THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (_continued_).
The Course of Diplomacy--Austria's Position--She becomes a
Peace-maker--The Treaty of the 2nd of December--The Four Points--The
Czar agrees to negotiate--Russell's Mission to Vienna--Opening of
the Conference--Prince Gortschakoff's Declaration--The Third Point
broached--Its Rejection by Russia--Count Buol's Compromise--A
Diplomatic Farce--Count Buol's final Proposition--Resignation of
Drouyn de Lhuys--The War debated in Parliament--Lord John Russell
resigns--Strength of the Government--The Sardinian and Turkish
Loans--Vote of Censure on the Aberdeen Cabinet--Finance of the
War--General Pélissier--The Fight for the Cemetery--Success
of the French--Occupation of the Tchernaya--Expedition to
Kertch--Description of the Peninsula--Sir George Brown's
Force--The Russians blow up their Magazines--Occupation of
Kertch and Yenikale--Lyons in the Sea of Azotf--Result of the
Expedition--Attack upon Sebastopol decided--Ordnance of the
Allies--The Attack--The French occupy the Mamelon--The British in
the Quarries--Lord Raglan overruled--New Batteries--Pélissier's
Change of Plan--The Fourth Bombardment--Preparations for the
Assault--Mayran's Mistake--Brunet and D'Autemarre--The Attack on the
Redan fails--Abandonment of the Assault--General Eyre--Losses on
both Sides--Death of Lord Raglan.
While the armies in the Crimea had been occupied in holding their ground,
and recovering from the effects of the winter campaign, the political
action of the allied Governments had been directed into a channel of
negotiations opened by Austria and conducted at Vienna.
Austria had not approved of the expedition to the Crimea. She had, to a
certain extent, joined the Western Powers; and although Russia might not
deem it expedient to turn upon Austria and make war upon her, still that
was possible; for Austria had given a cause of war to Russia by exerting
that pressure--severe, though distant and indirect--which impelled the
Czar to raise the siege of Silistria, and then abandon the Principalities.
Then the troops of Austria, by slow degrees, occupied the country as
far as the Pruth, and thus enabled the Western Powers to divert their
armies upon Sebastopol. But when they took that direction, and left
Austria alone face to face with Russia, supported only by a few Turks,
and having a very doubtful ally in Prussia, Austria was discontented. She
had, however, gone too far to recede. She was committed to the course of
armed neutrality, verging always upon open war. Becoming aware of her
situation, and having, just before the war broke out, reduced her army
by 90,000 men, she now spent £16,000,000 sterling in order to place her
public force on an effective war footing. For a moment, in the victory
of the Alma and the first bombardment of Sebastopol, she saw prospects
of a speedy termination of the war. The dark cloud of Inkermann and the
failure of the bombardment suddenly hid those prospects from her view.
The Allies had not been beaten, but they had been frustrated; and Austria
saw in the new circumstances an opening for a new effort to bring about
peace. Her special object had been gained when the Russian monopoly of
the Lower Danube had been removed, and she did not appear to appreciate
the larger objects of the Allies, namely, a definite reduction of Russian
power in the Black Sea; or she did not feel capable of aiding in their
accomplishment by a direct participation in hostilities. She therefore
renewed her part of peacemaker.
In order to place herself in a better position as regards the Western
Powers, she agreed to sign a treaty known as the Treaty of the 2nd
of December, 1854. This document stated that the Three Powers, being
desirous of bringing the war to an end as speedily as possible, and of
re-establishing peace on a solid basis, and being convinced that nothing
would be more conducive to this result than the complete union of their
efforts, they had resolved to conclude this treaty. By it they undertook
not to make peace without first deliberating in common. Austria engaged
to defend the frontier of the Principalities against any return of the
Russian forces; in case war ensued between Austria and Russia, the Three
Powers mutually promised to each other their offensive and defensive
alliance; and in case peace should not be re-established before the 1st
of January, 1855, the Three Powers agreed "to deliberate, without delay,
upon effectual means for obtaining the object of their alliance." Here,
then, it seemed, were fetters binding Austria to the fortunes of the
alliance; and the Western Powers believed that at last they had a fair
prospect of aid from Austrian arms, especially when she concluded a
defensive alliance with Prussia. The object of Austria, however, was not
war, but negotiation. By giving what seemed a proof of her willingness to
share the fortunes of the Allies, she took up a position which enhanced
the value of any peace proposals she might devise. Accordingly, she set
to work, contriving how, upon the bases of the negotiations carried
on in the summer, which took the shape of the Four Points, she could
present a scheme which Russia would be willing to consider. These four
points were a further definition of the Protocol signed by the Powers at
the beginning of the war, by which the purpose of the contest was set
forth. If she succeeded, she would relieve herself from the obligation
of fighting imposed by the treaty; if she failed, some excuse might be
evolved in the process of failure. Thereupon negotiations were quietly
resumed at Vienna between Count Buol and the Ministers of the Allies.
Prussia, having declined to accede to the treaty of December 2nd, had
no part in these proceedings. By the 28th of December the Ministers had
agreed to a paper defining the sense of the Four Points. Those points were
first, the cessation of the Russian protectorate in the Principalities,
and the substitution therefor of a European protectorate; second, the
free navigation of the Danube; third, an arrangement having "for its
object to connect the existence of the Ottoman Empire more completely
with the European equilibrium, and to put an end to the preponderance
of Russia in the Black Sea;" fourth, renunciation by Russia of her
pretentions to exercise a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the
Sultan. These bases of negotiation were presented to Prince Gortschakoff,
Russian Minister at Vienna, and by him transmitted to the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg. The Emperor of Russia was not at all disinclined to treat. He
had nothing to lose by negotiations, and, as it was possible something
might occur at a conference to disturb the harmony of the Allies, he
might have something to gain. Then it may well be that he counted on the
presence of a Prussian envoy, and consequently of a backer; and therefore
in December he gave his Minister at Vienna conditional, and on the 7th of
January definite, power to negotiate. But the British Ministry falling
under the shock of a popular tempest, it became impossible to send any
plenipotentiary to Vienna until the Government of England was once more in
such a position, as regarded Parliament, that it could act with authority.
Lord Palmerston adopted the resolution of sending Lord John Russell to
attend a conference at Vienna. While at Paris Lord John received and
accepted an offer of the post of Colonial Secretary. He had been sent
off so hurriedly that his written instructions were not prepared until
two days after he had sailed. Passing through Paris and Berlin, and
conferring in each capital with the highest personages of the State, he
did not reach Vienna until the 4th of March, and even then ten more days
passed before the Conference held its first sitting.
This took place on the 15th of March, in the Austrian Foreign Office. The
Plenipotentiaries were, for Austria, Count Buol-Schauenstein and Baron
Prokesch-Osten; for France, Baron de Bourqueney; for England, Lord John
Russell and the Earl of Westmorland; for Turkey, Aarifi Effendi; and for
Russia, Prince Gortschakoff and M. de Titoff. Count Buol, as a matter of
course, became the President of the Conference. At the very outset there
was a faint foreshadowing of the discussion which subsequently occurred.
The Czar Nicholas had just died, but his successor had declared with
emphasis that he should pursue the policy of Peter, Catherine, Alexander,
and Nicholas. When, therefore, the mild tones of conciliation in which
Count Buol opened the Conference had died away, and Baron de Bourqueney
and Lord John Russell had, on behalf of their Governments, reserved the
right of making special conditions over and above the four guarantees,
Prince Gortschakoff seemed to regard this as a challenge. At all events,
he took it up as such, and answered promptly. He hoped, he said, they
all had a common object, the object of arriving at an honourable peace.
"If," he added, "from whatever quarter they come, conditions of peace were
wished to be imposed on Russia which should not be compatible with her
honour, Russia would never consent to them, however serious might be the
consequences." He did not contest the right of the belligerent Powers to
add new demands according to the chances of the war; but, for his part, he
considered himself under the obligation to keep within the limits of the
Four Points. Having thus broken ground, the Conference went at once into
the details of the First Point, and determined to debate them in the order
laid down. We need not enter into these details. It is sufficient to state
that in five sittings the plenipotentiaries had agreed upon a form of
words, fully embodying the spirit of the original basis of the first two
Points. It was on the third, the key-stone of the whole, that they split
asunder.
It was on the 26th of March that Count Buol broached the question. It
may be remembered that the object in view was to connect Turkey with the
European system, and, in the words used by Lord Clarendon's instructions
to Lord John, to abrogate the supremacy of Russia in the Black Sea. For
this, indeed, three fleets and three armies were thundering against the
stronghold of the Czar. It was this supremacy and the temptation it held
out to Russia which had led her Sovereign into arrogant courses, and had
brought on the war. In opening the debate on this now famous Third Point,
Count Buol, speaking not only for himself but his allies, suggested that
it would be the better course for the Ministers of Russia and Turkey to
state to the Conference what means they thought adequate to accomplish the
ends desired. The French and British Ministers supported this suggestion,
Lord John enforcing it with the courteous remark, called forth by Prince
Gortschakoff's early declaration touching the honour of his country, that
England and her allies deemed "the best and only admissible conditions
of peace would be those which, being the most in harmony with the honour
of Russia, should at the same time be sufficient for the security of
Europe." Of course, Prince Gortschakoff could only be gratified, and could
not do less than agree to ask his Cabinet whether they would act on the
suggestion of Count Buol. The Turks did the same. As it was unavoidable
that some time should elapse before answers were received, Count Buol
proposed to pass to the Fourth Point; but to this neither the Cabinet of
Britain nor that of France, and both were consulted, would consent. Thus
several days were wasted, during which the French and Turkish Ministers
for Foreign Affairs were hurrying towards Vienna to take part in these
very critical negotiations.
