direction of Winchester. As skirmishing at this time was frequent,
we could not positively decide as to what it portended. Rodes was
now at Stephenson's Depot, Breckinridge and Gordon at Bunker Hill,
and Ramseur at Winchester. Rodes received orders to "move out,"
but was not directed where to go. We moved out, took position
behind a rock wall north of the road intersecting the Winchester
road, where we anxiously awaited further orders for the space of
two hours. All this time Ramseur, with his seventeen hundred men,
was actively engaged with Sheridan's advance corps. Had we been
properly directed we could have moved forward and crushed this corps
before the remainder of Sheridan's troops arrived, and secured a
complete victory. In speaking of the time when the firing commenced,
Early, who was with Gordon, says: "I immediately ordered all the
troops that were at Stephenson's Depot to be in readiness to move,
directions being given by Gordon, who had arrived from Bunker
Hill, to move at once, but by some mistake on the part of my staff
officer, the latter order was not delivered to either Generals
Breckinridge or Gordon."
Ramseur was compelled to bear the whole brunt of the attack of
Sheridan's army until we came to his support, about 10 A. M. While
Rodes was moving in column up the Martinsburg road, near Winchester,
we were unexpectedly called to attention, faced to the left, and
moved forward to engage the enemy, who had advanced to within one
hundred yards of the road. Grimes' Brigade was on the right, mine in
the centre, and Cook's on the left, for Battle's was still behind.
After a brief and vigorous assault the Federals commenced falling
back.
Grimes drove the enemy through the woods and formed on the left
of Ramseur, while I was driving the Federals before me in an open
field, supported by Cook on my left. The latter brigade was brought
to a temporary halt. Rodes was now in my rear, and dispatched his
only remaining staff officer to push forward this brigade. At this
moment Lieutenant J. S. Battle of my staff came up, informed me that
Colonel Bennett of the Fourteenth Regiment had just had his horse
shot under him, and he had given him his. It was now that General
Rodes was shot in the head by a ball, and caught by Lieutenant
Battle as he fell from his horse. The fall of Rodes was not observed
by the troops, who pushed on, and struck a weak line between the
Sixth and Nineteenth Corps. At this point the Federals were severely
punished, and fell back, leaving their killed and wounded. A large
number of officers and men, secreted in a ditch, were captured. We
pursued the enemy, with a hot fire, beyond the crest of the hill
on which Grimes had established his line. Here Evans' Brigade,
upon meeting a heavy fire, fell back, which exposed my brigade to
a concentrated, direct and left oblique fire. Seeing that I could
not maintain this advanced position, my aide, Major Gales, was sent
to General Early with a request to have a battery placed on a hill
in my rear. This was promptly done, when my men fell back and were
formed behind the battery, which opening with telling effect upon
their heavy lines, they laid down, and the victory appeared to be
ours. In this brief engagement Colonel Bennett had two horses shot
from under him and was captured. Colonel Cobb of the Second lost
a foot, and Colonel Thurston of the Third was severely wounded.
While my loss in officers and men had been severe, my troops were
in fine spirits. Here we lay until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when
Major G. Peyton of the division staff directed me to fall back, for
the infantry had retired from my left, and Fitz Lee's cavalry was
hotly engaged with that of the Federals. I replied that there was
no occasion for my falling back, as I could repulse any assault the
Federals might attempt; and upon their endeavoring to advance, I
opened fire upon them and they rapidly sought shelter. Discovering
(after Major Peyton retired) that the Federals were in my rear, I
fell back in good order to the Martinsburg pike and formed on the
left of our troops. Here we were exposed, without any protection, to
a heavy artillery fire, which was inflicting unnecessary punishment
upon my men. I turned to General Breckinridge, who was near, pointed
to a line of hills, and suggested that that was the place to make
our stand, to which he agreed. Thereupon I faced my men about
and commenced retiring deliberately to the hills, all the troops
conforming to this movement. General Early, through a staff officer,
directed me to return; I thereupon faced my men about and moved them
to the front. Upon reaching the turnpike a second officer came from
General Early and directed me to fall back. Facing my men about, I
again commenced slowly retiring.
