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COMPANY "A,"
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. S. A.,
1846-'48,
IN THE
MEXICAN WAR.
BY
GUSTAVUS W. SMITH,
FORMERLY LIEUTENANT OF ENGINEERS, AND BVT. CAPTAIN,
U. S. ARMY.
THE BATTALION PRESS,
1896.
PREFACE.
Executive Document, No. 1, United States Senate, December 7, 1847,
contains a Communication from the Secretary of War, transmitting to
Congress the official reports of commanding generals and their
subordinates in the Mexican War.
The Secretary says: "The company of engineer soldiers, authorized by the
act of May 15, 1846, has been more than a year on active duty in Mexico,
and has rendered efficient service. I again submit, with approval, the
proposition of the Chief Engineer for an increase of this description of
force." (Senate-Ex. Doc. No. 1, 1847, p. 67.)
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Page
PREFACE. 3
CHAP. I.--Enlistment--Instruction--Detention on
the Rio Grande--March to Victoria and
Tampico--Landing at Vera Cruz--Death
of Captain Swift. 7
CHAP. II.--Engaged in Operations against Vera Cruz. 21
CHAP. III.--After the Surrender of Vera Cruz to the
Occupation of Puebla. 28
CHAP. IV.--From Puebla to Churubusco. 34
CHAP. V.--Capture of the City of Mexico. 48
CHAP. VI.--In the City of Mexico; Return to West Point. 57
APPENDIX A.--Brief Extracts, from Wilcox's History of the
Mexican War, 1892. 66
APPENDIX B.--Promotions of Enlisted Men of the Company. 69
CHAPTER I.
ENLISTMENT--INSTRUCTION--DETENTION ON THE RIO GRANDE--MARCH TO VICTORIA
AND TAMPICO--LANDING AT VERA CRUZ--DEATH OF CAPTAIN SWIFT.
Previous to the war with Mexico there existed among the people of the
United States a strong prejudice against maintaining even a small
regular army in time of peace. Active opposition to a permanent, regular
military establishment extended to the West Point Academy, in which
cadets were trained and qualified to become commissioned officers of the
army. That Academy was then a component part of the Military Engineer
Corps. For years the chief of the Corps had, in vain, urged upon
Congress, the necessity for having, at least one company of enlisted
engineer soldiers as a part of the regular army.
In the meantime he had, however, succeeded in persuading the Government
at Washington to send--by permission of the Government of France--a
selected Captain of the U. S. Engineer Corps to the French School of
engineer officers at Metz; for the purpose of having in the U. S. Army,
an officer qualified to instruct and command a company of engineer
soldiers in case Congress could be induced to authorize the enlistment
of such a company.
Captain Alexander J. Swift was the officer selected to be sent to Metz.
On his return to the United States, he was assigned to temporary duty at
West Point awaiting the long delayed passage of an act authorizing the
enlistment of a company of U. S. Engineer soldiers.
That act was passed soon after the commencement of hostilities with
Mexico. It provided for the enlistment of an engineer company of 100
men, in the regular army. The company to be composed of 10 sergeants, 10
corporals, 39 artificers, 39 second class privates, and 2 musicians; all
with higher pay than that of enlisted men in the line of the army.
Captain Swift was assigned to the command; and, at his request, I was
ordered to report to him as next officer in rank to himself. At my
suggestion, Brevet Second Lieutenant George B. McClellan, who had just
been graduated from the Military Academy, was assigned as junior officer
of the company.
At that time I had been an officer of engineers for four years; my rank
was that of second lieutenant. All the first lieutenants, and some of
the second lieutenants, of that corps, were then in sole charge of the
construction of separate fortifications, or were engaged in other
important duties. Captain Swift was not disposed to apply for the
assignment of any of those officers to be subalterns under him in a
company of soldiers.
I had taught McClellan during his last year in the Academy, and felt
assured that he would be in full harmony with me in the duties we would
be called upon to perform under Captain Swift. It is safe to say that no
three officers of a company of soldiers ever worked together with less
friction. The understanding between them was complete. There were no
jars--no doubts or cross purposes--and no conflict of opinion or of
action.
