THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).
Changes in the Allied Camp--Advance upon the Malakoff and
Redan--Attempt to raise the Siege--Prince Gortschakoff determines
to Attack--The Allied Camp on the Tchernaya--Gortschakoff's
Reinforcements--The Russian Plan--The Allies partially
surprised--Read's Precipitation--Check of the Russian Attack--The
French Counter-stroke--Gortschakoff changes his Front--A
last Effort--The Battle is won--Allied Losses--Progress of
the Siege--The French sap towards the Malakoff--The British
Bombardment--The Covering Army--The Allies on the alert--Combats
before the Malakoff--The Crisis arrives--Gortschakoff secures
his Retreat--Council of September 3rd--Plan of Attack--The
Last Bombardment--The Hour of Attack--Disposition of the
Allied Troops--The Russians--The Signal--Assault of the
Malakoff--Description of the Works--MacMahon and Vinoy--Failures
upon the Curtain and Little Redan--MacMahon is Impregnable--Failure
to take the Redan--Evening--Gortschakoff's Retreat--End of the Siege.
General James Simpson succeeded to the command of the British army, and
General Barnard became Chief of the Staff. Captain Keppel succeeded
Captain, now Admiral, Sir Stephen Lushington in the command of the Naval
Brigade. Sickness also drove home Sir Richard England, and Sir William
Eyre took the 3rd Division. Lieutenant-General Markham, coming from India
(there was a clamour for the appointment of Indian officers), succeeded to
the 2nd Division, and Sir William Codrington to the Light Division. In the
French camp there had been some changes. General Canrobert was recalled to
France. General Bosquet reassumed the command of the French troops on the
right, and General Herbillon, as senior officer present there, commanded
the French on the Tchernaya.
The great object of the Allies was now to press as closely as possible
to the body of the place. The French had begun to see distinctly that
the Malakoff was the key of the whole defences on the eastern side,
and that, with the fall of that redoubt, the town and the western side
would be untenable. Accordingly, they continued with vigour the works
of approach begun after the capture of the Mamelon. They descended the
eastern slope of this hillock, burrowing in the ground where the soil was
soft, planting gabions and piling up sand-bags, and using blasting powder
where it was hard and rocky. Day after day the space between the Mamelon
and Malakoff showed signs of their labours; the works on the Careening
Ridge were extended and strengthened; and the whole front protected
by being tied together by a connecting parallel. But the loss of men
was very great. The fire of guns and mortars, although not heavy, was
constant, and the shells, flung with low charges from a short distance,
burst in the parallels and batteries, and among the working parties, with
destructive effect. The labour required was prodigious; for every approach
had to be protected by traverses from an enfilading fire. The watchful
eyes of Todleben were never turned from the works of the Allies, and as
fast as they projected a new approach, he found means of taking it in
flank or raking it from his side. Unseen mortars, far in the rear, sent
their shells into the Allied works. The steamers were still active, and,
although they were frequently fired at, yet they were rarely, if ever,
hit. Then the fire of musketry was incessant, and so from shell, and shot,
and bullet the soldiers in the trenches lost numbers night and day. The
British were quite unable to work the rocky soil in front of the Quarries.
They pushed out but a little way under an irregular but searching fire
of shells, flung in clusters of eight or ten and sometimes twelve at a
time. The engineers were chiefly engaged in enlarging and strengthening
the works, and in placing a still heavier armament in the batteries. The
British loss was also very large--between thirty and forty men per diem
were put _hors de combat_.
So, through the month of July and the beginning of August, these deadly
labours were continued, and the Allies crept nearer and nearer to the
Malakoff and the Redans, and to the ramparts on the western face. In the
meantime came reports that the Russian Government, determined to strike
one blow for victory, had directed several divisions from Poland towards
the Crimea. These reports were true. An effort was about to be made to
raise the siege. As no attack could be made from the head of the harbour,
it was plain that the covering army would be assailed from the Heights of
Mackenzie and the Valley of Chouliou; wherefore the Sardinian infantry
from Tchorgoun made several excursions into the hilly region to the
north-east, yet they found no enemy. The Turks also entered the mountains,
and the French cavalry in the Baidar Valley kept an eye on all the rugged
passes leading into that fertile spot. They found no enemies in force, and
they obtained from the valley a boundless supply of forage. But in the
beginning of August it was observed that the Russians were constructing
new works on the road from the Tchernaya to the Heights of Mackenzie, at
points whence they could fire into the front and flanks of an advancing
column. Clusters of Cossacks came down more frequently to the brow of the
hills, gazed curiously into the valley, and sometimes skirmished with the
French outposts. Small parties of the same useful troops hung about the
French cavalry camps in the Baidar Valley, and one or two were caught by
the active Chasseurs d'Afrique. From the end of the first week in August
the Allies were on the look-out for an assault in force upon the Tchernaya.
It was the fact that Prince Gortschakoff, having received large
reinforcements, in obedience to orders from St. Petersburg--for the
Emperor on the Neva, like the Emperor on the Seine, interfered in the
conduct of the war--proposed to assail the Allies. He was painfully aware
of the strength of their position. He knew the ground. It had long been
visible to him throughout its whole extent. He could see the Sardinian
entrenchments from the heights above Tchorgoun, and his very batteries
could almost reach the French camps from the heights of Inkermann. He had
two batteries, called by the French Gringalet and Bilboquet, upon these
heights, whose missiles amused the French outposts, and sometimes annoyed
them, but seldom did any harm. Knowing the ground well, and the strength
of the force holding it, he designed a clever plan of attack, based on
that knowledge, but depending entirely for success upon a surprise,
followed by rapid movements urged on without hesitation.
The French were encamped on the crown of the Fedoukine hills. Their
outposts on the left, or western side, were on the banks of the Tchernaya,
and they held an angular entrenchment or redan on the right bank, to
defend the access to the bridge. The valley in front of the French camps,
looking north, was a meadowy plain, through which ran the road to the
Heights of Mackenzie and Inkermann. The troops occupying this position
were seven battalions of Turks, with four guns, whose duty it was to watch
the ford of Alsou, and guard the course of the Tchernaya thence to the
confluence of the Kreuzen, having ten battalions in support near Kamara,
on the other side of the affluent. Next, the Sardinians under La Marmora,
consisting of the divisions of Durando and Trotti, encamped on the Hasfort
Hill, and in the plain the cavalry under Saviroux. The Sardinians had
thirty guns, and a British battery of position, 32-pounder howitzers,
under Captain Mowbray. Then came the three French divisions--that of
Fancheux on the right, that of Herbillon in the centre, that of Camou
on the left. The French cavalry, Morris's division, were encamped in
the plain on the left of the Sardinians. The artillery park was in the
rear of the Fedoukine heights. General Herbillon commanded the whole.
