accompanied the army of Lee in its invasion of Pennsylvania. In
connection with Rodes' Division, in the first day's fight at
Gettysburg, they secured the elevated ridge known as Oak Hill, which
was the key to the entire field. Swinton, in his _Campaigns of Army
of the Potomac_, says: "When towards three o'clock a general advance
was made by the Confederates, Rodes speedily broke through the Union
centre, carrying away the right of the First Corps and the left of
the Eleventh, and, entering the interval between them, disrupted the
whole line." The Federal troops fell back in much disorder, and were
pursued by our troops through the town of Gettysburg. This was our
opportunity to have seized the heights, the subsequent assaults on
which proved so disastrous to us during the progress of this battle.
Ramseur urged that the pursuit should be continued until Cemetery
Heights were in our possession. The light of subsequent events
shows that he was clearly in the right. Our friends in Virginia
are fond of boasting of the advanced position of their troops at
Gettysburg. It is a thing to be boasted of. Her sons were gallant
and martial, and far be it from me to detract one tittle from the
fame to which they are entitled, yet it is but an act of justice to
call attention to the fact that the only two brigades which entered
the works of Cemetery Heights on the second day of the battle were
Hoke's North Carolina and Hays' Louisiana Brigades. The former was
then under the command of that gallant soldier and accomplished
gentleman, Colonel Isaac E. Avery, who lost his life on this
occasion while gallantly leading his brigade on the heights on the
2d of July. In his report of this battle, Early says: ...
"As soon as Johnson became warmly engaged, which was a little before
dusk, I ordered Hays and Avery to advance and carry the works on
the heights in front. These troops advanced in gallant style to
the attack, passing over the ridge in front of them under a heavy
artillery fire, and there crossing a hollow between that and
Cemetery Hill, and moving up this hill in the face of at least two
lines of infantry posted behind stone and plank fences, and passing
over all obstacles, they reached the crest of the hill and entered
the enemy's breastworks, crossing it, getting possession of one or
two batteries."
Brigadier-General Iverson, of Georgia, had manifested such a want
of capacity in the field at Gettysburg that he was relieved of his
command and assigned to provost guard duty. As a further mark of
Lee's appreciation of Ramseur, this brigade was assigned temporarily
to his command, in addition to the one he already commanded.
In the various skirmishes and battles of this campaign Ramseur
displayed his usual efficiency and gallantry. After returning from
Pennsylvania our troops went into winter quarters near Orange Court
House, and as it was clear that after the exhaustive campaigns of
the year we would enjoy a period of comparative quiet, Ramseur
obtained leave of absence for the purpose of entering into the most
important relations of one's life. He had long been attached to and
was then engaged to Miss Ellen E. Richmond, of Milton, but the
consummation of his hopes had been often deferred by the exigencies
of the public service. He was now made supremely happy in their
marriage, which occurred on the 22d of October, 1863.
The successive failures of the Army of the Potomac in its
engagements with the Army of Northern Virginia created a general
apprehension throughout the North that unless something more
satisfactory was accomplished the successful issue of the war was
becoming a most doubtful problem. This prompted the nomination
of General Grant to the grade of Lieutenant-General, and he was
assigned to the command of "all the armies of the United States."
One of the conditions of his acceptance was that he should not be
hampered in the discharge of his duties by the central authorities
at Washington--a wise and judicious precaution, which else had
resulted in his supersedure after his terrible losses at Cold
Harbor, where, according to Swinton, he had thirteen thousand of
his men killed and wounded within the space of two hours, and this
without inflicting but little loss on his adversary.
On the morning of May 5th, 1864, over one hundred thousand of
Grant's troops had crossed the Rapidan, and thence followed that
series of battles on the overland route to Richmond, wherein the
killed, wounded and disabled on the part of Grant's army were as
great as the whole army of Lee when these engagements commenced.
During this march Ramseur's men were frequently engaged in
successful skirmishes and battles with the enemy, but the great
battle in which he shone conspicuously was on the 12th of May, at
Spottsylvania Court House.