Our troops now retreated towards Fisher's Hill. My brigade secured
the elevation which I had selected, and stood as a menace to
pursuit until our army had measurably retired. Then proceeding to
the turnpike, I was retreating in column, when Dr. Hunter McGuire,
who was with Early, approached and said General Early was feeling
badly; that we had lost but one caisson, and he wished I would take
my troops and protect from capture the artillery then passing. I
informed him that I was so far from division headquarters (for our
army was not then in sight) that I did not desire to have my brigade
exposed to capture unless he would bring me an order from General
Early, who was then riding slowly along the pike. He returned to the
General and came back and said the General wished I would do it. I
then dispatched Assistant Adjutant-General Gales to General Battle,
who, after the fall of Rodes, was in command of the division, with
information as to where I was and what I was doing. I then turned
to my command, which had been joined by other troops who had lost
their commands, and directed them to deploy and advance between the
enemy's cavalry and our artillery, which was done with great spirit
and promptness in the presence of the General, but without a word
of indorsement from him. In this manner we moved on, protecting the
artillery until near dusk, when we found Ramseur with his division
thrown across the turnpike to prevent pursuit. About the time the
artillery and my brigade crossed his line the enemy made a spirited
charge to capture the guns. Ramseur's men rose and met it with a
well-directed fire, which stopped further pursuit. I moved on and
soon joined our troops. So that Ramseur, upon whom the enemy had
opened their battle in the morning, gave them the last repulse at
night.
Of this battle, Early writing, says: "A skillful and energetic
commander of the enemy's forces would have crushed Ramseur before
any assistance could have reached him, and thus caused the
destruction of my whole force; and later in the day, when the battle
had turned against us, with the immense superiority of cavalry which
Sheridan had and the advantage of the open country, would have
destroyed my whole force and captured everything I had.... I have
thought, instead of being promoted, Sheridan ought to have been
cashiered for this battle." In his _Memoirs_, Grant says: "Sheridan
moved at the time fixed upon. He met Early at the crossing of the
Opequan Creek and won a most decisive victory--one which electrified
the country. Early had invited this attack himself by his bad
generalship, and made the victory easy." Considering the great
disparity of numbers, this battle of Winchester was, after all,
no great victory on the part of Sheridan, and Grant intimates as
much, for his troops outnumbered those of Early more than three to
one. His cavalry was in fine condition, while ours was worn down by
excessive duties and scant forage. It was won at a critical moment
to the Federal government, and it became to its interest to magnify
it in every way practicable.
After our defeat at Winchester we fell back and formed a line of
battle behind Fisher's Hill. In our encounter with Sheridan's
army, notwithstanding our defeat, his loss had been severe and
his pursuit was languid. It was the 20th before he reached our
front, and several days were passed in maneuvering and skirmishing.
Ramseur's Division occupied the left of our line of battle and
the prolongation of our line was defended by cavalry. On the 22d,
Sheridan threw forward Crook's Corps, pushed back our cavalry and
took possession of our line. Ramseur hearing the firing to his left,
withdrew my brigade from the line and ordered me to move in the
direction of the firing, for after the fall of Rodes, Ramseur, to
our great gratification, was placed in charge of his division. On
moving to the left I had a brisk skirmish with a part of Crook's
men, but did not encounter the main force. From the firing in the
direction of our line it was soon apparent that our army was falling
back. I now met General Lomax with a part of his men, and he kindly
conducted me by the nearest route to the turnpike over which we were
retreating.
It was full dusk when we reached the road. Colonel Pendleton, an
admirable officer and an accomplished gentleman of the corps staff,
met me and requested that my brigade be thrown across the road to
cover the retreat. The brigade was promptly formed, advanced rapidly
to a fence, where it met the enemy in a hand-to-hand encounter,
repulsed them and stopped the pursuit for the night. It was while
near me that Colonel Pendleton, whom I had intimately known when on
Jackson's staff, fell mortally wounded.
Napoleon said: "The moral force in war is worth twice its physical
effect." Unfortunately from this time on, that moral force which
leads to success in battle was, in this army, under its present
leadership, sadly lacking.
After the affair of Fisher's Hill we fell back to the lower passes
of the Blue Ridge, where Sheridan followed us as far as Staunton.