[Illustration: SEBASTOPOL FROM THE RIGHT ATTACK.]
At the ninth sitting, on the 9th of April, these two, M. Drouyn de Lhuys
and Aali Pasha, were formally introduced. But no other business was
transacted, because Prince Gortschakoff had not received instructions
from his Court in regard to Count Buol's suggestion touching the views of
Russia on the Third Point. On the 17th the Conference again assembled.
Would Russia take the initiative and propound a plan for the abrogation
of her preponderance? The question was answered at once, and all the
more readily, perhaps, because the second bombardment of Sebastopol had
failed. Russia would _not_ take the initiative; moreover, "Russia would
not consent to the strength of her navy being restricted to any fixed
number, either by treaty or in any other manner." The Allies were, or
affected to be, in consternation. They had no plan, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys
suggested that they should meet at once to decide what they should demand.
Lord John Russell blurted out the opinion that the refusal of Russia had
diminished the chances of peace. Prince Gortschakoff rejoined that Russia
would consider any mode except that of limitation. That was not consistent
with honour. The high spirit and bold front maintained by the new Czar are
shown in nothing more than the arrogance with which, at this period, his
Ministers endeavoured to prevent the Allies from meeting to consult on and
arrange the terms to be offered to Russia! Of course, the Allies would not
suffer such arrogant pretensions. They retired to debate among themselves,
and a singular debate it was. The Austrian Cabinet clearly wished to
shrink out of the engagement of the 2nd of December. Although in favour
of the complete neutralisation of the Black Sea, preferring limitation to
counterpoise, and agreeing to support the plan of limitation, Count Buol
not only declined on behalf of Austria to make a refusal by Russia of the
two former a _casus belli_, but suggested the extravagant plan of simply
binding Russia not to increase her naval force in the Black Sea beyond
the point at which it stood _before_ the war! To this, strange to say,
Lord John Russell assented, telling his Government that if this system of
settlement could be made an ultimatum by Austria, the Western Powers ought
to accept it. But when, a few days afterwards, Count Colloredo, in London,
submitted the scheme to Lord Clarendon, the Minister did not hesitate a
moment in rejecting it.
In the meantime, with this tendency to give way on the side of the
Allies, the Conference had become a farce. They met on the 19th, after
consulting, and propounded a plan. The first proposition declared that
the Powers undertook to respect, as an essential condition of the
general equilibrium, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman
Empire. The Russians concurred, but--did not intend thereby to pledge
their Court to a territorial guarantee! So the virtue of the article
vanished at once. Then came the proposal intended to take away Russian
preponderance by limiting the number of her ships in the Black Sea.
Prince Gortschakoff demanded time to consider the project, and M. de
Titoff took the liberty of regretting that Russia had not the option
of settling the whole question by discussion with a State "free in its
movements and resolutions"--meaning Turkey, which he knew, as well as
the other Ministers, was, like Britain and France, bound to act on the
basis of a common understanding. The taunt is of no moment, except as
an illustration of the assurance of the Russian envoys. They had not
exhausted the ample stock of that commodity they brought to Vienna.
Indeed, it seemed to increase under the influence of Austrian vacillation
and timidity. The Conference held two more sittings. On the 21st of April
Prince Gortschakoff refused point-blank to accede even to the mild and
inadequate proposal of limitation, and brought forward an alternative
plan for throwing open the Black Sea and, of course, the Dardanelles
and Bosphorus to the war ships of all nations--a very startling mode
of liberating Turkey from menace, and preserving her independence. The
Ministers of Britain and France at once declined to discuss such a
proposal, and declared their instructions to be exhausted; and Lord John
Russell started for London. M. Drouyn de Lhuys lingered to attend another
conference, and to hear Prince Gortschakoff, as if in mockery of the
Allies, put forth a proposition to maintain the old plan of keeping the
Strait closed, and--admirable benevolence!--giving the Sultan the right,
a right he already possessed, of opening the Strait, and calling up the
ships of his Allies when he was menaced. The Conference closed, leaving
the Russians exulting at the skill with which they had done what they were
sent to do--that is, to feel the pulse of Austria, to find out whether she
would actively join the war or only make a brave show of resolution before
all Europe.
Although the Conference had closed, Count Buol persisted in thinking
that he could devise terms of peace. He had pledged himself to discover
such terms, and when the British Government pressed upon Austria the
fulfilment of the treaty of December, the answer was that Count Buol was
engaged in his search after a satisfactory measure of pacification. Now
it happened that, although the Western Powers were not averse from an
honourable peace, which they did not believe Russia would grant, they
were extremely desirous to obtain the active support of Austria in the
war. Therefore Count Buol went on with his search, and by the middle of
May he had hit upon a scheme so weak and ineffective that the Allies
warned him beforehand they could not assent to it. This scheme contained
the guarantee of independence and integrity for Turkey; maintained the
principle that the Strait should be closed, but gave the contracting
Powers the right of keeping two frigates in the Black Sea; laid it down
that Turkey and Russia should agree as to what force they would maintain
there, the amount not to exceed, on either side, the force of Russian
vessels then (May, 1855) afloat in the Euxine; and stipulated that this
agreement should form an integral part of the treaty. Subsequently an
article was added whereby Austria bound herself to regard as a _casus
belli_ such additions to the Russian fleet in the Black Sea as would bring
it up to the number existing in 1853! As the Western Powers would not
agree to any such proposals, Austria declared that she had fulfilled her
part; that Russia was now no longer exclusively to blame for the failure
of negotiations; that Austria regarded herself as absolved from her pledge
in the treaty of December 2nd, and that she had nothing to do but wish
success to the Allies. So the great central German Power shuffled out of
her engagements; and it cannot be doubted that one of her reasons for so
acting was to be found in the fact that the flag of Italy was waving in
the breezes of the Crimea. There was a meeting of the Conference on the
4th of June, called solely that Austria might record her propositions, and
place herself in a position to say that she had redeemed her promises.
The only result of it was this: it enabled Prince Gortschakoff to boast
that Austria had proposed bases which she deemed sufficient, but which
her Allies deemed insufficient, and thus to publish the dissension in
the allied camp. Such were the conferences at Vienna in 1855. The Allies
had agreed to them solely at the instance of Austria, and because she
had made her active co-operation in the war depend upon the failure of
attempts to conclude peace on the terms agreed upon between the Three
Powers. The Allies were, therefore, discredited in the eyes of Europe by
their complaisance towards Austria; but although she gained her end, which
was to evade the obligations she had undertaken of her own free will, the
conferences served to show Europe more clearly than ever that Alexander
was as obstinately bent as Nicholas upon maintaining Russian preponderance
in the Black Sea.
There was something enervating in the atmosphere of Vienna; for, as the
Conference proceeded, the spirit and firmness with which M. Drouyn de
Lhuys and Lord John Russell began their task diminished visibly. Lord John
became painfully conscious that Austria would not propose or support any
efficacious plan to abrogate Russian preponderance in the Black Sea if the
support she gave led her into war. "The occupation of the Principalities
by Russia," he wrote to his Cabinet, "she felt to be dangerous to her
existence as a great Power, and she risked a war to put an end to it.
But that point accomplished, I fear we must not count upon her aid to
save Constantinople from the encroaching ambition of Russia." This is
the language of despair. Britain and France could continue the war, "but
the waste of life and money would be enormous." This was written on the
16th of April. On the 17th Lord John had become so down-hearted that he
consented to support the Austrian proposal fixing the Russian maximum at
the force possessed by Russia before the war. If this, which would have
sacrificed the whole of the exertions of the Allies, could have been made
an ultimatum by Austria, he thought the Western Powers should accept it.
The Western Powers had resolved not to sink so low. M. Drouyn de Lhuys,
who was equally despondent and submissive, went home and resigned, because
he had compromised his Government by giving even a qualified assent to
terms so disastrous. Lord John Russell went home, pleaded his cause in
the Cabinet, and being overruled, did not resign. He remained in office,
and, on the first opportunity, made a speech, not in favour of his Vienna
views, but in favour of "the vigorous prosecution of the war."
The resignation of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs did not pass
without comment. The reason soon became apparent, and it was broadly
stated that Lord John Russell himself had participated in the line of
action adopted by M. Drouyn de Lhuys at Vienna. Count Buol himself,
resenting the publication of the protocols of the Conference, issued a
circular in which he stated that the English Plenipotentiary had supported
the Austrian scheme of pacification. Then followed the publication by
the British Government of several despatches, showing clearly the course
taken by the British Plenipotentiary and the British Cabinet; and in July
Mr. Milner Gibson brought the conduct of Lord John under the notice of
the House, and demanded explanations. Lord John explained and defended
the course he had taken; but not to the satisfaction of any one. The
public feeling was strong; and the Opposition, taking advantage of the
incident, Sir Edward Lytton gave notice of a motion censuring the whole of
the Government. In the meantime there was commotion in the Ministerial
ranks. The Minister then offered to resign, and in answer Lord Palmerston
frankly said that it was for Lord John to judge; but if he determined not
to resign, then the Cabinet would stand by him. But Lord John was informed
that a large number of the Liberals could not resist the motion, and, to
save himself from censure, and the Government from defeat, he resigned.