On the afternoon of the 11th there was severe fighting on our right,
when Ramseur's men mounted our works and drove the enemy from our
front in a hand-to-hand engagement. It was expected by Lee that
during the night Grant would withdraw his troops for the purpose
of continuing his advance on Richmond. In order to be in readiness
to confront him when he should make this change, Lee had directed
that the guns in front of Ed. Johnson's Division, in a point in
our lines known as the "salient," should be withdrawn during the
night to facilitate our movements in the morning. This fact became
known to Grant through a deserter from our lines. Hancock's Corps
was in front of this point, and he was directed to approach under
the cover of night and a dense fog and assault the line at early
dawn. The attack resulted most successfully, for our works were
captured, together with a large number of prisoners. To restore in
part this line became Ramseur's duty. In his report of the action he
speaks substantially as follows: That in anticipation of an attack
on his front on the morning of the 12th he had his brigade under
arms at early dawn. Very soon he heard a terrible assault on his
right. He therefore moved Cox's Regiment, which was in reserve, to
a position perpendicular to his line of battle. At this time the
enemy was massing his troops for a further advance. For the purpose
of driving him back he formed his brigade in a line parallel to the
two lines held by the enemy. The men in charging were directed to
keep their alignment and not pause until both lines of works were
ours. How gallantly and successfully these orders were executed were
witnessed by Generals Rodes and Ewell. The two lines of Federal
troops were driven pell-mell out and over both lines of our original
works with great loss. The enemy held the breastworks on our right,
enfilading the line with destructive fire, at the same time heavily
assaulting our right front. In this extremity, Colonel Bennett of
the Fourteenth offered to take his regiment from left to right,
under a severe fire, and drive back the growing masses of the enemy
on our right. This hazardous offer was accepted as a forlorn hope,
and was most successfully executed. To Colonel Bennett, and his men,
and to his gallant officers, says General Ramseur, all honor is due.
I distinctly recall the circumstances under which the charge was
made, and for cool audacity and unflinching courage I never saw it
surpassed. At the time the movement was commenced Colonel Parker's
Regiment and the Federals were engaged in a hand-to-hand encounter
in and over the works, while my regiment was pouring a most
destructive fire into the Federals in our front. We entered these
works at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 12th and remained in the
works fighting and contending for over twenty hours. When relieved,
hungry and exhausted, we dropped upon the wet ground and slept most
profoundly.
A correspondent of the London _Morning Herald_, who had familiar
access to Lee's headquarters, in a description of the battle of the
Wilderness, gives this vivid account of the action of Ramseur's
Brigade on the morning of the 12th:
"The Federalists continued to hold their ground in the salient,
and along the line of works, to the left of that angle, within a
short distance of the position of Monoghan's (Hays') Louisianians.
Ramseur's North Carolinians of Rodes' Division formed, covering
Monoghan's right, and being ordered to charge, was received by
the enemy with a stubborn resistance. The desperate character of
the struggle along that brigade-front was told terribly in the
hoarseness and rapidity of its musketry. So close was the fighting
there, for a time, that the fire of friend and foe rose up rattling
in one common roar. Ramseur's North Carolinians dropped in the ranks
thick and fast, but still he continued, with glorious constancy, to
gain ground, foot by foot. Passing under a fierce fire, resolutely
on, on, on, the struggle was about to become one of hand-to-hand,
when the Federalists shrank from the bloody trial. Driven back,
they were not defeated. The earthworks being at the moment in their
immediate rear, they bounded on the opposite side; and having thus
placed them in their front, they renewed the conflict. A rush of an
instant brought Ramseur's men to the other side of the defenses;
and though they crouched close to the slopes, under enfilade from
the guns of the salient, their musketry rattled in deep and deadly
fire on the enemy that stood in overwhelming numbers but a few yards
from their front. Those brave North Carolinians had thus, in one of
the hottest conflicts of the day, succeeded in driving the enemy
from the works that had been occupied during the previous night by
a brigade which, until the 12th of May, had never yet yielded to a
foe--the Stonewall."