In the beginning I was charged with the instruction of the company as an
infantry command, whilst the Captain took control of the recruiting, the
collection of engineer implements--including an India Rubber Ponton
Bridge--and he privately instructed McClellan and myself, at his own
house, in the rudiments of practical military engineering which he had
acquired at Metz. In the meantime we taught him, at the same place, the
manual of arms and Infantry tactics which had been introduced into the
army after he was graduated at the Military Academy. In practical
engineer drills the Captain was always in control.
After the men were passably well drilled in the "Infantry School of the
Company"; the time had come for him to take executive command on the
infantry drill ground. He did this on the first occasion, like a veteran
Captain of Infantry until "at rest" was ordered.
Whilst the men were "at rest", McClellan and myself quietly, but
earnestly, congratulated him upon his successful _debut_ as drill
officer of an Infantry Company. He kindly attributed to our instruction
in his house, whatever proficiency he had acquired in the new tactics
which had then been recently introduced.
But, after the company was again called to "Attention" and the drill was
progressing, whilst marching with full company front across the plain,
the men all well in line, to my surprise the Captain ordered "faster",
and added "the step is much too slow". Of course we went "faster". In a
short time the Captain ordered "faster still, the step is very much too
slow". This order was several times repeated, and before the drill ended
we were virtually "at a run".
After the drill was over and the Company dismissed from the parade
ground, I asked the Captain why he had not given the commands "quick
time" and "double quick", instead of saying "faster" and "still faster".
He said he did not intend the step should be "quick time"--much less
"double quick". He only wanted the rate to be in "common time--90 steps
a minute"; and added: "you had not reached that rate when the drill
ended".
I insisted that he must be mistaken, and told him we were marching in
"common time" or very near it, when he first gave the order, "faster".
He persisted that he was right in regard to the rate of the step--said
"that he had carefully counted it, watch in hand"; and added: "You were,
at the last, not making more than 85 steps to the minute". I was
satisfied that he was mistaken; but he relied implicitly upon the
correctness of his count and the accuracy of his watch.
McClellan and I proceeded to the company quarters, of which I still had
charge. On the way we referred to the matter of the step, and both of us
were at a loss to account for the misapprehension we were sure the
Captain labored under in regard to it.
I asked McClellan to take out his watch and count whilst I marched in
"common time". I made 90 steps per minute--and repeated it more than
once. It presently dawned upon us that our Captain, whilst consulting
his watch, had counted only one foot in getting at the number of steps:
and that we were really making 170 steps to the minute when he counted
85. The mystery was solved, the Captain had counted "the left foot"
only.
When we next went to his house for instruction in details of the school
of the engineer soldier, I asked him how many steps we were making a
minute when he first ordered "faster". He said "about 45". I replied:
"That's it. We have found out what was the matter. You counted only the
left foot. We were marching in 'common time' when you ordered us to move
'faster'; and you pushed us to nearly twice that rate".
"The cat was out of the bag." The Captain saw it at once and laughed
heartily over the error he had fallen into in the latter part of his
"first appearance" as captain, in drilling the company as infantry. He
made no such mistake thereafter; and the men never knew of his "count",
watch in hand.
On the 26th of September, 1846, we sailed from New York, 71 rank and
file, for Brazos Santiago, under orders to report to General Taylor,
commanding the U. S. army in Mexico. We landed at Brazos on the 12th of
October, remained at that point for several days, proceeded thence to
the mouth of the Rio Grande and arrived at Carmargo on the 2nd of
November. There the company was delayed for several weeks because
transportation for the engineer train to the headquarters of the Army at
Monterey, was not then available.
The Company left Carmargo for Brazos, on the 29th of November, under
orders to proceed to Tampico by sea, but was ordered to return to
Matamoros with a portion of its tools, and march, via Victoria, to
Tampico--the bulk of its train to be transported to the latter place by
water.
Whilst detained at Carmargo instruction in the school of the engineer
soldier was kept up, and infantry drills were constantly practiced.
During that time several thousand troops were in camp near Carmargo, and
the men of the engineer company learned that they were, by the line of
the army, styled: "the pick and shovel brigade". Their officers advised
them not to care for this epithet but, "take it easy, continue to
endeavor to become _model_ infantry, and engraft on that a fair
knowledge of the duties of the engineer soldier". They were assured that
"for heavy work", details would have to be made from the line of the
army; and these details would, for the time, constitute the real "pick
and shovel brigade" under the control of engineer officers, assisted by
trained engineer soldiers. When the time came for close fighting the
engineer company would be at the front.