Thus the Opposition was foiled. The resignation did not prevent a debate,
although it prevented a division; and Lord John, having six months before
broken up one Ministry by a rapid retreat, now saved another by a similar
manœuvre. This may be called the climax of the ill-fated Vienna Conference
of 1855.
[Illustration: THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.]
During the course of the Session the Opposition had done what it
considered to be its duty as a body of critics on the proceedings of
the Government. It was well known to Mr. Disraeli that, independently
of the purely party votes he could command, a number of gentlemen of
various opinions, if they did not vote with him, would at least help him
to damage the Cabinet. When, therefore, in the middle of May, Mr. Milner
Gibson gave notice of a motion in favour of peace, Mr. Disraeli promptly
took it out of his hands with his full consent, and framed a resolution
which, while it censured the Government for its ambiguous language and
uncertain conduct in reference to the great question of peace or war, yet
promised to give her Majesty every support in the prosecution of the war
until a safe and honourable peace had been obtained. Mr. Disraeli's motion
was rejected by 319 to 219; and when Lord Grey made a similar motion
in the House of Peers, Lord Derby would not even divide the House upon
it, so plainly was the general conviction against it. Nevertheless the
debates in the House of Commons--debates raised upon amendments to Mr.
Disraeli's motion--went on for several days, revealing the true character
of the different sections, and showing the inadequate views which many
had formed of the objects at stake. Mr. Bright and Mr Cobden thought
Russia had a claim to preponderance in the Black Sea. Mr. Sidney Herbert,
Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham, and their friends declared that the
negotiations had been broken off on a question of "terms," mere phrases,
a few ships more or less; that enough had been done to show that Russia
could not be dominant in Europe; and that the propositions of Count Buol
were adequate bases of a safe and honourable peace.
[Illustration: SAPPERS DESTROYING THE RUSSIAN TRENCHES. (_See p._ 99.)]
But while we lament the defective judgment and blindness of the Peelites,
and the utter incapacity to understand the dynamics of the question
displayed by the peace-at-any-price party, we are bound to admire and
applaud the courage of both. They did their duty bravely--for it is the
duty of the chief men of a nation to speak out; and no nation is well
served in which the chief men, yielding to menace or succumbing to apathy,
withhold their opinions in moments of great trial. The debates on the
policy of the war, on the conduct of the war and of the negotiations,
ended by rallying a larger support than ever to the Government; for even
the leading Tories admitted that the war was so just that the Government
ought not to have avoided it if they could, and so necessary that they
could not have avoided it if they would, while no less a person than Lord
Derby, allowing his judgment to get the better of his party feeling,
insisted that it would be humiliation for Britain and France to retire
from the contest baffled before Sebastopol.
Nevertheless, when the Government proposed to become a joint guarantee
with France for a loan of £5,000,000 to be contracted by Turkey, Mr.
Disraeli, who had earlier in the Session cavilled at a loan of £2,000,000
to Sardinia, now, seeing a prospect of obtaining a majority by a surprise,
divided the House against the project and was only defeated by a majority
of three. Yet the propriety of both measures was manifest. We wanted
the aid of 15,000 Sardinian troops, and it was not too much for so small
a State to ask us to lend her the means of placing them fairly on the
theatre of war. In the same way the war had disordered more deeply the
deeply involved finances of Turkey. By giving a guarantee, in conjunction
with France, that the interest should be paid to the lenders, we enabled
the Sultan to raise the money at smaller cost to the Turkish Treasury, and
by so doing we were, of course, aiding her as effectually, in kind but not
in degree, as we were by our fleets and armies. But a Turkish loan was a
good subject for a hostile division. Mr. Disraeli saw his chance, seized
it, and nearly surprised the Ministry. He would have been content to
imperil the alliance and the war at the price of a Parliamentary victory.
Mr. Disraeli pursued a similar course, but with a divided party and no
chance of success, upon another occasion. Mr. Roebuck, the head and front
of the incomplete and abortive Sebastopol inquiry, moved on the 17th of
July a vote of censure on all the members of the Aberdeen Cabinet, whose
counsels led to what he was pleased to term the disastrous results of the
winter campaign in the Crimea. General Peel, as one of the committee,
moved the "previous question," on the ground that the inquiry was
incomplete, and that the greater part of the sufferings of the army arose
in the very nature of the duty which it fell upon them to perform. Mr.
Disraeli and the bulk of his supporters made the motion a party question.
But the course of the debate was decidedly against them, and they and Mr.
Roebuck failed utterly in procuring from the House, either a retrospective
censure on a dead Administration, or an endorsement of the Sebastopol Blue
Books. The House decided, by 289 to 182, that the question should not even
be put from the chair. Thus ended an attempt, first to discover evidence
which would bear out the fierce accusations advanced during the winter,
and then to base upon the imperfect and conflicting evidence discovered a
censure not deserved.
The Government had, since January, 1855, effected considerable changes
in the machinery for carrying on the war, chiefly, however, in the
concentration of power in the War Department. They had raised the total
force of the army to 193,595 men, including 14,950 who formed the Foreign
Legion; and they had increased the number of sailors to 70,000. They had
embodied fifty militia regiments, some of whom were in the Mediterranean
garrisons; and from the whole militia force they had drawn 18,000 recruits
for the army. Having found that the expenses of the war were outrunning
the estimates of the spring, they increased those estimates, making the
total for the whole service of the army, navy, transport, commissariat,
and ambulance purposes, £49,537,692, bringing up the total estimated
expenditure for the year to more than £88,000,000; to cover which they
provided £96,339,000, leaving a large margin for contingencies. Among the
ways and means were a loan of £1,600,000, and power to issue £10,000,000
Exchequer bills or bonds. The active navy consisted almost wholly of
steamers, and among the supplementary votes of August was one to provide
for the cost of a host of steam gunboats to be used, if required, in 1856.
General Pélissier, the new Commander-in-Chief of the French army, was a
hardy soldier, who had taken part in many campaigns, and had gained in
Algeria a name not only for military ability in the field, but for skill
in the cabinet as an administrator. A cloud hung over his reputation
for a time, because he had caused a number of obstinate Arabs, who
would not surrender, to be suffocated in the caves of Dahra. But when
he went to the Crimea, men only faintly remembered this dreadful act,
while all recognised the stern energy, sound military judgment, and
stout moral courage of the new chief. Henceforth they felt there would
be no faltering, no hesitation, no undue deference for opinions formed
in Paris, no terror of responsibility. Pélissier brought to his task a
will quite as firm as that of the Emperor Napoleon, and a reputation for
soldiership higher than that of his Imperial Majesty. He was told to
abide as nearly as possible by his instructions; and if he modified them,
he was to do so in concert with Lord Raglan. We have already pointed
out that these two officers did not differ on the question before them.
General Pélissier differed from the Emperor, not from Lord Raglan. He
recognised the soundness of the measures recommended over and over again
by Sir John Burgoyne; and he resolved to take Sebastopol by capturing the
key of the place--the Malakoff. It was more arduous now than it was two
months before, because the Russians had been allowed to develop their
hardy system of counter-approaches on the Malakoff ridge, and above the
Careening Bay, consisting of the Mamelon Redoubt on the former, and what
were called the White Works on the latter. These it was essential to
capture and hold before the final blow could be levelled at the Malakoff.
It was on the 19th of May that he took command. On the 22nd, three days
afterwards, the expedition to Kertch sailed, and on that very night
Pélissier began a bloody contest for the possession of the ground about
the cemetery to the west of Quarantine Bay. The Russians had seen the
advantage which works of more pretension than rifle-pits would give them
on this quarter. They, therefore, began to connect the pits with the
place by sinking a covered way across the ravine, and by connecting the
pits with each other by a gabionade, that is, a parapet made of large
baskets filled and then covered with earth. The incipient stages of this
design were observed by the French on the 21st of May. General Todleben's
object went further than the mere establishment of a series of strong
rifle screens. He had in view the construction of a regular battery on the
Russian left of the line, which would have poured a raking flanking fire
through the principal works of the besiegers. To prevent this, Pélissier
ordered General de Salles, now commander of the Siege Corps, to storm and
hold the new Russian line.
This line was of very great extent, stretching from flank to flank for
nearly three-quarters of a mile along the broken ground. The whole of
it was under the fire of the place, and the conformation of the ground
between the Cemetery and Sebastopol, a ravine widening towards its mouth,
gave the enemy great facilities for bringing up troops to feed the combat.