In an address before the Army of Northern Virginia, Colonel Venable,
of Lee's staff, says: "The restoration of the battle on the 12th,
thus rendering utterly futile the success achieved by Hancock's
Corps at daybreak, was a wonderful feat of arms, in which all the
troops engaged deserve the greatest credit for endurance, constancy,
and unflinching courage. But without unjust discrimination, we may
say that Gordon, Rodes, and Ramseur were the heroes of this bloody
day.... Rodes and Ramseur were destined, alas! in a few short
months, to lay down their noble lives in the Valley of Virginia.
There was no victor's chaplet more highly prized by the Roman
soldier than that woven of the grass of early spring. Then let the
earliest flowers of May be always intertwined in the garlands which
the pious hands of our fair women shall lay on the tombs of Rodes
and Ramseur and of the gallant dead of the battle of twenty hours at
Spottsylvania."
General Long, in his _Life of Lee_, puts the name of Ramseur in the
van of those who rushed into this angle of death and hurled back the
Federals' most savage sallies. During the long and fierce struggle
I saw soldiers place the arms of their comrades who had just fallen
in such a position as when they had become stiffened they would hold
the cartridges we were using. Yes, fighting and exhausted, amidst
blood and mud and brains, they would sit on the bodies of their
fallen comrades for rest, and dared not show even a finger above
the breastworks, for so terrible was the fire at this angle that a
tree eighteen inches in diameter was cut asunder by minie balls.
After the battle was over Generals Lee and Ewell thanked Ramseur
in person, and directed him to carry to his officers and men their
high appreciation of their conspicuous services and heroic daring.
At this time such portions of the First and Third Regiments as
were not captured in the salient were placed in the brigade, and
it is sufficient praise to bear witness that from that time on to
the surrender at Appomattox their officers and men always showed
themselves worthy of the highest confidence reposed in them. In
appreciation of the conspicuous services rendered by Ramseur on this
occasion he was made a major-general and assigned to the command
of Early's Division, and I had the distinguished honor of being
assigned to Ramseur's (now to become Cox's) historic brigade.
The Valley of Virginia, both physically and strategically, is
one of the most attractive regions of that State. It is not less
distinguished for the brilliant achievements of Stonewall Jackson
than for the ardent patriotism of its men and the devotion and
sacrifices of its women to the cause of the South. It was here that
Jackson, with only a little army of thirteen thousand men, defeated
and drove from the valley Milroy, Frémont, Banks, and Shields,
whose combined forces were five times as great as his own, besides
capturing vast quantities of much needed commissary and ordnance
stores and large numbers of prisoners. After the battle of Cold
Harbor the Second Corps, composed of Ramseur's, Rodes' and Gordon's
Divisions, were placed under the command of Early, and directed to
proceed to this valley, with instructions to capture or destroy
the army of Hunter, a recreant Virginian, who was marching in the
direction of Lynchburg, destroying the country as he moved along.