The troops stationed on the Rio Grande during the fall of 1846, suffered
greatly from Mexican diarrhoea, fevers and other diseases. Several men
of the engineer company died, and Captain Swift and twenty of the men
were left in hospital at Matamoros, when the company finally left the
latter place.
Before giving an account of our first march in the enemy's country, it
may be well to state here, that with two exceptions, the enlisted men of
the engineer company were native born, and all but four of them were raw
recruits. Each of those four had served, with credit, during one or more
terms of enlistment in the regular army. Three of them were promptly
made sergeants, and the fourth was a musician (bugler).
All of the recruits but one, were very carefully selected material, out
of which to form, as soon as practicable, skilled engineer soldiers. The
one exception was a short, fat, dumpy, Long Island Dutchman--a good
cook, specially enlisted by Captain Swift to cook for the men. He was
given the pay and rank of artificer of engineers. The men looked upon
him more as a servant of theirs than as a fellow soldier. He was well
satisfied with his position, prided himself on his special duties,
rather looked down upon "soldiers"--and was impudent by nature.
All went well enough with the "cook" until he was required to take his
place in the ranks, at regular bi-monthly "muster, and inspection" for
pay. His performance on that occasion was so grotesquely awkward that I
directed he should be put through the "squad-drill" by one of the
sergeants, who was a thoroughly competent, but rather severe,
drill-master.
The "cook" felt that his rights were invaded, in requiring him to submit
to be drilled. The sergeant made no progress in teaching him. After
three days' trial, he reported to me that he was mortified, and ashamed,
to have to admit he could do nothing with "that cook"; and he asked to
be relieved from the duty of drilling him. In reply to my question:
"Can't you make him obey you?" He replied: "No--the only thing I can do
is to kill him"; and added: "When that kind of thing has to be done, in
this company, my understanding is, the lieutenant in command is the only
one who has the right to kill".
I relieved the sergeant, and told him I would take the "cook" in hand at
the next drill. On the following day, I marched him off into the dense
chaparral, on the bottom lands near Matamoros. After following obscure
paths, about three miles in their windings through the jungle, I halted
him in a small open space a few hundred yards from the company camp. He
thought no doubt, we were five miles from camp--in a boundless
wilderness--whilst, in fact, we were at no time five hundred yards away.
I told him of the report that had been made to me of his disobedience,
informed him that I had brought him into the chaparral for the purpose
of compelling him to obey me; called his attention to the fact that we
were in the enemy's country in time of war; all of our lives were in
peril, and that persistent disobedience on the part of any officer or
soldier to the legal authority of those over him, was punishable with
death; that I did not propose to place him before a Court Martial; but,
would kill him, if he did not implicitly obey an order I proposed then
and there to give him.
I measured 15 paces in front of him and placed a small white chip on the
ground, called him to "attention", ordered him to place his eyes on that
chip, and told him if he removed them from it before I gave the command
"rest", I would run him through with my rapier.
I then drilled him at the manual of arms for about 20 minutes. Large
beads of perspiration rolled down his face--he began to totter on his
feet--and I gave the command "rest". He had not taken his eyes from the
chip.
At the command "rest", he drew a long sigh of relief and uttered a
subdued but prolonged "O-h". I asked him if he now thought he could obey
the sergeant. He replied: "Yes, I will obey anybody".
I told him I would temporarily withdraw what I had said about killing
him, and would put him on his good behavior. I drilled him about two
hours longer; and then took him, by a circuitous route, through the
jungle, back to camp. He was obedient enough thereafter.
When the war had ended and I was relieved from duty with the company,
one of the men told me that "the cook", on his return from the drill I
had given him said: "The Lieutenant took me way off, ever so far, in the
chaparral, and told me he took me there to kill me if I didn't mind him.
The little devil meant it, and would have done it too, if I had fooled
with him like I had done with the sergeant."
Except this _case_, of "the cook", there had been no difficulty in
bringing the men of the company to a high standard of drill and
discipline as an infantry company, and a reasonable degree of
proficiency in the school of the engineer soldier. But, on their first
march into the enemy's country, they were called upon to do an immense
amount of hard work not specially referred to in their preliminary
instruction.