The French general placed upwards of 4,000 men, including two battalions
of the Light Infantry of the Guard, under the orders of General Paté. At
nine o'clock the signal was given, and, dashing out of the trenches, the
two columns fell upon the enemy so impetuously that he was driven out at
the first shock. But it so chanced that at this very moment the troops,
the battalions destined to furnish and cover the working parties of the
enemy, had paraded in front of the place, under the orders of General
Chruleff. Therefore the French had no sooner driven off the Russians who
held the lines, than these fresh troops, moving rapidly across the ravine,
first smote them with a crushing fire, and then coming on with lowered
bayonets, engaged in a combat so close, and fierce, and vehement, that
the French were overthrown on their right, and forced back into their
trenches; while on their left General Brunet sustained with difficulty
the forward position he had won. General la Motterouge, who commanded
the French right column, was not the man to yield so easily. Re-forming
his men, and bringing up his reserves, he flung them once more into the
fight. The combat now raged along the whole line. As the French poured in
fresh troops, the enemy, resolved to win, brought up eight battalions, our
old foes at the Alma, the regiments of Minsk and Uglitz. And thus through
the night the battle continued, sometimes dying away into a faint flicker
of fire, and then bursting out again with sudden and appalling fury. When
the French gained an advantage and pushed the enemy, their sappers in the
rear of the confused roar of struggling men began to destroy the Russian
lines; and then in the midst of their work, the battle would roll back
upon them and sweep over the disputed ground. Just before daybreak the
masses on both sides retired under shelter from the cannon of the opposing
batteries; but General Brunet kept the line he had won, and turned the
face of the rifle-pits and gabions towards the enemy.
Throughout the next day there was a brisk cannonade kept up on both sides,
each intent on preventing the other from occupying in force the contested
ground. At night the combat was renewed. General Couston, with four
battalions, reinforced General Brunet's position, in order to defend it
against any attack, and to complete the works of approach begun on that
side. General Duval, with six battalions, issuing from the French trenches
and assailing the Russian left, drove out the enemy's troops posted there,
and held the ground in front, while the working parties, in the midst of
a heavy fire from the main batteries of Sebastopol, rapidly transformed
the Russian trench into a parallel of attack, giving ample shelter to the
besiegers. Thus, in two nights, the French won this important ground, and
connecting all their works together, showed a united front, and left but a
comparatively narrow space, formed by the ravine across which they could
not work their way, between them and the town. This line on the ridge a
little east of the Cemetery was the limit of their regular approaches in
that quarter.
Another result of the change of commanders was the occupation of the line
of the Tchernaya by a combined force of French, Sardinians, and Turks.
This was effected on the 25th. General Canrobert led his own division and
that of General Brunet across the valley, and took post on the Fedoukine
heights. General la Marmora and his Sardinians took up a position on
the Hasfort Hill, above Tchorgoun. Sir Colin Campbell moved the Marines
out of their lines near the sea to the ridge looking down on Kamara on
one side, and the Baidar valley on the other. Omar Pasha, with 16,000
Turks, occupied the whole line of low hills on which stood the redoubts
on October 25th. The whole force was about 43,000 strong. There were but
few Russian troops on the river, and these gave way and retired up the
opposite hills as soon as they felt the advance guard of the Allies. Thus
the line of the Allies now extended from the sea on the right, through
Kamara and Tchorgoun to the Fedoukine heights, just out of range of the
Russian batteries, east of the Inkermann ruins. There were many who
thought this a beginning of operations in the field. They were doomed to
be disappointed. The Allies had now very large forces in the Crimea, but
while Lord Raglan could not assent to the Emperor's plan of a regular
campaign, the Emperor could not concur in Lord Raglan's suggestions; and
thus, as a compromise, the Allies continued the siege, and undertook no
other operation except one which we are now about to narrate--the naval
and military expedition to the inhospitable and foggy regions of Kertch
and the Sea of Azoff.
The Russian forces in the Crimea were dependent chiefly for their supplies
upon the mainland itself, for the Crimea is a peninsula, projecting from
the steppes of Southern Russia, and joined on to it only by the narrow
neck of land at Perekop. The road through Perekop was the chief line of
communication, leading as it did to Nicolaieff and Odessa. But there were
other roads by which the enemy received supplies. At the eastern part
of the Crimea was a small peninsula, called the Peninsula of Kertch,
from the town of that name. In order to deprive the enemy of at least
one road, and to ruin all his depôts within reach, and deprive him of
the waterway over the Sea of Azoff to Yenikale and Arabat, and force him
upon a more circuitous route, it was determined to seize Kertch, push
through the Strait into the Sea of Azoff, and destroy the ships on its
waters and the magazines in its ports. In order to accomplish this, it
was deemed expedient that a military force should occupy the towns of
Kertch and Yenikale, which are within the Strait, and thus, by taking
the land defences in reverse, open a road into the Sea of Azoff for the
light steamers. The Strait is narrow, especially where the waters of the
Sea of Azoff pour into it. In 1854 the Russians had sunk many ships in
the channel below Kertch, but in the winter, the waters of the Sea of
Azoff, fed by the swollen streams of Southern Russia, rushing through the
confined space in full volume, and at the rate of between three and four
miles an hour, swept away the wreck; so that what was not possible in
1854 became possible in 1855.
What the Allies required was to get command of the Strait; and to put
all resistance out of the question, it was determined, on the very day
after General Pélissier assumed command, that the force sent should
be overwhelming. Sir George Brown was again to take command of the
expedition. The French supplied 6,800 men, including fifty Chasseurs
d'Afrique and three batteries, under D'Autemarre; the Turks furnished
5,000 men and one battery; and the British 3,800 men, namely--the 42nd,
71st, 79th, and 93rd Highlanders, a battalion of Marines, fifty men of
the 8th Hussars, and a battery. The force thus amounted to 15,600 men
and thirty guns. The naval force consisted of twenty-four French ships,
including three sail of the line, under Admiral Bruat; and thirty-four
British vessels, including six sail of the line, under Admiral Lyons.
The gunboats and light steamers were organised into a flying squadron,
consisting of fourteen British and five French steamers, the whole
under Captain Lyons, son of the admiral, and, like his sire, a bold and
resourceful sailor.
Starting from Kamiesch and Balaclava on the 22nd, though obstructed by a
dense fog, the ships were, on the morning of the 25th, off Cape Takli, the
south foreland of the Strait; and soon after daylight the ships having
troops on board rounded the cape and running as near the shore as the
water would allow, proceeded to disembark the men. No enemy appeared,
and the troops speedily got ashore; the French taking the right, and the
British the left or exposed flank, while the Turks were held in reserve.
But the enemy, though not in sight, was audible enough on land; for the
troops had no sooner stepped ashore than the air was rent with the noise
of repeated explosions, and tall pillars of white smoke rose up on the
right of the allied forces. All along the coast, from Fort Paul towards
Yenikale, the Russians were blowing up their magazines. On the sea a
British gunboat, followed by another, was seen chasing the Russian ships
and engaging the batteries, not yet abandoned, on both sides of the
Strait. At the same time other vessels came up and silenced the battery
on the spit opposite Yenikale; and the Russians, feeling resistance to be
hopeless, blew up one magazine after another on both sides of the Strait;
so that by the morning of the 25th there was not a gun or a man to resist
the Allies. General Wrangel, who, with 6,000 men, had charge of the
peninsula, retired to Argin, midway between Kertch and Kaffa, and in no
way molested his opponents.
[Illustration: VOLUNTEERS OF THE FLYING SQUADRON FIRING THE SHIPPING AT
TAGANROG. (_See p._ 102.)]
Therefore, on the 25th, the steamers of light draught went up to Yenikale;
and the troops, quitting their bivouacs, set out to march on the same
place. They proceeded in three columns, the French on the right next the
sea, the British on the left, covering their flank, and the Turks in the
rear. When they came to Kertch, the whole broke into one column and filed
through the town, and by mid-day the troops reached Yenikale. The fleet
had come up, and the generals and admirals held a consultation in the
afternoon. The sailors having buoyed the channel into the Sea of Azoff,
Captain Lyons led his flying squadron at once into those waters. Already,
in two days, the Allies had captured upwards of a hundred heavy guns, many
new; had destroyed immense stores of corn and flour; had seized a mass of
naval stores, and had forced the enemy to burn or wreck thirty or forty
ships. By day clouds of smoke rose upward on all sides, and at night the
sky was lurid with flames. The strength of the Allies, and the swiftness
with which it was applied, soon completed the work and dismayed the enemy.
It is with pain that we record the shameful fact that the allied soldiers
and sailors disgraced themselves by plundering the houses and public
buildings of Kertch and Yenikale. The predatory instincts of our troops
were repressed severely, but Sir George Brown had no real control over
our allies, and the French generals and Turkish pashas did nothing to
restrain their men. The plunder of Kertch and Yenikale is a blot upon this
brilliant expedition.
The flying squadron under Captain Lyons really deserved its name.
Speed was essential to success, for delay would have given the mass of
shipping employed in feeding the Russian army time to run up the Don,
or enter the Strait of Genitchi and push into the Putrid Sea. Captain
Lyons was as swift as a spirit of fire. It was his business to destroy
every sail afloat, to visit and burn all the public magazines of the
Russian Government within the reach of his guns and boats, and to bombard
every fortified place on the shore. He fulfilled his task. Within
four-and-twenty hours he was off Berdiansk, the best port in the sea.