Attached to this corps were Nelson's and Braxton's battalions
of artillery, together with a division of cavalry. At this time
Breckinridge, who, in a brilliant engagement, had recently defeated
Sigel, was at Lynchburg awaiting our arrival. Our troops were
transported by rail. Ramseur's and the greater part of Gordon's
Division were sent forward as soon as they were ready. They arrived
at Lynchburg at about 4 o'clock P. M. on the 17th of June. Here they
united with Breckinridge and the troops of Major-General Ransom,
who was in command of the whole cavalry in the valley. Hunter was
in camp near the city of Lynchburg. In a letter to me, General
Ransom says at this time "he (Ramseur) and I reconnoitered the left
flank of Hunter's army and found it could be most advantageously
assailed, and in person reported the fact to General Early, who said
he would not attack until the whole of Rodes' Division had arrived
from Richmond." The opportunity to destroy Hunter's army was then
lost. Hunter took counsel of his fears and advantage of the cover
of night and darkness to make a hasty retreat. Early on the morning
of the 19th we commenced a pursuit, and just before night overtook
the enemy's rear at Liberty, when Ramseur's Division moved on it
and drove it through the place. It was now ascertained that Hunter
had not taken the route that we anticipated, but had retreated by
way of Buford's Gap, where, on the next day, he was found occupying
a commanding position on the crest of the mountain. After our
arrival we spent the afternoon in efforts to secure a position from
which to successfully assail him the following day. Hunter, by
our failure to promptly pursue at daylight, made his escape, and,
being in the mountains, further pursuit was useless. Early, in his
report, says: "By mistake of the messenger who was sent with orders
to General Rodes to lead the next morning, there was some delay in
his movement on the 21st, but the pursuit was resumed very shortly
after sunrise." After resting a day we resumed the march and reached
Buchanan that night. Our next important move was to cross the
Potomac into Maryland. We reached Frederick, Md., about the 9th of
the month, when Ramseur, after a slight resistance, moved through
the town and brushed away the Federals before him. Our invasion had
so alarmed the Federal capital that General Wallace was directed
to move at once with such forces as he had and could collect and
interpose them between us and Washington. When Wallace reached our
front he drew his troops up on the eastern bank of the Monocacy.
Ramseur deployed in his front, drove his skirmishers across
the river and a brief and brisk artillery duel followed. In
the meantime McCausland, with his cavalry, crossed the river,
attacked the Federal left flank and threw it into confusion, which
Early discovering, threw forward Gordon's Division, commanded by
Breckinridge. Gordon moved to the assistance of McCausland, while
Ramseur crossed over the railroad bridge and fell upon Wallace, who
retreated with great precipitation, leaving in our hands six or
seven hundred prisoners besides his killed and wounded. Our loss in
killed and wounded was severe, but as this was a sharp and brilliant
engagement, well planned and spiritedly executed, it infused new
life into our troops. On the 10th we moved to Rockville. As the
weather was hot and roads dusty, our troops were easily fatigued
and made but slow progress. The next day we resumed the march, and
in the afternoon reached Seventh street pike, which leads into
Washington. In a history of the Army of the Potomac, Swinton, in
speaking of this movement, says: "By afternoon the Confederate
infantry had come up and showed a strong line in front of Fort
Stevens. Early had there an opportunity to dash into the city, the
works being very slightly defended. The hope at headquarters that
the capital could be saved from capture was very slender." The
truth is, the Sixth and Ninth Corps of Grant's army were then _en
route_ to save the capital, and for us to have entered it at this
time might, in the end, have proved a costly experiment. Probably
more expedition might have been exercised by us in our march. After
reconnoitering and skirmishing a couple of days, we turned our backs
on the capital, beat a hasty retreat to the Potomac, followed by the
enemy's cavalry.
The next engagement of any importance in which Ramseur was concerned
was at Winchester, where he was left with his command and a
battery of artillery to protect the place from a threatened attack
from Averell. While here he was informed by General Vaughan, in
command of the cavalry, that Averell, with a small force, was at
Stephenson's Depot, and could be surprised and easily captured.
Placing too much confidence in these representations, Ramseur
advanced against him without the proper precaution of throwing
forward a strong skirmish line, and he encountered Averell with a
large force of infantry and cavalry, and met with a pretty severe
repulse. In a letter to me, General W. G. Lewis, who was wounded in
this engagement, says that Ramseur was not altogether responsible
for the mistake that occurred, for he had every reason to suppose
that the information furnished by Vaughan was correct. This matter,
while not of much importance, is referred to simply because it is
the only instance in which he met with a reverse. The blame properly
rests upon General Vaughan, who should have been more careful in his
statements.