THE MARCH FROM MATAMOROS TO VICTORIA AND TAMPICO.
By special orders from General Taylor, brought by Major George A. McCall
to Captain Swift, the latter was charged with the duty of repairing the
road from Matamoros to Victoria, and making it practicable for artillery
and the baggage train; and to do this, if possible, so that the whole
command might make its prescribed daily marches and arrive at Victoria
on a named day. Captain Swift was authorized to call upon the commander
of the forces, on this march, for such assistance as might be needed to
perform the work; and was directed to do no more to the road than was
barely sufficient to enable the trains to pass over it. It was not
expected that we would ever have occasion to pass through that region
again; and it was not proposed to make a permanent road for the benefit
of Mexicans.
Captain Swift being sick in hospital, the foregoing instructions were
given to me, as Commander of the company, by Major McCall, who, in the
capacity of Adjutant-General of the forces under General Patterson,
accompanied him on this march.
Under orders from General Taylor, the company of engineers, reduced to
two officers and forty-five enlisted men for service, marched from
Matamoros on the 21st of December, 1846, with a column of volunteers
under General Patterson, to join General Taylor's army at Victoria. We
arrived at the latter place on the 4th of January, 1847. A great deal of
work had been done by details of volunteers and the engineer company in
making the road practicable for artillery and baggage wagons. Without
dwelling upon daily operations, the following statement of the manner in
which we made our way across a difficult stream may be of interest.
About noon one day I was informed by Major McCall, who had ridden ahead
of the working party, that there was an exceedingly difficult
"river-crossing" about one mile in front, and that he feared we would be
detained there for, perhaps, two days. I galloped forward to the place
designated. It looked ugly. The banks of the stream were something more
than 100 feet high and quite steep. Guiding my horse down to the water's
edge, I crossed the river which was from two to three feet deep, and
about one hundred yards wide. The bottom was fair enough, until within a
few yards of the opposite shore, where it was soft mud. Getting through
this with some difficulty I rode to the top of the bank on the far side.
To make an ordinary practicable road across that stream would require
two or three day's work of several hundred men. It seemed a clear case
for the free use of drag-ropes to let the wagons down into the stream on
the near side, and haul them up the opposite bank.
It was plain to me that with a working party of two hundred men--which
was the greatest number we could supply with tools--a straight steep
ramp could be cut on both banks in six or eight hours hard work. The
greatest difficulty would be encountered in getting out of the stream on
the far side.
Returning quickly to where I had left Major McCall, I asked him to give
me a working party of about 800 men, told him I would find use for that
number and that in my opinion, with that force, the wagon train could be
put across the stream before dark. The commanding General thought my
requisition for the working detail was extravagant, as we scarcely had
tools enough for a quarter of that number of men. But the detail was
ordered, as called for, to report to me. In the meantime the engineer
company and its train was taken to the crossing, and the character of
the work to be done there was explained to the men.
Leaving Lieutenant McClellan with a portion of the company to take
charge of the near bank, directing him to halt there about 300 of the
working party and send about 500 to me on the opposite bank, I crossed
the stream with the rest of the company and explained to them the work
to be done on that side, particularly the means to be used in getting
out of the river. On each side of the stream the working party was
divided into three "reliefs", or relays--with one hundred men or more
held in reserve, to meet contingencies.
The working party arrived in good season, tools were promptly
distributed to the first "relief" on each side of the river, and the men
were told that, if they would work as at a "corn-shucking-match", or as
if the "house was on fire", they would be let off in an hour, or less,
depending on the rapidity and effectiveness of their work. It was to be
a race against time. I wanted all the work there was in them, and wanted
it inside of an hour.
Before the hour was up the "first relief" on each side of the river, was
ordered to stop work, drop their tools, get out of the road and take to
the bushes. The "second relief" was immediately marched into the vacated
places, seized the tools, and worked like the first--and on the same
conditions. So with the "third relief"; and, inside of three hours from
the time the work began, the engineer wagons were crossing the river.
They soon moved on, leaving the rest of the forces to follow at their
leisure.
The volunteer officers afterwards complained to me that the "wild work"
on the banks of that river, had "scattered" their men so badly, it was
several days before they could be again got into their proper places.