Five brigades held the heights, and one occupied the eastern slopes of
Mount Sapoune, and thus connected the army of observation with the corps
engaged in pushing the attacks against the Malakoff. Including the British
cavalry, 3,000 strong, there were nearly 40,000 men and 120 guns in line
between Alsou and Mount Sapoune.
The information brought in by our spies and the reports of deserters had
led the allied generals to look either for a sortie from the town, or for
an attack on the line of the Tchernaya. On the 14th of August the troops
in camp were under arms before daybreak, but nothing occurred on one side
or the other. On the 15th more positive news arrived. General d'Allonville
from the Baidar Valley notified by the semaphore that he had troops in
front of him, or rather that his patrols had discovered bodies of the
enemy moving down into the Valley of Chouliou. Signal lights flashed from
Mackenzie to Inkermann, and from Inkermann to Sebastopol. An ostentatious
gathering of troops in rear of the Redan and Malakoff was discovered from
the tops of our men-of-war, and at the same time a suspicious movement of
Russians towards Inkermann. All the commanders were warned, and orders
were issued to be more than usually vigilant; General La Marmora directing
his brigades to get under arms before daylight the next morning.
Prince Gortschakoff had, indeed, resolved to surprise if he could, if
not, to force, the line of the Tchernaya. His reinforcements consisted
of the 4th, 5th, and 7th divisions of infantry. To these he was able to
add the 17th, 12th, 6th, and 11th; of these the 11th, 12th, and 17th had
long been in the Crimea, and had fought at the Alma and Inkermann; but the
4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th were fresh troops, which had arrived recently from
Poland and Bessarabia. In fact, as soon as it was certain that Austria
did not mean to fight, the Czar put in motion all the troops that could
be spared from the Austrian frontiers. Had all these divisions been in
full strength, Prince Gortschakoff could have brought into line 78,000
infantry alone. But long marches had weakened some regiments, and others
had suffered great losses in the field and the trenches; and instead of
78,000, he could only dispose of 50,900 infantry. To support them he had
7,200 cavalry, chiefly regulars, and 262 guns; in all about 60,000 men.
The plan of the Russian general was to move the bulk of his force, on the
night of the 15th, by the roads leading from the Mackenzie Heights into
lower ground, while two divisions marched from Korales down the Valley of
Chouliou, and joined the left of the main body above Tchorgoun. The right
column he entrusted to General Read. It consisted of the 7th and 12th
divisions, and sixty-two guns. The left was under the orders of Liprandi,
and was composed of the 5th, 17th, and 6th, and some ninety cannon. The
11th and 4th were in reserve, and remained so. General Liprandi led
the way. On quitting the defile he was to move to his left, and before
daylight drive the Sardinian outposts from the Mamelon, occupy that hill,
and also the heights above Tchorgoun and Karlovka. The object of this
was to give the Russians a good site, whence they might cannonade Mount
Hasfort, and cover an infantry attack on that position. While Liprandi
formed on the Sardinian Mamelon, Read was to bring his two divisions into
line, but out of range; hold himself prepared to storm the Fedoukine
heights, but not to make that attempt until he got orders to do so from
Prince Gortschakoff.
All night on the 15th the Russian columns were moving silently down the
steep road from Mackenzie, along the wooded valley of Chouliou, spreading
out over the slopes, and pushing nearer and nearer to the outposts and
patrols of the Allies. While this formidable host was approaching, the
allied soldiers were asleep, and only the usual guards were under arms,
and the usual patrols were moving across the front. Before daylight,
however, the Sardinians got under arms; but the French do not appear to
have turned out earlier than usual. Long security had bred confidence, and
no doubt they relied upon their advanced posts, and not without reason.
A thick fog hid everything in the valley, and hung heavily over the low
meadows on both sides of the Tchernaya. Under cover of this, Prince
Gortschakoff had got his troops into the positions he had designed them to
occupy.
But the sentries were on the alert. There was a splutter of musketry
in front of the bridge--a French patrol had stumbled in the fog upon
the skirmishers of Read! Then followed a few reports near the Sardinian
outpost, and a quick fire of musketry. General La Marmora, with great
promptitude, sent a support across the Tchernaya to aid the riflemen on
the Mamelon in delaying the advance of the enemy, while he made his final
preparations. Liprandi had, while it was still dark, brought up such a
heavy force, that although the Sardinians stood their ground with great
gallantry, they were so pressed on all sides as to be forced out of their
entrenchments, and were retiring down the hill as the support came up.
The whole then gave ground before the enemy, and fell back upon the rocky
elevation in front of the left of the Sardinian line, whence they were not
expelled.
In the meantime the guns of Liprandi and Read were both in action; and
the whole line of the Allies began to seize their arms and form. Morris's
Chasseurs d'Afrique, 2,400 strong, formed between the left of the
Sardinians and the right of the French, one regiment being at the head of
the defile leading to the bridge. Saviroux's Sardinian cavalry, 300 men,
came up on their right; and General Scarlett, turning out the British
cavalry, a splendid force, 3,000 strong, moved them across the plain,
and drew up in rear of the French and Italian squadrons. The Turkish and
Sardinian guns were answering the fire of Liprandi's artillery; and two
French batteries were ready to engage Read. So thick was the fog that
the enemy's troops were still invisible, and pending the development of
their attack, Generals La Marmora and Herbillon simply reinforced their
outposts. Prince Gortschakoff has stated that about this time he had
ridden on to the Sardinian Mamelon to survey the ground, and proceed with
the execution of his original plan. While he was meditating and trying to
pierce through the fog, he heard a violent fire of musketry on his right.
General Read, without orders, as his superior officer avers, had begun
the attack, and frustrated the whole scheme. From this moment the battle
of the Tchernaya was a battle mainly between the French and Russians; the
former, however, being assisted by the deadly fire of the British and
Sardinian guns.
The Russian cannonade had thoroughly roused the French, but uncertain from
what quarter the real attack of the enemy would come, the brigades were
kept drawn up near their camps, ready to move in any direction. Suddenly
dark masses were seen dimly through the mist moving down on the Tchernaya.
They came on with great resolution, and very fast. At one and the same
moment a column from the 12th Division assailed the bridge, and another
from the 7th attacked the French left. The onset was so impetuous that
the French outposts were at once thrust away from the river all along the
line, and forced over the aqueduct. The advance of the 7th Division had
been equally successful. Issuing from the fog, boldly passing the river,
closing in from all sides on the French, the latter, outnumbered, were
compelled to retire with all speed up the slopes of the Fedoukine hills.
