CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).

France in 1870--The Ollivier Ministry--Diminution of Imperial

Prestige--Constitutional Reforms submitted to the Popular

Vote--Resignation of Daru and Buffet--The _Plébiscite_--The Military

Vote--Lull in European Affairs-The Hohenzollern Incident--The

Duc de Gramont's Speech--Excitement in France--The Candidature

withdrawn--Benedetti at Ems--His Second Interview with King

William--The Alarmist Telegram--War declared at Paris--Efforts of

the British Government--Bismarck divulges a supposed Franco-German

Treaty--Benedetti's Explanation--Earl Russell's Speech--Belgian

Neutrality guaranteed--Unpreparedness of the French Army--Hopes

of Alliances--The Emperor's Plans--Saarbrück--Weissenburg--The

Emperor partially resigns Command--Wörth--MacMahon

at Châlons--Spicheren--The Palikao Ministry--Bazaine

Generalissimo--Battle of Borny--Mars-la-Tour--Gravelotte--English

Associations for the Sick and Wounded--Palikao's Plan--MacMahon's

Hesitation--De Failly's Defeat--MacMahon resolves to

Fight--Sedan--The Surrender--Napoleon and his Captors--Receipt

of the News in Paris--Impetuosity of Jules Favre--A Midnight

Sitting--Jules Favre's Plan--Palikao's Alternative--Fall of the

Empire--The Government of National Defence--Suppression of the Corps

Législatif--The Neutral Powers: Great Britain, Austria, and Italy.

At his usual New Year's Day reception (the 1st of January, 1870) the

Emperor Napoleon expressed himself to the diplomatic body as highly

satisfied with the relations existing between his Government and

all Foreign Powers. He added, "The year 1870, I am sure, cannot but

consolidate this general agreement, and tend to the increase of concord

and civilisation." So it might easily have done, had not the rise or fall

of his own prestige, and that of his family, been matters of much greater

importance in the Emperor's mind--notwithstanding these fine words--than

the peace of Europe and the happiness of France.

M. Ollivier, having succeeded in inducing several public men of a higher

stamp than had ever before served the Emperor--notably Count Daru and M.

Buffet--to join him in the effort that he declared himself resolved to

make to give real political liberty to France, appeared before the Chamber

with his Ministry fully constituted on the 3rd of January. But these

honest politicians of the Left Centre--these men of honour, and character

and known antecedents--must have felt considerable surprise, not to say

mistrust, when they found what sort of persons they were associated with

in the Government and in what hand the executive force of the Empire

really lay. Marshal Lebœuf was continued in the post of Minister of War;

and courtiers like Marshal Vaillant, the Duc de Gramont, and General

Fleury knew the Emperor's secrets and influenced his determinations

much more than his responsible Ministers. M. Ollivier himself was a

vain, impetuous man, abounding in self-confidence, but lacking in

self-respect,--who was dazzled by the attentions shown him by the Emperor,

and believed that he had converted his master to Liberal principles;

whereas his master did but make a tool of him all along, and in the end

caused him to lose the respect of everyone.

[Illustration: EMILE OLLIVIER. (_From a Photograph by Benque and Co.,

Paris._)]

Although the country was materially prosperous, the popularity, and

therefore the stability, of the Empire had greatly diminished in the

last five years. With the temper that ruled in the breasts of French

politicians, the aggrandisement of a neighbouring State was necessarily

regarded as a check to the policy and a kind of outrage to the feelings

of France. Even so moderate a writer as Jules Favre seemed to think

that if the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern had not been

withdrawn when it was, the elevation of a Prussian prince to the throne

of Spain would have constituted a real _casus belli_ for France. The

line of French thought would appear to be this: "Prussia, by annexing a

number of provinces without our consent, and not offering us a share, has

brought herself relatively nearer to us in power than she was before,

and has thereby done us a grievous wrong; if now the ambitious House of

Brandenburg, not content with this provoking increase of power, should

try to seat one of its princes on the throne--even though it be but a

revolutionary throne--of Spain, we Frenchmen will not submit to it; our

feelings will boil over; and we must go to war rather than allow it."

It is true these things were little felt by the working and trading

millions, to whom "peace was their dear delight;" yet even to them a

little "glory" now and then was necessary in order to embellish their

existence; and, moreover, the Emperor was a man of ideas, knew the French

people, and could calculate the force of epigrams and the undermining

power of a hostile sentiment. Certainly he could not afford, nor could

the Empire afford, to lose any more _prestige_. Yet at this very moment

an incident of the most damaging and discreditable character covered the

name of the Bonapartes with infamy, namely, the death of the journalist

Victor Noir at the hands of the Emperor's ruffianly cousin Pierre, and the

latter's acquittal before the High Court of Justice at Tours.

The position of the Government was strange and precarious; no one seemed

exactly to understand it: with the exception of the extreme parties--the

courtiers on one side, and the "Irreconcilables" on the other--all the

actors on the political stage were moving they knew not precisely whither.

M. Ollivier on one occasion (February 23rd) announced that the Government

disapproved of the system of official candidatures, and would no more use

pressure at the elections. No intelligence could be more unwelcome to a

large proportion of the members on the Right, who had owed their seats to

Government pressure, and knew that without it they had no chance of being

re-elected. A split therefore began to develop itself in the ranks of the

majority. But the Emperor still continued to support Ollivier and to play

his Liberal game. His instincts and opinions were without doubt genuinely

Liberal; and his life was consumed in the attempt to reconcile the

gratification of these instincts with the conservation of his dynasty. And

yet there must have been something in the apologetic tone that Ollivier

often assumed in the Chamber, which must have been a little galling to

Napoleon's pride. The Emperor resolved to teach his Liberal supporters

a lesson and at the same time to reimpress a large and awkward fact on

the minds of his enemies--namely, that he and his system were the choice

of France. He instructed M. Ollivier (March 21st) to prepare a _Senatus

Consultum_ for the redistribution of powers between the two branches

of the Legislature, so that the Senate--the less popular body--should

be curtailed of many privileges which it had before enjoyed; while the

Corps Législatif--the more popular body--would have its powers extended,

especially by giving it the right of originating all money Bills. M.

Ollivier introduced the measure into the Senate on the 26th of March. But

a few days later he was startled on being informed by the Emperor, that

since, in his opinion, the new constitutional changes involved a departure

from the basis that the popular vote had ratified in 1852, he was resolved

to submit them also to the ordeal of universal suffrage. Ollivier

remonstrated vainly against this decision: the Emperor stood firm; and

the Minister, either not seeing or not wishing to see the vast difference

that his consent made in his position, agreed to continue at the head of

affairs and arrange the machinery of the _plébiscite_.

But Count Daru and M. Buffet, more clear-sighted and self-respecting

than their flighty colleague, refused to have anything to do with a

_plébiscite_. For the meaning of it was simply this--that the popular

vote covered everything, and was itself the source of right and legality;

that France had no right to liberty and just government unless the masses

voted to that effect; and that similarly the _plébiscite_ of 1852, having

sanctioned a system that arose out of perjury and violence, had made

that system immaculate and unquestionable. In taking office, Count Daru

and M. Buffet had never intended so to commit themselves; and they now

accordingly resigned their _bureaux_. The Duc de Gramont, a courtier,

received the charge of the Foreign Office in succession to Count Daru.

In resorting again to the device of a _plébiscite_, we cannot doubt that

the Emperor had one main object in view--increased stability. The tide of

Liberalism, he felt, was continually pushing him onward; piece by piece,

the system of administration on which he had ruled France for eighteen

years was giving way to its assault; and then, as he had once before said

to M. Ollivier, "one always falls on the side on which one leans." Feeling

the advances of age--conscious that his powers both of body and mind were

being undermined by a harassing and incurable malady--he became more than

ever desirous to secure the peaceable transmission of power to his son.

If all France could be got to ratify the changes that were now being made

in the system of government as decisively as it ratified his assumption

of power after the _coup d'état_ of 1851, surely the dynasty might then

breathe freely. One would have thought that the friendship and the

pledged word of two or three leading generals would have offered a more

substantial security for the succession of his son than the illusory test

of a _plébiscite_. Perhaps, however, the Emperor had by this time half

convinced himself that a popular vote, taken on a matter which the masses

cannot properly judge of, was an honest and lawful mode of devolving

power, and also a mode that imparted a peculiar strength and durability

to the decision arrived at. The vote was taken in all the departments of

France, and separately in the army and navy, with the following result:

_Oui_, seven millions of civilian votes, and three hundred and nine

thousand in the army and navy; _Non_, one million and a half (within five

thousand) of civilian votes, and fifty-two thousand in the army and navy.

