ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AGAINST VERA CRUZ.
Within a short time after Captain Swift was taken to the beach, I
received an order, from General Worth, directing me to withdraw the
engineer company from the line of investment and report to General
Patterson. The latter instructed me to locate and open a road through
the chaparral to the old Malibran ruins. This was accomplished by the
middle of the afternoon. General Pillow who was to occupy a position
beyond Malibran, requested me to take charge of a working party of his
troops and, with the engineer company, locate and open a road along his
line to the bare sand hills on his left. In this work we were somewhat
disturbed by the fire of Mexican detachments.
On the 11th, the work of locating and opening the road along the line of
investment was continued, the working party being still a good deal
annoyed by both infantry and artillery fire. At 1 P. M., I reported to
General Patterson that the road was opened, through the chaparral, to
the bare sand hills. He ordered me to report, with the engineer company,
to General Worth; and the latter directed me to report to the General
Headquarters.
On the same day I was ordered by Colonel Totten, Chief Engineer, to find
and cut off the underground-aqueduct which conveyed water into Vera
Cruz. That business was effectually accomplished by the engineer company
on the 13th.[2]
From that time, until the commencement of work upon the batteries and
trenches, the engineer company and its officers were engaged in
reconnoitring the ground between the picket line of our army and the
fortifications of the city. My reports were made each night to the Chief
Engineer. The night of the 15th, he pointed out to me, on a map of the
city and its fortifications, the general location in which it was
desired to place the army gun battery, on the southern prolongation of
the principal street of the city, and within about six hundred yards of
its fortifications. He directed me, with the engineer company, to
closely examine that ground. I was informed by him, at the same time,
that Captain R. E. Lee, of the engineer corps, had discovered a
favorable position for a battery, of six heavy naval guns, on the point
of a commanding sand ridge, about nine hundred yards from the western
front of the city; but no final decision would be made in regard to the
naval battery until the army battery could be definitely located. He
said General Scott was getting impatient at the delay; and I was
directed to find, as soon as possible, a position that would satisfy the
conditions prescribed, by the Chief Engineer, for an army battery.
I explained those conditions to McClellan and to Foster; and informed
them that I would assign one-third of the company to each of them as an
escort--take one-third myself--and we would all three start, at daylight
next morning, in search of a location for the required battery. It was
necessary that we should be extremely careful not to get to fighting
each other in the dense chaparral.
We found a location that complied with the conditions. In reporting this
fact to the Chief Engineer, I added: "The communication with the battery
will be very difficult--will require a great deal of work--and will be
dangerous". He ordered me to take the engineer company to the selected
ground, next morning, and lay out the battery; and said he would direct
Lieutenant G. T. Beauregard, who had supervised the construction of the
field fortifications at Tampico, to assist in the work.
At 2 P. M. that day the battery and magazine had been traced out, all
necessary profiles carefully adjusted; and, the whole completed, ready
to commence throwing up the works. We had not been discovered by the
Mexicans--though we could plainly see their sentinels on the walls; and
occasionally hear words of command. After allowing the company to rest
for a couple of hours we started to return to camp.
In going forward we had the Mexicans before us; and by exercising great
care, at certain places, could avoid being seen. When our backs were
turned to Vera Cruz I felt confident that we would soon be discovered
and fired upon. I had cautioned the men to be as careful as possible;
but, in spite of their best efforts, we were seen, and a heavy fire of
artillery was opened upon us. The order to move at double-quick was
immediately given. The company was conducted about three hundred yards,
to a cut in a low sand ridge, that had been formed by a road crossing
that ridge. All got safely into the cut. The Mexican artillery fire,
aimed at us, was continued for about twenty minutes. We had then before
us an open level plain for five hundred yards. Soon after the fire upon
us had ceased, I ordered the men to scatter and run rapidly across the
plain until they reached a designated place of shelter behind high sand
hills. Beauregard and I brought up the rear in this movement. The
Mexicans re-opened their guns upon us whilst we were crossing the plain
and continued to fire for some time after we reached the shelter above
referred to.
When I reported the result of that day's work to the Chief Engineer, I
urged him to permit a further examination to be made, for a location of
the army gun battery, before attempting to construct the one we had just
laid out.
He consented, and we made further reconnaissance the next day. In the
meantime the pickets of Worth's division had been considerably advanced.
On returning from an examination at the extreme front that day I came
across a detachment of the Fifth Infantry not far from the Cemetery.