Now the tide of combat was going to change. In crossing the aqueduct the
Russians had lost their regular formation, and they had to recover it
as well as they could under a heavy fire. Thus their charge was stopped
at the moment when victory depended upon its continuance; and while
the troops in their front kept them in play, the French generals were
executing movements intended to effect a bloody counter-stroke. The column
of the 7th Division fell first under this calamity. They had crossed the
river and aqueduct with comparatively little opposition, apparently only
that of the outposts and the supports. They were advancing up the hill,
when General Wimpfen, who commanded a brigade of General Camou's division,
sent the 3rd Zouaves to check them. This brought the Russians to a stand.
The heavy column, growing vaster as the men scrambling over the aqueduct
came up, gave and received a telling fire, but did not advance. All this
time, by the orders of Wimpfen, a battalion of the 82nd Regiment was
rapidly coming down the hill to the aid of the Zouaves. As soon as the
82nd appeared, the French attacked with the bayonet. The Zouaves went
headlong into the right, the 82nd into the left flank of the enemy. The
outward ranks were lifted off their feet by the violence of the shock,
and the column loosening at the rear, turned and hurried, in dreadful
confusion, back over the aqueduct. A battery of artillery on the left of
the line of attack poured grape into the flying mass, and augmented the
slaughter.
So far the attack on the left had been repelled, but the beaten troops
were still at hand to take advantage of any success that might fall to the
share of their comrades, who had carried the bridge and were assailing the
centre and right.
The Russians had poured over in three irregular columns. Those who crossed
by the bridge formed the centre; what may be called the wings had forded
the river and the aqueduct. Each column was bravely encountered and
overthrown. When General Wimpfen saw that his Zouaves and one battalion
of the 82nd were sufficient to deal with the Russian extreme right, he
sent the whole of the 50th, with the remainder of the 82nd as a reserve,
to fall upon the central Russian columns. Thus, while the battalions of
Herbillon's division assailed the centre, the 50th, moving obliquely down
the hill, came upon the flank of the Russian column which had passed the
aqueduct on the Russian right of the bridge. Exposed to such an assault,
the Russians were unable to stand, and, after a brief musketry fight, they
turned and sought shelter beyond the aqueduct and the Tchernaya. At the
same time, General de Failly, in the centre, had charged, and the effect
of the combined movement was to sweep the enemy over the river. The mass
of the French were kept behind the aqueduct; but Colonel Danner, with
portions of the 97th and 95th, was sent over to re-occupy the bridge-head.
On the other side of the road to Balaclava the Russian column had proved
too strong for the 19th Chasseurs; and after driving them up the eastern
hillock, had, regardless of the tearing flank fire of the Sardinian
artillery on Mount Hasfort, sought to deploy and storm the height. They
were just moving up when the 2nd Zouaves came over the crest. The Russians
began to fire, but the Zouaves continued to march forward, and then, with
loud shouts and levelled bayonets, they went down the hill at a charging
pace, and literally lifting the Russians off their legs, drove them
pell-mell over the aqueduct.
[Illustration: GENERAL SIMPSON. (_From a Photograph by Fenton._)]
Prince Gortschakoff had heard the beginning of the attack upon the French
left. He was, he says, astonished. General Read had frustrated his design
of first driving the Sardinians from their entrenchments, and taking
himself a solid grasp of Mount Hasfort. To effect this object he had in
hand four divisions of infantry, and he was preparing to hurl his bolt
when the uproar of Read's untimely onset broke upon his ear. At once he
suspended the movement of these divisions, and changed the whole tide
of his battle. He felt that he must support the troops of Read, for he
could not be sure that the Allies would not assume the offensive, and, by
good luck, they might interpose between him and the Mackenzie Heights,
and throw the bulk of his army upon the hills and narrow valleys towards
Aitodor and Chouliou. Wherefore he directed the cavalry to move up, and
should the infantry be repulsed, hold themselves in readiness to charge
or to cover the retreat of the 7th and 12th Divisions, and enable them to
rally. At the same time he directed the 5th Division to move by its right
into the plain and assail the French at and above the bridge. The 17th
Division was ordered to descend the Sardinian Mamelon and cross the river,
and strive to penetrate through the open space between Mount Hasfort
and the most eastern slopes of the Fedoukine heights. The 6th Division
moved up to guard the ground opposite the Sardinians above Karlovka and
Tchorgoun, and the 4th Division remained in the rear up the valley of
Chouliou as a reserve. The attack was vigorous enough, but the columns
were defeated in detail and driven back.
But the enemy would not yet own himself beaten. The 17th Division had
arrived on the right bank of the Tchernaya. It was formed of regiments
that had met the Allies at the Alma and Inkermann. Undismayed by defeat,
determined to risk another throw of the dice, Prince Gortschakoff
ordered a brigade, composed of three regiments--that is, twelve
battalions--supported by a large body of cavalry, to cross the river,
and push in between the French and Sardinians. The march of these troops
had been seen by the Allies. General Herbillon had reinforced the right
by three regiments of Cler's brigade and part of Sencier's brigade, and
General La Marmora had directed Mollard's brigade of Trotti's division to
descend from Mount Hasfort and, crossing the valley, support the French
right. The support, as it happened, was not needed, but it would have been
most timely and effectual had the French been overmatched. As it was, the
Russians crossed the river and the aqueduct, pushing the French before
them, and partly turning their right. They moved with evident resolution,
for their columns were struck by the fire of a powerful artillery in
flank. A French battery, disregarding the shot and shell poured upon it
by the Russian guns on the opposite hills, devoted all its might to the
injury of the enemy's infantry. These were now smitten on all sides except
their right. For when they saw the deep masses of cavalry facing the gorge
into which they had entered, and when they felt the Sardinians on the left
of their line of advance, they turned to the right and made a desperate
attempt to crown the hillock. The first column which reached the crest was
immediately assailed in flank by a French regiment of Cler's brigade, and
driven helplessly into and over the aqueduct. But the other deep columns
now filling the whole space between the aqueduct and the river still came
on with unfaltering resolution, and flung themselves into a focus of
fire. But they could make no way. The guns and musketry were too much for
them. In vain their officers ran out and waved their swords and showed
the way. In vain the columns tried to get along. Presently they fell into
confusion; then turned and hurried back over the river, pursued by volleys
of musketry and flights of grape and roundshot.
The Russians brought up into line a number of batteries to cover the
retreat of the infantry, and their splendid-looking cavalry drew up in
glittering lines out of range to protect the guns. But the heavy British
pieces in the Sardinian earthworks, opening on the enemy's artillery, soon
made them move farther away. It was about eight o'clock of the morning of
the 16th. The battle was won.