When, in the autumn of 1852, the Emperor demanded from the popular voice a

condonation of the past and a sanction for the future, the Ayes numbered

nearly 8,000,000, the Noes only 253,000. The returns of the voting in 1870

marked a notable progress of dissatisfaction since the commencement of

the Empire. But it is known that the nature of the military vote was that

which chiefly disquieted the Emperor. These fifty thousand soldiers who,

in spite of the restraints of discipline and the ties of self-interest,

had, by their "Noes," expressed their disapproval of the Imperial system,

could not but be regarded as the more active and intelligent spirits

in the army, who were more likely, unless their aims were attained, to

estrange from the Empire the still loyal majority, than to be absorbed

in that majority themselves. What, then, were their aims? In a warlike

nation, where the humblest day-labourer is possessed by the sentiment of

military glory, the more stirring and ambitious characters in the army are

prone to become impatient in a long-continued peace; and this feeling is

likely to be enhanced when a neighbouring people, the rival and antagonist

of the soldier's country in many an historic campaign, has been winning

_spolia opima_, and gaining victories of extraordinary brilliancy. Such

reflections must have agitated the mind of Napoleon as he thought of those

fifty thousand "Noes;" and the conviction must have come upon him with a

lurid clearness, that the only way to regain the loyalty of the army and

to secure the succession of his son lay through war. When the ruler of

a great nation, having the absolute control of its military resources,

arrives at such a conclusion as this, an occasion is not likely to be long

wanting.

But for a time everything wore a peaceful aspect, and the results of the

_plébiscite_ were even considered on the whole to have strengthened the

Emperor's position. It was a matter of course that, on receiving from M.

Schneider (May 21st) the official report of the results of the voting,

the Emperor should use the language of serenity and cheerful hope. "We

must," he said, "more than ever look fearlessly forward to the future."

In a debate on the Bill for fixing the army contingent for 1870, M.

Ollivier, to whom the Emperor's mind was a sealed book, declared that the

Government had no uneasiness whatever; that in no epoch was the peace of

Europe more assured; and that no irritating question anywhere existed.

When, after the death of Lord Clarendon, Earl Granville repaired to the

Foreign Office to take up the portfolio of the deceased statesman, he was

informed by Mr. Hammond, the Under-Secretary, that in all his experience

he had never known so great a lull in foreign affairs. Two hours later, a

telegram from Mr. Layard, the British Minister at Madrid, communicated the

decision of the Spanish Council of State to offer the crown of Spain to

Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. On the same afternoon, the Duc de Gramont

informed Lord Lyons, the British ambassador at Paris, that France would

use her whole strength to prevent the election of a Prussian Prince, and

he requested the co-operation of Britain in warding off this danger to the

peace of Europe. On the following day (July 6th) the Duc de Gramont read

in the Chamber a memorandum of the views of the Government, the unusual

and menacing language of which spread alarm through all the capitals of

Europe. "We do not believe," he said, "that respect for the rights of a

neighbouring people obliges us to suffer a Foreign Power, by placing a

prince upon the throne of Charles V., to disturb the European equilibrium

to our disadvantage, and thus to imperil the interests and honour of

France. We entertain a firm hope that this will not happen. To prevent

it, we count upon the wisdom of the German nation and the friendship of

the people of Spain; but in the contrary event, with your support and the

support of the nation, we shall know how to do our duty without hesitation

or weakness." These words were received with wild and enthusiastic

cheering.

The candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern had been first broached

so far back as March, 1869, but at that time it met with no encouragement

at Berlin; while M. Benedetti, under instructions from the French

Government, represented that such an election could only be viewed by

France with serious dissatisfaction. Now, after an interval of more than

a year, the project was resumed, and that in circumstances of apparent

trickery and intrigue that called forth disapprobation, not in Paris only,

but also in London. At a later date the Duc de Gramont suggested, though

he had no means of proving, that the idea of reviving the candidature

of Prince Leopold came to General Prim from a Prussian source; and he

pledged his veracity for the existence of a letter written to Prim by

Count Bismarck some time in June, 1870, in which the Prussian Chancellor

said that the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern was in itself an

excellent thing, that it must not be abandoned, and that at a given moment

it might be serviceable. The duke declared that though he had never seen

this letter himself, it had been read by well-known eminent men. These

and other details were related by the Duc de Gramont in order to bear

out his theory that Prussia, and in particular Count Bismarck, was the

real originator of the war, by means of a series of studied provocations

and affronts, designedly framed so as to awaken the warlike passions of

the French people, and hurry them into a strife for which he knew that

Prussia was far better prepared than France. Whatever may be thought of

this theory, it is certain that the suddenness of the whole thing (for the

Council of Ministers at Madrid decided on the 5th of July to propose the

Prince of Hohenzollern to the Cortes, and to convoke that body for the

purpose on the 20th of July) was viewed with suspicion and disfavour in

Britain, where no prejudice existed either against Prussia or France. The

excitable imagination of Frenchmen immediately developed the incident into

a hundred painful and humiliating consequences. "Prussia," they thought,

"desires first to isolate us in Europe, and then to crush us. Just as she

ruined Austria in 1866 by placing her between two fires--herself on the

north, and Italy on the south--so it is her present aim to place France

also between two fires--North Germany on the one side, and Spain, with a

Prussian prince on its throne and its army reorganised on the Prussian

system, on the other."

But the candidature was not adhered to; and this fact, in the absence

of more weighty evidence on the other side than has yet been adduced,

suffices in the judgment of most men to saddle France with the chief

responsibility of the rupture. Lord Granville exerted all his influence

at Berlin to procure the withdrawal of the dangerous candidature; and M.

Olozaga, the Spanish Minister at Paris (a statesman of great experience,

and sincerely friendly to France), alarmed at the terrible excitement

around him, took measures with the Prince Anthony of Hohenzollern, the

father of Prince Leopold, to induce him to exercise his parental authority

and bring about the renunciation by his son of the honour proposed for

him. Could this be accomplished, it seemed certain that the storm would

blow over, for the Duc de Gramont himself said to Lord Lyons, on the 8th

of July, that the voluntary renunciation of his candidature by Prince

Leopold would be "a most fortunate solution" of the difficulty. Prince

Anthony accordingly wrote to General Prim renouncing all pretensions

to the crown of Spain on the part of his son; Prim communicated the

renunciation to Olozaga, and by him it was conveyed to the French

Government. M. Ollivier was greatly elated, and went about in the lobbies

of the French Chambers, telling his friends that all difficulty was at an

end, "_l'incident est vidé_." But, in fact, he was not behind the scenes:

to the secret councils of the Emperor, in which the issues of peace or war

were discussed, he was not summoned.

[Illustration: "À BERLIN!"--PARISIAN CROWDS DECLARING FOR WAR. (_See p._

554.)]

Finding, as the result of its pressing representations since the first

announcement of the candidature, that the Prussian Government declined all

responsibility in regard to it, and professed to consider it as a matter

that only concerned the King of Prussia in his capacity of head of the

Hohenzollern family, the French Government instructed M. Benedetti to seek

an interview with the King, who was then at Ems, and obtain from him an

explicit disavowal of all share in the project. "We are in great haste,"

wrote Gramont, "for we must gain the start in case of an unsatisfactory

reply, and commence the movements of the troops on Saturday in order to

enter upon the campaign in a fortnight." M. Benedetti accordingly went to

Ems, where he obtained an interview with the King on the 10th of July. At

first, the King of Prussia said that he had certainly consented to the

Prince of Hohenzollern's accepting the crown of Spain; and that having

given his consent, it would be difficult for him to withdraw it. Two days

later, the Prince's renunciation was known at Paris, and it became then a

serious question with the French Government what course it should take. By

the peremptory and unusual language that they had employed in the tribune,

they had excited the passions and raised the expectations of the people

to an extraordinary height, so that merely to accept the renunciation

of the candidature appeared too lame and poor a conclusion to the tumult

they had raised. The Duc de Gramont accordingly explained to Lord Lyons,

on the 13th of July, that while the withdrawal of the candidature put

an end to all question with Spain, from Prussia France had obtained

literally nothing. M. Benedetti was ordered again to wait on the King and

procure from him a guarantee that the project of raising his kinsman to

the Spanish throne should not be renewed. The exact terms of the French

demand, according to a memorandum placed by the Duc de Gramont in the

hands of Lord Lyons, were these: "We ask of the King of Prussia to forbid

the Prince of Hohenzollern to alter his present resolution. If he does

so, the whole matter is at an end." M. Benedetti saw the King again at

Ems, on the 13th, and endeavoured to obtain from him the assurance for the

future required by the French Government. But to this the King, although

M. Benedetti insisted warmly, and hinted at the serious consequences

that might follow upon a refusal, declined to consent. Later in the day

Benedetti sent to request another interview; but the King sent word that,

as his mind was made up, and he had no other answer to give than that

which he had given in the morning, it would be useless to re-open the

question. This message--which seems to have been sent naturally and with

perfect sincerity and in which M. Benedetti himself, as his despatches

prove, saw no discourtesy--was so magnified and distorted as to create,

on the minds of all who received the intelligence, the impression of an

already consummated rupture. From Berlin the incident was officially

telegraphed to most of the European Courts to the following effect--that

M. Benedetti had accosted the King in the Kurgarten at Ems, and preferred

his last extravagant demand; and that the King had thereupon turned round

and ordered an aide-de-camp to tell M. Benedetti that there was no reply

and that he would not receive him again.