This case was an exception--a frolic. The usual daily work on the road
was more regular and continuous, without disorder.
It may perhaps not be out of place here to mention, that about the time
I sent the "first relief" into the bushes, and set the "second relief"
to work under the directions of men of the engineer company, the
commander of the forces, with his staff, arrived on the bank where
McClellan was in charge, and asked for me. He was told that I was on the
opposite bank. Just at that time the confusion and wild yells of the
"first relief" and the loud cheers of the "second relief" when told that
they, too, would be let off inside of an hour, provided they would work
as if engaged in a "corn-shucking-match", astounded the general, and had
to him the appearance of disorder, perhaps mutiny.
On asking Lieutenant McClellan what it meant, the latter replied: "It is
all right; Lieutenant Smith has the larger portion of the engineer
company with him on that bank; and I can see him, and men of the company
near him in the road, all of whom seem to be quietly giving instructions
to the new working party".
After starting the "second relief" to digging in the road, I had gone to
the brow of the bank overlooking the work which was being done, mostly
by my own men in the river, where the road was to leave it. The engineer
sergeant in charge of that work informed me that he was then in
immediate need of about twenty additional men. The reserve working force
was not far from me. I called out for a sergeant and twenty men, without
arms or accoutrements, to come to me. Pointing to the river, just under
the place at which I was standing, I directed the sergeant of this
reserve party to take his men down at once and report to the engineer
sergeant in charge there. The bank was precipitous. The sergeant of the
reserve working party said that he would take his men back about one
hundred yards, and go down by the road on which the "second relief" was
working. I demurred, and told him again, to take his men straight to
where they were needed. He still hesitated. I pushed him over the brow of
the bank, and he went headlong into the river. I then ordered his men to
follow him. They did it with a cheer and regular "Comanche-whoop"--sliding
down the slope, which was too steep to stand on.
This scene, too, was witnessed from across the river by the General of
the forces and his staff. I did not know they were there; but if I had,
it would have made no difference; I was in charge of the working party,
and in haste to finish that _special job_.
On our arrival at Victoria, the company was relieved from duty under
General Patterson, and I was directed to report to the headquarters of
General Taylor. On the 12th of January the company was ordered to report
to General Twiggs. With two companies of the line to furnish additional
details for labor when required I was charged with the duty of making
the road between Victoria and Tampico practicable for wagons. These
three companies left Victoria on the 13th.
The following extracts from my official report of the operations of the
Engineer Company for the month of January, 1847, illustrate, in part,
the difficulties met with.
"The first day, (out from Victoria,) we had three bad boggy brooks to
cross; besides a great deal of cutting to do with axes in order to open
the road; and many bad ravines and gullies to render passable. To make a
bridge, across a boggy stream, with no other material than the short,
knotty, hard and crooked chaparral bush, was no easy matter. The first
day's march was about ten miles--we encamped about sunset after a very
hard day's work."
In order to shorten the route and save the forces one day's march, we
were, for several days, working on a mule path "cut-off" from the main
road.
"January 14th. The mule path was infamous. No wagon had ever traveled
that road--the rancheros have a tradition of a bull cart that, it is
said, once passed that way. I believe, however, that the story is not
credited. We worked from dawn of day until dark and encamped about six
miles from where we started in the morning and about the same distance
from the camp we wished to reach that day."
"January 15th. Another day's tremendous hard work."
"January 16th. We had again a very severe day's work."
"January 17th. Road improved very decidedly, but still a good deal to
do. We managed, by getting a little ahead with our repairs after the
army encamped for the night, to get along without seriously delaying the
column."
We arrived at Tampico on the 23rd. The distance from Victoria to Tampico
is 120 miles; whole distance from Matamoros to Tampico, by way of
Victoria, is 354 miles.
Although the service was arduous, the men came through it in good
health, and were all the better soldiers for the practical schooling
acquired in that 350 miles of road making. After this experience,
ordinary marches and drills were to them, very light matters.
TAMPICO TO VERA CRUZ.
From Tampico we sailed for Lobos Island and Vera Cruz, on a small
schooner, the Captain of which was a brave little Frenchman, who was not
acquainted with the Mexican Gulf coast, and was not provided with
accurate instruments for taking observations. Late one afternoon the
clouds rolled away, and we distinctly saw the snow-clad peak of Orizaba.