Here he landed his small-arm men, and burnt stores worth £50,000, and
many merchant ships. Then detaching ships to watch Genitchi and the mouth
of the Don, he steamed with the rest of the squadron to Arabat. Here
the Russians had a fort, mounting thirty guns, and Lyons and the French
shelled the place and blew up the magazine. In three days he had destroyed
a hundred transports laden with provisions for the enemy. Without delay
he made for Genitchi. Lyons bombarded the place in order to cover the
passage of his boats through the Strait into the Putrid Sea. The boats'
crews worked through, fired the shipping and corn depôts, and returned;
but the wind shifting, it became necessary to go in again and complete the
work. This was done by three volunteers: Lieutenant Buckley, Lieutenant
Burgoyne, and Mr. John Roberts. These men had the hardihood to land alone,
and, in the face of the Cossacks, performed the duty they undertook; and
then the boats, under a fire of field-pieces, set fire to the shipping
which had escaped before. At the end of the 29th of May the squadron had
destroyed, in the Sea of Azoff, four war steamers, 246 merchant ships, and
corn and flour worth £150,000. On the 2nd of June the indefatigable Lyons
was off Taganrog. The governor would not accept terms of surrender, which
would have saved private property; and under cover of the gunboats, in the
face of 3,000 troops, Lieutenant Buckley and a band of volunteers landed
repeatedly and performed the desperate service of firing the stores and
Government buildings. Marioupol shared the fate of Taganrog. Thus Captain
Lyons made a tour of the Sea of Azoff. Not one place escaped him or his
able lieutenants, Sherard Osborn, Cowper Coles, Horton, Hewett, M'Killop,
and his French coadjutors. The Russians lost not only the command of this
sea, but masses of corn, forage, fish, and marine stores, and ships which
it is impossible to estimate. Hewett and Lambert effectually destroyed all
the means of connecting the spit of Arabat with the Crimea; and, after
Captain Lyons had left, to meet an untimely death before Sebastopol,
Sherard Osborn kept the sea, and left the enemy not a moment's rest.
But ere this the French and British troops, leaving the Turks to hold a
fortified camp at Yenikale, had returned to the camp at Sebastopol.
The losses inflicted by the flying squadron were not the only losses
sustained by the enemy. When he quitted Kertch on the 24th of May, he
destroyed himself 4,166,000 pounds of corn, and 508,000 pounds of flour;
and it was estimated that this, with the quantity destroyed in the Sea
of Azoff, would have furnished four months' rations for 100,000 men.
The amount of supplies drawn from Kertch is shown by the fact that just
before the Allies landed, the Russians had been sending off daily convoys
of 1,500 waggons, each containing half a ton weight of grain or flour.
Besides this, the fortress of Anapa, on the appearance of an allied fleet,
was blown up by the garrison, and 245 guns rendered useless thereby. The
garrison retired across the Kuban River, abandoning the last post held by
them in that part of Circassia. Thus the expedition to Kertch and the Sea
of Azoff surpassed in its effects the most sanguine expectations of its
designers, and struck a severe blow at the vitals of the Russian army.
Once more the tide of war carries us back to the trenches before
Sebastopol. General Pélissier had, on taking command, accepted Lord
Raglan's proposals for carrying on the siege by vigorous and direct
attacks. The two officers being of one mind, and recognising the Malakoff
as the true key of the place, determined, in council by themselves, that
the Russians should be immediately deprived of their counter-approaches,
and forced back into the body of their works. They agreed that on one and
the same day, by simultaneous assault, the Quarries under the Redan, the
Mamelon in front of the Malakoff, and the White Works above the Careening
Bay, should be wrested from the enemy. This comprehensive operation was
a necessity, for these three works supported each other. The Mamelon
flanked, and was flanked by, the other two, and hence all three had to
be taken together. Having determined to take them, they requested their
generals to submit plans for the execution of their resolve. Accordingly,
a council of war was held for this purpose. There were still in the
French camp officers who were strongly in favour of operations in the
field, and as strongly opposed to an assault, even of the outworks. The
chief of these were Niel, Bosquet, and Martimprey, all able men. But at
the council, when Pélissier announced the decision of the generals, and
named the day for the assault, and General Bosquet ventured to dissent,
the Commander-in-Chief stopped him with the peremptory statement that the
attack was "decided." The French generals had no choice but to obey.
The main points being settled, the work of preparation finished, the
magazines well filled, the troops all eager, orders went forth that
the bombardment should begin on the morning of the 6th of June, and
should continue four-and-twenty hours, and that then the works should be
carried by storm. By dint of great exertions, and drawing from our large
resources, we were able to put in battery 157 pieces of ordnance. All the
lighter pieces, the siege guns of an older period, the famous 24-pounders
of the early years of the century, were withdrawn. The 32-pounder was the
lightest gun in the trenches. So heavy an armament had never before been
arrayed at any siege. There were in battery no fewer than twenty-seven
13-inch, seventeen 10-inch mortars, and forty-nine 32-pounders. The
remainder were 68-pounders, and 10-inch and 8-inch guns. The French
batteries, were armed with 300 pieces, but the bulk of these were opposed
to the western face of the town, and, for some unexplained reason, did
not maintain a fire equal in intensity to those on the east front.
According to the plan laid down, our left attack, while pouring a torrent
of missiles into the Redan, was also to keep up a combat with the Barrack
and Garden Batteries, in which they were to be supported by the French on
their left. Our right attack was to devote nearly the whole of its might
upon the Mamelon and Malakoff, in aid of the direct fire of the French,
and these latter were to pound at the White Works, as well as the Malakoff
and Mamelon. Thus it will be seen that the fire of at least a hundred and
fifty guns and mortars was to be concentrated on these works.
The 6th of June was a clear, sunny day, and the mighty lines of the enemy
stood out in bold relief against the western sky. About half-past two
in the afternoon, at a given signal, the allied batteries opened all at
once, with a roar that rent the air and shook the earth. In two hours
the effects of the ceaseless shower of shot and shell upon the Malakoff
and Mamelon were visible to practised eyes; and the comparatively rare
responses made by the enemy showed that his guns had suffered as well
as his earthen parapets. From that time until nightfall, the complete
superiority of the allied fire was secured; but as the French on the
left fired feebly, the Barrack and Garden Batteries, and some of the
guns in the Redan, stoutly maintained the combat with our left attack.
When darkness set in, the firing did not cease; for the huge shells from
our big mortars rushed upward all night, and fell crashing and exploding
within the enemy's works. At daybreak on the 7th the smoke and the mists
of the morning hung over the hills and ravines. The growing light showed
that, although the enemy had worked hard in repairing damages, yet the
outlines of the great entrenchments were less shapely and trim than
heretofore. Once more the batteries on both sides put forth their might,
and the deafening roar was renewed. The enemy showed some vigour at first,
but the Malakoff and Mamelon were soon forced to succumb. It was plain,
however, to all eyes and ears that, on the vital points, the enemy was the
weaker, and that the attack had got the mastery over the defence. Late
in the afternoon, and for an hour or two preceding the assault, the fire
of our guns became quicker than ever. The men in the batteries put forth
their whole energies, and for an hour before the assault the cannonade was
fiercer and more deadly than at any preceding period.
The British had told off about 3,200 men of the Light and 2nd Divisions
to carry the Quarries. Two small columns, each 200 strong, were to turn
the flanks of the work, and then advancing towards the Redan, lie down,
and cover by their fire a working party, 800 strong, whose duty it was to
turn the face of the work towards the Redan. About 1,000 men were held in
support in the trenches, and two battalions were posted in the Woronzoff
Road to cover the flank of both our attacks. The French, having a more
serious operation, and being more accustomed to act in masses, detailed
about 28,000 men for the two assaults. General Mayran had the direction
of the operations against the White Works--redoubts on the Careening
Ridge, one more advanced than the other, and standing between the Great
Harbour and the Careening Ravine. Two of his brigades--the right under De
Lavarande, the left under De Failly--were to storm the redoubts, while
General Dulac held an entire division in reserve to support both; and
besides these, there were two battalions in the Careening Ravine, intended
to push down it, and cut off the retreat of the enemy. General Camou was
entrusted with the attack on the Mamelon. One brigade, under Wimpfen, was
to carry that work; while another brigade and an entire division were
drawn up in the middle ravine between the French left and our right.
Behind them were two battalions of the Imperial Guard, and in rear of all,
near the Inkermann battle-field, was a complete division of Turks. The
whole operation was under the control of Bosquet, who proved himself quite
equal to the occasion. The fire of the allied batteries was at its height
when three rockets fired from the Victoria Redoubt, at 6.45 p.m., let
loose the excited soldiers, who dashed at once upon the enemy.
The brigades on the extreme right went up to the White Works at a run,
Lavarande's men first storming the redoubt on the right at the point of
the bayonet, and De Failly rushing past this work, and being equally
successful in carrying its counterpart; while the battalions in the ravine
marched down it, and swept up a number of the flying garrison. Led away
by a furious impulse, the troops even entered a third work, just above
the Careening Bay, but this they could not hold. The other two redoubts,
however, were firmly grasped and held in spite of the fire of the
batteries on the north.
At the same time Wimpfen's brigade issued from the trenches in three
columns, and went impetuously up the slope of the Mamelon, led by Colonel
Brancion, of the 50th Regiment of the line. On his left were the 3rd
Zouaves, on his right Algerian Native Light Infantry. Soon they were at
the ditch, firing into the embrasures, and receiving from the parapets a
telling fire. Then the 50th dashed into the ditch, and began to scramble
up the slope of the work, and Zouave and Algerine closed bodily with it.