Then, after destroying the Central Railroad, he retreated up
the valley and took position behind his intrenchments at Cedar
Creek. Early had now been reenforced by the return of Kershaw's
Division, Cutshaw's battalion of artillery and some cavalry,
which about made up his losses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill.
About the time Sheridan fell back it had been Early's purpose to
attack him, which he doubtless anticipated, for he heard that
Longstreet had joined Early, and it was their purpose to destroy
him. Early pursued Sheridan beyond Middletown, where he found him
too strongly intrenched for a direct attack, and we were therefore
formed behind our breastworks at Fisher's Hill. From our signal
station, which overlooked their camp, it was discovered that the
Federal left flank was lightly picketed, and by a long detour and
careful movement could be taken in reverse. A flanking movement
was directed by Early and mainly intrusted to Gordon, who, with
Ramseur's Division, commenced moving early after dark. The night was
consumed in a fatiguing and exhausting march, which was conducted
with the greatest secrecy. We reached the point at which we were
to cross the creek and make the attack at early dawn. Here we
were joined by Payne's cavalry, who at full speed dashed upon and
captured Sheridan's headquarters, and, but for his absence, would
have captured him. While Crook's Corps was enjoying its undisturbed
quiet, and possibly dreaming of to-morrow, we descended "like a
wolf on the fold" and aroused them by "Rebel yells" and peals of
musketry, and they hastily fled in garments more suited to a camp
than a ball-room.
After our great reverses the sensation of pursuit was delightful.
As Ramseur hurried from point to point to hasten forward his
troops where resistance was offered his presence and manner were
electrical. Notified of our attack by the firing, the Federals in
other parts of the field formed and offered some resistance, but
they were so much demoralized that my little brigade drove back
a division ten times its numbers after but slight resistance. By
8 o'clock we had captured nearly all their artillery and from
fifteen hundred to two thousand prisoners, and the Federals were
in retreat. Early in the meantime, with two divisions which had
scarcely been engaged, came upon the field. Gordon informed me
that he then advised him to seize all his wagon, artillery, and
ambulance horses--indeed, every one he could get--mount his men upon
them, and hotly pursue the Federals before they could recover from
their panic. But we were very deliberate. While this was occurring
Sheridan was at Winchester, on his return from Washington. He gives
this graphic account of his meeting with his fleeing troops: "At
Mill Creek my escort fell behind and we were going ahead at a
regular pace when, just as we made the crest of the rise beyond
the stream, there burst upon our view the appalling spectacle of
a panic-stricken army--hundreds of slightly wounded men, throngs
of others unhurt, but utterly demoralized, and baggage-wagons by
the score, all pressing to the rear in hopeless confusion, telling
only too plainly that a disaster had occurred at the front. On
accosting some of the fugitives, they assured me that the army was
broken up, in full retreat, and that all was lost; all this with
a manner true to that peculiar indifference that takes possession
of panic-stricken men." In the meantime General Wright, with one
division and some cavalry, had the only organized force in our
presence. The return of Sheridan and the lack of a vigorous pursuit
had the effect to allay the panic with which his army was seized
early in the day. Ascertaining from some prisoners that were
captured that Longstreet was not with Early, Sheridan reorganized
his men the best he could and turned upon us, I should say about 3
o'clock in the afternoon. Ramseur kept his men well in hand, and
from behind rock walls successfully resisted the advance of the
Federals. Near 4 o'clock Kershaw's Division gave way on my left. I
sent my headquarters courier, private Beggarly, to report the fact
to General Ramseur. While doing so his horse was shot through the
ear and the horse upon which General Ramseur sat (for he refused to
take shelter) was killed. At the request of General Ramseur, private
Beggarly let the General have his horse. So careful was Ramseur of
the rights of others, even in the midst of a severe engagement, this
horse was not taken before getting my consent.
During this whole encounter no man could have behaved more
magnificently and heroically than Ramseur did in his efforts to
resist the overwhelming tide which was now setting in upon us. From
the position which he occupied the retreat of Kershaw's Division and
the overlapping flanking column of the Federals could be seen. His
troops became alarmed and could not be held in position, and in a
vain effort to hold them this brave and accomplished young officer
fell mortally wounded and was captured. In speaking of his conduct
upon this occasion, General Early says: "Major-General Ramseur has
often proved his courage and his capacity to command, but never did
these qualities shine more conspicuously than on the afternoon of
the 19th of this month, when, after two divisions on his left had
given way and his own was doing the same thing, he rallied a small
band, and for one hour and a quarter held in check the enemy, until
he was shot down himself. In endeavoring to stop those who were
retiring from the field, I had occasion to point them to the gallant
stand made by Ramseur with his small party, and if his spirit could
have animated those who left him thus battling, the 19th of October
would have had a far different history. He met the death of a hero,
_and with his fall the last hope of saving the day was lost_!