In this action the Allies lost 1,747 men killed and wounded, of whom
only 196 were killed. The Sardinians lost one general officer, the Count
Montevecchio. But the Russian loss was awful. The French buried upwards of
2,000 bodies; the Russians more than 1,000. There were 2,250 prisoners in
the hands of the French, some wounded, some whole. General Read and two
other generals of his corps were among the dead; and among the wounded
were eight generals and ten colonels. The Russian loss altogether could
not have been less than 15,000 men. The battle of the Tchernaya sealed the
fate of Sebastopol.
The battle of the Tchernaya did not interrupt the progress of the siege.
The Russians only succeeded in drawing upon themselves the bulk of the
covering army, for although the French showed a strong line of troops on
the old Inkermann ground, and kept up a sharp look-out upon their own
left, this did not hinder the working parties in the advanced works from
continuing their labours.
It should still be borne in mind that the French had fully recognised the
fact that the Malakoff was the key of Sebastopol, that their main efforts
were directed towards it, and that all the other attacks had become
subordinate to this one. In short the attack on the Malakoff had become
what is termed regular. But Sebastopol was not invested. The supply of
guns in the place was practically unlimited. As much ammunition as the
enemy could find transport for could be and was carried into the town.
Hence, although the progress of the sap went on against the Malakoff
and the Little Redan alone, the whole fire of the Allies could not be
concentrated on those works, because they had to reply to the other
batteries used so vigorously by the enemy. These conditions of the siege
had been long established; the new feature in it was the determined attack
upon the Malakoff, to which the other attacks were made subordinate.
The moment the French began to descend the western slope of the Mamelon,
and push up the eastern slope of the Malakoff, they became sensible of
the arduous nature of the undertaking. Their trenches had to be designed
with the utmost care, their connecting parallels to be constructed with
rapidity and solidity in the face of a destructive fire. About the period
of the battle of the Tchernaya they were losing a hundred men a night in
the trenches. Batteries, low down in the Russian works and unseen by the
Allies, flung shells into the trenches and batteries with fatal accuracy.
Nevertheless, the French steadily gained ground. They had descended one
slope, they were ascending the other. But when they had reached within
a hundred yards of the ditch of the Malakoff they could go no farther.
The work of the night was destroyed by the enemy the next day. In vain
the sharpshooters in their pits and in the most advanced cover kept up a
deadly fire on the embrasures of the Malakoff. The enemy's guns were so
numerous and so well placed that there seemed to be always some capable of
firing, and with the dawn came the destruction of the labours of the night.
In these circumstances, General Simpson agreed to open on the 17th of
August the heaviest possible fire upon the Malakoff; and the batteries
of the French on the left were to bombard the town front to prevent the
Russians on that side from overwhelming our left attack. Accordingly,
on the 17th, the British opened fire; but the French, for some reason,
did not support them, and the Russians in the town batteries did us
considerable damage and killed two good officers. Yet this did not prevent
the British from accomplishing their object. They maintained so crushing
a fire on the Malakoff that the Russian artillerymen were soon obliged
to quit their pieces, and only fire a gun now and then. At six in the
evening a magazine blew up in a work between the Redan and the Malakoff.
This battery was ruined. All night the mortars of the Allies fired heavily
into the Malakoff and Redan, to hinder the enemy from repairing damages;
and all night the French worked lustily at their trenches, doing more
in twenty-four hours than they had done in a fortnight. The bombardment
continued on the 18th. On the night of that day signal was made that
masses of Russians were in the Redan. Thereupon the mortars were directed
upon this work, and the heavy shells must have destroyed many men. There
was a considerable exchange of musketry fire between the advanced trenches
and the place, but the enemy did not venture out. The French on the
left, who had been almost silent, now found that, in order to complete
their approaches to a certain point, they also must open a general fire.
This they did on the evening of the 20th, taking the enemy somewhat by
surprise. While under cover of this fire they pushed forward their sap.
From this time to the end of the month there were constant alarms on the
side of the Tchernaya. The French had been very active in the valley of
Baidar immediately after the battle of the 16th. General d'Allonville had
caused his infantry to penetrate the passes leading to the Tchernaya from
the north, and establish posts of observation on the hills. At the same
time the Sardinians strengthened their formidable works on Mount Hasfort,
and the French constructed three batteries for guns intended to sweep the
ground about the Stone Bridge. On the right they mounted twelve pieces
of heavy artillery, naming the work the Raglan Battery. On the other
flank they placed the same number of guns in a battery named after La
Boussinière, a gallant artillery officer, distinguished at the Alma, and
killed before Sebastopol. These guns looked obliquely up the road to the
Mackenzie Heights. Then farther to the rear, and on the right of the road
to Balaclava, they constructed a work for twelve pieces, whose fire would
sweep the whole road as far as the bridge, and named it Battery Bizot.
Behind these works they re-made the old Turkish redoubts of October, 1854.
Thus the Allies covered Balaclava with a triple line, the third being the
now famous line of Balaclava, constituting a position as strong as any in
the world.
Although it seemed improbable that the Russians would repeat the
enterprise of the 16th of August, yet the information that reached
headquarters, the partial disappearance of the Russians from the North
Camp, the incessant flashing of signal lights from the eastern mountains
to Inkermann, and from Inkermann to Sebastopol, induced the Allies to
keep on the alert. General Simpson reconnoitred the whole position on the
Tchernaya. The troops were under arms, both on the plateau and on the
Tchernaya, long before daylight for several days, dispersing only when the
sun rose. The men-of-war in the harbour of Balaclava were in readiness
to take up positions whence they could do the most damage to the enemy.
The splendid cavalry of the Allies turned out every day, and showed its
thousands of sabres and lances in the plains of Balaclava; a spectacle
gratifying to the military eye, and not encouraging to the enemy. The
Highland Division took post above Kamara. The field artillery of the
Allies was in constant readiness. From the hills that enfold the Baidar
valley to the heights of Inkermann all was vigilance. Prince Gortschakoff,
who had his army on the plateau of Mackenzie, and in the little valleys
leading down towards the outposts and main position of the Allies,
probably looked upon this scene, enacted daily; if he did so, what he saw
must have extinguished any notion of breaking into the allied lines at any
point. There was no weak place in the chain.
Nevertheless, the siege works made steady progress towards the Malakoff.
There the assailants and defenders were within a few yards of each other.
The Russians had a series of rifle-pits on the slope under the Malakoff
Redoubt itself. The French works had approached so near that it became
necessary to seize these pits, and incorporate them with the main body
of the approaches. Accordingly, on the 23rd of August, a body of Zouaves
worked all day in opening a trench leading towards the pits; and in the
evening the light infantry of a line regiment went in and carried them.