In France the rumour flew that the King had affronted the French

Ambassador and the ardour for war rose to fever heat. Immense crowds

of Parisians gathered on the Boulevards (July 14th), singing the

"Marseillaise" and eagerly discussing the chances of war. Three meetings

of the Council of Ministers were held that day. At the first the peace

party had the upper hand, but the voice of the Empress prevailed and at

the third meeting, held shortly after midnight, the vote was given for

war. At Berlin, on the same day, the King was received, on his return

from Ems, by the acclamations of an immense multitude of persons, all

animated by stern and enthusiastic resolution. On the next day occurred

the memorable scene in the French Chambers which left no doubt remaining

that the die was cast, and that the terrible eventuality of a war between

France and Prussia was close at hand. The Duc de Gramont in the Senate,

and M. Ollivier in the Corps Législatif, communicated a Ministerial

message, in which it was stated that the King had refused to give the

engagement required by France; that, notwithstanding this, in consequence

of their desire for peace, they did not break off the negotiations; but

that they had learned, to their surprise, that the King had refused to

receive M. Benedetti and had communicated the fact officially to his

Cabinet. "In these circumstances, we should have forgotten our dignity

and also our prudence, had we not made preparations. We have prepared to

maintain the war which is offered to us, leaving to each that portion of

the responsibility that devolves upon him."

The Ministerial announcement produced an indescribable ferment in the

Legislative Body. The majority applauded vehemently every expression that

had a warlike sound; but there were a few sober-minded and independent

men on the Opposition benches who endeavoured to gain a hearing,--who

demanded that the despatches on which the action of the Government was

founded should be laid before the Chamber,--who declared that since the

withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature they could see no sufficient

cause for war. Among these objectors the most prominent was M. Thiers. His

remonstrances were met by passionate cries and invectives. "Offend me,

insult me," he cried; "I am ready to endure anything to spare the blood of

my countrymen, which you are ready to shed so imprudently. You will not

reflect for a moment; you will not demand the contents of the despatches,

upon which your judgment ought to be founded." "Keep your advice, we do

not require it," exclaimed the violent Imperialist, M. Jérôme David. The

sitting concluded with the vote of a credit of fifty millions of francs

for extraordinary military expenses, as demanded by the Government, by

a majority of 245 to 10 voices. On the next day, the Senate, with its

President, M. Rouher, at their head, waited upon the Emperor with an

address, conceived in the worst French taste, and marked by that appalling

disregard of moral considerations which led a noble country into such

terrible misfortunes. "Your Majesty," he said, "draws the sword, and the

country is with you, trembling with indignation at the excesses that an

ambition over-excited by one day's good fortune was sure, sooner or later,

to produce." As a matter of fact the war was popular in some sixteen only

of the eighty-seven Departments of France.

All through the period of nine days that intervened between the

announcement of the French Government on the 15th of July and the speech

made by the Duc de Gramont on the 6th, the British Government had laboured

heartily and indefatigably for the preservation of peace. All was,

however, in vain. The French Ministry had, by the needless publicity and

_empressement_ which they had imported into the affair, raised such a

tempest of passion and excitement, that soon neither they nor the Parisian

public were in a condition to listen to reason. On the other hand, Count

Bismarck, while remaining perfectly cool, was not disposed to take

extraordinary pains to avert a struggle which he believed to be sooner or

later inevitable, and which he was too well informed as to the comparative

armaments of the two countries to view with apprehension.

The same spirit of rivalry and combativeness that impelled Count Bismarck

in 1866, against the traditions of his country and the declarations of his

whole life, to employ revolutionary agencies against Austria because they

furnished him with a convenient weapon, now induced him, in contempt of

the usages of men of honour and the _bienséances_ of diplomacy, to bring

forth from some secret drawer in the Prussian Foreign Office a document

that he rightly thought was calculated seriously to damage France and the

Emperor in the judgment of the neutral States. On the 25th of July there

appeared in the _Times_ what purported to be a textual copy of a project

for a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and

Prussia. The paper containing it was communicated to the _Times_ from the

Prussian Foreign Office and was stated to be in the handwriting of M.

Benedetti. The Emperor and the King agreed to the following bases: That

France should recognise all the Prussian acquisitions of 1866, and should

engage not to oppose the incorporation of the South German States, with

the exception of Austria, in the North German Confederation; and that

the King, on his part, would facilitate for France the acquisition of

Luxemburg by means of an indemnity to be paid to the King of Holland, and

would also "lend, if need were, the support of his arms for the conquest

of Belgium." At the reading of this audacious proposal, a sentiment of

stupefaction came upon the English mind, succeeded by a feeling of lively

indignation. But as further correspondence developed accurately what had

occurred, the case against France assumed a less unfavourable aspect. On

the 29th of July the Duc de Gramont transmitted to London a letter from

Benedetti, containing the following explanation of the circumstances. In

the first place, he pointed out, that, if the project was a villainy,

there were evidently two parties to it; on the very face of the document

it was manifest that Prussia was not more averse from entertaining the

question of the absorption of Belgium than was France. Secondly, whereas

Count Bismarck had stated that this was but one of many such schemes

with which he was continually being pestered by the French Ambassador,

Benedetti asserted that since 1866 he had had no communications with

the Prussian Chancellor upon any matter of the kind; but that in that

year, and particularly while the negotiations for the Treaty of Prague

were going on, Bismarck, fearful lest France should be provoked by the

annexation of Hanover, Frankfort, etc., to Prussia, laid several proposals

of this nature before him and discussed them with apparent seriousness.

On one such occasion, wishing to put the substance of the conversation in

a tangible shape, Benedetti wrote, almost under the direction of Count

Bismarck, the rough draft now made public by the Prussian Government;

Bismarck took it from him, saying he would show it to the King; after

that Benedetti saw and thought no more of it. But when the project was

submitted to the Emperor, Benedetti added, he at once rejected it; and he

believed that it was also rejected by the King of Prussia.

Whatever might be the exact balance of truth between the conflicting

statements, the painful impression was left on the minds of English

statesmen, that neither France nor Prussia would have much scruple about

destroying the independence of Belgium; and that, if that independence

were worth preserving, from the point of view both of the honour and of

the interests of Great Britain, new guarantees for its maintenance had

become necessary. It is a pleasure to record the manly stand taken on

this question by Lord Russell (which was in marked contrast with his

abandonment of Denmark, in 1864), when (August 2nd) the subject came up

in the House of Lords. Britain's duty, he said, was clear. "It is not a

question of three courses. There is but one course and one path--namely,

the course of honour and the path of honour--that we ought to pursue.

We are bound to defend Belgium. I am told that that may lead us into

danger. Now, in the first place, I deny that any great danger would

exist if this country manfully declared her intention to perform all her

engagements and not to shrink from their performance." After saying that

all these intrigues arose from the doubt that prevailed on the Continent

whether Britain would adhere to her treaty engagements, he proceeded: "I

am persuaded that if it is once manfully declared that England means to

stand by her treaties, to perform her engagements--that her honour and her

interests would allow nothing else--such a declaration would check the

greater part of these intrigues, and that neither France nor Prussia would

wish to add a second enemy to the formidable foe which each has to meet."

Being strongly urged forward by the expressions of opinion delivered

both in and out of Parliament, Mr. Gladstone's Government acted on this

critical occasion both promptly and skilfully. Earl Granville prepared

the text of a treaty guaranteeing the independence of Belgium during the

continuance of the war and twelve months afterwards, and proposed its

acceptance, simultaneously, but separately, to the two belligerent Powers.

The substantial proviso of the treaty was to this effect: "His Majesty

[Emperor of the French, or King of Prussia] having declared that, in spite

of the state of war existing between [France and North Germany], he is

determined to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as it shall be

respected by [North Germany, or France], her Majesty the Queen of Great

Britain and Ireland declares, on her part, that if, during the continuance

of hostilities, the [North German, or French] armies should violate that

neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with [his Imperial Majesty,

or his Prussian Majesty] with the view of defending, in such manner as

shall be mutually agreed upon, by employing to that end her naval and

military forces, and of maintaining, in conjunction with [his Imperial

Majesty, or his Prussian Majesty], then and afterwards, the independence

and neutrality of Belgium." The other contracting Power agreed to

co-operate with Great Britain for the accomplishment of the same end. The

treaty was to be in force during the continuance of the war between France

and Germany, and for a term of twelve months after the ratification of

any treaty of peace concluded between those Powers; after which time,

the independence and neutrality of Belgium would continue, so far as the

high contracting parties were respectively concerned, to be maintained, as

heretofore, in accordance with the first article of the Quintuple Treaty

of the 19th of April, 1839. This treaty was accepted and signed by Prussia

immediately, and by France also, after a little hesitation. Its provisions

slumbered indeed, but there is no reason to suppose that they were without

effect. Had there been no such treaty, it is possible that, during the

operations near the Belgian frontier which terminated in the capitulation

of Sedan, the neutrality of the Belgian territory would have been forcibly

violated by one or the other belligerent; the area over which the

devastating effects of war were experienced would have been extended; and

serious political complications, from which it would have been difficult

for any one of the great Powers to hold aloof, must infallibly have

supervened.

So much heat and haste had been apparent in the proceedings of the French

Government since the first rise of the Hohenzollern incident that it

was generally expected that very few days would pass after the formal

declaration of war (July 19th) before the French Army of the North would

be arrayed along the frontier of Rhenish Prussia, ready to take the field

in overwhelming force. But day followed day and nothing decisive was done.