On the 9th of September information reached us that a large force
had been concentrated at Harper's Ferry, which consisted of the
Sixth, Nineteenth, and Crook's Corps, and was under a new commander,
who proved to be Sheridan. From this time on constant maneuvering
and skirmishing occurred between the two armies, in which Ramseur
was more or less prominently engaged. Sheridan proved to be a
wary, cautious, and prudent commander. In all of these movements
it appeared that his purpose was rather to ascertain the strength
and character of his adversary than to engage him in battle. Early
was disappointed and disgusted by his wary methods, and says in
his _Last Year of the War_ that "the events of the last month had
satisfied me that the commander opposing me was without enterprise
and possessed an excessive caution which amounted to timidity. If
it was his policy to produce the impression that his force was too
weak to fight me, he did not succeed; but if it was to convince
me that he was not an able and energetic commander, his strategy
was a complete success, and subsequent events have not changed my
opinion." Sheridan had recently been transferred from the Army of
the West, where Lee's methods and "Stonewall Jackson's way" were
known as towers of strength. For the first time Sheridan was given
an independent command, had a wholesome dread of our veterans, and
also fully realized the fact that upon the result of his first
encounter with his adversary there was involved an important
political as well as military element.
Grant's campaign from the "Wilderness to Cold Harbor had been
disappointing to the North, where there was a feeling that so
far the war had been a failure, which, in commenting on, in his
_Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac_, Swinton says, that when the
records of the War Department shall be carefully examined they will
develop discoveries of the most startling nature. In speaking of
public sentiment just prior to the battle of Winchester, Grant says
in his _Personal Memoirs_:
"I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid
to have a decisive battle fought at that time, for fear it might
go against us and have a bad effect on the November elections. The
convention which had met and made its nomination of the Democratic
candidate for the Presidency had declared the war a failure.
"Treason was talked as boldly in Chicago as ever it had been at
Charleston.
"It was a question of whether the government would then have had
the power to make arrests and punish those who thus talked treason.
"But this decisive victory was the most effective campaign argument
made in the canvass."
In addition to what Grant says there was another motive which made
Sheridan timid in encountering our forces, and possibly Grant's
presence was necessary to get him up to the fighting point.
In his _Memoirs_, Sheridan says:
"I had opposing me an army largely composed of troops that had
operated in this region hitherto under 'Stonewall' Jackson with
marked success, inflicting defeat on the Union forces almost every
time the two armies had come in contact.
"These men were now commanded by a veteran officer of the
Confederacy, General Jubal A. Early, whose past services had so
signalized his ability that General Lee specially selected him
to take charge of the valley district, and notwithstanding the
misfortunes that befell him later, clung to him to the end of the
war. The Confederate army at this date was about twenty thousand
strong, and consisted of Early's own corps, with Generals Rodes,
Ramseur, and Gordon commanding its divisions; the infantry of
Breckinridge, of Southwestern Virginia; three battalions of
artillery, and the cavalry brigades of Vaughan, Johnson, McCausland,
and Imboden."
Early had marched and countermarched so often in the presence of and
around Sheridan's army without bringing him to a test of strength
he began to think him no better than Hunter, and entertained more
contempt for than fear of him. He separated his divisions at will,
and scattered them from Winchester to Martinsburg--twenty-two
miles--with no greater motive than that of interrupting railroad
traffic, producing a little diversion in Washington, and securing a
few commissaries in Martinsburg. His last movement in this direction
was on the eve of the battle of Winchester. Of this movement he
says: "Having been informed that a force was at work on the railroad
near Martinsburg, I moved on the afternoon of the 17th of September
with Rodes' and Gordon's Divisions and Braxton's artillery to Bunker
Hill; and on the morning of the 18th, with Gordon's Division and a
part of the artillery, to Martinsburg, preceded by a part of Lomax's
cavalry." It will thus be seen that in the presence of a largely
superior force, and a new and untried commander, Early had his
troops stretched out and separated like a string of glass beads with
a knot between each one. In a previous move of a similar nature on
Martinsburg, at Bunker Hill, I had been reliably informed that the
next time Early should make the mistake of separating his command
Sheridan intended to attack and endeavor to crush his troops in
detail. This fact I communicated to General Rodes, who replied: "I
know it. I have told Early as much"; and with much irritation of
manner, said, "I can't get him to believe it."