But the Russians, determined not to lose their shelter without a struggle,
dashed out of the Malakoff, and expelled the Frenchmen. The Russians,
however, did not long enjoy their triumph, for the expelled troops, being
supported by their comrades, returned to the assault, reconquered and held
the work. The next day the enemy kept up a heavy fire on the Mamelon, in
spite of the support that our batteries afforded to the French. But the
onward march of the latter could not be arrested. On the evening of the
24th they seized the whole line of Russian works on the glacis. Again
the enemy violently essayed to prevent the French from making good their
hold. Before the morning the whole line was complete, and the French
works were within thirty-four yards of the salient of the Malakoff. The
efforts of the enemy were directed chiefly against the Mamelon and the
approaches therefrom, the quarter, as they well knew, where their greatest
peril lay. On the night of the 28th they made a lucky shot. One of their
shells rolled into a magazine in the left or southern face of the Mamelon
Redoubt. There were at the time 15,000 pounds of powder in the magazine.
This exploded with an awful roar, awakening the whole camp, and killing or
wounding 150 Frenchmen. This vast explosion of powder did not seriously
damage the Mamelon; but it delayed the final assault, because the store of
powder, thus expended, had to be replaced.
For the remainder of the month the trying labour of getting close to the
Malakoff and Little Redan went on in the usual way. But the crisis of the
long siege had now come. Neither side could bear much longer the horrible
losses inflicted by this deadly strife. The Russians might endure, hoping
against hope, to hold out until the winter once more became their keen
ally; but the French and British felt that they must risk an assault or
raise the siege.
When Prince Gortschakoff saw that the French had opened their seventh
parallel within a few yards of the Malakoff, he must have felt certain
that an assault would soon be attempted. He was quite as well aware as
the allied generals that the Malakoff was the key of the place. General
Todleben had, from the first, shown a just appreciation of the ground,
and upon those two salient and commanding points, the Flagstaff and
the Malakoff, he had exhausted the resources of his art. Once firmly
established in one of these, he knew that the Allies must win the city.
He knew also that if the Flagstaff only were taken, he could defend the
place long enough to secure a retreat; but that if the Malakoff fell
before a raft-bridge could be constructed, the Russians must surrender
or die fighting, for the Malakoff Hill commanded the harbour. Here one
cannot but admire the foresight of a general, who, while he defended his
lines to the last, took early and ample precautions to secure a retreat.
The great raft-bridge over that arm of the sea we call the Harbour,
which is half a mile wide, was begun in July, and finished by the end
of August. This stupendous work was designed and executed, no doubt,
partly with the object of enabling the Russian general to pour troops
rapidly into Sebastopol, but mainly to enable him to avoid capture in the
last extremity. Nor was this the only work undertaken with the view of
preparing against a calamity. The genius of Todleben had designed an inner
line of works in rear and to the east of the Malakoff; and this must have
been done only to gain time for the evacuation of the place in the event
of the capture of that work.
[Illustration: THE FRENCH IN THE MALAKOFF. (_See p._ 124.)]
The Russians were quite right in assuming that an assault would be
hazarded at no distant day. It was the uppermost thought in the minds of
the allied generals. The approach of winter, the expenditure of men and
ammunition, the vast extent of the works, the proximity of the trenches
to the place, and the impossibility of pushing them farther in certain
quarters, dictated imperiously a resolution to storm. General Pélissier
and General Simpson, therefore, directed the principal officers of
artillery and engineers to meet and report on the propriety of making an
assault, and on the best means of carrying it out. They met on the 3rd of
September, and drew up a memorandum. In the attack on the town, that is
the French left attack, from the Flagstaff to the Quarantine, they said,
the works of approach had remained for a long time stationary, and they
declared that these works could not be pushed farther without causing
great loss. The British had made some progress before the Redan--their
works had stopped short at 200 yards from the salient angle. Here again
these officers were of opinion that the approaches could not be advanced,
because serious impediments interposed; in other words, because the ground
was rocky and enfiladed by several Russian batteries on both sides of
the South Harbour. In front of the Malakoff, the report went on to state,
the French artillery had attained a marked superiority over that of the
place, and under its protection--and, as we may add, the protection of
the British batteries--the approaches had arrived within five-and-twenty
yards of the enemy's lines. The French were also within thirty yards of
the Little Redan. Here it was impossible to work nearer, because the
ground was living rock. Therefore, for these reasons, the officers decided
unanimously that the moment had arrived for assaulting the place. How
should this be done?
It was assumed, and justly, that if the Malakoff could be captured and
held, the fall of the Karabelnaia suburb, that is, the whole space east of
the South Ravine, would be inevitable. Therefore the main attack was to be
directed against the Malakoff, and in order that it might be successful,
while a powerful column rushed into the work itself, two other columns
assailed simultaneously the Little Redan, and the long rampart or curtain
connecting it with the Malakoff. But as the Allies were fighting, not
against a mere garrison of limited number, but against a numerous army,
and as the enemy, knowing the importance of the position, would do his
uttermost to keep, or, if he lost, to regain it, so it was held to be
necessary that other attacks should be simultaneously made upon the place,
in order to prevent the Russians from concentrating their forces at the
vital point. It was with this object that the officers of the Engineers
recommended an assault by the British on the Redan, and by the French
on the west or town front. These, it should ever be borne in mind, were
to be subordinate assaults. It was held essential to success that the
assault should be preceded by a heavy bombardment for three days. Such was
the scheme devised by the principal officers of artillery and engineers
of both armies on the 3rd of September. The day chosen was the 8th of
September, the hour, noon exactly.
The sixth and last bombardment began at daybreak on the 5th of September.
Nearly the whole of the 800 pieces of ordnance in battery opened on the
place. The sun shone brightly; a light air from the south-east blew over
Sebastopol. One moment the old familiar scene was visible--the still
majestic town, the serene waters of the harbour, the dark and rugged
outline of the defences, the Black Sea, and the allied fleet. The next
moment the rolling clouds of smoke, boiling up and extending on all sides,
hid everything from view. It was the policy of the Allies to fill the
mind of the enemy with doubt as to their projects, and thus force him to
keep at a strained attention on all sides. Therefore it was from the 350
guns and mortars in the fifty-two batteries directed against the western
face of the ramparts of Sebastopol that the most furious volleys issued.
Even the official report of the British engineers calls it a "terrific
cannonade." The fire from our batteries, and that of the French right,
was what is called steady and careful. It was incessant but not hurried.