It appears that the arrangements for mobilisation--especially in what

relates to transport--were found to be extremely defective. In truth, the

military system of France was rotten and honeycombed with abuses; wherever

unexpected pressure was applied, it gave way. In the subordinate posts

there were many excellent and honourable men--it needs but to mention such

names as MacMahon, Trochu, and Vinoy to establish the fact--but the real

power lay with the Emperor and his personal friends or favourites. He is

said, after the first great disaster had occurred, to have had continually

on his lips the words, "I have been deceived." Doubtless he had been

deceived; "cooked" reports had been submitted to him; money received for

substitutes, instead of being so applied, had gone no one knew where, and

the regiments were disgracefully attenuated in consequence; jobbery and

corruption, extending into every department, made every service on which

the usefulness of soldiers depends less efficient by many degrees than it

ought to have been. Thus it happened that it was not till quite the end of

the month that a respectable French force was collected at the frontier,

and it was in sore stress for provisions. Meanwhile, the Prussians

silently mustered three powerful armies behind the Rhine, intending to

fall with an irresistible onset, when the fitting moment should arrive, on

the heedless and vainglorious foe. The Emperor left Paris on the 28th of

July, accompanied by his son Louis, and assumed the chief command of the

army at Metz on the following day.

[Illustration: COUNT VON (AFTERWARDS PRINCE) BISMARCK.]

Napoleon appears to have reckoned even to the last moment that dislike and

jealousy of Prussia would move the South German Governments to separate

their interests from hers in the great struggle that was impending, or

at least to wait and see how events fell out before finally committing

themselves. How--knowing as he did the existence of the secret treaties

of 1866, by which Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden bound themselves to

assist Prussia, if attacked--he could seriously entertain such a hope,

it is not easy to understand. The Governments of those States, on this

occasion in full sympathy with their subjects, were animated by a hearty

indignation at the unwarrantable attack made on Germany and they speedily

sent in their adhesions to Prussia. Their military contingents were

assigned, under the supreme command of the King of Prussia, to the third

of the great armies that were being formed for the protection of German

interests. These armies furnished a grand total of 338,000 men, to which

enormous force France could for the moment only oppose 200,000. Marshal

Lebœuf unfortunately imagined that the Foreign Office had concluded

alliances with Austria and Italy, and that a great part of the Prussian

army would in consequence be detained on the southern frontier. He was

justified to this extent that Austria was willing enough to wound

Germany, but yet afraid to strike. Count Beust saw that an immediate

participation of Austria in the war would involve the appearance of Russia

in the field on the side of King William. He determined therefore to

restrict himself for the present to armed mediation in concert with Italy

and to that end advised Napoleon III. to place the Italians in possession

of Rome. Here were obviously the materials for a triple alliance and

affairs were further advanced on the 2nd of August when the Papal States

were evacuated by the French Government. Austria and Italy, however,

stipulated for the preliminary success of the French troops as a condition

of their armed support, in which case they promised to assume a position

of armed neutrality, then to demand the exact performance of the treaty of

Prague, i.e. the independence of the South German States, and to take the

field in the event of refusal by the 15th of September. According to the

Duc de Gramont a draft treaty had actually been drawn up, but before it

could be signed the French armies had been dispersed.

The Emperor's plan of campaign, as explained in a pamphlet which he drew

up while at Wilhelmshöhe, was to draw together 150,000 men from Metz and

100,000 from Strasburg, and with a force of 250,000 men cross the Rhine

at Maxan, between Rastadt and Spires, while his rear was covered by the

advance of a reserve force of 50,000, under Marshal Canrobert, from

Châlons to Metz. Marching towards Dresden, the Emperor hoped to meet and

defeat the North German forces, and, being thus interposed between North

and South Germany, to intimidate the South German Powers into an attitude

of acquiescence while he followed up his advantage against Prussia, and

endeavoured to break up the newly cemented and, as he fain would believe,

fragile ties that united Prussia to the countries annexed in the last war.

If Germany had been unready; if Bismarck had been no more far-seeing than

Persigny, and Moltke no more vigilant than Lebœuf; lastly, if the Emperor

could have disposed of a hundred thousand more men, the plan might have

been promising, perhaps even feasible. But when the Emperor remembered

the enormous strength of the Prussian armies in 1866, and reflected that

the populations then annexed were instantly brought within the cords of

the Prussian military system, it is wonderful (even supposing him to have

been under a complete delusion as to the probable conduct of Bavaria and

Würtemberg) that he did not see that 250,000 men--on paper--was an

utterly inadequate force wherewith to attempt so vast an enterprise as

that he meditated.

The 2nd Corps, under General Frossard, was at Forbach, close to the

Prussian frontier, just within which, on the river Saar, was the

flourishing little town of Saarbrück, held by a battalion of infantry and

three squadrons of cavalry belonging to the 8th North German Corps (First

Army). General Steinmetz had assumed the command of that army at Coblenz

on the 28th of July, and at the beginning of August had concentrated it

in a position where it covered Trèves, and guarded against any sudden

inroad into the Rhine province on the side of Thionville. On the 2nd of

August Frossard received orders to drive the Prussians out of Saarbrück.

The action began at 10.30 A.M., and soon afterwards the Emperor,

with the Prince Imperial, arrived on the ground from Metz. The Prussians,

though greatly outnumbered, held their ground tenaciously, but were

gradually pushed out of the villages to the south of Saarbrück, and

finally compelled to evacuate the town and retreat to the wooded heights

that look down upon it from the north. The French did not attempt to

occupy the town, nor to dislodge the enemy from the heights beyond.

Forty-eight hours after the French made this unmeaning demonstration at

Saarbrück, the concentration of the German armies was completed, and

their heavy masses were ready to be moved down to and across the French

frontier. To the Third Army was given the honour of striking the first

blow--doubtless because in it were arrayed the contingents from the South

German States, and Prussia desired that France and the world should

be convinced without delay of the futility of all calculations that

took German dissension for their basis. On the 3rd of August the Crown

Prince sent orders from Spires to his corps commanders to advance upon

Weissenburg, just across the Alsatian frontier. At this point MacMahon had

stationed his second division, commanded by General Abel Douay, in order

to cover his communications with the 5th Corps, under De Failly, which was

stationed round Bitche. Douay's force, which did not exceed 12,000 men,

was left absolutely without reinforcements. The French were outnumbered,

probably two to one, but they had a very strong position, and their field

guns and chassepôts scattered destruction through the German lines as they

slowly forced their way up the height. At one o'clock the assailants were

in possession of the castle of Geissberg, near the top of the hill. The

leading brigade attacked from the eastward; the other, edging round to the

left, and scaling the southern face of the hill, threatened to cut off

the French from their line of retreat. Douay had been killed early in the

action, and the officer who succeeded to the command, judging that further

resistance was unadvisable, ordered a retirement.

On the day after the affair at Saarbrück the Emperor was exceedingly

unwell, and the physicians would not allow him to quit his room. It was

probably from a sense of great weakness that he came to the resolution

of divesting himself of a portion of the responsibility of command, by

appointing Marshal Bazaine to the command of the three corps (2nd, 3rd,

and 4th) that formed the left wing of the Army of the Rhine, and Marshal

MacMahon to that of the 1st; 5th, and 7th Corps, forming its right wing.

This was carried out on the 5th, till which day Bazaine remained in

ignorance of the Emperor's plan of campaign. The three corps that this

order placed at the disposal of MacMahon--namely, his own at Strasburg

and Hagenau, De Failly's at Bitche, and Félix Douay's at Belfort--would,

if united, have formed an army of about 80,000 men. He wished to effect

a concentration, but was overruled by the Emperor, who feared the

political consequences of a retreat. Accordingly, in the course of the

5th, MacMahon drew up his army along the high ground to the west of the

Sauer. In the first line were the three divisions of his own corps that

had not yet been engaged; in the second line he placed the troops who had

been beaten at Weissenburg, a division of the 7th Corps that had come

up from Belfort and two brigades of cavalry, one of which consisted of

two fine regiments of cuirassiers. De Failly was expected with his corps

in the course of the day. On the 5th of August, the Crown Prince, still

holding the 1st Bavarian Corps in reserve, moved the main body of his

army, marching in four columns as before, from the Lauter towards the

Sauer. At the headquarters of the Crown Prince no thought was entertained

of fighting a battle on the next day, during which the Prince intended

to have remained quietly at Sulz. But early on the morning of the 6th of

August the impetuosity of the divisional commanders brought on a general

battle, after the Germans had suffered severely for their rashness.

Soon after twelve, the Crown Prince, finding that the troops already on

the field were hotly engaged, and that the French showed no signs of an

intention to retreat, determined to bring his whole force into action, in

order to deal a crushing blow to an enemy whose greatly inferior numbers

could not expect from any quarter to be adequately reinforced. A long

cannonade ensued, to which the French, who were deficient in artillery,

could not make an effective reply. Then Kirchbach ordered the advanced

guard to storm Wörth, which was done about 12.30, and the victorious

troops advanced up the hills on the left bank of the Sauer. Soon, however,

they were brought to a stand by a biting fire from the French position

and made no progress for a long time. A great artillery duel went on for

hours on the centre and right of the line. About 11 A.M. the

French right had made a forward movement across the Sauer, and drove the

Germans out of Gunstett, but were unable to hold it long. Fresh troops

continually coming up, General Bose moved his corps across the Sauer in

support of Kirchbach; the Würtembergers also joined in this advance,

and turning towards the north, after crossing the river, Prussians

and Würtembergers steadily pressed forward, and took from the French

the village of Elsasshausen about two o'clock; but the resistance was

stubborn and the loss proportionately heavy. It was while the Germans were

advancing by Elsasshausen that Michel's brigade, composed of two regiments

of cuirassiers, made its celebrated but useless charge. With wild fury

these devoted horsemen charged into the advancing masses, but the rapid

discharges of the needle-gun smote and crushed their ranks, and not more

than 150 unwounded men remained after the battle in the whole brigade.