Whilst explaining the object of my search to a group of four or five
young officers, a person whom I took to be a veteran sergeant, said to
me that he knew a good position for a battery, only a few hundred yards
from where we then were. I asked him to describe it to me.
From the description he gave I thought the ground referred to would be a
favourable site; and asked him to tell me definitely how to reach it. He
offered to guide me to the place. On getting to the position I found
that the conformation of the ground constituted almost a natural parapet
for a six gun battery--requiring but little work to complete it for use.
It afforded immediate shelter for men and guns.
It was not on the prolongation of the main street of the city, and it
was farther from the enemy's works than the site where a battery had
already been laid out. But the communications with the proposed new
location were shorter, and could easily be made much safer--in every way
better than was possible in the former case. I thanked my guide for
pointing out the position; and told him I thought it would be adopted by
the Chief Engineer.
After our return to the group of young officers, my "guide" was soon
called away; and, I then asked one of them the name of that "fine old
Sergeant" who had pointed out such a good location for the battery. To
my amazement he replied: "That was Major Scott, the commander of our
regiment".
The Major was enveloped in an ordinary soldier's overcoat and wore an
old, common slouched hat. I had mistaken the "famous Martin Scott" for a
"fine old Sergeant" of the line.
On my return to camp I reported all the facts to the Chief Engineer. The
position first selected and laid out, for the army gun battery, was
abandoned; and the location pointed out by Major Martin Scott was
adopted.
The work of throwing up batteries, digging trenches, and making covered
communications with them, was commenced on the night of the 18th by
large working parties detailed from the line. After that time, the
officers of the engineer company, including myself, were placed on
general engineer service--supervising the construction of the siege
works. All the engineer officers then with the army, except the Chief,
were in regular turn detailed for that duty; each having some of the men
of the engineer company to assist him.
After the work upon the army gun battery, the mortar batteries and the
trenches had been fairly commenced, I was transferred to the naval
battery and took my regular turn, with Captain R. E. Lee, and Lieutenant
Z. B. Tower, in superintending its construction. I was in charge of that
work the day it opened its guns upon the fortifications of the city,
having relieved Captain Lee that morning. Seeing him still in the
battery, about the time the firing commenced, I asked him if he intended
to continue in control; adding, "If so, I report to you for instructions
and orders". He replied: "No. I am not in charge. I have remained only
to see my brother, Lieutenant Sydney Smith Lee of the Navy, who is with
one of the heavy guns. My tour of service is over. You are in control;
and, if I can be of any service to you whilst I remain here, please let
me know".
There had previously been a difference of opinion between Captain Lee
and myself in regard to the dimensions that should be given to the
embrasures. The Chief Engineer decided in favor of Captain Lee, and the
embrasures were changed and made to conform to his views. In a very
short time after the firing began one of the embrasures became so badly
choked that it could not be used until the _debris_ could be removed.
Hastily renewing the blindage of brush-wood that had been used to
conceal the work from view of the enemy during the construction, the
detail of engineer soldiers then on duty, in the battery, cleared the
embrasure of the obstructions, removed the blindage, and the gun resumed
its fire. Just after that incident, I asked Captain Lee what he now
thought in regard to the proper dimensions for the embrasures. He
replied: "They must be made greater when the battery is repaired
to-night."
The naval detachment had only forty rounds of ammunition; which was
expended in about three hours, and the firing had to cease until the
arrival of the next naval detachment. The latter when it came into the
battery, had only forty rounds of ammunition and was to serve until
relieved, the next afternoon by a third naval detachment.
Before the ammunition of the first detachment was expended the
embrasures were all in a very bad condition--the battery was almost
entirely unserviceable; and before the second detachment arrived I
caused the embrasures to be filled up, until the battery could be
repaired that night and put in good condition for re-opening the next
day.
The second naval detachment came into the battery about the middle of
the afternoon. The naval captain in command, without consulting me,
ordered the embrasures to be cleared at once, with the intention of
immediately opening fire. Perceiving what was being done by the sailors
in re-opening the embrasures, I ordered them to stop; and asked by whose
authority they were acting. On being informed that their orders came
from the commander of the detachment, I asked them to point him out to
me. I immediately introduced myself to him, as the engineer officer in
full charge of the construction of the battery, and told him if the
embrasures were cleared the battery would still be unfit for
service--that it could not be repaired until that night, and would then
be put in better condition than it was when it first opened. The army
gun battery would be ready next morning; and its fire, combined with
that of the naval battery, after the latter was put in good condition,
would be very effective. But, if the naval detachment opened fire that
afternoon, the battery being unfit for service, its ammunition would be
exhausted before night without hurting the enemy; and the battery would
necessarily be silent the next day, when the army battery would open its
fire.