This was the first intimation to us that we were "somewhere", near Vera
Cruz. In a very short time we saw opposite to us a large fleet of
vessels at anchor.
We were south of Vera Cruz and were passing Anton Lizardo, the place to
which we were bound. But a reef was between us and the anchorage where
the fleet was quietly lying. The Captain of the schooner said he could
cross the reef. Taking his place in the rigging from where he could
better observe the breakers and the currents, the schooner tacked here
and there, rapidly and repeatedly, under the orders of the little
Frenchman; and we were soon clear of the reef and breakers. It was now
nearly dark. In a few moments after reaching the anchorage ground, we
glided up a gentle slope, without perceptible shock; and the bow of the
vessel was almost entirely out of water.
In less than twenty minutes thereafter a boat from one of our men-of-war
pulled alongside; and when the officer in charge learned who we were, he
said he would report at once to the naval commander; and had no doubt
that the company with its effects would have to be landed on an adjacent
island, while the schooner was being lightened and hauled off into deep
water.
He said the movements of the little schooner, through the heavy surf,
across the dangerous reef, had been watched from the naval vessels with
intense anxiety, and expectation that we would be wrecked and all hands
lost. This feeling was changed to admiration when it was seen that the
schooner was being very skillfully handled in the difficult channel; and
all rejoiced when they saw the unknown little craft safely in smooth
water; but were surprised, immediately after, to see her put on a course
that would inevitably run her aground.
We found that Captain Swift with the convalescents from Matamoros on
another vessel, had arrived before us. In the meantime Lieutenant J. G.
Foster, of the Engineer Corps, had been assigned to duty with the
Company. He was with Captain Swift. I at once reported to the latter,
and he resumed command of the Company; but the men remained on separate
vessels.
Captain Swift was still very sick; to all appearance more feeble than
when we left him at Matamoros. All the men he brought with him were
convalescent. In a few days after our arrival at Anton Lizardo, an order
was issued by General Scott for the transports to move up next morning,
towards Vera Cruz, with a view to landing the army on the main shore,
opposite the Island of Sacrificios, two or three miles south of the
city. On the morning of the day we were to make the landing the whole
company was transferred to another vessel; and all were again together.
Early in the previous night, McClellan, who had just been aboard the
vessel on which Captain Swift arrived, informed me that the latter
proposed to lead the company ashore. Worth's division was to land first,
and the engineer company was temporarily assigned to that division.
McClellan added: "The Captain is now too feeble to walk across the cabin
of his vessel without assistance--the effort to lead the company in this
landing will be fatal to him, and I told him I thought he ought not to
attempt it. But, he looks upon me as a boy,[1] and I have no influence
with him in this matter. You ought to advise him against this thing. If
he attempts it, it will certainly kill him."
I fully agreed with McClellan in reference to the physical condition of
the Captain; and the probable, if not certain, result of an attempt on
his part to lead the company in the landing. But for me to advise him
not to go ashore with us, was to request him to give me the command of
his company in this important enterprise. I told McClellan that I felt a
delicacy about the matter which made me hesitate to advise the Captain
to give me the command of the company. He replied: "Yes, but this case
is beyond mere delicacy. The act of leading the company ashore will kill
him; and I think you can persuade him not to undertake it. You ought to
try. I am sure he will not misconstrue your motive."
Urged thus, I pulled over to the Captain's vessel, after dark found him
alone in the cabin, and quickly told him why I came. He listened
patiently to all I had to say; thanked me cordially for the interest I
took in his physical welfare; said he fully appreciated the kindness
shown; understood the motive which actuated the advice given; and added:
"My mind is made up; I will lead the company in this landing; and would
do so even if I knew that the bare attempt would certainly cost me my
life."
The next afternoon, the Captain, standing by the gangway, directed the
embarkation of about 20 men in the smaller of the two surf boats in
which the company was to land. Just as that boat was ready to pull away
to make room for the larger boat, I said to him: "I suppose I am to go
with this detachment of the Company; and if so I must get aboard now".
He replied "No. I wish you to go in the larger boat with me". To which I
said: "All right", and added: "McClellan goes with the detachment?" The
Captain said, "Yes."