General Ramseur was a soldier of whom his State has reason to be
proud--he was brave, chivalrous, and capable." General Grimes says,
in his report of this battle: "Up to the hour of 4 P. M. the troops
of this division, both officers and men, with a few exceptions,
behaved most admirably, and were kept well in hand--but little
plundering and only a few shirking their duty. After that hour
all was confusion and disorder. The brigade commanders conducted
themselves, each and all, with great coolness and judgment, and
are deserving of especial mention for using all possible efforts
to check their troops, but without success. The death of the brave
and heroic soldier, General Ramseur, is not only a loss to this
division, but to his State and country at large. No truer and nobler
spirit has been sacrificed in this unjust and unholy war." Colonel
Winston, commanding the Forty-third and Forty-fifth North Carolina
Regiments, says that "only one man of those regiments in passing
through the rich spoils of the enemy's camp fell out of ranks, and
he did it to get a hat, and was court-martialed." And so far as I
observed, the charge of General Early that the loss of the fruits
of our victory in the morning was ascribable to the plundering of
the soldiers, is a great injustice. Certainly it is an injustice,
as applicable to that large body of North Carolinians who were
then in his corps, and who upon this, as upon prior and subsequent
occasions, proved themselves to be among the best soldiers in the
Army of Northern Virginia.
What General Lee said in his letter to General Early, dated
September 22, 1864, in regard to his strategy as a separate
commander, was clear to all, and in the main led to his want of
success. Lee said: ... "As far as I can judge from this distance, you
have operated more with your divisions than with your constituted
strength. Circumstances may have rendered it necessary, but such a
course is to be avoided if possible." When General Forrest was asked
the cause of his uniform success he replied: "I get there first with
the most men." If not classic, this is at least epigrammatic.
We cheerfully accept the well-merited tribute General Early pays the
chivalrous and knightly Ramseur, but it is insisted he is entitled
to one still higher. Instead of fighting with a few hundred men, as
Early elsewhere says, we see him, in the language of General Grimes,
"holding his division well in hand," officers and men doing their
duty faithfully, while the disorder and confusion in other parts
of the field hastened the disaster which, with troops skillfully
handled, should not have occurred.
It will be asked if the criticisms of Early's valley campaign are
just, why did not General Lee remove him? There are several good
reasons why General Lee should have been slow to pursue such a
course. Early was a man of superior intelligence, he was earnest in
the cause, and as a brigadier and division commander a hard fighter
and successful officer. There is, however, a marked difference
between a chief and subordinate commander, and Lee had never known
him otherwise than as a subordinate. It is true that Lee was finally
compelled to remove him, and we may presume it was his reluctance
to wound that caused him to unwillingly take the step which soon
became necessary. This forbearance was in keeping with Lee's general
character as known to those who served under him. It is so well
expressed by Colonel W. H. Taylor of his staff, in his book entitled
_Four Years with General Lee_, we can but quote from him. He says:
"If it shall be the verdict of posterity that General Lee in any
respect fell short of perfection as a military leader it may
perhaps be claimed: First, that he was too careful of the personal
feelings of his subordinate commanders, too fearful of wounding
their pride, and too solicitous of their reputation. Probably it
was this that caused him sometimes to continue in command those of
whose personal fitness for their position he was not convinced, and
often avowedly or tacitly assumed responsibility for mishaps clearly
attributable to the inefficiency, neglect or carelessness of others."
Through the courtesy of the family of General Ramseur, I am placed
in the possession of a personal letter from R. R. Hutchinson, of
Virginia, an able and accomplished officer, who before the battle
of Cedar Creek had long served as Major and Acting Adjutant-General
to the division. Major Hutchinson was with General Ramseur when he
received his fatal wound, was captured while endeavoring to remove
him from the field, and was by his bedside during his last moments.