Froschweiler, the village to the north of Elsasshausen, attacked both from

the south and from the east, was taken at 3.30. MacMahon, outnumbered and

beaten, was now compelled to retreat. Keeping his centre and left pretty

well together, he fell back on Niederbronn, where he found a division

of De Failly's corps, which, through some telegraphic mistake, had not

arrived in time to take part in the battle. These fresh troops checked

the German pursuit. The French right, demoralised by defeat, and losing

almost all its organisation, fled in headlong flight towards Hagenau and

Strasburg.

On the day following the battle, MacMahon reached Saverne, on the

Strasburg-Paris railway, and proceeded to despatch his troops to Nancy

and Châlons. His only course now was to reorganise his army at the camp

of Châlons, while Bazaine, with his portion of the Army of the Rhine,

detained the enemy round Metz. De Failly, prevented from marching towards

Metz by the rapid advance of the First and Second German Armies into

French territory, in consequence of the success we are about to describe,

fell back from Bitche in a southerly direction, struck the Strasburg-Paris

railway, and brought his corps to join MacMahon. The remainder of the

7th Corps was brought up to Châlons soon afterwards from Belfort. The

Crown Prince, before crossing the Vosges in pursuit of MacMahon, detached

General Werder with the Baden division to invest and besiege Strasburg.

General Beyer, the divisional commander, summoned General Uhrich, the

governor of the fortress, to surrender, but of course with no result. The

town was then invested (August 10th) and several regiments of Prussian

Landwehr were presently added to the besieging force.

A second disaster happened on the same day as the battle of Wörth. On the

previous day, General Frossard, commanding the 2nd Corps, withdrew his

troops from the valley of the Saar to the heights of Spicheren, where his

right rested on a difficult wooded country; on his left was the little

town of Forbach and the railway to Metz. General Kameke, commanding a

division of the 7th Corps (First Army), pushed troops over the Saar

at Saarbrück on the morning of the 6th, who came into action with the

French batteries on the Rothe Berg (a hill jutting out from the Spicheren

plateau) about 11.30 A.M. From that time the battle raged with

varying success all through the day till nightfall. Von Göben came up and

took the command about three o'clock; about five the Prussians carried

the greater part of the heights of Spicheren, though at a terrible cost

of life. On the other hand, the French left, between six and seven,

advanced along the railway from Stiring and drove back the Germans nearly

to the Saar. The bravery of the French in this battle was conspicuous;

the losses they inflicted on the Germans were far heavier than those they

themselves suffered; and there seems little reason to doubt that with

more clear-sightedness and determination on the part of Frossard, and

more energetic co-operation on the part of Bazaine (who was at St. Avold

with the 3rd Corps, about fifteen miles from Spicheren), or, perhaps, on

the part of Bazaine's lieutenants, the Germans would have been repulsed

with heavy loss. Frossard does not appear to have held the plateau with

a sufficient force; and in a critical period of the action, when German

reinforcements were coming up from all sides, he telegraphed to Bazaine,

asking him to send him a regiment! It was not till towards six o'clock

that he telegraphed to Bazaine to assist him with all the forces at his

disposal; but it was then too late. The French were sadly demoralised by

their defeat. Frossard retired upon Saargemund, and thence, with what was

left of his corps, joined the army that Bazaine was collecting near Metz.

On that fatal Sunday (August 7th) the full truth concerning Wörth and

Forbach was known at Paris. A telegram from the Emperor was published,

admitting that the army had suffered reverses, but feebly adding, "_Tout

peut se rétablir_" ("All may yet be regained"). An indescribable ferment

agitated all minds and hearts. The cry in the streets was for a _levée en

masse_, and the word "_déchéance_" ("deposition") was often heard. The

Corps Législatif met on the 9th of August. Jules Favre and the party of

the Left urged the Emperor's recall from the army, and the appointment of

a committee with full power for the conduct of war. Ollivier, who showed

little sense of the terrible gravity of the situation, spoke in defence

of the Ministry, but his speech was received with vehement interruptions

and loud denials, and the majority cared not now to screen him from the

attacks of the Left. A middle course was taken. The Empress sent for the

Count de Palikao (August 10th), and requested him to form a Ministry. He

was in command of the military centre of Lyons when summoned to Paris

by the Empress. He succeeded in forming a Ministry, in which Magne took

charge of the Department of Finance; the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne,

of Foreign Affairs; and Palikao himself became the Minister of War.

Vigorous measures were instantly taken to make timely preparation for

the worst, in case the armies still in the field should not be able to

prevent the Germans from marching upon Paris. General Trochu, a brave and

honest soldier, but a little too rigid and positive in his opinions, was

appointed to the command of the forces of Paris; a new war loan of one

thousand millions of francs was set on foot; the ranks of the National

Guard and Mobiles were filled; and great efforts were made to bring into

Paris as large a supply of provisions as possible from the surrounding

country.

After Forbach there was nothing to hinder the Germans from pushing

forward their armies into France. The First and Second Armies, facing

to the westward, marched in the direction of Metz--Steinmetz keeping to

the north, and Prince Frederick Charles to the south, of the railway

connecting Metz with Saarbrück. Bazaine on his part was doing his utmost

to re-form and augment the French army round Metz. He was now possessed

of uncontrolled authority; for Count Palikao, though he would not consent

to Jules Favre's motion for the recall of the Emperor to Paris, lest the

excited populace should rise and put a sudden end to the dynasty, wisely

yielded on the main point, and prevailed upon the Emperor to resign the

chief command.

[Illustration: FRANCO-GERMAN WAR: SKETCH-MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN IN THE RHINE

COUNTRY.]

Accordingly by an Imperial order of the 12th of August Bazaine was

appointed generalissimo of the Army of the Rhine, with Colonel Jarras as

his chief of the staff. Nevertheless, Napoleon, afraid to return to Paris,

unwilling even to trust himself at the camp of Châlons, remained with the

army and was the cause of much embarrassment and delay. Bazaine had now

under his command the Imperial Guard, the 4th, 3rd, 2nd, and part of the

6th Corps, making a total of about 140,000 men. Finding that with his

utmost efforts he could not bring together a force capable of coping with

the First and Second German Armies in the field, Bazaine resolved to leave

Metz for a time to the protection of its encircling forts and powerful

garrison, and fall back towards Verdun and Châlons. The movements within

the French lines, caused by the preparations for complying with this

order, attracted the attention of General Steinmetz and brought on the

battle of Borny. Prince Frederic Charles had moved with the Second Army to

the southward, intending to cross the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson and other

places above Metz, and then seize the roads leading to Verdun and Paris.

Steinmetz seems to have intended only a reconnaissance in force, but the

eagerness of the German troops brought on an engagement along the whole

line, some miles to the east of Metz, in which (August 14th) neither side

gained a decided advantage, but a part of the French army was detained at

Metz on the following day; which was the very thing that Steinmetz had

desired. The German armies had but to cross the Moselle and Bazaine was

caught in a trap.

On the morning of the 16th, no movement having been made that day by the

French troops massed in front of Gravelotte on account of the non-arrival

of the 3rd and 4th Corps, the heads of the German columns, appearing

from the southward about 10 A.M., pushed back Forton's cavalry

division, which had bivouacked to the south of the lower Verdun road,

and occupied Mars-la-Tour. At first the Germans were in no great force,

but their numbers kept increasing and their artillery fire became more

and more deadly. At noon Bazaine was compelled to bring up the Guard and

place them in line. It was not till two o'clock that the 3rd and 4th Corps

came into action on the right of the French line, which then extended

in a north-westerly and south-easterly direction across both the Verdun

roads, facing the Prussians who were coming up from the south and west.

The battle raged all day with great violence; at nightfall the French held

their positions and had taken a Prussian flag. But their loss, apparently

owing to the superiority of the German artillery, was fearfully heavy; and

the Germans were masters of the road to Vionville.

The French bivouacked on the battle-field. On the next day Bazaine found

that it was impossible to continue his retreat on Verdun for several

reasons. The enemy held the lower road in great force, so that an attempt

to break through them would only have brought on another battle against

augmented numbers; and almost the same might be said of the upper road,

which for a long distance is only separated from the lower by a narrow

tract of level or undulating country. Provisions also had fallen short

and ammunition still more; and these could only be replenished from the

Government establishments in Metz. On the 17th, therefore, the French

were engaged all day in falling back to, and strengthening themselves

upon a commanding position extending from Amanvillers on the north to

Rozerieulles on the south.

In advance of the right front of this position is the village of

Verneville, round which Bazaine stationed the 6th Corps under Canrobert.

But observing that there was a strong position at the village of St.