When the larger boat for the rest of the Company came along side I
relieved the Captain at the gangway and superintended the embarkation of
the men in that boat. The Captain was lowered over the side of the
vessel in a chair; and I, when all else was ready to pull off, scrambled
down into the closely packed boat, and took my place in the bow.
Each boat was rowed by sailors from the fleet under the direction of a
naval officer.
We had reason for anxiety in regard to the resistance we might meet with
from Mexican batteries that could easily have been sheltered behind the
sand hills immediately overlooking the open beach on which the landing
was to be made. A single cannon-shot striking one of the closely packed
surf-boats would probably have sent it, and all on board, to the bottom.
The anxiety of the soldiers was to get ashore before such a fate should
befall them. They cared very little for anything that might happen after
they were on land; but wished to escape the danger of having the boats
sunk under them by Mexican batteries.
When we were within five or six hundred yards of the beach all were
startled by the whistling of shells and cannon balls close about our
heads. This fire was soon understood to come from our Naval gunboats,
and aimed at small parties of Mexican lookouts on shore. No resistance
was made to the landing of Worth's division.
When we were within two or three hundred yards of the beach, I made my
way, over the heads of the men to the stern of the boat where the
Captain was seated; and said to him I thought the time had come for him
to get to the bow, if he still intended to lead the company in going
ashore.
For a moment the most painful expression I ever saw depicted on a human
countenance marked his face. He rallied, however, almost immediately,
and said: "I must, at the last moment, relinquish my command"; and added
"I turn the command over to you until the company is formed in line on
the beach".
I made my way quickly back to the bow; ordered the right file of the
company, two stalwart corporals--thorough soldiers, to go to the stern
of the boat, take their places near the Captain, keep their eyes on me
after they reached him, spring into the water when they saw me jump from
the bow, seize the Captain, place him on their shoulders or heads, and
bring him to me in the line on shore without a wet thread on him.
I informed the corporals that I had been placed in full command by
Captain Swift; warned them he would probably resist their bringing him
ashore; but no matter what he said or did, they must obey my orders.
They did it. The corporals were athletes--over six feet in height, young
and active. In the Captain's then physical condition he was as helpless
as an infant in their hands.
The water where they went overboard was nearly up to their necks; but
when they brought the Captain to me he was as dry as whilst sitting in
the boat. He had resisted them more violently than I anticipated. In
vain they explained to him that they were instructed by me to take him
ashore without his touching the water. He ordered them to put him down,
used all his force to compel them to do so, repeated his orders in no
measured terms, and continued to denounce the corporals after they had
placed him on his feet by my side.
He was wild with rage. I at once relinquished to him the command of the
company, and said: "Captain, the corporals are not in fault. They simply
obeyed my order whilst I was, by your authority, in command of the
company. Blame me, if you will, but exonerate them."
He apologised to the corporals for kicking, striking, and otherwise
abusing them, and thanked them for the service they had rendered him.
The termination of this incident made an indelible impression on the men
in favor of their Captain.
That night the company slept among the sand hills a few hundred yards
from the shore, undisturbed, except by a flurry of firing which occurred
about 10 P. M., between a Mexican detachment and the Light battalion of
Worth's division. This firing continued for a few minutes, and then all
was quiet for the rest of the night.
About sunrise next morning, the company moved several hundred yards,
into its position on the sand hills, on the right of Worth's division in
the line of investment, facing Vera Cruz which was about two miles
distant.
The Captain showed wonderful increase of vitality after he reached the
shore. He conducted the company to its assigned place in the line of
investment without much apparent difficulty in walking through the sand.
But three hours exposure to the hot sun was more than he could bear; his
strength was gone. He lost consciousness and was, by my order, carried
to the beach on an improvised litter. The sergeant of the party was
instructed to report to the naval officer in charge of the surf boats,
and in my name, request that Captain Swift be taken as soon as
practicable, to the steamer which was the headquarters of General Scott.
That request was promptly complied with; but the Captain's vitality was
exhausted. He was sent to the United States on the first steamer that
left Vera Cruz after the landing was effected, and died in New Orleans
within twenty-four hours after his arrival at that place.
Thus, the army and the country lost the services of one of the best
officers of the U. S. Corps of Military Engineers; and the engineer
company lost their trained Captain.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] At that time, McClellan was about 20 years of age.