This was calculated to make the enemy believe that the assault would be on
the town front and not on the suburb, and, therefore, to keep more men in
readiness in that quarter. Nevertheless, the mere weight of metal directed
upon the Malakoff entirely silenced that work from the first. Upwards of
200 guns and mortars were levelled and trained to bear upon its outward
faces, its embrasures, and its interior. The 7th passed like the 5th and
6th, opening with a volley along the whole four miles of batteries, then,
of set purpose, dying away, and suddenly bursting forth again. The wind
had changed. The smoke and dust were driven back from Sebastopol by a
northern blast, and men strained their eyes in vain to catch a glimpse of
the place. Yet patient watchers peering through the rifts in the sombre
cloud saw enough to convince them that the enemy was suffering almost
beyond endurance. At night fires were visible in several places; about
eleven o'clock a magazine blew up; and at the same time a huge two-decker
was burning solemnly in the Harbour. Up to this time the enemy had lost
4,000 men, exclusive of gunners, who, says Prince Gortschakoff, perished
in great numbers, shot down at their guns.
Hitherto the allied generals had kept secret the hour of the assault. At
noon they held a fresh council, and took their last resolutions. Now the
secret was divulged. Precisely at noon of the following day the stormers
were to make their rush. In order to secure uniformity of movement the
staff officers met at headquarters, and set their watches in concert. Next
morning General Bosquet, who had the immediate command on the Malakoff
side, went into the sixth parallel; and between eleven and twelve General
Pélissier took post in the Mamelon. General Codrington and General Markham
were in the front of our Redan attack; and a little before noon General
Simpson went to a spot selected for him by the engineers in the first
parallel. With him went Sir Harry Jones.
We have already described the plan of attack; we have now to set forth the
means of executing it. To ensure success in the attack on the Malakoff
works, General Pélissier employed 25,000 men. There were not only the
whole of the corps of Bosquet, but Mellinet's Brigade of the Imperial
Guard, and Marolles' Brigade of the Reserve. MacMahon, with 5,000 men,
was to storm the Malakoff Redoubt, and in support were Wimpfen's Brigade,
3,000 strong, and two battalions of the Zouaves of the Guard; thus giving
10,000 men to take and hold the Malakoff itself. General La Motterouge was
entrusted with 4,300 men to storm the curtain between the Malakoff and
Little Redan; and General Dulac had 4,600 wherewith to carry the Little
Redan itself, and 3,000 under Marolles wherewith to make good his grip
of this work, and thence carry the unfinished interior lines of defence.
There was no special support allotted to La Motterouge, but General
Bosquet had upwards of 3,000 men as a general reserve. In addition,
two batteries of artillery were held in readiness to drive through the
trenches and over the open, and take part in the combat in case they were
required. On the western front General de Salles commanded. He had 18,500
men available, including Cialdini's 1,200 Italians. Levaillant, with 4,300
men, was to make two attacks on the Central Bastion, and D'Autemarre, with
5,280 men, was to furnish a support. In case of success, and when one of
the storming columns had turned the Flagstaff Bastion on its proper right,
D'Autemarre's division, Cialdini at its head, was to turn the proper left
of the Flagstaff. The remaining troops were in reserve. Thus Pélissier had
set apart 43,000 men for the assaulting and supporting columns.
The British arrangements were not on this colossal scale. Two divisions,
the Light and Second, were directed to furnish both stormers and supports.
Each division supplied a covering party, a ladder party, a storming party
divided into two sections, and a working party. The whole amounted to
1,600 men. The covering parties, riflemen intended to spread out and keep
down the fire of the unsubdued Russian guns, were under Captain Fyers and
Captain Lewes. The ladder parties, intended to be stormers as soon as they
had placed their ladders, were under Major Welsford. The storming parties
were under Lieutenant-Colonel Handcock, Captain Grove, Brigadier Shirley,
and Colonel Windham. The supports consisted of 750 men of each division,
and the remainder of both were held in reserve. Thus General Simpson had
resolved to try and take the Redan by dribbling into it about 3,100 men;
and the whole force he kept in hand in case of emergencies was about 4,000
more. At the same time the Highland Division was posted next to the French
attack, while the Third and Fourth were held back in the rear of the right
attack, and the First was under arms in camp.
The Russians had no fewer than 75,000 men in Sebastopol. There were
sixteen battalions in the works on the proper left of the Malakoff, and
twelve battalions in reserve on this side. In the Malakoff were four
battalions and some companies, and four battalions in the Gervais Battery
on its proper right. There were besides sixteen battalions in reserve.
They had been called up from the town by General Chruleff, when his
suspicions were aroused by the information that the French trenches seemed
to be full of troops. Thus there were about 22,000 men under arms for the
defence of the Malakoff system of works. In the Redan and to the right and
left of it were nine battalions and sixteen in reserve. The battalions in
the front line were chiefly our old foes of the Alma and Inkermann. Their
numbers were about 13,000. In addition to these troops there were no fewer
than 10,000 in reserve for general purposes. The total number for the
defence of the line from the Barrack Battery to the Harbour was therefore
45,000 men; or 2,000 more than were set apart by the French alone for all
their attacks, and 10,000 more than the combined numbers of the English
and French on the eastern side. In the town the Russians had 20,000 men,
2,000 more than the number at the disposal of General de Salles. The
front line of works from the Quarantine to the Flagstaff was strongly
manned; and besides the special reserves of the different bastions, there
was a general reserve nearly 10,000 strong. Such a vast force, fighting
behind the strongest entrenchments ever raised, was certain to be hard to
conquer; and although it was divided into huge fragments, and one half was
separated from the other by an arm of the sea--the South Harbour--we have
shown that in mere numbers alone the Russians were in every point superior
to their assailants. This should be remembered in view of what followed.
At mid-day the officers gave the signal. The clarions sounded, the drums
beat, the men cried "_Vive l'Empereur!_" and dashing over the trenches,
went headlong towards the Malakoff, the curtain, and the Little Redan.
At the first rush all these places were surprised and overrun; but the
attack on the great redoubt was the only one destined to be permanently
successful.