Privat, commanding the road to Briey, the occupation of which would extend

northwards the line already taken up, and make a turning movement on the

part of the enemy more difficult, Marshal Canrobert asked permission to

move his corps to St. Privat. Bazaine gave his consent; the 6th Corps

occupied St. Privat; and the symmetry and defensive strength of the French

line were doubtless improved by the change. As in previous engagements the

rashness of divisional commanders, particularly Steinmetz, caused the loss

of whole brigades before the battle was won by the Germans. Thus a great

combined attack of cavalry and artillery was ordered by Steinmetz between

four and five. The batteries of the 8th Corps, and three reserve batteries

of the 7th Corps, supported by a large body of horse, were pushed across

the defile. But they fared no better than their predecessors. The 4th

Light Battery, trotting up the hill to the right of St. Hubert, "suffered

so severely that, after firing ten rounds, it was put _hors de combat_,

and obliged to retire down the hill." The attack failed and both cavalry

and artillery fell back by degrees on their original positions. But

gradually the superiority of the Prussian artillery fire told, and

Bazaine persisted in keeping his reserves, amounting to a third of his

forces, out of the field of action. Finally the Saxon Corps, after a

long _détour_, delivered their attack on the north flank. After several

unsuccessful attempts, in which a great many men fell, a combined assault

by the Prussian Guards and the Saxon Corps, simultaneously directed on St.

Privat from three sides, the north, the west, and the south, forced the

brave defenders, soon after seven, to relinquish their hold. The right of

Canrobert's corps was then thrown back, but still faced the enemy, and

darkness soon terminated the contest. The result was that the French had

held their ground everywhere except on the extreme right, but that all the

roads leading to Verdun had been taken from them. On the following day

Bazaine withdrew his whole army from the plateau and brought them down

to within the shelter of the guns of Metz. Only the half-trained levies

at Châlons remained to bar the march of the invader upon the brilliant

capital of France.

The intelligence of the great battles fought near Metz reached England in

various conflicting forms. But it was clear that a French army was cooped

up in Metz; that thousands of men were lying, disabled by sickness or

wounds, in hospitals, many of which were of a provisional and inadequate

character; and that great distress must infallibly fall upon the poor

inhabitants of the north-east region of France, which formed the theatre

of war. The reckless way in which the French Government began the war had

aroused feelings of deep and indignant disapproval among all classes and

parties in Great Britain; but now that it was a question of suffering to

be alleviated, human needs to be supplied, the warm hearts of British men

and women forgot all but the urgency and the duty of charity. Associations

for the relief of the sick and wounded were formed in every direction,

and received overflowing support; and numbers both of men and women

volunteered to tend the wounded of both armies under the protection of

the red cross of the Geneva Convention. The German authorities, whose

arrangements in view of these and other accidents of war admitted of

little improvement, declined to avail themselves of the zeal of foreign

volunteers; but by the French, whom overwhelming misfortune had surprised

in a state of unreadiness that only brings out the rashness of their

Government into stronger relief, all such services were thankfully

accepted. Later a very useful organisation was set on foot by the _Daily

News_ newspaper for the special purpose of relieving the wants of the

peasantry and others in the country round Sedan, whom the devastating fury

of the war had left houseless and penniless.

As soon as a clear notion of what had occurred near Metz was obtained by

the French Government, it became a matter of very anxious deliberation

what course should be adopted. For some days Marshal MacMahon had been

actively engaged in forming a new army at the camp of Châlons out of the

heterogeneous materials that he had at his disposal. Altogether a force

had been collected of 135,000 men. What was to be done with it? Made

wise by the event, critics and historians without number have condemned

MacMahon's flank march through the Argonne for the purpose of relieving

Bazaine, and have written as if it was absurd and incapable of achievement

from the first. Then, as it must have been undertaken from some motive,

they have seen in the enterprise the reckless and desperate resolve of

the Government of the Emperor to sacrifice the interests of France,

which would have dictated MacMahon's retirement towards Paris, to the

interests of the dynasty, and stake everything on the success of a most

hazardous combination, the failure of which, while it was fatal to the

Empire, involved France also in its ruin. The Empress and Palikao, so

it is commonly said, forced MacMahon to march towards Sedan against his

better judgment, they being influenced by purely dynastic considerations.

Count Palikao replied to these critics in a book published after the war

was over, and it is impossible to deny that his assertions seem to be of

great weight. Was the scheme practicable? Count Palikao maintains that

it was; and Colonel Rüstow, an independent witness, appears to be of the

same opinion. The gist of their argument is that had MacMahon started at

once and pursued a direct march, he would have eluded the Crown Prince

and relieved Bazaine after a battle with the small force commanded by the

Prince of Saxony.

MacMahon, however, when, after long resistance, he acceded to the policy

of endeavouring to relieve Bazaine, considered that he would be exposing

his right flank too much if he were to lead his army on the line indicated

by Palikao: he preferred a more circuitous course which would take his

army close to the Belgian frontier and bring it by way of Montmédy and

Briey upon Metz. On the 23rd he marched northwards from Rheims, where he

had delayed for two days. Even by this route he had sufficient start, in

the opinion of Palikao, to have outmarched the Crown Prince, had he given

way to no indecision, and made long marches every day without troubling

himself about the number of stragglers whom he might leave behind him.

He might, it is said, have reached Montmédy on the 25th of August, on

the evening of which day the Crown Prince of Prussia first heard of his

northward march. "On the 29th, or, at the latest, on the 30th, he could

have united with Bazaine before Metz--that is, if the latter broke through

the investing lines--and have fought a battle with Prince Frederick

Charles, who would then have been no longer able to oppose him with equal

forces." But instead of this, the head of MacMahon's army only reached

Mouzon on the 28th of August, and he was therefore unable to bring his

whole army across the Meuse before it was struck by the Crown Prince.

[Illustration: SEDAN. (_From a Photograph by D. Stévenin, Sedan._)]

That commander, immediately he heard of MacMahon's movements, hastened

in hot pursuit together with the Prince of Saxony. On the 27th MacMahon

became aware that his plan was discovered and wished to retreat but

was overruled by the Empress from Paris. On the 30th of August the 5th

Corps (De Failly) was at Beaumont near the Meuse. They had arrived there

only that morning after a fatiguing march, and a defeat on the previous

day; the soldiers were engaged in cooking; and the scouting and outpost

duties appear to have been shamefully neglected. While engaged in the

multifarious avocations of a camp, and dreaming of no danger, the doomed

men were startled by the bursting of shells among them, fired by a battery

belonging to the 1st Bavarian Corps (Von der Tann) which had advanced

unperceived through the woods. Von der Tann was presently supported by

the 4th Corps (Alvensleben II.) and the 12th Corps (Saxons). Surprised

and outnumbered, the French made a feeble resistance, and were driven

in confusion from the field. Of the beaten troops, some succeeded in

crossing the Meuse, others fled northward in the direction of Sedan.

MacMahon was deeply distressed on hearing of the ill conduct of the 5th

Corps--of the negligence that had allowed it to be surprised, and the

ease with which it had suffered itself to be dispersed and demoralised. A

portion of the beaten troops had been, as we have seen, cut off from the

Meuse, and thrown back in the direction of Sedan: it was this probably,

as well as the knowledge that the head of Vinoy's column was at Mézières,

which induced MacMahon--although the 1st and 12th Corps had already

crossed the Meuse and were marching upon Montmédy, and the 7th Corps

crossed it at Villers below Mouzon in the course of the 30th--to give

orders on the evening of that day for the abandonment of his former line

of march, and the concentration of all the forces under his command upon

the heights surrounding the fortress of Sedan and on the right bank of

the Meuse above the town. In the course of the 31st this movement was

effected. By gross negligence the 11th German Corps was allowed by the

French to throw two pontoon bridges, apparently without opposition, across

the Meuse at Donchery, over which the whole 11th Corps was transported to

the right bank by the morning of the 1st of September, and was shortly

afterwards followed by the 5th Corps. By this operation the doom of the

French army was sealed, the only fear of the Germans being lest it should

cut its way into Belgium. On the evening of the 30th, orders had been sent

from the royal headquarters that the Army of the Meuse, occupying the

right wing, should prevent the French left from escaping to the eastward,

between the Meuse and the Belgian frontier; while the Third Army should

continue its march northwards, and attack the enemy wherever he was fallen

in with. These orders had been complied with, and the 11th Corps had been

pushed across the Meuse at Donchery during the night of the 31st, so that

on the morning of the 1st of September seven German Corps and a half,

together with cavalry and artillery, forming a force of upwards of 200,000

men, with from 600 to 700 guns, were already posted in such positions as

to leave no way of escape for the French. Two independent armies being on

the field, the commander of neither of which could properly take orders

from the other, the King of Prussia came upon the scene, as he had done

before the day of Königgrätz, and assumed supreme command. The battle

began very early on the morning of the 1st of September, while the summer

haze still covered the low grounds, with the attack of the Bavarians on

Bazeilles, which they carried after a desperate resistance. MacMahon, who

had been severely wounded, handed over the command to General Wimpffen.

Meanwhile the left wing of the Germans had been making alarming progress.

The 11th Corps, having reached Vrigne aux Bois at 7 A.M., was

ordered by the Crown Prince of Prussia to wheel round to its right and

attack St. Menges. This village lies a little to the east of the extremity

of the great horse-shoe bend of the Meuse, nearly due north of Sedan.