In a few moments the redoubt was full of Frenchmen. They had won the
victory with such comparative ease that their passions got the better of
their judgment. Disobeying all orders, the Zouaves and Algerines pursued
the Russians towards the Malakoff, into which our batteries were now
pouring a terrible fire. It was an unhappy move; for the enemy immediately
lined his parapets and brought his guns to bear, and the Zouaves, although
they stood well and fought well, and although they were aided by shells
pitched into the Malakoff from our batteries, yet they only stood to be
slain. In the meantime, alarmed by some appearances indicating a mine, the
troops holding the Mamelon all ran out, and the Zouaves and Algerines,
returning from their mad rush on the Malakoff, pursued by a heavy and
angry column of Russians, found the Mamelon empty. Shattered as they
were, they could not hold it, and thus the enemy burst in triumph into
his stronghold once more. It was an anxious moment, but General Bosquet
was prompt in supplying a remedy. Throwing forward a fresh brigade, and
giving it ample support, these new troops, rallying hundreds who had fled
in terror at the idea of a mine, went steadily up to the work. There was a
brief combat, and rattling volleys; but, overpowered, the enemy sullenly
yielded possession and retired back into the town, this time unpursued.
Thus the French stormed, and lost, and regained the famous Mamelon.
Soon after the first advance on the Mamelon, Colonel Shirley, obeying a
signal from Lord Raglan, launched his little band against the Quarries.
The men of the Light and 2nd Divisions carried the work and its outlying
trenches without firing a shot, and then advancing, began to ply their
rifles against the gunners of the Redan. Anticipating an assault, the
enemy had filled this work with troops, and a horrible carnage was the
consequence. Either to escape this fire or to succour the Malakoff, for
a time the garrison of the Redan ran out of that work, and some British
soldiers actually went up and peered into it, and saw it was empty. But
when night came, the Russians returned to the Redan, and six times during
the night they strove to expel the little band of Britishers who occupied
the Quarries, and at one time, by turning the left flank, they succeeded
for a brief space; then, with a rolling cheer, our soldiers went at them
with the bayonet, and regained and held the lines, which were at once
turned into a new parallel, and the site of a new and most formidable
battery.
After the success of the 7th of June the question immediately
arose--should that success be pushed, and should the whole place be at
once assailed on all sides? To answer this question there was a council
of war. It should always be remembered that the British played a very
subordinate part in the siege of Sebastopol. They had reaped their glory
at the Alma and at Inkermann. They had soon lost that equality in point
of numbers with which they began the war, and the views of Lord Raglan
could now only prevail by dint of their comparative sagacity. He had, of
course, a certain authority as the representative of Britain; but it was
one of the penalties we paid for making war side by side with France,
that he should often have to succumb, and that in place of one plan or
another a medium course should be struck out and acted on. Whatever we
did in the siege was purely secondary after Inkermann. Our batteries,
indeed, were very formidable, and paved the way for the French successes
against the Mamelon and finally against the Malakoff; but our troops were
so placed by the stress of circumstances, that it was impossible for them
to perform any striking action. It would appear that Lord Raglan's plan of
taking Sebastopol would have been to follow up a heavy fire by, if need
be, repeated assaults at all points--some by way of diversion, to keep a
large force of the enemy occupied, others driven home with the view of
carrying the place. So that it is not surprising he should have wished to
continue the bombardment on the 8th, and then assault at the moment when
the enemy's batteries were at the lowest ebb of their power. But to this
the French would not agree. They wanted more time to build more batteries,
to push approaches nearer; and as they furnished the large assaulting
columns on the vital point, Lord Raglan had no choice but to acquiesce.
He knew that he could not take the place. He knew, and all knew, that if
the Redan were captured, it could not be held so long as the Malakoff was
in the hands of the Russians. Therefore he was obviously bound to assent
when General Pélissier proposed to defer the assault until the Mamelon and
White Works were armed, and a battery established in the Quarries.
[Illustration: MARSHAL PÉLISSIER.]
The French and British at once began to strengthen and arm their
acquisitions, and to sap onward towards the enemy's lines. But this caused
great losses day by day. Mortars from behind the Malakoff threw shells
into the Mamelon, mortars from the Redan threw shells into the Quarries;
guns and mortars from the north side threw their missiles into the White
Works. On the left the French did little more to aid the siege. There was
mining and counter-mining in plenty in front of the Flagstaff, and some
new batteries were constructed and armed on the extreme left; but they did
not now push the attack as they had done before. They had come at last to
recognise the Malakoff as the true point of attack, and against this they
turned all their energies. They worked out above a hundred and fifty yards
from the Mamelon, formed a large sheltered place in which to assemble
troops, and covered the front with a curving line of parapet. The British
built up and armed a six-gun battery in the Quarries, which looked into
the enemy's communications behind the Malakoff, and was destined to play
an important part; and they also increased the armament in the two attacks
until the 13-inch mortars alone amounted to thirty.
The Russians were not a whit less active. Their energies also were bent
upon making more complete the formidable defences of the Malakoff. They
were especially careful to close the gaps on its proper left towards the
Careening Bay, to open new batteries sweeping the ground at the head of
that bay, and to construct interior retrenchments and flanking batteries.
Their line of works, beginning from the South Harbour and extending to the
Great Harbour, was broken only at one point. About a quarter of a mile
to the proper left of the Redan, the Karabelnaia, or Middle Ravine--that
which ran between the British right attack and the French Malakoff
attack--broke the line of the Russian works. On the opposite bank of the
ravine, the outer defences of the Malakoff Redoubt began with a work
called the Gervais Battery, connected by a curtain with the Malakoff. But
in rear of this, as well as in rear of the Little Redan on the proper left
of the Malakoff, and in rear of the connecting curtains, the enemy had
thrown up retrenchments. In short, General Todleben developed his plan of
defence to meet the plan of attack, and as he had plenty of men, and a
boundless supply of guns and material, he could execute all his admirable
designs. He was a worthy foe.
As usual, the plan of attack was debated at headquarters when it had
been decided by superior generals that the guns should open on the 17th,
and that the assault should take place the next day. How should this be
carried out? It was arranged that the French on the west face of the
town should attack its salient defences, the Flagstaff, Central, and
Quarantine Bastions, in three columns, under General de Salles; and it
was anticipated that if these attacks did not succeed, they would keep
many thousands of the enemy employed, and might, if occasion offered,
be converted into real attacks, pushed home. The British were to send a
brigade down the South Ravine, to seize the cemetery lying at the bottom
of its basin, and, in conjunction with a French force, threaten the enemy
in that quarter. The main British assaults were to be made on the Redan.
If the Redan was carried, then the column in the South Ravine was to climb
up to the Barrack Battery, and join the Redan column in the rear. The
French were to attack in three columns on the extreme right. One was to
follow the Careening Ravine, and storm the Little Redan; a second was to
rush upon the proper left of the Malakoff; while a third, issuing from
the Middle Ravine, carried the Gervais Battery, and worked round thence
to the rear of the Malakoff. The fleet was to send in steamers on the
nights preceding the assault, to keep the enemy on the alert in his sea
batteries. Immense reserves were to be provided along the whole line. Such
was the original plan. It was settled on the 16th, but in the afternoon
General Pélissier desired to make an important modification. General de
Salles urged that, as the attacks on the left could not succeed, they had
better not take place; and General Pélissier, much to the discontent of
Lord Raglan, notified that this change had been made. Lord Raglan did not
press his objections, and thus the French were merely to "demonstrate" on
the left front. No other change was made, except that Lord Raglan decided
to send a third column against the Redan, having for its object the
salient angle of that work. Finally it was decided that the British should
not attack until the French were in possession of the Malakoff. The reason
for this was that the guns on the right face of the Malakoff commanded the
Redan and the road to the Redan. The whole of the 1st British Division was
brought up from Balaclava. The Imperial Guard was marched up to the open
ground at the head of the Malakoff Ridge; and 10,000 Turks were posted on
the field of Inkermann. There were in the British batteries 166 pieces of
ordnance, and nearly 300 in the French.
The bombardment opened at daylight on the 17th with great effect. The
Malakoff and the Redan were the objects of our gunners, and the torrent of
shot and shell poured into these works had, by nine o'clock, reduced the
fire of the Malakoff to an occasional gun. Throughout the day it was the
same. The Redan, although it soon ceased to fire with any vigour, flung
shells from small mortars with low charges into the Quarries. The Barrack
and Garden Batteries were, as usual, conspicuous for their vivacity. But
the fire of the Allies completely overpowered that of the eastern front.
Its severity may be estimated by the fact that the ammunition consumed in
the British batteries alone on the 17th and 18th was 22,684 projectiles,
including 2,286 13-inch shells. It must have been nearly impossible for
the Russians to work their guns, and quite impossible to work them without
awful loss. When the sun went down on the 17th the mortars continued to
hurl forth their monstrous missiles; and three or four of the steamers
standing in opened a fire of shot, shell, and rockets on the town. It was
on one of these occasions that Captain Lyons, fresh from his triumphs in
the Sea of Azoff, was struck in the leg by a fragment of shell. The wound
proved mortal, and death deprived the British navy of one of its most
promising officers.
From the comparative silence of the Russian batteries, Lord Raglan and
General Pélissier inferred that the enemy was at the end of his resources.
They hoped that at length he had exhausted his stores of artillery. It was
a vain delusion. In spite of the bombardment, which went on all night,
the enemy managed to replace the pieces in his batteries, and at dawn, as
will be seen, he was ready to begin anew. This advantage, indeed, might
have been counteracted had the Allies remained faithful to their original
plan. There was, in the French camp, a sort of passion for an assault at
the very first flush of the dawn. Their officers, Pélissier excepted,
had urged that the attack on the Mamelon should be given at daybreak.