The Malakoff Redoubt was a mighty keep, 380 yards long, and 160 wide; the
ditch was upwards of six yards deep and seven wide, and its slope next to
the work was very steep. In the interior were, first, the ground floor of
the old stone tower, and then a multitude of traverses, huge ramparts of
earth and timber designed to minimise the effect of shell fire. It was
a closed work, that is, fortified on all sides, with one narrow opening
in the rear, so that when once the assailants mastered the interior and
closed the gorge the vast ramparts were defences for and not against
them. This brief description will enable the reader to form some notion
of the difficulties in the way of the stormers, and of the advantages
which told in their favour when they had subdued the garrison. The Little
Redan was also a closed work, but the long curtain connecting it with the
Malakoff was exposed to the fire of the Russian second line, thrown up
about 300 yards in the rear. The Great Redan was an open work, like a very
straddling V, and its flanks were well supplied with traverses. The old
trace of the entrenchment, as it existed in 1854, formed a sort of low
retrenchment at the open end, in no sense formidable except as affording
cover behind which infantry could rally. Here, it will be observed, the
disadvantages were on the side of the assailants. Although the defenders
might not be able to keep their foes out, in all probability they could
prevent them from remaining in, unless they entered in overwhelming
numbers, and succeeded in closing the rear against the attacks of the
expelled enemy. In order to make the separate scenes of the 8th of
September clear, it will be necessary to treat them separately, trusting
the reader to remember that several actions were fought simultaneously.
The leading troops of MacMahon's division were the 1st Zouaves and the
7th of the Line. The Zouaves darted out on the right, and the Linesmen
on the left. The heads of the columns reached the deep ditch together,
leapt into it without waiting for ladders, swarmed up the opposing bank,
and climbing, some over the parapet, some through the embrasures, jumped
into the midst of the astonished Russians. In a short space half the
force of the two regiments was in the work; but the engineers had thrown
a ladder bridge so swiftly over the ditch that the rear companies of the
7th were able to cross it. At the same time four companies of Chasseurs
had crossed the ditch, and entering the work at its point of junction
with the Gervais Battery, drove its defenders out at the point of the
bayonet, and made good their hold upon the battery. The Zouaves and the
Linesmen in the Malakoff had attacked with such impetuosity and in such
numbers that the Russians were obliged to fight in disorder, about the
base of the old White Tower. But Frenchmen rushed in on all sides. There
was a brief and bloody combat. Assailed in front, turned on both flanks,
unable to retreat, above a hundred Russians ran into the lower storey of
the old tower, and began to fire through the loopholes. By this time the
Zouaves and the 7th had driven the enemy completely out of the space round
the tower. Quickly rallying, the Russians collected behind the first huge
line of traverses, and, in spite of the efforts of the French, held for
awhile their ground. Foot by foot the French had gained upon them. They
dashed at the openings, they wound in and out around the flanks, they
crept along the parapets, and just as Vinoy's brigade was entering the
work in support of Decaen, the latter's men had succeeded in forcing the
enemy to seek shelter behind the second great line crossing the Malakoff
at its widest part. Here the Russians rallied stronger than ever. They
were plainly gathering for a rush. Hundreds had fallen on both sides, but
the fury of the combat did not abate. The great French flag floated in
the smoke and dust over the tower, but the Malakoff was yet to win. Until
the gorge was gained and closed nothing was gained. So thought MacMahon.
Vinoy was bursting in to his aid, but he determined to be secure, so
he sent one of his staff for part of the Imperial Guard and Wimpfen's
reserve. Before these could arrive, Vinoy, a prompt and gallant soldier,
had led his men into the work and made use of them with striking skill.
He had thrown the bulk of his force on the right of the assailants. With
the 20th he supported the right of the Zouaves, and with the 27th, by a
most soldier-like movement, he turned the Russian left. Paralysed by this
rapid manœuvre, executed with unfaltering impetuosity, as soon as he saw
the 27th in the rear of his left, and rapidly approaching the gorge, the
enemy quitted his hold of the great line of traverses, and made for the
sole exit from the redoubt. The French burst through like a flood. The
more daring of the enemy turned several times, and spent their strength
in brave but useless charges. Though they were swept along by the torrent
of foes which streamed upon them, they made a brilliant resistance; and
it was only when they felt that the 27th of the Line, so skilfully led,
so relentlessly bent on gaining the gorge, would soon reach it, that they
rushed out of the work. MacMahon and Vinoy swooped upon their prize,
closed the gorge, and forbade all return.
[Illustration: THE STRUGGLE IN THE REDAN. (_See p._ 126.)]
During this time the French on the extreme right had fought with great
bravery but adverse fortune. The parallels of approach had been pushed
up close to the Little Redan, and the heads of the columns of attack
were close under the work; Dulac's leading brigade, therefore, had at
the appointed hour started like the rest and had at once seized the
Little Redan. Somewhat later in point of time, because the distance to be
overcome was greater, General La Motterouge had sent his first brigade
under Bourbaki against the curtain. Here again the French succeeded. The
whole line from the Malakoff to the Little Redan was in their hands. Eager
to take advantage of this burst of success, the leading brigades, as soon
as the supports were well up, dashed forward. Bourbaki led his men against
the second line, while St. Pol, issuing from the Little Redan, sought
to turn the line at its point of intersection with the rear defences of
the latter work. But the Russians were now fully alive. The batteries on
the north side opened on the assailants. Three war-steamers ran up to
the mouth of the Careening Bay, and poured in broadside after broadside.
Field guns were promptly brought up to the second line, and used to hurl
forth showers of desolating grapeshot. The Russian reserves came up, and
charging the disordered columns of the French, forced them violently
back--Bourbaki, as far as, and over, the curtain; St. Pol into the Little
Redan. So prompt and vigorous was this counter-stroke, so deadly was
the fire of the steamers, that St. Pol could not keep his hold even of
the Little Redan. He was driven out, and the French, with difficulty,
ensconced themselves on their own side of the curtain and in its ditch.
The attempts to recover these positions were unsuccessful. Similarly on
the extreme right they failed to carry the Central Bastion.
The afternoon was wearing away. The British attack on the Great Redan,
which we shall presently describe, had failed. The guns on the left
face of this work were shooting down the French on the slopes of the
Malakoff. General Chruleff had tried by three desperate charges to break
into the gorge of the key of the place, and tear away from MacMahon his
blood-stained prize. But the defence was too strong. The Russians only
dashed up to the gorge and tried to pull down the gabions that closed
it, or endeavoured to scramble up the ramparts, to meet death from the
crushing musketry fire that blazed from the parapets. A huge column had
emerged from the houses, and for a moment seemed resolved to sweep the
gallant Chasseurs out of the Gervais Battery. Suddenly the massive column
was rent by round shot and disordered by shell, and struck in flank by
musketry. The British gunners in the Quarry Battery had caught sight of
this column, and in an instant had trained and fired their pieces. Finding
only five guns bore upon the enemy, they tore down the sides of the other
embrasures, and brought promptly seven into action. That was the source
of the torrent of shot and shell. The streams of musketry rolled from
the western flank of the Malakoff, and from the Chasseurs in the Gervais
Battery. The column broke up under this fire and fled to the rear. Prince
Gortschakoff had arrived from the north side, and scanning the Malakoff,
saw that life would be vainly wasted in further attempts to retake it. He
therefore forbade them; but he ordered his generals to resist to the last
on the other points.