His account of the sad occurrence on that occasion is so vivid and
touching, that no apology is deemed due for introducing his letter,
with a single omission, in this monograph:
"NEAR STRASBURG, VA., October 20, 1864.
"MRS. S. D. RAMSEUR, _Milton, N. C._:
"DEAR MADAM:--I do not know how to write to you; how to express
my deep sympathy in your grievous affliction; but the Christian
soldier who has gone before us to that other world has asked me to
do it, and I must not shrink from the performance of this duty,
however painful. I am writing by the side of him whose last thought
was of you and his God, his country and his duty. He died this day
at twenty-seven minutes past 10 o'clock A. M., and had, at least,
the consolation of having by his side some one who wore the same
uniform and served in the same holy cause as himself. His last
moments were peaceful, his wounds were painful, but his hope in
Christ led him to endure _all_ patiently. He received his mortal
wound yesterday afternoon (October 19th) between the hours of 5 and
6 P. M. at the post of honor and of danger, where he always was. Our
troops had fallen back a short distance, but had reformed, and were
stubbornly contesting a position on a hill which the enemy attacked
from three sides. He exposed himself to every shot, cheering and
encouraging all. I was not far from him when I saw his horse shot;
he procured another, which was shot also, and immediately after he
received his fatal wound (the second), all in the space of a very
few minutes. I ran over to him, got some men, and bore him to the
rear, your brother joining us on the way. I then went off after an
ambulance, found it, but saw on returning with it that he had been
left, as I thought, in the enemy's lines. This fear was soon after
dissipated, however, by seeing him on Captain Randolph's horse,
the Captain running alongside and supporting him. We got him then
to the ambulance I had brought up. I thought he was safe then, not
knowing how dangerous was his wound, and remained with the rear
guard. When I was subsequently captured by the enemy's cavalry, I
was carried to General Sheridan's headquarters, and learning that
General Ramseur had been captured, asked and obtained permission to
remain with him. The road had been blocked up by wagons, causing
a delay that gave the enemy time to get up and take him prisoner,
just south of Strasburg. Many of his former friends (West Pointers)
called to see him yesterday and to-day, and offered every assistance
in their power, General Sheridan among the number. He was taken
to General Sheridan's headquarters and made as comfortable as
circumstances would permit. Dr. James Gillespie (Cutshaw's battalion
of artillery), a Confederate surgeon, assisted by the enemy's
surgeons, attended to him and did all that could be done under the
circumstances. He suffered a good deal from his wound, the ball
having entered his right side, penetrating the right and left lung,
and lodging near the left side. But the end was peaceful and quiet.
He spoke continually of you, and sent very many messages to his
family, but above all, to his wife. He told the ambulance driver to
tell General Hoke that he died a Christian and had done his duty. He
told me to give his love and send some of his hair to his darling
wife; and often wished he could see his wife and little child before
he died. He told me to tell you he had a firm hope in Christ, and
hoped to meet you hereafter. He died as became a Confederate soldier
and a firm believer.
"I inclose the lock of hair he desired sent to you.
"Respectfully, R. R. HUTCHINSON,
"_Major and A. A. G. P. A. C. S._"
Ramseur in personal appearance was slight, erect, alert, earnest in
speech, with dark prominent eyes and well developed forehead. He was
an ideal soldier.
General Robert Ransom, in writing of his bearing in action, while
they were together in the valley, says: "Ramseur commanded infantry
and I the whole of Early's cavalry during the time I was with Early.
Whenever I had opportunity to see Ramseur his conduct was marked by
great energy, brilliant dash (often amounting to impetuosity) and an
enthusiasm which inspired those he led."
Among the soldiers of Napoleon Marshal Ney was known as "the bravest
of the brave." When asked whether he ever felt fear in battle, he
replied that he never had time. His reply might aptly be that of
Ramseur. When in action his enthusiasm arose with the magnitude of
the dangers that environed him. But this enthusiasm was controlled
by a well-directed judgment as to the best disposition to make of
his troops, and as to the weak points of his adversary. He fully
realized that war meant danger, even death; that the eyes of his
troops were upon him, and their greatest safety lay in marching
fearlessly and promptly to the front of danger, and he never
hesitated to lead them.