The naval captain insisted that the embrasures should be cleared at
once, and the firing resumed.
I protested against his clearing the embrasures and told him that, but
for the appearance of the thing, I would leave the battery and take my
men with me if he persisted in carrying out his intentions. I added: "I
will remain here until regularly relieved, but will continue to
_protest_ against the course you propose to pursue".
He then told me that it was "the General's" order that he should open
fire that afternoon as promptly as possible.
I asked him why he had not told me of that order in the first place; and
added: "It is not customary for General Scott to give orders to engineer
officers through officers of the navy. But, if you had told me in the
beginning that he had ordered the battery to commence firing as soon as
possible after you reached it, I would have accepted his order--coming
to me through you."
To this he replied; "I did not say the order came from General Scott." I
asked: "Whom did you mean when you said 'the General.'" He told me that
he meant "General Patterson." To which I replied: "I receive no orders
in reference to this battery except from General Scott or the Chief
Engineer of the Army."
The naval captain finally said he would not open fire until next
morning; provided I would report the circumstances to General Scott. I
told him it was not usual for me to report my action direct to the
General-in-Chief: but, I would report all the facts to the Chief
Engineer as soon as I was relieved and had returned to camp, and he
would report them to General Scott.
When I commenced to make my report to the Chief Engineer he stopped me;
and said he was instructed to order me to report in person, to General
Scott as soon as I reached camp.
I obeyed the order; and was very coldly and formally told by "The
General": He had been informed it was my fault that the naval battery
had not opened fire against Vera Cruz that afternoon. I answered: "I did
prevent the fire being opened; but, that act was not a fault on my part;
and I can convince you of the latter fact if you will give me a
hearing".
He replied--still very coldly--"I hope you can do so". I then related to
him, in full, all that had occurred--as briefly stated above--between
the commander of the naval detachment and myself.
My reasons for opposing the opening of the fire of the battery seemed to
produce little or no favorable impression on General Scott until I
reached that part of the narrative in which I replied to the naval
captain's statement that he meant General Patterson when he said "_the
General_". I gave General Scott the exact words I had used in replying
to the naval commander. At this he rose from his seat--came to where I
was standing, and clasping one of my hands in both of his; said: "Thank
God I have young officers with heads on their shoulders and who know how
to use them". He added: "your opinion, and your action, in this matter,
would do credit to a Field Marshal of France"!
To which I made no reply, but thought to myself: "If there was a
sergeant in the engineer company who, in view of the plain facts of this
case, would not have known that the naval battery ought not to open fire
that afternoon, I would reduce him to the ranks before night."
The following extracts from my official report of these operations may
not be amiss in this connection:
"Whenever we have acted as a company I have been most ably and
efficiently supported by Lieutenants McClellan and Foster; and I am
proud to say that the non-commissioned officers and men of the company
have shown great willingness and skill in the discharge of the important
duties assigned them. Great part of our labors have been performed under
fire. On such occasions I have had every reason to be satisfied with the
cool deportment and conduct of the company.
"In conclusion I regret that I have to state, a serious blow was
inflicted on the military pride of the engineer company in _not_
allowing them to participate in the ceremonies of the surrender, when it
was well understood that the troops having had most to do in the attack
were selected to take a prominent part in the proceedings."
We all felt that, if our distinguished Captain had been with us, we
would have been called on to take part in those ceremonies.
The Chief Engineer, Colonel Joseph G. Totten, in his report of
operations against Vera Cruz, says: "The obligation lies upon me also to
speak of the highly meritorious deportment and valuable services of the
Sappers and Miners, [engineer company] attached to the expedition.
Strenuous as were their exertions, their number proved to be too few, in
comparison with our need of such aid. Had their number been four-fold
greater, there is no doubt the labors of the army would have been
materially lessened and the result expedited." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 245).
FOOTNOTE:
[2] In illustration of the character of the work done during the first
two or three days after the landing, the following quotations from
General Scott's official report are not irrelevant. He says:
"The environs of the city outside the fire of its guns, and those of the
castle, are broken into innumerable hills of loose sand, from twenty to
two hundred and fifty feet in height, with almost impassable forests of
chaparral between." "In extending the line of investment around the city
the troops, for three days have performed the heaviest labors in getting
over the hills and cutting through the intervening forests." ("Ex. Doc.
No. 1" p. 216.)