Champs
Elysées into the Rue de Rivoli and other parts of the district assigned
to them. But this occupation, deeply painful and humiliating as it must
have been to the Parisians, was not of long duration. News came on the 2nd
of March that the preliminaries of peace had been ratified at Bordeaux,
and then Paris, in accordance with an express stipulation to that effect,
was immediately evacuated. The preliminaries were submitted by M. Thiers
to the National Assembly on the 28th of February. The terms of peace
were oppressive and exorbitant; they were terms which Germany, having
found France ill prepared for war, had been enabled by her admirable
preparation, her profound study of the art and thorough elaboration of the
means of war, to impose on the vanquished; nor is it to be supposed for an
instant that the Assembly assented to them except under compulsion, and
from the conviction that their refusal would bring still more terrible
misfortunes upon France. In the course of the discussion that ensued,
the Assembly solemnly voted the deposition of Louis Napoleon and his
dynasty, by a resolution that declared him responsible for the invasion,
dismemberment, and ruin of France. On the 1st of March the preliminaries
of peace were accepted by a majority of 546 votes against 107, and after
bitter controversies, chiefly connected with the payment of the indemnity,
the definitive treaty was signed at Frankfort on the 10th of May.
Thus while France emerged from the war with a reduction of territory, the
struggle brought to Germany a unification of the Empire. Various minds
had been occupied with this project since the earliest German victories,
among others that of the Crown Prince. He received, however, but cold
encouragement from Count Bismarck, who was jealous of the Prince's
interference in matters of State, chiefly on account of his English
connections. Nevertheless, Bismarck was also occupied in shaping a plan
and it gradually assumed the form of a German Empire with its chief at
Berlin. After the battle of Sedan, negotiations were opened with each
of the Southern States for its entry into the Northern Confederation,
when it appeared that particularism was strong in Bavaria, which kingdom
was not disposed to come into the agreement without favourable terms.
Count Bismarck accordingly invited the various Governments to send
representatives to Versailles for the arrangement of a settlement. At
first the King of Würtemberg showed a disposition to act with Bavaria,
but his Ministers resigned rather than refuse to sign the treaty, and the
accession of Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt to the unionist side showed the
two kings the peril of their situation. Accordingly, when Bavaria had
been granted larger separate rights than any other State--for instance,
an independent postal system, and an independent army--King Louis gave
way and the treaties were signed. It was some time before Bavaria would
consent to the assumption of the Imperial title by the King of Prussia.
Under pressure from Bismarck, however, the king wrote a letter to his
fellow-Sovereigns, proposing that William I. as President of the newly
formed Federation should assume the title of German Emperor, and this
request he renewed to William himself in a letter composed by Bismarck.
A deputation from the North German Reichstag expressed the concurrence
of the nation, but so strong was local patriotism in Bavaria that the
ceremony was delayed from the end of one year to the beginning of the next
and even then the approval of Munich had not been secured. Nevertheless
on the 18th of January, surrounded by German princes and German warriors,
King William assumed at Versailles the title of German Emperor. Thereby a
fresh chapter in the history of Europe was begun, though it was some time
before the effects of the new order were manifest.
* * * * *