They were overruled. Now they came to the charge afresh. The whole scheme
of the assault rested on the basis that the fire of the enemy had been
crushed. To make sure, however, it was originally planned that the assault
should be preceded by a three hours' violent cannonade. This would have
searched every part of the enemy's works, and prevented him from massing
his troops in them in large numbers. On this basis all the orders were
given.
Literally at the eleventh hour, the French changed the whole plan. On the
evening of the 17th, when all orders had been issued, General Pélissier
informed Lord Raglan that his officers declared they could not place their
infantry in the trenches without their being seen by the enemy, and that
consequently he desired the time of the assault to be altered and fixed
for daybreak. Lord Raglan was justly much annoyed, but he yielded. It was
a fatal concession. But how could he oppose a colleague who commanded a
force nearly double that under Lord Raglan's orders? Therefore, a few
hours before the assault was to take place, the old orders were revoked,
and fresh orders were issued. This occupied the British commander nearly
all night, and left him but one hour for repose.
Throughout the night the troops appointed to storm and support the
stormers and the reserves were moving to their appointed places. Down into
the British trenches went the men of the Light 2nd and 4th Divisions,
under Sir John Campbell, Colonel Lacy Yea, and Colonel Shadforth; while
Eyre's Brigade of the 3rd Division moved deep into the South Ravine, and
Barnard's Brigade of the same division was placed higher up in support.
The right column was to attack the left face of the Redan, the left
column the right face. If these succeeded, then the centre column was
to charge in at the salient. Eyre was to move towards the works at the
end of the South Ravine. The French, in addition to the ordinary guards,
marched three entire divisions, about 16,000 men, into their trenches, and
placed in reserve a part of the division of the Imperial Guard, bringing
the force up to about 24,000 men. The right division, under the orders
of General Mayran, marched into the Careening Ravine; the centre, under
General Brunet, had one brigade in front of the right of the Mamelon, the
other in the trenches behind; the left, under General d'Autemarre, placed
one brigade on the left front of the Mamelon, the other in the trenches
in the rear. The trenches and the ravines were choked up with troops, all
silent and crouching in the dark. Some were sitting under the parapets,
others lying flat in the ravines. But there was also a good deal of
movement, for the troops had to be placed so that they could most easily
and with slightest disorder move swiftly out of the trenches. Seen from
the higher ground in the rear, the soldiers are said to have looked, in
the deep obscurity, like the people of a world of shadows.
The allied generals had intended to surprise the place; to break into it
when its defenders were the least prepared. Some suppose that the enemy
was forewarned by spies and deserters of the coming assault, for, far
from being taken unawares, the Russians were as much on the alert as the
Allies. Behind those dark and silent entrenchments there were thousands of
soldiers under arms, and waiting in silence to do their duty at the first
tap of the drum or bray of the trumpet. It needed not spies or deserters
to forewarn them. The custom of armies when near each other is to parade
before break of day, and this is not less the custom of garrisons when
besieged, or of an army, like that in Sebastopol, defending a mighty
entrenched camp. So it was on the 18th. Behind the huge Malakoff and the
Great Redan, in rear of the connecting parapets, and in the houses of the
suburb, lay 16,000 men ready to clutch their arms and fall on. In front of
the works were watchful sentries, and in the works the gunners stood by
their pieces, prompt to fire. The steamers in the harbour, sheltered under
the cliffs, had their fires lighted and their steam up, and were prepared
to throw shell, and grape, and canister on the assaulting columns. But had
Lord Raglan's plan of a three hours' bombardment been carried out, the
fire could not have failed to disarrange the plan of defence, the chances
of surprising the defenders would have been great, and the assailants,
moving upon what they could see, would have stormed with greater unity and
greater confidence.
It was still dark. General Regnault de Saint Jean d'Angely, with the
Imperial Guard, was in the Lancaster Battery. Lord Raglan was at his post,
watching for the signal. The unemployed spectators, officers and amateurs,
were on the hills in groups here and there. General Pélissier was still on
his way, and upwards of half a mile from his post. Hope, nay, confidence
reigned in every breast. The British were cool, ready, and quiet. The
French, to use their own expression, were quivering with eagerness, but
their centre columns were not yet placed.
Suddenly, none knew why, flashes of fire, followed by a sullen uproar,
were seen and heard on the extreme right. The flashes grew brighter and
more frequent, the noise of exploding gunpowder grew louder. The roar
of big guns rose above the crash of musketry, and the roll of drums and
shrill notes of trumpets were heard in the transitory lulls of the larger
tumult. What had happened? No signal rockets had climbed upwards from
the Lancaster Battery to break into a bouquet of coloured fires. General
Pélissier, hurrying through the dark over the plateau, was perplexed and
furious. Still the combat raged about the head of the Careening Bay,
and the fire of the place grew fiercer and more sustained. Ten minutes
elapsed--minutes that seemed weeks to the wondering spectators. The French
general entered the battery in a fury; demanding sharply who had given the
signal, his wrath changed into astonishment when he was told no signal
had been given, and his astonishment into vexation when he learned that
General Mayran had mistaken a military rocket, fired from the Mamelon, for
the signal to assault! The unity and suddenness of the assault were thus
destroyed; but General Pélissier, without hesitation, ordered the rockets
to be fired, and, at seven minutes past three, the clustering stars of
fire hung for a moment up in the black sky, and then paled and vanished.
The French troops dashed out in the gloom to the assault.
A fatal accident had precipitated the conflict. General Mayran had been
up all night engaged in disposing himself the division he commanded. He
had them all in hand in the Careening Ravine, and he was eager, he was
impatient for the fray. In this frame of mind he was disposed to take
every rocket fired from the Mamelon for the signal agreed on; and when,
a little before three, one of these blazing missiles writhed and bounded
through the air towards the Russian lines, he called out, "That is the
signal." The rash step was taken; his division was ordered to move. With
the first brigade Mayran went himself; the second was commanded by De
Failly. But the troops no sooner rushed out than they were smitten by a
heavy fire. The leading soldiers, after the fashion of their countrymen,
began to fire on the retreating Russian outposts, and the flash and the
sound guided the Russian artillery in training their guns. Then it was
still dark, and the troops were unable to see the nature of the ground.
Instead of following the left bank of the Careening Bay, and striving to
turn the line of entrenchments, they went full in the teeth of a battery.
The steamers came up to the mouth of the bay, and, at short range, poured
in showers of grape and shell. So that this unhappy column, struggling in
the obscurity over rough ground, was torn through and through by the iron
sleet hurled at it in front and flank. Mayran was soon among the wounded,
but he would neither retire nor give up the command. Another grapeshot
striking him in the body, he was carried off mortally wounded; and part
of his troops, after a vain but gallant stand, hurried back into the
Careening Ravine, shattered and disorganised. But De Failly, bringing up
the reserve, rallied them in a hollow, and held his ground.
[Illustration: THE ASSAULT ON THE REDAN. (_See p._ 110.)]
In the meantime, at the signal from the Lancaster Battery, D'Autemarre and
Brunet gave the word to advance. Brunet's men were not in order; and in
disorder, and as they could, they scrambled into the open. The disorder
was increased when a shot struck and killed the general as he quitted the
trenches. General Lafont de Villiers took command. Part of the division
went towards the Malakoff, under Colonel Lorencez, while the rest were
held in hand to meet the exigencies of the moment. The men engaged, like
those on the right, were exposed to a crushing fire, and could make no
way, but they would not retreat. The attack on the right had, by this
time, utterly failed. The attack on the centre made no progress. The left
attack was more fortunate. D'Autemarre, on spying the signal, sent forward
two battalions, one of rifles, the other of the line. Day had dawned, and
the twilight revealed the column to the enemy, but it also allowed the
troops to see where they were going. With steady tread in the face of a
searching fire, D'Autemarre's men pressed along the ridge, on the right
of the Middle Ravine; Garnier, the commander of the rifles, kept his men
together and prevented them from firing; and thus they arrived at the
ditch of the Gervais Battery, on the proper right of the Malakoff, all
together. In a moment they were seen scrambling over the parapet, and
then firing their rifles, point blank, they went in with the bayonet. The
strife was close, but the French prevailed; and the 19th Line regiment
coming up, the two battalions were actually established within the
enemy's lines, among the ruins of houses, and under the mighty Malakoff.
The column on the right had by this time been reinforced by part of the
Guard, chiefly for the purpose of securing it from attack, but also to
have a body of men ready to take advantage of any opportunity. The head
of Brunet's column was under the Malakoff, exchanging volleys with the
enemy's troops, who fired exultingly from their parapets. D'Autemarre's
two battalions, as we have said, were inside the Russian lines, and their
gallant leaders, Garnier and Manèque, both wounded, had sent officer after
officer to the rear begging for reinforcements. Ten minutes had slipped
away since Pélissier gave the signal, and such was the condition of the
combat.
Lord Raglan had been a spectator of this engagement in the grey dawn.
He had seen and heard the false movement of Mayran; he had watched the
confused march of Brunet's troops; he had seen dimly the soldiers of
D'Autemarre storm the Gervais Battery. The French had not succeeded; but
the British commander, admiring their showy bravery, and feeling that he
ought to risk something to aid them, directed Sir George Brown to order
the assault on the Redan. Alas! here, too, the enemy were prepared. They
had a mass of infantry in the Redan; its guns, loaded with grape, were
ready to belch it forth; and between the stormers and their object there
was the abattis with its strong woodwork and deep ditch. The British
columns were small--400 men in each. They were covered by a scattering of
riflemen, and with them were to march a party of sailors under William
Peel, carrying ladders, a party of soldiers with sacks of wool, and a
party of artillerymen to spike the guns of the Redan. When the signal
was given, all these gallant men climbed over the parapets and alighted
in the open. Then the guns of the Redan opened with energy and effect.