Following the 11th, the 5th Corps also passed round the head of the bend,

and took ground to the eastward of Bose. Then turning southwards and

deploying into line, both corps advanced against the 7th French Corps,

which occupied the hilly ground between Floing and Illy. Before one

o'clock the ring of encircling fire had been so closed in that an interval

of not more than 4,000 paces separated the left of the 5th Corps from the

right of the Guards. Balan, the village between Bazeilles and Sedan, was

taken and held by the Bavarians and the 4th Corps about two o'clock. About

4 P.M. the French troops about Balan were ordered to fall back

upon Sedan.

[Illustration: MARSHAL MACMAHON. (_From a Photograph by E. Appert,

Paris._)]

At 5 P.M. the heads of all the German columns pushed forwards,

and commenced to bombard Sedan with field pieces. It is a small town

of 15,000 inhabitants, without detached forts, and powerless to resist

artillery. The whole French army being now pent up within its walls, a

scene of indescribable confusion arose. Shells fell and exploded upon

houses and in the streets; and the shrieks and groans of the wounded,

the execrations of the infuriated soldiers, the cries of the miserable

inhabitants, the helpless clamour and hubbub that reigned everywhere,

combined to form a picture such as only a Virgil or a Dante could paint.

Wimpffen desired to resign his command into the Emperor's hands; but to

this Napoleon naturally would not consent. However, the Emperor himself

caused a flag of truce to be hoisted over the gates of Sedan. To this it

had come; and the sun of France, as the first military Power in Europe,

set on that fatal day.

The Emperor desired to surrender his own person into the hands of the King

of Prussia, and sent to the latter, by General Reille, who accompanied the

German envoy on his return, a letter thus expressed:--

"Sire, my Brother,--Not having been able to die in the midst of my troops,

nothing remains for me but to place my sword in the hands of your Majesty."

The King sent a courteous reply, in which he prayed the Emperor to

nominate an officer of rank to negotiate with the officer whom he had

named on his side, General Moltke, for the capitulation of the French

army. Wimpffen undertook the sad and humiliating duty, and met Moltke

at the Prussian headquarters, in the village of Donchery. The Frenchman

tried hard to obtain terms that fell short of unconditional surrender.

But the logic of facts was against him and Moltke, calm as fate and cold

as the grave, unfolded to him with pitiless accuracy the full horror of

his situation. The terms of surrender were settled at six o'clock on the

morning of the 2nd of September and, being ratified by the King, soon

afterwards, came into force. The French army became prisoners of war; and

all arms and material of war, whether belonging to the army or to the

fortress, were to be handed over by a French to a German commission; the

officers were to retain their freedom, their arms, and their personal

property on giving their word of honour not to serve against Germany

during the continuance of the war. There were many officers, however,

who preferred the nobler part of sharing captivity with the men rather

than renounce the right of bearing arms against Germany so long as the

war lasted. The wild excitement, rage, and grief that seized upon the

soldiers, when they knew that they were to surrender their arms and go

into captivity, surpass the power of description. By batches of about

10,000 at a time, they were transported, during several days, by rail, to

Saarbrück and thence to various parts of Germany.

Seeing the struggle it had cost Wimpffen to agree to the terms proposed,

Napoleon thought that could he see Bismarck, he might perhaps obtain from

him some alleviation of their rigour. About six in the morning, therefore,

of the 2nd of September, he set out in a carriage towards Donchery, having

sent forward a messenger to inform Count Bismarck of his desire for an

interview. Bismarck was still in bed, but immediately rose and rode out

to meet the Emperor. He met the carriage a little distance on the Sedan

side of the Donchery bridge and, dismounting, respectfully approached it

and asked his Majesty's commands. Napoleon said that he wished to speak

with the King, whom he imagined to be at Donchery; but Bismarck replied

that the King of Prussia was then at Vendresse, some fourteen miles away.

Indeed the Count, knowing his master's kindly nature, had removed him

to a distance until the terms were signed. Later in the day a meeting

was arranged between the Emperor and the King at a country house near

Donchery, called the Château de Bellevue. The interview was brief, but

Napoleon's eyes filled with tears when he learned that Prince Frederick

Charles was still before Metz, and consequently that there was no hope

for Bazaine. The Emperor quitted the Château on the morning of the 3rd

of September, and proceeded in a close carriage (it was raining heavily)

to the Belgian town of Bouillon. Thence escorted by rail to Liége, and

entering Prussian territory at Verviers, the illustrious prisoner reached

Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel, on the evening of the 5th of September, where

suitable preparations had been made for his reception.

M. Jules Favre says that late in the evening of the 2nd of September a

trustworthy person came to him, and informed him that Marshal MacMahon had

been wounded, that the army had been defeated, and that it, along with the

Emperor, was shut up in Sedan. All the next day a feverish anxiety reigned

in every part of Paris. What was known was terrible, but a just foreboding

whispered that there was still worse behind. A meeting of the Chamber was

summoned by the Government for three o'clock on the afternoon of the 3rd

of September. Count Palikao announced the failure of Bazaine's sorties out

of Metz on the 31st of August and 1st of September, and admitted that,

after a partial success, the French army, overwhelmed by numbers, had

been driven back, partly upon Mézières, partly upon Sedan, and a small

portion across the Belgian frontier. In presence of these grave events the

Minister declared that the Government appealed to the strength, vigour,

and patriotism of the nation; he added that 200,000 Gardes Mobiles were

about to enter Paris, who, united to the forces already there, would

ensure the safety of the capital. Jules Favre then rose. Availing himself

of an admission made by Palikao that the Emperor was not in communication

with his Ministers and gave them no orders, he came to the conclusion that

"the Government had ceased to exist," and enlarged upon the means that

were at hand for supplying its place. Before separating the Chamber voted

urgency for a proposition of M. Argence, calling to arms all men between

twenty and thirty-five years, whether married or single. Filled with gloom

and anxious apprehension, the members separated till the following day

(Sunday, September 4th) at five o'clock.

But soon after the meeting certain intelligence of the capitulation

reached Palikao and the Ministers and the news, coming by various

channels, soon flew over Paris. Immense crowds filled the boulevards;

cries were frequently heard demanding the fall of the Government. M.

Favre and some of his friends went to M. Schneider, the President of the

Corps Législatif, and prevailed upon him to convene it for a midnight

sitting that same night. Jules Favre did not conceal from M. Schneider

that he meant to propose the deposition of the Emperor; but to this the

latter would by no means give his consent. He and many other honourable

members of the Chamber believed themselves, even were there no other

argument against a revolution, to be restrained by their oath of fidelity

to the Emperor from joining in any project that contemplated either his

dethronement or the repudiation of the dynasty.

The plan of Jules Favre and his friends of the Extreme Left was this: that

the deposition of the Emperor and his dynasty should be proclaimed, and

that the Chambers should assume all the powers of government, exercising

them through an executive commission consisting of a few members, in

which not only Palikao but also M. Schneider would be retained. The plan

was embodied in three articles, which ran as follows:--

Article 1. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and his dynasty are declared to be

deposed from the power given them by the constitution.

Article 2. A parliamentary committee, consisting of ----, is entrusted

with the powers of government and with the mission to expel the enemy from

France.

Article 3. General Trochu remains in his post as Governor of Paris.

The articles prepared by Jules Favre were signed by twenty-seven members

of the Corps Législatif, but the name of M. Thiers was not among them.

That experienced and wary politician had much confidence in the military

knowledge and skill of Count Palikao, and on this account, as well as

on account of the general considerations that may be urged against a

revolutionary procedure, he would bear no part in a plan for overthrowing

the Government. At the midnight sitting of the Chamber, no disguise

being any longer possible, Count Palikao announced that the army, having

been thrown back after heroic efforts on Sedan, and finding resistance

no longer possible, had capitulated, and that the Emperor had been

made prisoner. He then demanded an adjournment till noon of the same

day (September 4th), that the Government might have time to mature its

proposals in this alarming crisis. The adjournment was not opposed; but

M. Jules Favre gave notice that he should, at the mid-day sitting, bring

forward the motion the terms of which have been already stated. The

motion, if the Count Palikao is to be believed, was ill received by the

majority of the members.

Between 8 and 9 A.M. a council of Ministers was held at the

Tuileries, presided over by the Empress, who displayed exemplary firmness

and courage. It was resolved at this council to propose to the Chambers

the nomination of a Council of Regency of five members (each member to

be nominated by the absolute majority of the Legislative Body), with

Count Palikao as its Lieutenant-General. But when he arrived at the Corps

Législatif, shortly before noon, and communicated to a number of deputies

the plan of the Government, he found that the use of the term "Regency"

was generally disapproved. Thiers and his friends desired that the new

council should be simply described as a "Council of Government." To this

Palikao was unwilling to accede because the words seemed to betoken a

breach of continuity between the new Government and the old--to be

equivalent therefore to sanctioning revolution. An ingenious expedient

occurred to him: it was to alter the words "Council of Regency" into "a

Council of the Government and of National Defence;" thus avoiding the

unpopular word, and yet implying that the Government had not come to

an end, but was prolonged in and transformed into the new Council. The

majority of the deputies appeared to approve of the clause so worded; and

the Empress, whose consent Palikao was careful to obtain, sent him word

that she relied entirely on him and approved of whatever he might do.

The hour for the meeting was now come. The approaches to the hall of the

Legislative Body were occupied by troops of the line, and 600 mounted

gendarmes were stationed in reserve in the Palais de l'Exposition in the

Champs Elysées.