It is now time to narrate the attack of the British on the Redan. There
were in and near the work, and specially appointed to defend it, no less
than, at the lowest computation, 12,000 men, exclusive of a great reserve.
Against these we were about to send not altogether, stormers and supports,
more than one-fourth of the number. This handful of men were expected to
take and hold an open work defended by thirty-two battalions of Russian
infantry. The men did not hesitate. In a few minutes the salient was
won. The Light Division column had stormed in at the apex, the Second
Division column had been led to the right, and had entered the work on
its proper left face, some yards from the salient. Now the crisis of the
combat arrived. Driven back by the impetuous charge of the British, the
Russians in the salient, and on each flank ran to the rear, and collected
behind the breastwork, up to which they speedily brought field artillery.
The handful of British who had got in did not, unhappily, even attempt
to carry the breastwork by a rush. The British soldier is a creature of
habit, and he instinctively fell into his old ways. Instead of storming
on, he extended himself on parapet or traverse, and began to fire. The
officers saw how fatal this would prove, and tried to get the men out
from cover, and to form them for a rush. In this work Colonel Windham and
others were conspicuous. But it availed nothing. During this musketry
combat weak supports, in disarray, arrived from the British trenches; but
the Russians had now gathered in immense force. Pauloff, who commanded
here, had called up about 8,000 men. Throwing these into the fight as
they came up, he sent some along the flanks, while he kept a strong line,
aided by field guns, behind the breastwork, and from that point directed
a converging fire into the salient. Considering his numbers, the Russian
general was singularly slow in his movements. But by degrees, and by sheer
weight of men, his masses pressed the British closer and closer. These,
firing with all their might, soon exhausted their stock of ammunition,
and were forced to use stones. Then the supports from the trenches, on
reaching the salient, imitated the example of their precursors and fired
until their store was gone. Colonel Windham sent three officers to beg for
troops in formation. Not one reached General Codrington. This officer was
perplexed and irresolute, and at length Windham arrived himself to demand
a well-formed support. It was too late, assuming that such a support could
have reached the Redan and have expelled its numerous garrison. Just after
Windham had quitted the work on this errand, Pauloff grew emboldened by
his numbers, and pressing down upon the salient, closed with the British
soldiers still holding on. A short and terrible combat ensued at close
quarters. Our men were unwilling to surrender the little space they had
so dearly won; but the pressure of fire and steel was irresistible. The
remnant of the stormers was forced over the parapet, but not away from
it. There, on our side, they still hung, and were fed from the trenches
by sections of men who had survived the path of fire by which alone they
could reach the enemy. But this could not last long. At length the enemy
made a mighty effort, and swept every British soldier from the parapet
into the ditch. Those who were able to scramble up had to run the gauntlet
of a fire of grape and musketry on their return to the trenches, whither
they arrived breathless, bleeding, exhausted. The Russians cheered, manned
their parapets, fired into the chaos of human beings weltering in heaps
in the ditch, and even brought up two field-pieces, and with grape
from these pursued the fugitives. For this they paid a heavy penalty.
Our batteries instantly opened a deadly fire on the Redan, crushing the
field-pieces at once, and smashing the masses of infantry whose numbers
choked the work. But the enemy had gained his point, and had worsted the
victors of the Alma and Inkermann.
[Illustration: LORD RAGLAN VIEWING THE STORMING OF THE REDAN AT THE SIEGE
OF SEBASTOPOL.
FROM THE PAINTING BY R. CATON WOODVILLE.
By permission of Messrs. Henry Graves & Co., Ltd, Pall Mall, S.W.]
From his post of vantage on the Mamelon General Pélissier had witnessed
our defeat; and he now sent to inquire whether General Simpson intended
to renew the assault, telling him at the same time that the French were
inexpugnably placed in the Malakoff. General Simpson was compelled to say
that he could not renew the assault, for the trenches were full of the
beaten troops; but he promised to strike at the Redan once more in the
morning. The sun went down, and in the British camp gallant men groaned in
bitterness of heart over their splendid failure.
In the desperate efforts they made to recapture the Malakoff, the Russians
had lost hundreds of men and several generals. At five o'clock orders
for a general retreat were issued. As soon as it was dark the enemy
placed bodies of riflemen and artillerymen in all the works remaining to
them, and these were instructed to keep up a steady fire. Behind them
were some battalions in reserve, occupying the street barricades and
houses. Thus protected, the troops in the town were to march directly
to the raft-bridge, and across it to the north side in regular order.
Those in the suburb were to move upon the point where stood Fort Paul.
Thence steamers and other craft would transport them to the great bridge.
Then the reserves were to follow, and finally, at a given signal, the
rear-guard were to spike the guns, fire the trains of the magazines, and
beat a retreat over the bridge. All this was accomplished with great
skill and celerity. The Allies were uncertain of the intentions of the
enemy, and, moreover, they stood in awe of the mines supposed to exist.
So all night the long and heavy columns of men, with field artillery,
some of which they were obliged to throw into the sea, were passing over
the bridge, which swayed to and fro under the great weight. It was a
marvellous feat and forms a splendid _finale_ to the siege; but it should
be remembered that it was the retreat of an army by an unassailable line;
and what is admirable in the action is the promptitude of the general's
decision, and the coolness and speed with which it was executed. The town
was committed to the flames and the magazines were exploded. On the 11th
our guns had been brought to bear on the Russian steamers still afloat,
and the enemy, to prevent us from sinking them, burnt them at night,
making a second conflagration nearly as brilliant as that of the blazing
town. The Russian Black Sea fleet had ceased to exist.
Thus ended this now famous and unique military operation. The losses had
been enormous on both sides during the last days of the siege. In four
days in August the admitted loss of the enemy was 5,500 men from the
brief bombardment alone. From the 22nd of August to the 4th of September
the Russians had lost upwards of 7,000 men. During the cannonade and
bombardment which preceded the assault--that is, in three days--their loss
was 4,000, giving a total of 16,500 men, exclusive of the artillerymen
killed at their guns. On the 8th their loss, estimated by themselves, was
11,690. So that between the 16th of August and the 9th of September their
force was diminished by 28,190 men killed and wounded. Included in this
total, which is understated, are a few hundred "missing," but most of the
missing were among the slain. The losses of the Allies, although very
severe every day, were not so great. Allowing 200 a day for the last three
weeks of the siege, we have a total of 4,200, and if we add to these the
loss on the 8th--7,557 for the French, and 2,610 for the British--we have
a total loss of 14,367, a dear price for the prize that was won.