The rifles, in open order, gained the abattis, and began to fire on the
enemy's gunners. Parts of the two columns of attack struggled in utter
disorder up to the same place. But the sailors under Peel were so cut up
that only one ladder was borne to the abattis, and Peel was wounded. It
was in striving to make the men in the right column form, and in leading
them on by voice and gesture, that the brave Lacy Yea met his death. He
was struck by grape, and almost instantly died. On the left, Colonel
Shadforth was slain as soon as he had left the trenches; and Sir John
Campbell, leaping over the parapet, went at once to head the column, and
carried them up to the abattis. But there, cheering his soldiers, Campbell
was also shot dead. Indeed, the storm of grapeshot strewed the ground with
red coats and bluejackets. Lord West and Colonel Lysons found it a vain
sacrifice to keep the men under that awful fire, to which musketry was now
added from the parapets of the Redan; and accordingly, the remains of the
devoted stormers were hurried back into the trenches.
The French attack had failed also. Seeing Brunet's men exposed to a
fire of small arms from the parapets of the Malakoff, Colonel Dickson
endeavoured to drive the Russians down by shells. But they did not appear
to feel these missiles, and Dickson changing to round shot, soon cleared
the parapet. D'Autemarre's two battalions held the Gervais Battery for
more than half an hour. Their brave commanders, grim and blood-stained,
looked eagerly, but in vain, for the reinforcements they had demanded.
And as these did not arrive, these two heroic soldiers were forced to
withdraw. When the French quitted the Russian entrenchments, the Russian
infantry followed. The French halted in a depression of the ground, and as
part of their reinforcements had now come up, they turned with the bayonet
upon their pursuers and forced them back into the work. Other battalions
coming up, these men held fast, and General Pélissier, unwilling to throw
a chance away, ordered up the Zouaves of the Guard, and had a momentary
thought of making a fresh attack; but receiving unfavourable reports, he
halted the Guard, and recalled all the troops. The attack was at an end,
and once more the dogged tenacity of the Russian peasant had won the day.
But while Pélissier was thinking of renewing the assault, he sent General
Rose with a message to Lord Raglan, saying that he hoped Raglan would
agree to a fresh onslaught. At the same time Lord Raglan, seeing how
completely our fire had mastered that of the place, ordered Sir George
Brown to bring up the supports, and prepare for another assault. He then
sent Commander Vico, the French officer at the British headquarters, to
inform General Pélissier of the steps he had taken, and to propose that
another attempt should be made after the bombardment had continued a
few hours longer. Lord Raglan thought that in this way the enemy might
be surprised, and the place be won. The two messengers met each other
in the trenches, and thus the messages crossed each other. Lord Raglan,
therefore, determined to see Pélissier himself. Reaching the Lancaster
Battery shortly after seven o'clock, Lord Raglan found the French general
ready to fall in with his views. But while they were discussing the
details, General D'Autemarre, now senior officer in the French trenches,
sent word that the French troops had lost so many men and were so
discouraged, that he feared it would be impossible to assault again. It
was, therefore, decided that no fresh assault should be made; the troops
were withdrawn; and the batteries slackened fire.
We have now to narrate a remarkable episode in the incidents of
the morning. It will be remembered that General Eyre was to make a
demonstration in the South Ravine. A French force was to aid him by
covering his left flank. Their first object was to capture two rifle-pits.
The French took one, and our volunteers the other, with ease. Then the
French halted, the officer in command having no warrant to go farther.
General Eyre, however, exceeding, or rather straining, his instructions,
did go farther, and a handful of French breaking from restraint kept
pace with him. In the ravine, just before it is joined by the Woronzoff
Ravine on the right, there was a cemetery where the Russians had a post.
This was carried by our troops, after a very slight resistance; and,
not content with this success, they pushed still farther. There were
clusters of houses under the cliffs on both sides of the broad basin
formed by the juncture of the two ravines. Into these the enemy retired,
and General Eyre deeming it desirable to occupy as forward a position as
possible, drove the Russians out of the houses, and held them as well as
the Cemetery. The troops were now under the Garden Batteries on the one
side, and the Barrack Batteries on the other; and before them was the
battery at the head of the South Ravine, called the Creek Battery. They
were thus exposed to fire on three sides. Nevertheless they still made
progress, driving the enemy out of the houses and up the sides of the
ravine. Some of them ascended the steep, a few looked into the works in
rear of the Flagstaff Bastion, others climbed the opposite side and got
shelter at a point commanding the Creek Battery. Thus they were ready, if
fortune favoured the assaults on the Redan and Malakoff, to sweep either
into the town or make way through the Barrack Battery to the Redan. But
the Russians had no sooner fled from the ravine into the place, than the
batteries opened on our daring soldiers. Nevertheless here they remained
all day, offering to the French in the right of their left attack a
splendid spectacle of hardihood. General Eyre was wounded early in the
day; but he did not give up the command of his men until five in the
afternoon. About nine in the morning he had heard of the failure of the
grand assault. Requesting instructions from Lord Raglan, he was told that
the French would send a force to relieve him, and hold part of the ground
he had won; but that if at nightfall the French had not arrived, then
he was to evacuate the ravine. The French did not come; and this noble
brigade, bringing with them nearly all their wounded, and these were many,
regained the trenches at nightfall. The Cemetery, however, remained in our
possession.
The losses of both sides were very great. Of the British there were 22
officers killed and 78 wounded; 244 men killed and 1,209 wounded. The
French lost 33 officers killed, 257 were wounded, and 21 were missing.
They also lost 1,340 men killed, 1,520 wounded, and 390 missing. The
wounded men thus exceeded the dead by 180 only--an unusual proportion.
The totals stand--for the British, 1,553; for the French, 3,561 killed,
wounded, and missing. The Russian loss, as usual, it is difficult to
ascertain. Prince Gortschakoff's published despatch fixes the losses
during the 17th and 18th at 16 officers killed and 153 wounded; 781 men
killed and 4,826 wounded; giving a total of 5,776 as the amount of the
Russian loss from the bombardment and the combat. The Allied losses on
the 18th were 5,106. On the 17th, 37 men were killed or wounded in the
British trenches. As the French placed more men in their batteries and
parallels than we did, they may have lost 100. Adding 137 to the total
of the Allied loss in the two days, it still falls short of the loss of
the enemy by 533 men. The errors of the day were the fatal change which
dispensed with the bombardment; the refusal of the French to assault on
the left; the mistake of Mayran, and the consequent failure in the unity
of the assault. To these it may be added, that the British assaulting
columns, except that led by Eyre, were all too weak, and would probably
have failed against the Redan, even had the French succeeded against the
Malakoff. And, reviewing the whole operation carefully, there is some
ground for the inference, that, although a preliminary bombardment would
have given a chance of success, yet, at this stage, it is probable that
failure would have been equally the result, because the distance which
the stormers and supporters had to traverse to reach the enemy was so
great, and also because the spirit of that enemy was still too high, and
his losses, immense though they were, not enough to warrant that profound
discouragement which precedes the final efforts of a desperate cause.
And now a severe misfortune was impending over the British army. It
was about to lose its beloved Commander-in-Chief. On the 23rd, Colonel
Calthorpe from headquarters wrote to his friends in England that every
one was more or less out of spirits. "Lord Raglan is, perhaps, the most
cheerful of any one, considering how much he has had lately to worry and
annoy him. But at the same time, I fear that it [the failure of the 18th]
has affected his health. He looks far from well, and has grown very much
aged latterly." He fell ill seriously on the 26th, but no one, not even
the doctors, thought that he was sick unto death. He grew no better, but
he slept well, watched over by his staff and Dr. Prendergast. On the 28th
he seemed so much better to some of the medical men that they were about
to quiet the anxiety in England by sending a message to that effect by
telegraph; but Dr. Prendergast was doubtful, and a dubious message was
sent. In the afternoon the Field Marshal became visibly worse, but it was
not supposed that death was so near him. At four o'clock the truth burst
upon all--he was dying. His staff, his nephew, Colonel Somerset, General
Simpson, General Airey, and Colonel Lord George Paget gathered round his
bed, and the principal chaplain came, and read and prayed. Gradually,
quietly, in a holy calm, that noble spirit ebbed away, so peacefully that
it was scarcely possible to tell the moment when he ceased to be. At
five-and-twenty minutes to nine in the evening of the 28th of June, an end
had come to the earthly career of the British Commander-in-Chief. He died
in his bed, but he died, like a knight of old, with his harness on. His
remains were conveyed to England in the _Caradoc_. She arrived at Bristol
on the 24th of July, and landed her sad burden, which was conveyed through
a town in mourning to Badminton; and there, on the 26th, in a quiet
village church, surrounded by a group of living comrades, who had fought
beside him under the Great Duke more than half a century before, the
remains of Lord Raglan, a fine man but second-rate soldier, found their
last resting-place.
[Illustration: RECONNAISSANCE OF FRENCH CAVALRY IN THE BAIDAR VALLEY.
(_See p._ 114.)]