Three propositions were brought before the Chamber: first, that of the

Government; secondly, that of Jules Favre; and thirdly, that of M. Thiers.

The last was signed by forty-six deputies, and was expressed in the

following terms:--

"In view of the existing state of affairs the Chamber names a Commission

of Government and of National Defence.

"A constituent Assembly will be convoked as soon as circumstances will

permit."

The three propositions were referred to the bureaux in the usual way that

a committee might be appointed to report upon them. But while deliberation

was going on in the bureaux (which met in committee-rooms distinct from

the Legislative Chamber itself) events occurred that soon brought their

labours to an untimely end. The Chambers were invaded by an unruly mob and

the President was compelled to suspend the sitting. Gambetta with most of

the Paris deputies proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville and there proclaimed

the Republic. The Government of National Defence was constituted with

General Trochu as its President. Already the Empress had fled and the

Senate quietly dispersed without the slightest attempt to assert its

authority. The other Ministerial posts were thus distributed:--Foreign

Affairs, Jules Favre; Interior, Gambetta; War, General Le Flô; Marine,

Admiral Fourichon; Justice, Crémieux; Finance, Picard; Public Instruction

and Religion, Jules Simon; Prefect of Police, Count Kératry. M. Etienne

Arago was appointed Mayor of Paris.

The Corps Législatif did not resign itself without an effort to the

violent suppression that had been effected. A deputation of its members,

headed by M. Grévy, presently waited on the Provisional Government.

M. Grévy stated that a considerable number of members of the Corps

Législatif, holding the same principles as those that animated the

Provisional Government, and prepared to accept the fall of the Napoleonic

system as an accomplished fact, were desirous of continuing the sessions

of that body in a spirit of co-operation with the Government at the Hôtel

de Ville. It was arranged that a meeting should be held at the Presidency

at eight o'clock the same evening, when Jules Favre and Jules Simon,

as a deputation from the Provisional Government, would inform their

former colleagues of the decision arrived at in reference to M. Grévy's

proposal. The subject was then anxiously debated. M. Glais Bizoin informed

the Ministers that he had taken upon himself to close the doors of the

hall of the Corps Législatif and seal them. This energetic proceeding

it was deemed upon the whole advisable to sustain. The continuance of

the Corps Législatif would lead, it was feared, to political intrigues

and complications of various kinds that would be unfavourable to that

concentration of every one's faculties on the task of national defence

which it was so desirable to promote. At the meeting in the evening, M.

Thiers being in the chair, Jules Favre explained to the members present

the reasons that actuated the Provisional Government in declining the

co-operation of the Corps Législatif. Thiers replied with exquisite

_finesse_, spoke of Jules Favre as his "_cher ci-devant collégue;_" said

that he could not approve of what had happened, but that he desired none

the less earnestly that the courage of those of his colleagues who had not

withdrawn before a formidable task might be profitable to the country and

gain for it that success which was the ardent desire of every good citizen.

In England the news of the fall of the Empire and the Revolution of the

4th of September was received with mixed feelings. A very general opinion

prevailed that the Emperor had been overtaken by a just retribution,

though this feeling was qualified by the recollection of the real

friendliness that Napoleon had generally manifested towards the country,

and in which his sincerity cannot be doubted. With regard to any change

the revolution just consummated might make in the position of France, and

in the duties of the neutral Powers in her regard, the Government of Mr.

Gladstone gave no indication of a belief that, either now or hereafter,

interference (unless Belgium were attacked) could become the duty or

the interest of England. But, as far as words went, the Provisional

Government could not complain of any lack of cordiality. The British

ambassador, Lord Lyons, was the first of all the foreign representatives

to call on M. Jules Favre at the Foreign Office on the morning of the 5th

of September. Lord Lyons was full of good will. He reminded the Minister

that his Government had offered its mediation to France, which had refused

it. He could not conceal that public opinion in England was still hostile

to France and that the mind of the Queen was strongly acted upon by the

influence of relationship in favour of Germany. Yet it was possible that,

in the course of events, the feeling in England might change; and that

a sense of common interest might, if Germany pushed her successes too

far and too unscrupulously, make the majority of Englishmen think that

of two evils intervention was the less. In reply, M. Jules Favre, after

laving great stress on the circumstance that the Imperial Government

which rashly began the war had been overthrown, and that the party now

in power had from the first been opposed to war, enlarged on those

considerations which seemed to him to prove that England had a manifest

interest in interfering to prevent France from being seriously weakened.

England, he thought, would sink in reputation, and lose the respect that

her magnanimous conduct at the beginning of the century had won for her

among the nations of Europe, if she tamely suffered a people to which she

was bound by so many ties to be destroyed piecemeal. England was now in a

position, relatively to France, which might be likened to that in which

France stood, relatively to Austria, after the battle of Sadowa. France

then extended a generous and protecting hand and saved Austria from ruin;

so let England now act towards France. Lord Lyons promised to bring M.

Jules Favre's observations under the notice of his Government and, after

expressing the strong feeling of sympathy with France in her misfortunes

by which he was personally animated, took his departure.

[Illustration: CAMDEN PLACE, CHISLEHURST (NAPOLEON III.'S HOME IN

ENGLAND).]

At the time of the formation of the new Government Jules Favre was

honestly of opinion that the change in her representation would

powerfully recommend the cause of France to the neutral Powers. The

Emperor, he argued, made war upon personal or dynastic grounds; the

Emperor is overthrown; the true France now makes her voice heard; declares

that she would not have gone to war if she could have helped it; that her

ideas all lie in the sphere of peace and solidarity of peoples; and that

the other Powers of Europe may safely make a collective representation

to Prussia in order to bring about peace, because the Republic in France

is a guarantee that no wanton aggression will ever be practised towards

Germany hereafter. That this view should commend itself to an ardent

Republican was natural, but that it should be shared in by other nations,

and above all by Germany, was most improbable. Count Bismarck, though

Jules Favre did not as yet know it, had already caused it to be understood

that Germany held France, not the French Government for the time being,

responsible for the declaration of war; and would not now grant peace till

she had obtained the most solid guarantees for the future.

Still, though England held back, might not France hope to be aided in

her hour of need by one of the other Powers, or by a combination of

them? M. Favre was firmly persuaded that both gratitude and interest

ought to bring about a collective intervention on the part of the

neutral Powers, which should force Prussia to negotiate for peace.

Yet the grounds that he himself alleges for this persuasion are vague

and inconclusive. The greatest among the neutral Powers "could not,"

he says, "open its annals without finding glorious instances of the

devotedness of our chivalrous nation. All had enjoyed her hospitality,

had found her generous, kindly, ready for any sacrifice, and seeking no

recompense." Every word of this might be admitted, though not without

qualifications; but what then? Admiration for the geniality and fertility

of the French mind, recollection of cheering and stimulating hours passed

within her borders, ought not to have blinded the neighbours of France

to considerations of justice, nor to have induced them to shelter her

altogether from the effects of the just resentment of Germany. That

intervention was not resorted to later may be a legitimate subject of

regret; but no neutral will be convinced by M. Favre's reasoning that

it was the duty of his country to intervene immediately after the fall

of the Empire. Unless, indeed, there were some special pre-existing

obligation, by which a particular nation might be bound, in gratitude

and honour, to come to the assistance of France. Jules Favre thought

there were two nations thus situated--Austria and Italy. With regard to

Austria, the blunt explanations of Prince Metternich, who called at the

Foreign Office soon after Lord Lyons, dispelled all expectation of aid

in that quarter. Austria had been saved by French intervention after the

battle of Königgrätz; Prince Metternich did not think of denying this,

nor of extenuating the claim to which such a service rendered his country

amenable. He attempted to explain away the belief of the Duc de Gramont

respecting words that had fallen from Count Beust. "It is not impossible,"

he said, "that M. Beust may have spoken of preparing 300,000 men if we

were free to do so; but it is just this freedom that has always been

denied us. The Emperor and his Ministers will never brave the will of the

Czar. Now the latter has threatened that if we were to declare ourselves

for France, he would join Prussia. Our hands are therefore bound; but we

will do nothing against you; we will even aid you in everything that is

reconcilable with our neutrality." These words clearly define the position

of Austria at that time. She would willingly have aided France, but the

Court of St. Petersburg, impelled by strong family and dynastic ties

to sympathy with Prussia, had intimated that if Austria interfered for

France, the sword of Russia would be thrown into the opposite scale.

Italy remained: could the nation that owed its very existence to France

refuse to lend its aid to its benefactor in this time of peril? To the

Italian Ambassador, who called after Prince Metternich, M. Favre used

decided, almost peremptory, language. M. Nigra was embarrassed and sad;

perhaps he was thinking of the return that the Italian Government were at

that moment preparing to make for the generous aid of France in the shape

of the annexation of the Papal territory. He did not contradict one of

Jules Favre's assertions, but only took his stand on the impossibility of

isolated action on the part of Italy. She was ready to unite with other

Powers, and even to lead them if they would follow. But nothing was to be

done without the support of England or Russia.

These interviews opened the eyes of Jules Favre, and convinced him that

France could hope for no armed intervention. She must trust to herself,

and put forth her utmost energies to defend her capital, to kindle the

flame of patriotism in the population, and to raise new armies in the

place of those that had been lost.